2. The cross-examination is not limited to the exact facts stated on the direct examination but if it is connected with the direct examination the cross-examination may extend to matters tending to limit, explain or qualify the facts stated on direct examination: Ah Doon v. Smith, 25 Or. 89 (34 Pac. 1093); Maxwell v. Bolles, 28 Or. 1, 6 (41 Pac. 661); Oregon Pottery Co. v. Kern, 30 Or. 328, 331 (47 Pac. 917); Kenny v. Walker, 29 Or. 41 (44 Pac. 501). As stated in Sayres v. Allen, 25 Or. 211, 214, 215 (35 Pac. 254):

"Within the subject matter of the direct examination, a free range should be allowed in conducting❞— the cross-examination, especially when the person examined is a party to the litigation.

3. Assuming, without deciding, that where a judgment is rendered after a trial by the court without a jury, the authority of the court to grant a new trial is no greater than nor different from the authority exercisable after a trial by a jury, nevertheless, the order setting aside the judgment was correct even though the power of the court be measured by the rules governing a motion for a new trial after a judgment on the verdict of a jury. Under all the circumstances found in the record the rights of the defendants were substantially prejudiced when the court prevented the attempted cross-examination. By granting the motion for a new trial the court merely corrected a reversible error and avoided the necessity of an appeal: De Vall v. De Vall, 60 Or. 493 (118 Pac. 843, 120 Pac. 13, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 409, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 291); Smith & Bros. Typewriter Co. v. McGeorge, 72 Or. 523, 525 (143 Pac. 905); Rudolph v. Portland Ry. L. & P. Co., 72 Or. 560, 570 (144 Pac. 93, 7 N. C. C. A. 887, note); Frederick & Nelson v. Bard, 74 Or. 457, 461 (145 Pac. 669); McGinnis v.

Studebaker Corp. 75 Or. 519, 525 (146 Pac. 825, 147 Pac. 525, L. R. A. 1916B, 868); Delovage v. Old Oregon Creamery Co., 76 Or. 430, 435 (147 Pac. 392, 149 Pac. 317); Pullen v. Eugene, 77 Or. 320, 325 (146 Pac. 822, 147 Pac. 768, 1191, 151 Pac. 474); Brewster v. Springer, 79 Or. 88, 89 (154 Pac. 418); Wakefield v. Supple, 82 Or. 595 (160 Pac. 376).

The order setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MCBRIDE, MR. JUSTICE BENSON and MR. JUSTICE BURNETT concur.

Argued March 15, affirmed March 27, 1917. GERDETZ v. CENTRAL OREGON IRR. CO. (163 Pac. 980.)

Arbitration and Award-Conclusiveness of Determination.

1. There being no limitation in the arbitration agreement on the powers of the arbitrators, but it being agreed their decision on the law and facts shall be final, their determination cannot be disturbed, except for dishonesty or mistakes under the principles adopted by them.

[As to causes for impeaching award by arbitrators, see note in 14 Am. Dec. 754.]

Arbitration and Award-Decision According to Law.

2. As arbitrators not restricted by the arbitration agreement are not bound by the strict rules of law, but may decide according to the substantial equities of the parties, though both have broken their contract, they in so doing carry out their intention to decide according to law.

From Multnomah: WILLIAM N. GATENS, Judge.

L. F. Gerdetz instituted this suit against the Central Oregon Irrigation Company, a corporation, to set

*On the question of annulling award of arbiters, see note in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445. REPORTER.

aside a decision of arbitrators and from an adverse decree, plaintiff appeals. AFFIRMED.

Department 1. Statement by MR. JUSTICE Burnett. The plaintiff contracted with the defendant to construct for the latter in the Deschutes River a dam and conduit therefrom. Disputes arose between the parties and the plaintiff, claiming the right to do so on account of breaches of the agreement committed by the defendant, abandoned the work before the project was completed. He began an action in the Circuit Court of Multnomah County to recover from the defendant an amount which he alleged to be due him under the contract. The company also brought an action against him for an amount coming to it from him on the same contract. Without either party having answered in either action, they entered into an arbitration agreement, reciting the history of the dispute substantially as here set forth, in which they agreed as follows:

"Now THEREFORE, in consideration thereof and to avoid litigation and effect a speedy settlement of said matters between the parties hereto, it is hereby mutually agreed by and between the Central Oregon Irrigation Company, and L. F. Gerdetz, that the matters in dispute shall be and hereby are submitted to John B. Cleland, E. E. Lytle, and William S. Turner, all of Portland, Oregon, as a Board of Arbitrators, to hear the testimony of the respective parties and their witnesses, and such material documentary evidence as the respective parties may produce. All witnesses to be sworn by some person authorized to administer an oath, and be subject to cross-examination by opposing counsel.

That said arbitrators shall decide all questions coming before them by a majority vote, except legal questions, which shall be decided by the said John B. Cleland, whose decisions upon the legal questions shall

83 Or.-37

be final, and the decision of the arbitrators upon all questions of fact shall be final between the parties hereto, their successors and assigns."

By other provisions each party bound itself to accept and abide by the award of the majority of the arbitrators and to pay each to the other the amount found due, authorizing the entry of judgment by the Circuit Court on production of a copy of the award. After hearing the evidence and considering the matter the arbitrators made an award against the plaintiff in the sum of $6,095.04, and assessed reporter's fees, arbitrator's fees and other expenses so that the total allowance against him was $8,353.39. This suit was instituted to set aside the decision. The plaintiff claims that the conclusion of the arbitrators was contrary both to the facts and the law in that it deprived the plaintiff of any compensation for his services under the contract and further penalized him in the amount of the allowance; that it is inconsistent with any known rule of law or equity because the arbitrators credited him with $12,373.62, for delinquencies and breaches of the contract on the part of the defendant, his legal deduction therefrom being that having broken the contract itself the company is not entitled to recover anything for a breach thereof by him. Various other specifications are made charging that the arbitrators left out of their calculations many items in plaintiff's favor and arbitrarily cut down the actual cost of other expenditures and labor performed by him. The complaint is challenged in material particulars by the answer which sets up the history of the litigation and the arbitration agreement, together with the decision thereon. The reply having traversed the allegations of the answer, except as stated in the complaint, the matter was referred to a referee who reported in

favor of confirming the conclusion reached by the arbitrators. A decree having been entered accordingly the plaintiff appeals. AFFIRMED.

For appellant there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Thomas Mannix.

For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. John H. Hall and Mr. Jesse Stearns, with an oral argument by Mr. Hall.

MR. JUSTICE BURNETT delivered the opinion of the court.

It is important to note the extent of the submission. By that document the parties stipulated:

"That said arbitrators shall decide all questions coming before them by a majority vote, except legal questions, which shall be decided by the said John B. Cleland, whose decisions upon the legal questions shall be final, and the decision of the arbitrators upon all questions of fact shall be final between the parties hereto, their successors and assigns."

We note that no restriction is placed upon the arbitrators in any degree within their respective provinces. No reservation is made for reviewing any decision of law or fact. The case is not like many of those cited in the plaintiff's brief where the arbitrators were required to determine questions of law according to legal rules and the decisions of the courts on identical matters. Neither is it like other instances where the statute requires the award to be made agreeable to certain precepts or in pursuance of an order or rule of court where the award must be subject to the approval of the tribunal making the order. In the instant case the unrestricted terms of the submission