In Morrill v. Morrill, 20 Or. 96, 101 (25 Pac. 362, 23 Am. St. Rep. 95, 11 L. R. A. 155), in a suit to set aside a decree of partition it was said:

"This is undoubtedly a collateral attack. It is an attempt to impeach the decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying the decree."

In referring to the language so quoted a noted author remarks:

"This definition assumes that a proceeding to annul or enjoin is always direct. It is direct only when pursued in the time and manner provided by law against one who is not a bona fide purchaser": Van Fleet, Col. At., § 3.

Though the doctrine announced in Heatherly v. Hadley, supra, has not been overruled, it has never been followed. In a note to the case of Morrill v. Morrill, supra (23 Am. St. Rep. 95, 103), it is said:

"All irregularities in the exercise of a court of general jurisdiction are cured by final judgment, and it cannot be collaterally attacked.”

In another note to that case (11 L. R. A. 155) it is observed:

"Judgments cannot be collaterally assailed for mere errors or irregularities. They can be assailed only when void, or when rendered without jurisdiction."

Adopting the views thus expressed it is settled in this state the suit at bar is a collateral attack upon an order of a County Court directing a sale of land belonging to the estate of a decedent to pay the debts thereof: Finley v. Houser, 22 Or. 562 (30 Pac. 494); Belle v. Brown, 37 Or. 588 (61 Pac. 1024); Saylor v. Banking Co., 38 Or. 204 (62 Pac. 652); Meinert v. Harder, 39 Or. 609 (65 Pac. 1056); Smith v. Whiting, 55 Or. 393 (106 Pac. 791); Mansfield v. Hill, 56 Or. 400

(107 Pac. 471, 108 Pac. 1007); Harpold v. Arant, 64 Or. 376 (130 Pac. 737; Purdy v. Winter's Estate, 79 Or. 614 (156 Pac. 285); Johnstone v. Chapman Timber Co., 79 Or. 674 (156 Pac. 286).

It is insisted by plaintiffs' counsel that Section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution of Oregon, expressly declaring County Courts to be inferior tribunals and subject to the appellate jurisdiction and control of the Circuit Courts, governs the determination of this cause. In support of the assertion thus made attention is called to the case of Garnsey v. County Court, 33 Or. 201 (54 Pac. 539, 1089), and Farrow v. Nevin, 44 Or. 496 (75 Pac. 711), which were writs of review, or certiorari, to annul allowances made by County Courts of claims against estates of decedents. In the first case the writ was treated as a collateral attack, while in the second it was considered to be direct. The attack in each instance, though assailing an order of the County Court made in the transaction of probate business, was certainly direct because the writs of review, which in such cases are concurrent with the right of appeal were sued out in the time and manner limited by the statute to correct judicial errors apparent on the face of the record: Section 605, L. O. L.; Van Fleet, Col. At., Section 3; Malone v. Cornelius, 34 Or. 192 (55 Pac. 536); Title Abstract Co. v. Nasburg, 58 Or. 190 (113 Pac. 2). In Garnsey v. County Court, supra, it was held that a County Court, sitting for the transaction of probate business, was an inferior tribunal, citing as sustaining that conclusion the case of Kirkwood v. Washington County, 32 Or. 568, 571 (52 Pac. 568), which was a writ of review challenging an order relating to the collection of taxes, a matter pertaining wholly to county business. If an inferior court as there defined is one from which an

appeal will lie, it necessarily follows that Circuit Courts in Oregon are judicial tribunals of that class, for their judgments and decrees are reviewable on appeal; but such courts are conceded to be general and superior, and hence the definition so given is inapplicable. The conclusion reached in Garnsey v. County Court, supra, and in Farrow v. Nevin, supra, so far as they in effect relate to collateral attacks, are diametrically opposite, thus demonstrating that both cannot be correct expressions of the law. It may well be doubted if either decision is proper on the ground that a writ of review will not lie from the action of a County Court in probate matters, for to admit that a precept of that kind is available in such cases is to concede that the County Court while transacting business pertaining to the settlement of a decedent's estate is an inferior tribunal, a conclusion which is at variance with every other decision rendered by this court on that subject.

In the transaction of county business the county judge usually sits with the county commissioners, which officers when thus assembled at the time and place appointed by law, though exercising administrative and executive duties concerning the financial affairs of the county, its police powers, and its corporate business, are not designated as the board of county commissioners, but are called the County Court: Article VII, Section 12 of the Constitution. Section 937, L. O. L. When the county commissioners and the county judge are sitting thus for the transaction of county business, such County Court is an inferior tribunal: Article VII, Section 9, of the Constitution: Thompson v. Multnomah County, 2 Or. 34, 40; Johns v. Marion County, 4 Or. 46, 49; State v. Officer, 4 Or. 180, 183; Bewley v. Graves, 17 Or. 274, 282 (20

Pac. 322); State v. Myers, 20 Or. 442, 444 (26 Pac. 307); Cameron v. Wasco County, 27 Or. 318, 321 (41 Pac. 160); Grady v. Dundon, 30 Or. 333, 336 (47 Pac. 915); Kirkwood v. Washington County, 32 Or. 568 (52 Pac. 568); Munroe v. Thomas, 35 Or. 174, 175 (57 Pac. 419).

Section 1 of Article VII of the organic law of the state, as far as important herein, reads:

"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, circuit courts, and county courts, which shall be courts of record, having general jurisdiction, to be defined, limited, and regulated by law, in accordance with this constitution."

This clause was amended by an exercise of the initiative power at a general election held November 8, 1910: Laws 1911, p. 7. The changes thus authorized, however, have never been made. The County Court has been given exclusive original jurisdiction in all probate matters: Section 936, L. O. L. In construing these provisions together it has uniformly been held that a County Court in the transaction of probate business is a tribunal of general and superior jurisdiction, and its orders in such cases are not subject to collateral attack: Russel v. Lewis, 3 Or. 380; Tustin v. Gaunt, 4 Or. 305; Monastes v. Catlin, 6 Or. 119; Bewley v. Graves, 17 Or. 274 (20 Pac. 322); Richardson's Guardianship, 39 Or. 246 (64 Pac. 390); Slate's Estate, 40 Or. 349 (68 Pac. 399); Smith v. Whiting, 55 Or. 393 (106 Pac. 791); Hillman v. Young, 64 Or. 73 (127 Pac. 793, 129 Pac. 124); Yeaton v. Barnhart, 78 Or. 249 (150 Pac. 742, 152 Pac. 1192). To the same effect, see Clark v. Rossier, 10 Idaho, 348 (78 Pac. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 231); In re Creighton, 91 Neb. 654 (136 N. W. 1001, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 128); Kavanagh v. Hamilton, 53 Colo. 157 (125 Pac. 512, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 76).

The statute referring to the application of an administrator or executor for an order to sell real property belonging to the estate of a decedent, to discharge the debts thereof, reads:

"Upon the filing of the petition a citation shall issue to the devisees and heirs therein mentioned, and to all others unknown, if any such there be, to appear at a term of court therein mentioned, not less than ten days after the service of such citation, to show cause if any exist, why an order of sale should not be made as in the petition prayed for": Section 1254, L. O. L.

The citation put forth and complained of in this suit was served by publication for the required time, informed Henry Fletcher, his sister, and all others interested in the estate of Charles W. Fletcher, deceased, that the administrator thereof had filed in the County Court his verified petition for an order to sell the real property of the estate or so much thereof as might be necessary to pay the claims and expenses against the estate, particularly describing the land, and notified such parties that the County Court had made an order directing a citation to be issued to them requiring them to appear at a time and place as hereinafter designated

"to show cause if any exists, why the prayer of the administrator should not be granted. Now, therefore, in pursuance of said order of said court, you and each of you are hereby notified that you are required to appear at the county courtroom in the courthouse, at Coquille City, Coos Co., Oregon, on Wednesday, the 16th day of July, 1902, to show cause, if any exists, why the order of sale, as in said petition prayed for [] of the above described premises, or a sufficient portion thereof to pay the indebtedness against said estate and the expenses of administration thereof."