This subsection obliges the parties to hold meetings at least once a month, and to "keep formal minutes of each meeting." As to the

first of these requirements -- a monthly meeting

I surely cannot and

do not disagree in principle. That is, I think it entirely appropriate that the Congress satisfy itself that the parties are engaging in a good faith effort to settle the remaining retirement issues. Moreover, I am sure that, by the final reporting date, the parties will have met for many more days than the once-a-month provision would require. But I suggest that it can safely be left to the parties to block out the negotiating periods, particularly if they are obliged to include in their periodic reports to the Congress an account as to the meetings that have been held. If we were dealing with but one union, the once-a-month requirement would present no difficulties. But our experience has demonstrated that it is futile to hold meetings of our multi-union negotiating group unless the chief executives of all of the unions are present. This may mean that negotiations can best be advanced by holding extended discussions during some periods with substantial recesses during others. But, as I have said, this is a minor matter as to which I simply offer a suggestion for the Subcommittee's consideration. contrast, the obligation respecting formal minutes of meetings is of very considerable importance. I feel quite strongly that this sort of procedure is not conducive to collective bargaining. When we began the negotiations that led to the March 8th agreement, I proposed, and the union leaders accepted, a ground rule under which the discussions would be free and frank, so that any participant could without hesitancy state

In

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his views with full liberty to come in the next day and say that his facts were wrong or that he had changed his mind. Both management and union negotiators did in fact take full advantage of that ground rule, with results that, in my view, were exceedingly beneficial. When one is dealing with as complex a matter as the railroad retirement problem, I do not see any sensible alternative to this approach. But if the parties knew that formal minutes were being kept so that they spoke only at peril of having their positions, and reversals of positions, duly reported to the Congress, this salutary principle that we have jointly established would be destroyed and the negotiations would be seriously undermined. Accordingly, I urge that this provision not be included in the legislation. As to the March 1, 1974 reporting deadline set forth in subsection (c) of Section 107, I fully understand the aim.

in explanation of this provision, stated:

Senator Hathaway,

I have already indicated why management and the unions agreed upon the July 1, 1974 date. Our purpose is to maximize the chances of securing a collectively bargained solution to the remaining railroad retirement issues. While I cannot, of course, prove that a July 1 date is better than a March 1 date in these terms, I can say with confidence that our experience thus far in trying to unravel these exceedingly complicated problems demonstrates that, as a general rule, the more time we

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have the better. Accordingly, I hope that the Subcommittee will see fit to follow H.R. 7200 in this respect. If the Subcommittee concludes that the July 1 date is simply too late, then I hope that at least a date between March 1 and July 1 can be provided.

I turn now to Section 121 of S. 1867, the provision imposing additional tax burdens on both employers and employees effective January 1, 1975. Here again, we appreciate the purpose of the provision. As Senator Hathaway explained:

"This is, admittedly, a rough solution to the
problem, but it is a solution nonetheless, and
it puts the parties on notice that this is their
last chance to design their own solution."

We certainly cannot take exception to that purpose, but we do object to this means of carrying it out. Our objection is rooted in our conception of the basic approach that, in our view, the Congress should take in dealing with the railroad retirement system. The controlling principle, we believe, should be that the parties be given ample opportunity to settle these issues through collective bargaining, and that only when bargaining fails should the Congress intervene. We are dealing with what is essentially a pension plan supplemental to social security. In every other industry, most aspects of such plans are established through collective bargaining. There is much to be said for Senator Hathaway's view that "Congress should not be in the railroad retirement business at all." But while the long involvement of the federal government in railroad retirement suggests that this goal cannot be realized, at least the principle of the central role of collective bargaining should be secured. I believe

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that Section 121 is inconsistent with this principle.

If the parties should be unable to solve their problems by next year, it will be time enough for the Congress to fashion a solution for them.

I add one final thought: Entirely apart from the considerations I have just outlined, I suggest that Section 121 is, in any case, unnecessary. The parties know full well that this is their last chance, and that if we do not agree upon a resolution of the remaining issues we will have one thrust upon us. We know full well that, if the Congress enacts legislation of the type we now propose, the Congress will see to it that the next step will be the enactment of legislation that will insure the solvency of the retirement fund and that will address the other principal issues dealt with by the Commission on Railroad Retirement.

If it be suggested that we should have felt the same way about the matter this year, I can say only this: For the reasons I have discussed in detail, both unions and management concluded that the interests of the carriers and their employees would be best served at this point by the path we have charted; but there are no conceivable circumstances under which we could or would arrive at a like judgment next year. I have framed that representation in as strong terms as I am able. I am confident that Mr. Dennis, who will testify for the unions, shares my views. While we do not agree, as I have indicated, with certain of

the provisions of S. 1867, and while we urge that those particular provisions not be included in the legislation, I would like to say again, in closing, that we appreciate full well the validity of the general

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principles that are reflected in these provisions, that it is quite evident that a good deal of time and thought went into the composition of S. 1867, and that we are grateful indeed for the attention that our railroad retirement problem has received from Senator Hathaway and from this Subcommittee.

This concludes my remarks on H.R. 7200 as well as S. 1867 and

1805. On behalf of the carriers I represent, I want to express my appreciation to the Committee for according me this opportunity to state our position with respect to this matter of great importance to both

labor and management in our industry.