it is not necessary to discuss the first ground of the rejection of the application to lease by the board of harbor-line commissioners. Article 15, § 1, of the Constitution of the state, relating to tide lands, among other things deAn action may be maintained against a boom | company for cutting off access to the landing place of a riparian owner. French v. Connecticut River Lumber Co. 145 Mass. 261. An owner of a private wharf, who is in possession, may enjoin the construction of another wharf in front of it which will cut him off from navigable water, unless the persons making it show a lawful right to erect it. Cowell v. Martin, 43 Cal. | 605. A settler on public land bordering on tide water has, as against a private individual, a right of access to the water which the courts will interfere to protect. Lewis v. Johnson, 76 Fed. Rep. 476. The court says that the law of the Buccleuch and Lyon Cases was affirmed in Shively v. Bowlby. A tenant cannot during the term acquire a right to maintain a pier in front of the landlord's wharf which he can retain after surrendering the wharf. Bedlow v. New York Floating Dry Dock Co. 112 N. Y. 263, 2 L. R. A. 629, Reversing 44 Hun, 378. Estoppel by grant. Municipalities have been held to have estopped themselves by their grants of wharf rights from interfering with access to them. A city which has granted a whart right cannot -cut off access to the wharf by erecting a bulkhead in front of the wharf. Langdon v. New York, 93 N. Y. 129; Williams v. New York, 105 N. Y. 419; Kingsland v. New York, 110 N. Y. 569; Kingsland v. New York, 45 Hun, 198. If the city has granted a right to erect a wharf and take toll it cannot afterwards build a bulkhead beyond the end of the wharf so as to cut off access to it. Crocker v. New York, 15 Fed. Rep. 405. clares: "Nor shall any of the area lying between any harbor line and the line of ordinary high tide, and within not less than 50 feet nor more than 600 feet of such harbor line (as the commission shall determine), be sold or it is held that the right of the public to improve the navigation of the stream is superior to the riparian owner's right of access. Black River Improv. Co. v. La Crosse Boom & Transp. Co. 54 Wis. 659, 41 Am. Rep. 66; Cohn v. Wausau Boom Co. 47 Wis. 325; Sage v. New York, 154 N. Y. 61, 38 L. R. A. 606; Gibson v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 18; Scranton v. Wheeler, 16 U. S. App. 152, 57 Fed. Rep. 803, 6 C. C. A. 585. Summary. It thus appears that by what may be called the common law because it is that which is almost universally adopted by the courts without the aid of statute, a riparian owner has a right of access which cannot be impaired by the state by granting rights to other individuals which will interfere with it. A railroad, wharf, or embankment cannot be authorized which will cut off the right of access without making compensation to the riparian owner. This rule has not been adopted in New Jersey, Iowa, Washington, and Oregon. In these states the effect of the decisions has been in part neutralized by statutes giving privileges to riparian own ers. In England and countries following its law the riparian right cannot be taken by the public for improving navigation without compensation. If the riparian right of access is recognized as property it cannot be taken in this country without compensation because of constitutional protection. To obviate this result the United States Supreme Court has refused, contrary to the rule elsewhere, to recognize it as property. The same result is obtained in New York by But in Whitney v. New York, & Abb. N. C. 329, holding that the private right, although property, is note, it was held that a covenant by the city that subordinate to the public right to improve the wathe grantee should have the wharfage from a ters for navigation. The court holds that in every wharf which he should make in the river, not ex-grant of land bounded on navigable water made by tending to the extreme line owned by the city, would not deprive the city of the power to erect a wharf beyond the end of the former one which would cut the former one off from the water. Special reasons for refusing relief. There are some cases in which relief has been re fused, which cannot be regarded as direct deci sions upon the main question. Among these are Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146, in which the access was merely rendered more difficult, and complainant was injured as others were. The owner of a wharf cannot enjoin an adjoining owner from extending his wharf further into the stream, although the effect is to make the access to his wharf more difficult. Van der Brooks v. Currier, 2 Mich. N. P. 21. So, the existence of a street along the river front will cut off the riparian right of the person whose land borders on the street. United States v. Morris, 23 Wash. L. Rep. 745, 24 Wash. L. Rep. 168. If a riparian owner is entitled to compensation for deprivation of his right by the filling up of the flats in front of his property so as to cut him off from the water it must be claimed at the time. In a case where no attempt was made to enforce the right for a long time, the court says: "We do not think that at this late day they afford any ground, if ever they did afford any ground, for the equita ble interference of the court." Clarke v. Providence, 16 R. I. 337, 1 L. R. A. 727. Right as against improvement of navigation. In Wisconsin, New York, and the Federal courts the state, there is reserved by implication the right to so improve the water front as to aid navigation for the benefit of the general public without compensation to the shore owner. And in Wisconsin it is held that the riparian owner holds his rights by implied public license. That the exercise of this right may be prohibited by public law in aid of public use. That it gives way ex necessitate rei to public measures in aid of navigation. From the fact that navigable waters are natural public highways there is very little analogy in other branches of the law to aid in settling the conflict between public and private rights in regard to them. The position taken by the New York and Wisconsin courts, that the right of the riparian owner ceases to exist when it conflicts with the public right to improve navigation, is different from that existing in other departments of the law. Generally the private 'right is regarded as absolute, and when the public wishes to abridge it compensation must be made. It would seem that the harmony of the law would be much better subserved by extending the same rule to riparian rights, and requiring the public to compensate the owner in case its needs necessitate the destruction of his rights. The Wisconsin method of stating the rule seems preferable to that in New York, but it is likely to prove a surprise to the riparian owner to find that after he has exercised and been regarded as possessing certain rights for years it may be they are in effect only a license which the public may revoke at pleasure. H. P. F. granted by the state, nor its rights to control | sions relating to harbor areas in front of cities, the same relinquished, but such area shall be is unlike that of any other state Constitution forever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, that has been submitted to our attention. and other conveniences of navigation and com- Therefore it would probably be useless to atmerce." As asserted by counsel for plaintiff, tempt to find authority to aid in the constructhe word "commerce" is one of wide signifi- tion of our Constitution. The state of Washcance, and in its general sense may mean almost ington at its formation had before it the any transaction or intercourse between men. experience of the world in the regulation and But the word has been restricted by the courts control of harbor areas. The constitutional according to the context in which the term has convention well knew that private control of been used. Section 2 of article 15 of the Con- these waters had always been inimical to free stitution of the state declares: "The legislature navigation and to the public interests. The shall provide general laws for the leasing of insidious and plausible pretexts for the estabthe right to build and maintain wharves, lishment of private interests in such waters docks, and other structures, upon the areas were also well understood, and, however large mentioned in § 1 of this article, but no lease the harbor areas within the domain of the shall be made for any term longer than thirty state, it was well known, from the history of years; or the legislature may provide by gen- the past and the tendencies of the present, that eral laws for the building and maintaining the organization of private interests in combiupon such area wharves, docks, and other nation would be sufficiently powerful to perstructures." Counsel for plaintiff contend vade all these waters. A very fair comment that the words "navigation and commerce" do upon the import of these constitutional provi not appear in the 2d section, and that the sions is found in the Report of the Massachuphrase "and other conveniences of navigation setts State Board on Docks and Terminal Faciland commerce" appears in the 1st section; ities (1897) p. 37, in which it is said: "Alive to that the 2d section provides for laws for the modern tendencies, the state of Washington, leasing of the right to build and maintain in her Constitution, article 15, declares that no wharves, docks, and other structures, and water areas beyond high-water marks shall be that the purpose for which these "other sold or relinquished by the state, but such structures" are to be used, or their nature, is areas shall be forever reserved for landings, not defined; and also argue that navigation wharves, and streets, and other conveniences of and commerce mean one and the same thing, navigation and commerce.' Subsequently a and that commerce includes navigation, and harbor-line commission established harbor that the word "commerce" here is used in its lines in the navigable tide waters of the state broadest import; that the words "navigation adjacent to the cities, with a view to providing and commerce" are words of enumeration, for docks having a length of 600 feet and an and not those of definition; and that the court avenue fronting thereon of from 100 to 250 is called upon to define their meaning, and feet wide. Thus the water front of all the such definition should properly be made from cities in the state is to be forever preserved in a consideration of the people and their wants uniform condition, under control of the public. at the time the Constitution was adopted. It in the interest of economical and convenient is also argued that the reservation of harbor commercial uses, secure from the encroachareas is a very broad one, and a comparison is ment of individuals or corporations.” “Curmade between the harbor area in front of the ing and canning fish, maintaining a retail and city of Seattle and that of other noted em- wholesale fish market, and the storage of ice poriums of the world. The contention that for packing and handling fish," are not con"navigation" is included within "commerce," veniences of "navigation and commerce," and and means the same thing, cannot be main-maintaining establishments of that character tained. The word "navigation," as used in the 1st section of the article of the Constitution quoted, is clearly used as a qualification of the word "commerce," and the provisions for maintaining upon the harbor area wharves, docks, and other structures, by or through the state, refers to structures which are conveniences of navigation and commerce. We think the language as well as the sense of these two sections of the Constitution is plain, and the ordinary rules of statutory and constitutional construction fit this sense. It is plainly said in 2 that the wharves, docks, and other structures are those mentioned in § 1. Then the rule of ejusdem generis is plainly applicable here, and "other structures" must fall within the genus "conveniences of navigation and commerce." Our Constitution, in its provi40 L. R. A. and structures erected for such purposes are not the "other structures" mentioned in the Constitution relating to this subject. The act of the legislature (Laws 1897, p. 229, § 53) does not contemplate a lease for any other purposes than those specified in the Constitution. The act specially reserves to the state of Washington "the right to regulate, either under rules of the commission or legislative enactment, or by both methods, the rates of wharfage, dockage, and other tolls to be imposed by the lessee upon commerce for any of the purposes," etc. The writ is denied. Dunbar, Anders, and Gordon, JJ., concur. CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS. STATE of Connecticut Ο. John E. HARBOURNE, Appt. (Conn.........) A state statute making it unlawful to keep a place in which the business of transmitting money to be placed or bet on any horse race, etc., whether within or without the state, is permitted or carried on, or to be con 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36; Re Pennsylvania Teleph. Co. 48 N. J. Eq. 91; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, pp. 769-780; Dinsmore v. New York Bd. of Police, 12 Abb. N. C. 439; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L.ed. 694. Mr. Nathaniel R. Bronson, for the state: The line of distinction between that which constitutes an interference with commerce, and that which is a mere police regulation is sometimes exceedingly dim and shadowy. It is not doubted that Congress has the power to go beyond the general regulations of commerce which it is accustomed to establish, and to de cerned in such business, is not an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce as applied to an agent of a telegraph company, who keeps such place or is engaged in such business, and trans-scend to the most minute directions, if it shall mits the money to another state by telegraph. (May 3, 1898.) APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court for New Haven County, Waterbury District convicting him of keeping a place where betting was carried on and transmitting money to another state to be wagered on a horse race. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Charles E. Perkins and M. Kenealy, for appellant: The business of sending telegraphic messages from one state to another is interstate com merce. Prentice, Pol. Powers, p. 280. The sending money by telegraph is as much interstate commerce as sending messages. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 30 L. ed. 1187, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 306. Interstate commerce is protected against legislation by states in exactly the same way, and to the same extent, as foreign commerce, Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649. A state cannot be allowed to fix for itself whether certain articles or the dealing in them are so injurious or deleterious as to take them out of the protection of interstate commerce. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36. The state cannot, under any circumstances, make regulations as to telegraph companies sending money or messages to other states, as that matter is entirely under the control of Congress. Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067; Ratter man v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 127 U. S. 411, 32 L. ed. 229, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 59: Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 30 L. ed. 1187, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 306. Whenever the law of the state amounts essentially to a regulation of commerce with foreign nations or within the states, as it does when it inhibits, directly or indirectly, the receipt of an imported commodity, it comes in conflict with a power which in this particular has been exclusively vested in the general gov ernment. Re Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100,34 L. ed. 128, NOTE.-For statutes against betting on horse races in other states, see Ex parte Lacy (Va.) 31 L. R. A. 822: State v. Stripling (Ala.) 36 L. R. A. 81. be deemed advisable; and that, to whatever extent ground shall be covered by these directions, the exercise of state power is excluded. Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 722. In establishing police regulations, a state may incidentally affect commerce; but they, when not in conflict with any act of Congress, are valid. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 467, 24 L. ed. 529, quoted approvingly in Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 478, 39 L. ed. 229; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 104, 23 L. ed. 820. A distinction is drawn between acts passed regulating certain commerce for the preservation of the public good, and acts intended to produce a revenue from the trade or commerce regulated. 26 L. ed. 1067. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, A state may require that employees on railroads shall be examined for color blindness. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 32 L. ed. 352, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 238. and through it from one state to another on The running of railroad trains in the state Sunday may be regulated or prohibited. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 1888, § 3523; State v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 24 W. Va. 783; Western Inters. Com. Rep. 533. U. Teleg. Co. v. New York, 38 Fed. Rep. 552, 2 The states have the right to forbid acts prejudicial to the public good. Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 742; Bowman v. Chi cago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823; Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 464, 30 L. ed. 241. One of the powers most often exercised, commonly called "police," is that of restraining and abating nuisances. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205; Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 741. Game laws are passed in many states. 3 State v. Geer, 61 Conn. 144, 13 L. R. A. 804, Inters. Com. Rep. 732. Lotteries have been legislated against, and even out of existence, by the various states. Vannini v. Paine, 1 Harr. (Del.) 65, quoted approvingly in Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 508, 24 L. ed. 1118; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 167, 12 L. ed. 1032; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079. A lottery is recognized as a means of gambling, and state legislation with regard to it is upheld by virtue of the state's inherent right, never relinquished, to pass laws for its internal government and regulation; an exercise, that is, of its police powers. Brien v. Williamson, 7 How. (Miss.) 14. Where from the nature of the subject or the sphere of its operation the case is local and limited, special regulations adapted to the immediate locality could only have been contemplated. State action upon such subjects can constitute no interference with the commercial power of Congress, for when that acts the state authority is superseded. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 698, 26 L. ed. 240; Escanaba & L. M. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 687, 27 L. ed. 442; Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. ed. 1200, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. ed. 648; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 178; License Cases, 5 How. 504, 12 L. ed. 256. May not a state provide for the seizure and destruction of a gambling outfit or lottery tickets, although the gambling is carried on by the help of a confederate without the state, or the tickets issued by some lottery licensed or even chartered by another state? Com. v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236, 15 L. R. A. 839; 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 751, and cases cited; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. ed. 1115; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. 31 L. ed. 205; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232; State, Waterbury, v. Newton, 50 N. J. L. 534, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 63. The transaction is by its very terms one form of gambling, and nothing is better established in our jurisprudence than that this is one of the vicious practices which it is the province of the legislature to regulate and prohibit by virtue of its police powers. Edwards v. State, 8 Lea, 411; Moore v. State, 48 Miss. 147, 12 Am. Rep. 367; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 1169; Tanner v. Albion, 5 Hill, 121, 40 Am. Dec. 337; Phalen v. Com. 1 Rob. (Va.) 713: Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 167, 12 L. ed. 1032; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 819, 25 L. ed. 1080; State v. Lovell, 39 N. J.L. 463; McClean v. State, 49 N. J. L. 471; Haring v. State, 51 N. J. L. 386. Hall, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The act creating the offense charged is directed against that form of gambling known as "pool selling," including bets or wagers on the result of any trial of speed, skill, or endurance. Pub. Acts 1893, p. 240. It prohibits (1) keeping any place with apparatus or devices for the purpose of carrying on such gambling; (2) keeping any place where pool selling of any kind, either directly or indirectly, is permitted or carried on; (3) keeping any place in which the business of transmitting money to any race track or other place, there to be placed or bet on any horse race, etc., whether within or without the state, is permitted or carried on; (4) making any such wager, or buying or selling any such pools; (5) being concerned in buying or selling any such pools; (6) being concerned in carrying on the business of the transmission of money to any race track, etc. The defendant is charged in the first count with a violation of the third prohibition, and in the second count with a violation of the sixth. The defense relies on the alleged unconstitutionality of the act. The following case is presented by the record: "On the trial of the case to the jury, upon the plea of not guilty, the state claimed and offered, evidence to prove that on the 28th day of January, 1897, the defendant, in the city of Waterbury, was employed by the New Jersey News & Electric Telegraph Company as the manager of its telegraph office there located; that, as such manager, he received from one a telegraphic message in the ordinary form used for transmitting messages, addressed to the Jersey City Commission Company, Jersey City, New Jersey, directing the said Jersey City Commission Company there to bet for the sender of said message the sum of money named therein, and to draw upon Mills & Company, New York city, New York, for said money; that, at the time of delivery of said message to the defendant, the said deposited with the defendant said sum of money, to be by him transmitted by telegraph to Mills & Company, New York city, subject to the draft of the said Jersey City Commission Company; and that said telegraph message was by the defendant transmitted by telegraph to the Jersey City Commission Company, and said money was by the defendant transmitted by telegraph to Mills & Company; and that | the defendant knew that the purpose in said transmissions was to have said money bet upon a horse race without this state. The state offered evidence of no other violation of the law. The defendant claimed, and offered evidence to prove, and claimed he had proved, that, in the receipt of said message and of said money, he was acting as the agent of his said employer, in the ordinary course of business of a telegraph company engaged in the business of telegrapher of messages and moneys. The defendant admitted that he knew the purpose for which said money was sent and said message transmitted. "The defendant, in writing, requested the court to charge the jury as follows: (1) That if the jury shall find that the accused, as charged in the first count of the complaint of the prosecuting attorney, did possess, keep, manage, maintain, and occupy a certain room, office, and place in which the business of transmitting money to a certain race track or race tracks, or other places without this state, there to be placed or bet on certain horse races, games, and competitions, with full knowledge thereof, and that said keeping, possessing. managing, maintaining, and occupying was in the ordinary course of business of a telegraph company, he is guilty of no offense against the laws of this state, as any statute of this state prohibiting such acts would be, and is, in violation of and against the provisions of the Constitution of the United States vesting in the Congress of the United States the power of regulating commerce between the states. (2) That if the jury shall find that the accused | placed or bet. The decisions in respect to the did in fact, as charged in the second count of said complaint, transmit (by telegraph) money from the city of Waterbury to a place without this state, for the purposes alleged in this complaint, and that said transmission was in the ordinary course of the business of a telegraph company, he is not guilty of any offense against the laws of the state; and that a stat ute of this state which prohibits such act is void, being contrary to said provision of the Constitution of the United States.' The court refused to so charge the jury, but did charge the jury as follows: "That notwithstanding the jury should find that in the keeping, etc., of the place as set forth in the complaint, the accused kept said place for the ordinary purposes of a telegraphic business, yet, if the business of transmitting money for the purposes charged in the complaint was carried on in said place, the accused was guilty of a violation of the laws of this state, and the statute prohibiting such act was constitutional; and that if the jury should find that accused did, as charged in the second count of said complaint, knowingly transmit (by telegraph) moneys from the city of Waterbury to a place without this state, to be bet upon a horse race, that the accused is guilty of a violation of the laws of this state, notwithstanding such transmission may have been in the ordinary course of the business of a telegraph company, and that the statute of this state prohibitive of such act is constitutional.' To the court's refusal to charge as requested, and to the charge as delivered, the defendant duly excepted. The case was submitted in this court on briefs. In that of the state, it is stated that "the facts are not disputed, nor is it denied that the statute concerning pool selling dis tinctly prohibits the act done by the accused. He claimed, however, that the law was unconstitutional. No other line of defense was adopted, and no evidence put in to confuse the issue." The brief filed by the defendant in reply commences thus: "It appears from the brief of counsel for the state that the only question in this case is that of the unconstitutionality of the act of 1893 (page 240 of the Public Acts of that year). He also admits that the act would be invalid as a restraint of interstate commerce, if it cannot be brought within the limits of the police power of the state. This limits the question to the precise point as to whether, under any claim of police power, the state can interfere with messages sent from one state to another, because the legislature thinks that the matters concerning which the messages are sent are such as it does not approve of.' We shall dispose of the ap peal on the question to which the counsel on both sides have thus addressed themselves, and which they seem to agree in regarding as the only one presented on the record; assuming that the attention of the jury was properly directed by evidence and instructions (to which it was thought unnecessary to refer in the finding) to the necessity of proof, under the second count, that the defendant, at the time of transmitting the money to be bet, was unlawfully concerned in the carrying on of the business of the transmission of money to places without the state, there to be power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states, which is granted by the Constitution, have been numerous, and not altogether consistent; but they seem to have established the following propositions: A state law dealing directly and only with interstate commerce is void. A state law purporting to deal with domestic matters, but being in its effect and essence merely a regulation of interstate commerce, is void. A state law plainly and in good faith dealing only with state matters is valid, notwithstanding it may incidentally affect interstate commerce, unless it comes in conflict with some valid statute of the United States on that subject, or, in the absence of legislation, affects such commerce in a particular where the silence of Congress is equivalent to legislative prohibition. The power of regulating commerce covers such a wide field that cases must arise where a law passed in the legitimate exercise of the power of domestic legislation is also, in a sense, a regulation of commerce. But it is not therefore necessarily an invasion of the jurisdiction of Congress.-i. e. an exercise of the "power" of regulation. It is an exercise of the "power" of domestic legislation, and is valid unless it conflicts with some existing law, or so essentially affects interstate commerce as substantially to disturb those channels of commerce which Congress has seen fit to leave undisturbed. In dealing with such legislation, the courts have given a much wider latitude to what is called "police legislation" than to other forms of domestic legislation, because police regulations are absolutely essential to the protection of society, and in the main can only be established by the state government. The law in question is purely a police regulation. For more than 200 years we have treated wagering as against public policy, and playing at the games which promote wagering has been illegal. The restrictions on playing the games have been removed, but playing for anything of value is still an offense. Gen. Stat. § 2557, 2558. A wager of any kind is illegal. The loser can recover the money lost, and, if he does not sue, any person may sue for and recover treble the amount. Id. $ 2552, 2553 (passed in 1797); Rev. Stat. 1808, p. 361. Betting on horse races is a penal offense. Gen. Stat. § 2556. Since the establishment of our government wagering has been held to be, if not absolutely immoral, yet so injurious in its results as to require suppression by penal legislation. Such legislation has for many years past been directed against the business of promoting wagering in its various forms; and the keeping of places where such business is carried on has been treated as an offense. Indeed, throughout the United States the business of gambling is now recognized as illegitimate, and one whose contracts the courts will, in many cases, refuse to enforce. Within the past two years the United States Supreme Court has said: "This court had occasion many years ago to say that the common forms of gambling were comparatively innocuous, when placed in contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries. Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 496, 42 L. ed. 553, 555. Similar language may appropriately be used in respect |