NEW JERSEY COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS. NORTH HUDSON COUNTY RAILWAY COMPANY, Piff. in Err., V. Clarence ANDERSON. *1. A dollar bill from the upper lefthand corner of which a piece one inch and a half by one inch and a quarter had been torn is not a legal tender for car fare, and the conductor may eject a passenger who refuses to make another payment. He was not bound to accept a bill which was substantially mutilated. If any part was absent which might aid in determining whether it was genuine, he was under no duty to receive it. 2. The rules of the Treasury Department of the United States in regard to the redemption of mutilated notes relate simply to redemption, and do not affect the question of legal tender. (March 1, 1898.) Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Morgan, 52 N. J. L. 60. The United States treasury rules, § 10, says: "United States notes when not mutilated so that less than of the original proportion remains, are redeemable in coin. Notes of the United States are lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, both public and private, within the United States, except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt. U. S. Rev. Stat. p. 712, § 3588. Van Syckel, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Anderson, the plaintiff below, tendered the conductor on a car of the company defendant below a mutilated one dollar note for his car fare. The conductor refused to accept the note because it was imperfect, and put Anderson off the car for not paying his fare. Thereupon Anderson brought suit to recover damages for the alleged wrongful act of the conductor. The evidence of Anderson was that a piece one inch and a quarter by one inch and a half had been torn from the upper ERROR to the Supreme Court at Circuit in left-hand corner of the bill, while the evidence Hudson County to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover damages for alleged illegal ejectment from defendant's car. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. ror: The United States statute makes certain notes and certificates legal tender (U. S. Rev. Stat. 3588, 3589, 3590, but there is nothing in the statute which makes any part of a note or certificate a legal tender. There are provisions in the statute, by which the Treasury Department is directed to receive notes and certificates which are mutilated or otherwise injured so as to be unfit for use, and issue others in place thereof (U. S. Rev. Stat. 3580, 5184), and the Treasury Department has adopted certain rules regarding the redemption of such mutilated notes and certificates. Nothing less than a “bill,” i. e., a whole bill, is legal tender. A person is entitled to have the whole bill presented to him, in order that he may judge of its validity, and he is not required to pass on the validity of a part of a bill. United States v. Lissner, 12 Fed. Rep. 840; Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Morgan, 52 N. J. L. 61. on the part of the company was that the piece torn off was two and a half inches by one inch and three quarters. The trial court was requested by the counsel of the company to charge the jury that the note was not a legal tender for the car fare, which request the court refused to grant. On the contrary, the court did charge that the note was a legal tender. To the refusal to charge as requested, and to the charge as made, the defendant company excepted, and error is thereupon signed. as The case of Jersey City & B. R. Co. v. Morgan, 52 N. J. L. 60, is relied upon to support the ruling of the trial court; but it is not parallel. There a genuine silver coin, worn smooth by use, not appreciably diminished in weight, and distinguishable as a coin duly issued from the mint, was held to be a legal tender. The United States statutes make certain paper money legal tender, but there is no provision that part of such notes shall be impressed with that quality. The rules of the Treasury Department with regard to the redemption of mutilated notes relate simply to redemption, and do not make such notes legal tender. The company was not under any obligation to take upon itself the burden of ap plying to the Treasury Department at Washington for a perfect note, or to assume the Mr. Warren Dixon, with Messrs. Bent-risk of failing to obtain it. The conductor ley & Gedney, for defendant in error: The fact that the bill was torn on the upper left-hand corner an inch and a quarter on one side by an inch and a quarter on the other, at right angles, does not invalidate the note. A United States note has no intrinsic value as has a United States coin. *Headnotes by VAN SYCKEL, J. NOTE. AS to the tender of old, worn, or mutil ated coin, see Atlanta Consol. Street R. Co. v. Keeny (Ga.) 33 L. R. A. 824, and note. had the right to demand an entire bill, and was not bound to accept one from which a portion had been torn. If any part was absent which might aid in determining whether it was a genuine bill, he was under no duty to receive it. The portion torn off the bill presented in this case constituted a substantial mutilation of it. It was not a legal tender, and the trial court erred in refusing so to charge. The judgment below should therefore be reversed. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. Maryanna HUDA, Admrx., etc., of Valentine | owning buildings or operating machinery owes Huda, Deceased, Appt., to the persons injured V. Ray, Negligence of Imposed Duties, pp. 145, AMERICAN GLUCOSE COMPANY, Respt. 146; Seybolt v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. (154 N. Y. 474.) 1. Screwing down the windows of a factory so that there is no access to fire escapes except by breaking the windows, and forbidding employees to open the windows, in order to preserve a high temperature, which is necessary for the business, does not violate a statute requiring the construction and maintenance of fire escapes on such buildings, where the windows are so light in frame as to offer but the slightest difficulty in breaking through, if there is not time to unscrew them. 2. It is not negligence for a master to fasten windows leading to fire escapes, when this does not violate any statute to reach the fire escapes if there is not time to and the windows can be easily broken through unfasten them. 3. An employee assumes the risk of his employer's methods which are known to and acquiesced in by him, if they do not violate any statute. (December 14, 1897.) APPEAL by plaintiff from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Fourth Department affirming a judgment of the Erie County Circuit in favor of defendant in an action brought to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of plaintiff's intestate. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Le Roy Parker, for appellant: The direct cause of Huda's death was the fire which originated in defendant's dynamo room. A concurring cause was the unlawful screwing down of the windows whereby escape from the building was obstructed. The evidence given as to the defective and dangerous character of the appliances used by defendant was sufficient to show that it had not maintained its plant in that reasonably safe and proper condition required by law. Coddington v. Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co. 102 N. Y. 67; Mayer v. Liebmann, 16 App. Div. 54. Negligence may be presumed from the fact of the happening of an accident which could not, in the ordinary course of events, have occurred without some negligence, or omission in respect to the duty of care which the person NOTE.-For duty as to fire escapes, see note to Rose v. King (Ohio) 15 L. R. A. 160; also Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. (N. Y.) 15 L. R. A. 194; Schmalzried v. White (Tenn.) 32 L. R. A. 782. 95 N. Y.562; Scott v. London & St. K. Docks Co. 3 Hurlst. & C. 596. When experience has demonstrated that a certain business may be carried on, and certain machinery used without causing damage, if reasonable care is exercised, then the fact of damage may be sufficient, under such circumstances, to show negligence. Cooley, Torts, 703, 794: Seeley v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 102 N. Y. 719; 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 451; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Reese, 85 Ala. 497; Spaulding v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 30 Wis. 110, 11 Am. Rep. 550; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 10, 11; Volkmar Cleaveland v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 42 Vt. 449; Manhattan R. Co. 149 N. Y. 23; Mullen v. St. v. Manhattan R. Co. 134 N. Y. 420; Hogan v. John, 57 N. Y. 567, 15 Am. Rep. 530; Cahalin v. Cochran, 1 N. Y. S. R. 583; Gall v. ManN. Y. 714; Payne v. Troy & B. R. Co. 83 N. hattan R. Co. 24 N. Y. S. R. 24, Affirmed 125 Y. 572; White v. Boston & A. R. Co. 144 Mass. Seybolt v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 95 N. Y. 562, 47 Am. Rep. 75; Bowen v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 18 N. Y. 408, 72 Am. Dec. 529; 2 Thomp. Neg. 3, p. 1227; Black, Proof and Pleadings in Accident Co. 82 Mich. 457. Cases,7-9: Kraatz v. Brush Electric Light An electric-light company is liable for negligence when injury was occasioned by the insufficiency of fuse catches to break the circuit and cut off the flow of electricity when wires are overloaded. Yates v. Southwestern Brush Electric Light & P. Co. 40 La. Ann. 467. The defendant's method of screwing down the windows of the building in which the deceased was employed, so that there was no access to the fire escape except by breaking the windows, and forbidding the employees of the defendant engaged in that building from opening the windows, and requiring them to keep a high temperature in the work rooms, such as was necessary to accomplish the business carried on in these rooms, was a violation of the statute requiring a construction and maintenance of fire escapes in such building. Gorman v. McArdle, 67 Hun, 487; Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 131 N. Y. 92, 15 L. R. A. 194; Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Iron Min. Co. 99 N. Y. 376; Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 310, 34 Am. Rep. 536; Schwandner v. Birge, 33 Hun, 186; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517, 17 Am. Rep. 369; Stringham v. Stewart, 100 N. Y. 516; Stringham v. Hilton, 111 N. Y. 188, 1 L. R. A. 483; Eastwood v. Retsof Min. Co. 86 Hun, 99, Affirmed 152 N. Y. 651. It was for the jury to say whether Huda did not try to reach a fire escape, and, finding the window leading to it fastened, perished before he could open it. Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 310, 34 Am. Rep. 536. There can be no presumption, in the absence of evidence, that Huda did anything that he ought not to have done. The presumption may be made that every man is desirous of preserving his life and keeping his body from harm. Eastwood v. Retsof Min. Co. 86 Hun, 99, Affirmed 152 N. Y. 651; Morrison v. New York C. R. Co. 63 N. Y. 643. A failure on the part of owners of factories to perform a duty imposed by statute when, as a consequence, an injury results to another, is evidence of negligence, and is actionable. Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 131 N. Y. 90, 15 L. R. A. 194; Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 314, 34 Am. Rep. 536; McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222; Burton v. McClellan, 3 Ill. 436; Somerville v. Marks, 58 Ill. 371; Sangamon Distilling Co. v. Young, 77 Ill. 197. The court can only take the case from the jury when not only the facts are undisputed, but when only one set of inferences can be drawn from those facts, and those inferences lead to but one conclusion. Eastwood v. Retsof Min. Co. 86 Hun, 96, Affirmed 152 N. Y. 651; Johnson v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 146 N. Y. 160: Weeks v. Cornwell, 104 N. Y. 336; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 264, 38 Am. Rep. 134; Gardner v. Michigan C. R. Co. 150 U. S. 349-361, 37 L. ed. 1107-1110; Vinton v. Schwab, 32 Vt. 612; Hart v. Hudson River Bridge Co. 80 N. Y. 622. The deceased did what he could to escape death. Felice v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 14 App. Div. 350. The risks of the service a servant assumes in the employment of a master are those only which occur after the due performance by the employer of those duties which the law enjoins upon him. If the master has failed to perform his duty, the servant does not take the risk of the master's fault. Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 378, 32 L. R. A. 367; Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 131 N. Y. 95, 15 L. R. A. 194; Benzing v. Steinway, 101 N. Y. 552; McGovern v. Central Vermont R. Co. 123 N. Y. 280; Booth v. Boston & A. R. Co. 73 N. Y. 40, 29 Am. Rep. 97; Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Iron Min. Co. 99 N. Y. 376; Felice v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 14 App. Div. 351; Southwestern Teleph. Co. v. Woughter, 56 Ark. 206; Clairain v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 40 La. Ann. 178; Essex County Electric Co. v. Kelly, 57 N. J. L. 100: Western U. Teleg. Co. v. McMullen, 58 N. J. L. 155, 32 L. R. A. 351; Bailey, Master's Liability for Injuries to Servant, pp. 152-156. In the present case it cannot be claimed that the risk was a natural and ordinary one, incident to the work in which Huda was engaged. Schwandner v. Birge, 33 Hun, 186; Gorman v. McArdle, 67 Hun, 484; Mayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 63 Iowa, 566. The risk related to the safety of the place of employment, and not to the character of the employment itself. It was the risk of the master, and not of the servant. Freeman v. Glens Falls Paper Mill Co. 61 Hun, 132, Affirmed 142 N. Y. 639; Abrayan v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 16 N. Y. S. R. 750; Gaul v. Rochester Paper Co. 72 Hun, 485, Affirmed Eagle v. Rochester Paper Co. 145 N. Y. 603; Egan v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. 12 App. Div. 558; Cullen v. Norton, 52 Hun, 9; Hawley v. Northern C. R. Co. 82 N. Y. 370. Remaining in service after knowledge of defects is not negligence per se. Wood, Master & Servant, 681; Huddleston v. Lowell Machine Shop, 106 Mass. 282; Patterson v. Pittsburg & C. R. Co. 76 Pa. 389, 18 Am. Rep. 412; Hawley v. Northern C. R. Co. 82 N. Y. 370. Messrs. Rogers, Locke, & Milburn, for respondent: The defendant's method of fastening the windows of its building was not a violation of the statute requiring the construction and maintenance of fire escapes on the building. The defendant was not bound at common law to anticipate the destruction of its factory by fire, or to alter the adaptation of its internal arrangements to the conditions of the business with reference to the happening of a fire. Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 131 N. Y. 90, 15 L. R. A. 194; Jones v. Granite Mills, 126 Mass. 84, 30 Am. Rep. 661. The windows as they were had nothing to do with the death of the intestate as an operative cause. Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 131 N. Y. 98, 15 L. R. A. 194. When Huda was on the fourth floor if he had reached the fire escape on the north wall which was nearest to him he would have found a clear way to it through Hull having broken the window out and escaped that way. This point was absolutely fatal to any right of recovery in this action. Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 131 N. Y. 98, 15 L. R. A. 194; Ruppert v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 154 N. Y. 90; Bond v. Smith, 113 N. Y. 378; Taylor v. Yonkers, 105 N. Y. 209, 59 Am. Rep. 492; Morris v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 148 N. Y. 182. As the deceased was familiar with the defendant's method of screwing down the windows, and for a long period had worked under and acquiesced in that state of things, he assumed the risks of the situation, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Crown v. Orr, 140 N. Y. 452; Gibson v. Erie R. Co. 63 N. Y. 452, 20 Am. Rep. 552; Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372, 32 L. R. A. 367. Gray, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The appellate division of the supreme court in the fourth department has certified to this court certain questions for review in an action brought to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the defendant, whereby the 1897. HUDA V. AMERICAN GLUCOSE Co. A verdict | certified. They are: "(1) Whether the deplaintiff's intestate lost his life. was directed at the circuit for the defendant fendant's method of screwing down the winupon the evidence, and the appellate division, dows of the building in which the deceased after overruling the plaintiff's exceptions, was employed, so that there was no access to which were ordered to be first heard there, the fire escapes except by breaking the winunanimously ordered judgment to be entered dows, and forbidding the employees of the for the defendant. A brief preliminary state- defendant engaged in that building from openment of the facts, as established upon the ing the windows, and requiring them to keep trial, will aid in the discussion of the questions a high temperature in the work rooms, such certified. In the evening of April 12, 1894, as was necessary to accomplish the business the defendant's factory, in the city of Buffalo, carried on in these rooms, was a violation of was destroyed by fire. The building was the statute requiring a construction and maineight stories in height, and occupied a space tenance of fire escapes on such buildings. (2) of 160 feet on Scott street by 200 feet in depth. Whether doing the acts stated in the first The business conducted therein was the man- question, or any of them, was evidence of ufacture of glucose, and the deceased was one negligence on the part of the defendant that of the workmen employed. The fire was al- should have been submitted to the jury. (3) leged to have originated in some defect in the Whether the deceased, who was familiar with electric plant used for lighting the building. the defendant's methods as stated in the first When the fire broke out, the deceased was at question, and for a long period had worked work upon the sixth floor, and he, with some under and acquiesced in the conditions stated others, ran down the stairway to the fourth in the first question, assumed the risks of the floor, where the thick smoke prevented their situation; and whether by reason thereof, the further progress. Some of them then broke plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this acthrough a window, and escaped to the ground tion." by a fireman's ladder. The deceased was last seen near the foot of the stairway, and did not follow bis companions to the window. What, in fact, happened then to him is not known, and becomes purely a matter of presumption. There were three distinct stairways in this building leading from the top floor to the bottom floor, and two leading from the top floor A large covered bridge led to a flat roof. from the fifth and sixth floors to an adjoining building, which many of the workmen had been in the habit of using as a means of access to and of return from the four upper stories. Upon the outside of the building were three fire escapes extending from the roof to the ground; two being upon the south and one upon the north walls. Two windows upon each floor opened upon balconies which were constructed in connection with the fire In the process of the manufacture escapes. of glucose it was necessary that a high and uniform temperature should be kept up within the factory, and to that end the windows in the building were required to be kept closed. Directions to this effect being unobserved, at so nailed to the first strips of wood were sashes as to prevent the windows from being opened; but, these having been pried off at times, the more effective means had been resorted to, during the previous autumn, of screwing the sashes together, and notices were posted warning the workmen against opening or breaking the windows, under penalty of discharge. The windows in the building were constructed with two light sashes, containing, each, four panes of glass about 16 The sash frames were from an inches square. inch and a quarter to an inch and a half thick. The deceased had been working for the defendant for about twelve years, and the knowledge of the employees as to the fastening of the windows was testified to by several of the plaintiff's witnesses. When the fire occurred, the fire escapes were made use of by many by breaking through the windows, while some escaped by the stairways or by ladders. These facts are sufficient to inform us of the situation, and to enable us to consider the questions The statute referred to in the first question (Laws 1892, chap. 673, § 6) provided for the manner of construction of fire escapes upon factory buildings, and that they should have The landings or balconies of a certain size, "embracing at least two windows at each story and connecting with the interior by easily accessible and unobstructed openings." answer to the first question turns upon the propriety of the resort by the defendant to the methods adopted to keep the temperature of its factory sufficiently high and uniform. That such conditions were necessary is the fact assumed by the question, and it is conclusive here. Obviously, for their maintenance, the windows had to remain closed, and the duty of the defendant to its employees, in the face of that necessity, was not to interpose between them and the means of escape such a barrier in the description of windows constructed as would prevent a ready passage through them. The proof as to these windows is that they were so light in frame as to offer but the slightest difficulty in breaking through, if the time was wanting to unscrew them. The interior of the factory was connected with each balcony upon the fire escape through windows easily accessible by an unobstructed passage, If the windows, as "openings," were and the requirement of the statute was thus met. readily approached from the interior, and could be passed through, it cannot be said that the necessity of having to break them, which the testimony showed was easily done, constituted any greater obstruction than would have been the necessity of uncatching and of lifting them. The reading of the provisions of the statute, The construction of the upon the subject of fire escapes in factories must be reasonable, and in view of the demands of the case. fire escapes must be as prescribed for the outside of the factory building, and, unquestionably, that part of the law which requires a connection to exist with the interior is not to be slighted. But it would be wholly unreasonable to interpret the law as requiring a condition as to the openings upon the fire escapes In considering the third question certified, I think, with the assumption of facts to which the formulation of the question compels us, that but the one answer is possible, and that is that the deceased assumed the risks of the situation. An employee is very reasonably regarded as assuming those risks in his employ. ment which are obvious as well as ordinary. If the master has done all that his duty demanded of him with respect to securing the safety of his workmen, as to the place where they have been set to work, and as to the tools and appliances with which that work was to be done, he will not be liable for a personal injury occurring by reason of a risk which is incidental to the business itself, or which results from the dangers of the environment into which the workman knowingly entered, under which the successful prosecution of the business would forbid. There had to be a closed window during the manufacturing process, and, whether it was composed of one sash, or of two sashes fastened together, was imma terial, so long as it was readily removable by breaking through, and a ready access to and through it was preserved. The evidence shows that there was no serious obstruction at all to a passage to and through the windows. It must be borne in mind that all questions of fact are to be regarded as settled, with the unanimous affirmance by the appellate division, and we must assume every issuable fact in the case as determined below in favor of the defendant. Thus we have not before us any of the questions as to which negligence is alleged by the plaintiff except the one which relates to the defendant's method of prevent-proper instructions. In discussing this point ing its windows from being opened during the operation of its factory, and as to that discus sion is largely foreclosed by the assumption of fact that it was "necessary to accomplish the business carried on in these rooms." The first question certified is answered, therefore, in the negative. The second question certified must be like wise answered in the negative. The discussion of the first of the questions renders amplification of our views quite unnecessary. If the method adopted by the defendant was not a violation of the statute in question, then there was no evidence of negligence in that respect for submission to the jury. At common law there was no duty imposed upon the employer to provide fire escapes in anticipation of the burning of the building in which he employed his workmen. If his building was properly constructed for the purposes of its intended use, such extraordinary and unusual precau tions were not demanded of him. The statute of 1887 (chap. 462) created an absolute duty, and its effect was to give a cause of action for its breach in favor of anyone entitled to its observance and injured by a breach. Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 310, 34 Am. Rep. 536; Pauley v. Steam Gauge & Lantern Co. 131 N. Y. 90, 15 L. R. A. 194. For reasons already stated, I am unable to perceive any breach of duty here in the respect certified to us. It may be observed as it might have been in our discussion under the first question-that the evidence utterly fails to show that the condition of the windows had anything to do with the death of the deceased workman. It does not appear that he tried ineffectually, or at all, to get through them; and the manner of his death is left to surmise from the probabilities of his situation, when, upon his reaching the fourth floor, in his descent, he was involved in the smoke. 40 L. R. A we have to assume that the deceased met his death from a cause connected with the fastening of the windows, without, perhaps, sufficient in the evidence to warrant the assumption. But the difficulty is not so much in that assumption as in that found in the question certified. That compels us to assume the knowledge of the deceased of the defendant's methods, and his acquiescence in the conditions under which the work was necessarily done. The court below has passed upon those facts with all the force of findings, and the form of the question certified eliminates them from our review. If the deceased knew the defendant's methods and acquiesced in those resorted to by it in the conduct of its business, we are simply thrown back upon the discussion under the first question,-whether there was any violation of the statute in what the defendant did. Having reached the conclusion that there was none, no other conclusion, in the present stage of the discussion, is possible, than that the defendant added nothing to the risks assumed by its employees, and imposed none which they should not be regarded as assuming. Of course, it is not to be understood from what has been said that it necessarily follows that employees would assume such risks connected with the management of the business as would result from a violation by the employer of the statute in a neglect to provide fire escapes. That presents a different question. The first two of the questions certified are answered in the negative and the third question is answered in the affirmative, and it therefore follows that the judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Haight, J., absent. |