worth ridiculously less than the amount sued for. On the other hand, when you come to resist the attachment, you have got to give the plaintiff some corresponding relief. For instance, take attachments against railroads, wherein the practice has been almost everywhere abused a man, hoping to recover $2,000 or $3,000, sues for $25,000, gives a straw bond, attachment is issued, and it ties up rolling stock, all manner of accounts, and things of that kind. That ought not to exist, but before we can reach a conclusion, we must consider that we have got to give the plaintiff some proper protection against the road. Whatever may be the proper conclusion finally to be gotten at, this present proposed bill is in itself both insufficient, and, it seems to me, unfair to those persons who may need attachments legitimately and in the best of faith. It is difficult to say how you are going to prevent abuses in taking bonds. That there are notorious abuses in this regard is unquestionably true. It has got to come to the point perhaps of penalizing persons who take straw bonds knowingly, or take improper bonds without the right kind of qualifications. Whatever may be best, it is at least best not to touch this law until we have got something more far-reaching.

Mr. Frank Harwell (LaGrange): I agree with the gentleman who has just spoken. It is unwise to make a suggestion of this sort. We had better suggest something that will likely pass. I have not heard very many complaints with reference to attachments in the majority of the counties. These complaints that have been noted by the members of the bar originate mostly, I suppose, in the larger cities, where more damage suits are brought. I suppose in the majority of counties in this State, probably 135 out of the 140-odd counties, there are not many complaints with reference to these bonds. It would be better, if we have any legislation on this subject, to provide a penalty for the taking of straw bonds, or something of that kind, and not make it affect present practice in the matter of the legitimate issuing of attachments.

Mr. J. J. Strickland (Athens): It seems to me that the suggestion by this committee in Exhibit D is going a long way

towards getting the relief we want. It provides that before a bond shall be accepted it shall be signed by a surety company, regularly licensed to do business in this State, or by a man who is a free-holder, and shall qualify to an aggregate worth in excess of the amount of said bond over and above encumbrances and exemptions. It seems to me that that amendment will relieve us to a considerable extent. I think the best thing to do is to leave out Exhibit C and adopt Exhibit D. I make that as a motion.

The President: There is a motion before the house to adopt Exhibit C. This has been duly seconded and should be voted upon first.

This motion was then voted upon, and it was lost.

Mr. J. J. Strickland (Athens): Now, Mr. President, I move that we adopt Exhibit D.

This motion was seconded, voted upon, and carried.

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): The purpose of Exhibit E is to fix the venue for the return of attachments. It has occurred to the committee that it is an anomaly to have an attachment issued in one county and then go clear off to the opposite end of the State and make return of it. The object is to fix the venue in the county where the attachment is levied, or, if it is levied by garnishment, in some county in which at least one levy by seizure or garnishment has been made.

On motion this recommendation by the committee was adopted.

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): Exhibit F is intended to perfect the machinery for coöperation between the two courts, where an attachment issues out of one court in one county, and a person is garnished in another court in another county from the one out of which the attachment issues. As the law now stands, there seems to be no bridge between the two courts. For instance, if you levy an attachment by garnishment in a number of counties, you will have to make return to one of those courts, which we might term the court of original jurisdiction. All the other courts would become courts of ancillary jurisdiction. Now this section provides that these ancillary courts

shall be connected up, and bridged over to the court of original jurisdiction, and the ancillary courts shall not take any action whatever on pending garnishments until judgment has been obtained in the original court.

On motion this recommendation by the committee was adopted.

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): Exhibit G is perfectly plain. It is simply to hasten the filing of pleadings in attachment cases. It provides that the plaintiff shall file his declaration within ten days from the date on which the attachment shall issue.

Mr. H. C. Peeples (Atlanta): I have voted with a great deal of pleasure for the measures of relief proposed by the committee, but in this case I hardly think the committee have given enough time to the plaintiff in attachment. I know it frequently happens that an attachment has to be sued out on a telegram from some distant point, and there are cases likely to occur where ten days is not enough time for a client to get thorough information to his attorney, a distant attorney residing in Georgia, to enable that attorney to properly prepare the declaration. I would like to see that time extended. It seems to me that ten days is not quite enough.

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): Well, sir, is twenty days enough?

Mr. H. C. Peeples (Atlanta): I should think that would be much better.

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): The committee then accepts the suggestion and will substitute twenty days for the ten days named in Exhibit G.

On motion this recommendation by the committee. as amended was adopted.

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): Exhibit H simply requires that the attachment shall be immediately docketed. That suggestion arose from an experience I had in my own practice. An attachment was issued against my client, and the levy of the attachment stopped a very large enterprise and caused some 400 or 500 laborers to stand idle. The defendant was amply solv

ent. The claim was based on personal injuries, and very slight injuries, the case subsequently being settled for $25.00. That attachment was issued by a magistrate, and with all the help I could get, sending runners everywhere, I couldn't find out a thing in the world about it. The defendant lost some $2,000 simply because I couldn't find out the name of the case. The bond was all ready to dissolve it. It occurred to me that when such harsh process was issued there ought to be some place where it could be found out who it is, and what it is.

The President: Would it not be better to say "messengers" instead of "runners?"

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): Yes, it would, but I stated that I had already been retained. (Laughter.)

On motion this recommendation of the committee was adopted.

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Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): The next suggestion by the committee Exhibit I—is an independent bill on garnishments. It provides that "all summonses of garnishment issued out of any court in this State, whether based on judgment, attachment, or other suit, shall show in their face the amount of the judgment upon which they are based, or the amount claimed. under the attachment or other suit in aid of which they are issued, and any garnishee will be protected from any judgment against him in excess of the amount so stated in such summons of garnishment, notwithstanding such garnishee may have been indebted, or have had in his hands, property, money, or effects of the defendant in excess of such amount."

That practically abrogates an existing section of the Code, providing for the distribution of funds on garnishment, and the payment of court fees, but I do not think this section is of any practical importance. This way of holding up a large sum of money on a very small claim under garnishment ought certainly to be corrected, and I think it wise to make the plaintiff state to the garnishee how much he holds him for, and if he has funds or property in his hands in excess of the amount stated in the summons, he should be protected if he withholds the amount stated in the summons.

This recommendation by the committee was on motion adopted.

Mr. Alex W. Smith (Atlanta): It is quite warm this morning, and if my good friend Sibley, at whose suggestion the next recommendation (Exhibit J) was made, will explain it, I will be obliged to him. After that, by the earnest request of two of the judges, I wish to make two recommendations in addition to this report.

Mr. S. H. Sibley (Union Point): This suggestion in Exhibit J comes from judicial experience itself, rather than from that of the lawyer. I don't think that persons defending criminal charges will be at first blush in favor of it. The suggestion is in its nature somewhat revolutionary. I would be unwilling for the Bar Association to give assent to it without serious reflection, and at the same time I would not have them reject it without due consideration.

This whole thing centers around that provision of the Constitution which provides that no man shall twice be put in jeopardy, or rather what seems to be the abuse of the application of that principle of our criminal law. It seems to me that really the individual's right never to be tried twice for the same offense lies within the proposition, so far as society is concerned, that every man charged with a crime shall be once tried in a full, complete, and substantive sense. If he claims that he had ever had a trial, in which he was placed in jeopardy, it ought to be a trial in which he was actually and really in jeopardy. That is the foundation of these suggestions. The failure of the machinery of the law to give that sort of a trial is in my opinion more at the root of the spirit of lawlessness than any other one thing. This thing of a man frequently being arraigned before a court, and not tried, but discharged without a trial in a fair sense, is a thing that angers, and justly angers, people who are interested in the enforcement of the law. Now one of the things that has happened in my own experience more than once, is that a trial will be shifted from the question of guilty or not guilty on the merits of the charge to the question of whether the transaction occurred in this county or an adjoining county. In