seems to me that the proceedings in this case by the school authorities were in accordance with the requirements of the statute, and that, under section 1114 of the charter, above quoted, the decision of the school board was final, except so far as the relator may have a right of appeal to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. The alternative writ of mandamus must be dismissed, but, under the circumstances, without costs. Writ dismissed, without costs. HENRY C. GLASER, as Executor, etc., Plaintiff, v. THE NEW YORK PHYSICIANS MUTUAL AID ASSOCATION, Defendant. Interest (Supreme Court, New York Trial Term, June, 1900.) Where the time of default is uncertain. Where a debtor is in default for not paying money, delivering property or rendering services, in pursuance of his contract, he is chargeable with interest from the time of the defau't on the specified amount of money, or on the value of the property or services at the time it should have been paid or they should have been rendered. APPLICATION for interest on plaintiff's claim. H. F. Andrews, for plaintiff. John Sabin Smith, for defendant. GILDERSLEEVE, J. The question to be determined is whether plaintiff is entitled to interest on his claim. At the time of the death of plaintiff's testator, the said testator was a member in good standing of the defendant. On the 8th of February, 1899, letters testamentary were issued to the plaintiff. On April 19, 1899, proofs of the death of the said testator and proofs of the appointment of the plaintiff as executor were delivered to the defendant, and a deand made for the payment of $1,000, to which, under section 3 of article 5, of defendant's by-laws, the plaintiff was entitled. Payment was refused, and an action was brought, in which the said plaintiff has been successful. It is a general principle of law that where a debtor is in default for not paying money, delivering Supreme Court, June, 1900. [Vol. 32. property, or rendering services, in pursuance of his contract, he is chargeable with interest from the time of the default on the specified amount of money, or on the value of the property or services at the time they should have been paid or rendered. See Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, 2 N. Y. 135; Adams v. Fort Plain Bank, 36 id. 255; Board of Supervisors v. Clark, 92 id. 391. In the case at bar, it is difficult to determine the time of the default, owing to the wording of the by-laws of the defendant. I am inclined to the opinion that, under the circumstances, interest should be allowed on the claim from the 20th day of May, 1899. This allows the defendant thirty days after proof of death, in which to collect assessments, and seems to be, under the circumstances, a reasonable time for payment. Ordered accordingly. ELIZA A. MOORE, Plaintiff, v. MARIE LOUISE MOORE, individually and as Administratrix, etc., Defendant. Equity (Supreme Court, New York Special Term, June, 1900.) An accounting, which had been demanded, waived and a money judgment granted. The plaintiff brought an equitable action against the defendant. who was the widow and administratrix, with the will annexed, of the plaintiff's son, and also his sole legatee and devisee, upon allegations that the son was, at his death, indebted to the plaintiff, upon a formal account rendered, for moneys theretofore received by him in a fiduciary capacity. The plaintiff demanded an accounting, and a judgment against the defendant as administratrix for the amount which might be found to be due, further demanded an accounting in regard to certain real estate, devised by the son to the defendant, and in which the plaintiff alleged that her son had invested her moneys in whole or in part, and, upon this claim, she asked judgment against the defendant individually, either that the property be conveyed to her, or that the son's interest in it be sold to satisfy the debt. The defendant answered, making certain denials, but gave no evidence upon the trial of the action. Held, that the complaint showed a cause of action of an equitable nature, that the court would not remit the plaintiff to her remedy at law, that she would be permitted to waive the accounting which she Misc.] had demanded stances Supreme Court, June, 1900. as having become unnecessary under the circumthat she might also waive the relief demanded against the defendant individually as devisee of the real estate, and would be permitted to take merely a money judgment against the defendant as administratrix for the amount conceded to be due from the son and not paid by him or by the administratrix. ACTION for an accounting. Howland & Murray (Charles P. Howland and IIerbert S. Barnes, of counsel), for plaintiff. Whalen & Dunn (James A. Dunn, of counsel), for defendant. LAWRENCE, J. First. The amended supplemental complaint which was served in this action, pursuant to the authority given by the Special Term, and affirmed by the Appellate Division (44 App. Div. 253), contains an appropriate allegation as to the probate of the will, and that letters of administration with the will annexed, were duly granted to the defendant. The objection, therefore, which existed to the interlocutory judgment heretofore granted, was removed. See Moore v. Moore, 42 App. Div. 92. The complaint as it now stands avers in substance that at various times. previous to the 13th day of April, 1895, Gideon E. Moore, the decedent, who was a son of the plaintiff, collected for her, and had in his possession, and under his control, various sums of money, amounting to upwards of $20,000, the property of the plaintiff, and that plaintiff, at his request, permitted said Moore to have and retain the possession and control of said sums of money, for the purpose of caring for, and investing the same for the benefit of plaintiff, and that said Moore had said sums of money as plaintiff's property in a fiduciary capacity. That the said Gideon E. Moore departed this life on or about the 13th day of April, 1895, in the city of New York, leaving a last will and testament, a copy of which is hereto annexed and marked Exhibit A, and made a part of this complaint, which will was, on or about the 24th day of June, 1895, duly admitted to probate in the office of the Surrogate of the County of New York, and that letters of administration with the said will annexed were thereupon, on or about the 4th day of September, 1895, issued to the defendant above named, who is the widow of said Gideon E. Moore. That said will makes no mention of the plaintiff, or of the decedent's indebtedness to her, and nomi Supreme Court, June, 1900. [Vol. 32. nates the defendant, Marie Louise Moore, as sole devisee and legatee. That the legal title to the two pieces of property hereinafter described became vested in the defendant individually, and has remained vested in her up to the present time. That said decedent left no books of account or papers, except check-books and letter-press copy books, and that no other books or papers have been found relating to plaintiff's said property, and that plaintiff has been informed that the defendant, Marie Louise Moore, has been unable to find the same. That plaintiff has not been able to learn from books and papers found, the exact amount of plaintiff's property, principal and interest received by said Moore, nor the exact disposition of the same, but from the best information that plaintiff has been able to obtain, the said Moore was insolvent, and left personal property of a small amount, entirely insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. That since the appointment of Marie Louise Moore as administratrix, with the will annexed, on the 4th day of September, 1895, and the issuance of letters of administration to her, she has filed no inventory, no notice to creditors, and no accounting of her proceedings as administratrix, in the office of the Surrogate's Court in this county, nor has she procured her accounts as such administratrix to be judicially settled. That said Moore, at the time of his death, held the title to two pieces of real estate, situated in the city of New York. Then follows a description of the property, which was situated as follows: One lot on the southwesterly corner of Pearl and Platt streets, and one lot on the southerly side of Stone street the first piece of property being known as No. 121 Pearl street, and the second as No. 10 Stone street. It is further alleged that the premises above described were wholly or in part purchased with the money of the plaintiff, then held by the said Gideon E. Moore in a fiduciary capacity, and that the title thereto was taken by the said Gideon E. Moore in his own name, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, prays "that an accounting may be had between the plaintiff and the defendant, as administratrix with the will annexed, of the goods, chattels and credits of Gideon E. Moore, deceased, and that plaintiff may have a judgment against her as such administratrix, for the amount found due upon such accounting, or that an accounting may be had between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that the interest of the plaintiff in the said real property may be established and that the plaintiff have judgment directing Misc.] Supreme Court, June, 1900. the defendant to convey to her the said real property, or that an accounting may be had between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that the plaintiff have judgment directing that a sale of the said real property be had, and that payment be made to the plaintiff out of the proceeds of said sale of the amount of the plaintiff's money held by said Moore in a fiduciary capacity, and by him invested in the said real property, with interest, and that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant as administratrix, etc., for any deficiency arising from such sale, and such other and further relief as to the court may seem just." The first allegation of the complaint in reference to the money in the hands of the decedent, is denied by the answer. The allegations of the complaint as to the death of Moore, the probate of the will, and the issuance of letters of administration with the will annexed, to the defendant, and as to the legal title of the premises being vested in her individually, are also admitted by the defendant, but the remainder of the allegation, numbered as second, is denied. The allegation in paragraph three in said complaint, that decedent left no books of account, etc., is denied, but as to the remainder of said paragraph the defendant alleges that she has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief. It is admitted that the defendant has not filed an inventory or judicially settled her accounts, and it is alleged affirmatively that the plaintiff applied to the Surrogate's Court to compel the defendant to file an inventory and an account, and that said application was denied. It is admitted that Moore, at the time of his death held the title to the two pieces of real estate described in the complaint, but it is denied that the premises were wholly or in part purchased with money of the plaintiff, held by Gideon E. Moore in a fiduciary capacity. The six years' Statute of Limitations is also pleaded, and as a separate defense the defendant alleges that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. It is shown, either by the proofs or by the admissions contained in the defendant's answer, that Gideon E. Moore died on the 13th day of April, 1895, and that previous to that time he was, and for a considerable number of years had been, a resident of New York city, where he conducted the business of a chemist; that the plaintiff was his mother, and at the time of his death was eightyfour years old, and resided in Dresden, Saxony; that the decedent held in his hands a considerable amount of money, derived from different sources, belonging to the plaintiff, and that in a letter |