Misc.] Supreme Court, June, 1900. New York". The defendant, an American citizen, accepted the draft while sojourning in France, but did not in the acceptance designate any particular place for the payment of the obligation. The domicile of the defendant was in New York. Under such circumstances the draft was payable in New York at the place to which it was directed. The rule, briefly stated, is that where a bill of exchange is addressed to a drawee at a particular place, and the same is accepted generally by him, the address indicates the place where it is to be presented for payment, and a presentment there is sufficient. See 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 378; Cox v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 704. "Where a bill of exchange is specially addressed to the drawee, such address is presumed to be the place intended for its payment". 1 Rand. Com. Paper, § 26. The place for performance being in New York, the liability of the defendant as acceptor may be determined in accordance with the laws of that State. "It is by the law of the place where a bill of exchange is payable that we are to ascertain when it falls due, the days of grace belonging to it, the character of these delays, whether for the benefit of the holder or of the debtor; in one word, everything which relates to the right of requiring payment of the debt, or the performance of any other engagement, when the parties have not made any stipulation to the contrary. And it is of little consequence whether the person who demands payment is the creditor who made the contract, or an assignee of his right, such as the holder of a bill of exchange by indorsement ". Story Confl. of Laws, § 347; see, also, Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. 615. Such being the law, the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment. Judgment for plaintiffs. TOWNSEND WESTBROOK, Plaintiff, v. THE NEW YORK SUN AssoCIATION, Defendant. (Supreme Court, Orange Trial Term, June, 1900.) 1. Libel Words not charging a chief of police with assisting a criminal to escape - Right to arrest without a warrant. - A publication, of and concerning the chief of police of a village, that he was the last man who saw the defaulting cashier of a bank in the village, at its railroad station,, that he remarked to the cashier that he seemed in a great hurry to leave and in a joking manner Supreme Court, June, 1900. [Vol. 32. asked why he did not wait until a warrant came and save the trouble of following him up, is not libelous as charging the chief of police with assisting a criminal to escape, in violation of section 87 of the Penal Code. Semble, that the words in question contain no implication that the chief of police had violated his duty in not arresting the cashier without a warrant, nor any implication that he had reasonable cause for believing that the cashier had committed a felony. That a peace officer could arrest without a warrant only where a crime had been committed in his presence or, in the case of a felony, where he had reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed the crime. 2. Same - Pleader bound by the meaning he has attributed to words. Where the plaintiff has alleged that the words published have a particular libelous meaning, he is bound by the meaning alleged and cannot, on demurrer to the complaint, fall back on some other meaning, even though it may seem truer or more reasonable than the first. TRIAL of the issue of law raised by a demurrer to the complaint as not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The action is for damages for an alleged libel which is as follows: "Lewis E. Goldsmith assistant Cashier of the Port Jervis National Bank, who is accused of having stole $54,000.00, of the Bank funds, surrendered to United States Marshal Henkel at noon to-day having eluded a number of deputy Marshals who have been on his track for over two weeks under direction of United States Marshal Henkel. "United States Bank Examiner Bryan of Brooklyn made an examination of the Port Jervis bank books on Nov. 14th and found that Goldsmith was $54,000.00 short, he swore out a warrant December 12th but when United States Marshal Henkel went to Port Jervis to serve it he found that Goldsmith had left the place four days before very suddenly and without having left any intimations as to where he was going. Goldsmith made no secret of his intent to depart and the last man to say good bye to him at the Railroad station was the Chief of Police of Port Jervis who remarked to him that he seemed in a great hurry to leave and in a joking manner asked why he did not wait until the warrant came and save the trouble of following him up. Goldsmith replied that he had urgent business in another part of the Country, which required his immediate presence. The United States Deputy Marshal kept closely on Goldsmith's heels, but could not close on Misc.] Supreme Court, June, 1900. him for he left one place after another just before they got there. It is said Goldsmith visited places in Delaware and New Jersey in addition to this State." Wilton Bennet for plaintiff. Franklin Bartlett for defendant. GAYNOR, J.: Assuming that the plaintiff was chief of police at the time (which is not alleged, however), there is nothing in the publication implying that he neglected or violated his official duty in not arresting Goldsmith without a warrant. To say nothing of duty, he did not even have the right to arrest Goldsmith without a warrant for a crime of the grade of felony unless he saw him commit the felony, or, if he did not see it, unless a felony had as matter of fact been committed, and he had reasonable cause for believing that Goldsmith had committed it (Code) Crim. Pro. § 177). There is nothing in the publication implying that he had reasonable cause for such a belief. And in the case of crimes of the grade of misdemeanors, a policeman or peace officer may arrest without a warrant only when he actually sees the person commit the offense. He cannot do so on his own suspicion, nor on information communicated to him by others. His right to arrest for either a felony or a misdemeanor without a warrant is the same as that of any citizen, no more and no less (Code Crim. Pro. § 177, 183); except that in a case of felony, if the felony has actually been committed by some one, the law shields him from an action for false imprisonment for arresting without a warrant providing he had reasonable cause to believe the person arrested to be the one who committed the felony. One not an officer makes such an arrest for felony at his peril if he arrests the wrong person, but an officer is shielded if he have reasonable cause to believe such person to be the felon. This is the only difference in respect of the right of a policeman or peace officer, and of a private citizen, to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, and in respect of misdemeanors there is no difference. A policeman or peace officer has no more right to arrest a citizen except as prescribed by law than a citizen has to arrest him. The claim that this publication is libelous in that it implies that the plaintiff as a police officer neglected his duty grows out of the pernicious Supreme Court, June, 1900. [Vol. 32. notion which originated in the city of New York and seems to have spread over the state, that the police may arrest at pleasure without a warrant; whereas the citizen has the right to forcibly resist unlawful arrests. The complaint alleges as the libelous meaning of the publication that it charges the plaintiff with violating section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (meaning the Penal Code, no doubt) by assisting a criminal to escape. Having alleged that as the libelous meaning, he must stand upon it alone. He cannot now bring up some other meaning. By alleging a particular meaning he has excluded all other meanings. The defendant cannot be required to plead to some other meaning, even though it might seem truer or more reasonable than the one the plaintiff bases his action on (Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. Rep. 35, and cases there cited). In the recent case of Morse v. Press Pub. Co. (49 App. Div. 375) the learned justice writing cites from Odgers the English rule of practice, that if the plaintiff fails on the meaning he has alleged in his pleading he may on the trial fall back on the natural meaning of the words. But that is the English rule only because under the present system of pleading in England the complaint in such case is deemed to have two counts, one being upon the words in their natural meaning; and when the count alleging the particular meaning fails the plaintiff falls back upon the other count. This was the former way of pleading, and by a rule the present reformed pleading in England is to be deemed to the same effect (Townshend on L. & S. sec. 338 and note). But we have no such rule, and its citation here is incongruous and inapplicable. I do not understand the point to have been decided in the case cited. There is no implication in the present publication of a violation of the said section of the Penal Code. It relates only to facilitating the actual escape of prisoners out of prison, whereas Goldsmith was not in prison. The demurrer is sustained. Misc.] County Court, Queens County, June, 1900. Matter of the Application of OSCAR G. STUMPP and Others, Judgment Creditors, for an Examination of FRITZ STARKE, Judgment Debtor. (County Court, Queens County, June, 1900.) 1. Municipal Court of the city of New York - Judgment docketed on transcript therefrom is in Supreme Court. A judgment docketed in any county in the territory of the city of New York on a transcript from the Municipal Court of said city is a judgment of the Supreme Court, and upon it the county clerk issues execution as out of the latter court. 2. Same - Enforcement of judgment in a county not within district of Municipal Court. No county clerk of said territory can docket a judgment upon a transcript from such a Municipal Court unless the district of the said court is within his county; and, therefore, if it is desired to enforce such a judgment in another county of said territory, a transcript must first be filed and docketed with the county clerk of the county containing the district where the judgment was rendered, and thereafter a transcript of the latter judgment must be filed and docketed in the county where the judgment is to be enforced, the clerk of the latter county issuing execution thereon as in and for the Supreme Court. THIS is a proceeding supplementary to execution to examine the judgment debtor. The judgment was rendered by the Municipal Court of the city of New York, first district, borough of Manhattan, on the 26th day of March, 1900. A transcript thereof was duly filed in the office of the clerk of the county of New York, the county embracing that judicial district, and a judgment thereon duly docketed in said clerk's office. Thereafter a transcript of the judgment thus docketed by the county clerk of New York county was filed and judgment thereon duly docketed by the clerk of Queens county in his office. Execution was thereupon issued out of the Supreme Court by the clerk of the latter county to the sheriff of his county. Execution was returned unsatisfied. Thereafter, upon an affidavit of one of the attorneys for the judgment creditors, the county judge of |