Surrogate's Court, Washington County, June, 1900. * * * [Vol. 32. of the decedent passing, but to the property only, which "passes by any such transfer, to, or for, the use of any brother or sister." Here is no ambiguity. There is no need of a statutory definition because the word is defined definitely by its connection and environment. The sentence proceeds: "Such transfer shall not be taxed unless it is personal property of the value of ten thousand dollars or more." There can be no doubt as to what the word "it" relates to. It refers unmistakably to the earlier clause of the sentence, and to the property which "passes by any such transfer to, or for, the use of any brother, sister." There is no property alluded to, in this sentence, aside from the property passing to any brother or sister. When this property is real estate, it is exempt, and when it is personal property of less than $10,000, it is also exempt. The section throughout deals with exemptions. Its title is "exceptions and limitations." Only one interpretation can be given to the section upon its reading. It provides that all real estate passing to certain classes shall be exempt, and that personalty so passing shall be exempt up to the sum of $10,000. The word "property" is not used in the sentence in such a way that the statutory definition can be applied. Its meaning is each time determined by the context. Passing for a moment from the consideration of the question of literal interpretation to the question of intent, it should be noted that side by side in this enumeration with brother and sister, stand wife and child, and the children of a deceased child. Can the thought be entertained for a moment that the Legislature intended to impose a tax upon personal property passing to wife, children and grandchildren, without it aggregated a fairly respectable amount? Did the Legislature intend to provide a definite exemption for this class of persons, or did it intend to leave the amount of the exemption to be determined by decedent's liberality to collaterals, in case of testacy, and to the chances of death of the closest next of kin in case of intestacy? Take, for instance, in intestacy, the case of a man, one of ten brothers and sisters. His estate is worth net $10,000. Eight of his brothers and sisters have died leaving descendants. One sister survives. Is it supposable that the intent of the law is to tax the one-ninth of the estate going to the sister, for the reason that that added to the aggregate amount passing to collaterals makes the sum of $10,000? This question of intent is an important one, for its ascertainment is the ultimate Misc.] Supreme Court, July, 1900. object of all statutory construction. When the real design of the Legislature can be ascertained or is plainly perceivable, the language used must be given such interpretation as will carry it into effect, even at the sacrifice of the exact letter of the law. Here, however, intent and literal interpretation go hand in hand. The letter of the statute clearly and definitely expresses the desire of the Legislature to protect from taxation a certain class of next of kin up to a certain amount. * * * * * The respondent, however, claims that the statutory definition of the word "property " must be accepted. This definition is given in section 242 of the Tax Law. Reduced to its application here: "The words * * * and 'property' * * * shall be taken to mean the property of the testator, intestate * passing or transferred to those not herein specifically exempted from the provisions of this article and not as property passing or transferred to individual legatees, devisees, heirs, next of kin." It will be seen that this definition does not affect the question under discussion. It applies only to the property passing "to those not herein specifically exempted.” Here we are considering the property passing to an exempted class, and such property is expressly excepted from the operation of the definition. The decree should be reversed as to the tax determined upon the shares of the brother and sister, and a decree entered exempting these shares from taxation. Decree reversed. THE PEOPLE ex rel. JoпN С. BARTH, Relator, v. THE BOARD OF TOWN CANVASSERS OF THE TOWN OF BUSTI, THE BOARD OF INSPECTORS OF ELECTION DISTRICT No. 1, and THE BOARD OF INSPECTORS OF ELECTION DISTRICT No. 2 IN SAID TOWN, Respondents. (Supreme Court, Chautauqua Special Term, July, 1900.) Invalid election as to local option 1. Liquor Tax Law ter which a citizen can attack. A mere stockholder in, and the manager of, a hotel corporation, selling liquor to its guests, has no status to question the validity of a town election, held in the town where the hotel is situated and de Supreme Court, July, 1900. [Vol. 32. ciding against local option, where the corporation itself is not a party to the proceeding, as such a matter is not within the rule of law which authorizes a proceeding to be prosecuted by any citizen having an interest, as one of the public, in the performance, by a .public officer, of a public duty which ought to be performed in the interest of the public. 2. Same-Remedy by mandamus to canvassers and inspectors. Semble, that where a person has sufficient standing to attack an invalid town election authorizing local option, he is entitled to a mandamus compelling the canvassers and inspectors to reconvene and reject the ballots cast upon that question. The remedy of a special election provided in such case by the Liquor Tax Law is not adequate, as it depends upon the co-operation, by petition, of ten per cent. in number of the electors of the town according to the vote cast at the next preceding general election, and also upon an order of the Supreme or County Court. Semble, that an election as to local option is void where there was a failure to comply with such provisions of the Election Law and of the Town Law as are applicable thereto, and where the petition itself was insufficient under the Liquor Tax Law. APPLICATION by the relator for a writ of peremptory mandamus requiring the above named boards of inspectors and boards of town canvassers to reconvene and reject all votes cast in said election districts upon the subject of local option at the election of November 7, 1899. Wentworth & Wentworth and Norman M. Allen, for motion. Frank Stevens, opposed. WHITE, J. The relator, John C. Barth, is the owner of 125 out of the whole 150 shares of the capital stock of the Lakewood Hotel & Land Company, a domestic corporation that owns two hotels in the said town of Busti; these hotels entertain from 300 to 400 guests during the summer season, many of whom are accustomed to the use of wines and liquors, and who would not patronize the hotels if they were not licensed. Misc.] Supreme Court, July, 1900. The biennial town meeting of the town of Busti was held November 7, 1899, at the same time as the general election in that year. There are two election districts in said town, and at said town meeting the four excise propositions, or questions, provided for by section 16 of the Liquor Tax Law were voted upon by the electors of said town at said town meeting. The ballot furnished to and used by such electors in voting upon such questions was in form an official ballot under the Election Law of the State, containing upon its face not only the four cxcise, or local option, questions, but the four questions upon the then proposed four constitutional amendment questions submitted to the voters of the State at said general election. The ballot was furnished by the clerk of the county. No other ballot was used by the electors of the town in voting upon the local option ques tions. The vote upon the questions (four) whether hotels in said town should be licensed, resulted in favor thereof, 113, and against the proposition, 228. A few days prior to October 18, 1899, the town clerk of Busti received three several petitions signed, the first, by twenty-two individuals representing themselves to be duly qualified voters of said town, the second, by sixteen, and the third by seventeen individuals representing themselves to be duly qualified voters of said town, asking that said clerk cause to be procured ballots for the town meeting to be held in said town November 7, 1899, for the purpose of submitting to the voters of said town, according to articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of section 19 of chapter 112 of the Laws of 1896, pertaining to the liquor question. The signing of the first of said petitions was acknowledged by the persons named in and who subscribed it, before A. P. Simons, a notary public, on the 25th, 27th, and 30th days of September, 1899. At the foot of the second of said petitions, which is dated September twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh, is the following clause: "We, the above named legal voters of the town of Busti, did, on the above named dates, subscribe our names to the above petition for the purpose set forth therein. Sworn to before me this 27th day of September, 1899. "J. P. ALEXANDER, J. P." Supreme Court, July, 1900. [Vol. 32. A certificate of the acknowledgment of the third of said petitions in due form by the persons signing the same is made by H. N. Brown, a justice of the peace in said town of Busti. On the 18th day of October, 1899, the clerk of Busti filed said petitions with, and in the office of the clerk of Chautauqua county; no copies thereof thereafter remained with, or in the office of, the clerk of the town. No notice of any kind was given or posted by the town clerk that such local option questions would be voted upon at the election of November 7, 1899. No separate ballot-boxes were provided or used for the reception of the local option ballots. The Lakewood Hotel & Land Company had a license for its said hotels which expired April 30, 1900. Such license was in the name of Morris Partridge, as the manager of said hotels. It was stated by the counsel for the respondents upon the argument, and not controverted by the counsel for the relator, that the relator keeps and operates said hotels as the agent or manager of the corporation, and such seems to be a fair inference from Barth's own statement of the facts. The relator's claim and statement in the moving papers is that he, as an individual, is entitled to such license, and that the company has authorized him to make this application. The existence and rights of a township are recognized, and as yet remain zealously guarded, by law. In matters purely local the will of its electors, when lawfully expressed, is supreme. In giving expression thereto, of course, all essential requirements of the law must be observed and complied with. The first question raised upon the argument of this motion is whether or not a clear legal right possessed by the relator was infringed or prejudiced by the election in Busti, and the result thereof as declared, assuming such election to have been illegal. This application for a mandamus is made by John C. Barth, as an individual. The hotel corporation is not in any way a party to the proceeding. The statement that the hotel company has authorized him to make it in no way effects his status in the proceeding. No facts are stated from which it can be inferred that, as an individual, he would be entitled to a license for the hotels. Upon the argument it was stated by counsel for the respondents, and not controverted by counsel for the relator, that, in fact, he is keeping and operating the hotels as agent for the corporation, and not. otherwise, and such is the only fair inference from the moving |