Freeman v. Gainsford, K. & G. 448; 31 L. J., C. P. 33. Steele v. Bosworth, 34 L. J., C. P. 47; H. & P. 106. So where the corporation of a town let out certain acres of land of which they were possessed to "poor and necessitous burgesses," on payment of a small rent, and in accordance with certain bye-laws made by them, by which it was provided, that on the death of such burgess his widow should continue to occupy, if resident in the borough; it was held that such an estate was either a tenancy at will or from year to year, terminable at the pleasure of the corporation, or an occupation by the corporation itself, by means of their servants, and that the tenant had not a freehold interest sufficient to confer a vote, although in practice the burgess once admitted occupied for life. Fernie v. Scott, L. R. 7, C. P. 202; 1 H. & C. 718; 41 L. J., C. P. 20. And a mere right to a variable money-payment, though it issues out of land, is clearly not sufficient, Simey v. Marshall, L. R. 8, C. P. 269; 2 H. & C. 1 ; 42 L. J., C. P. 49. But where lands were vested by Act of Parliament in certain deputies, to be allotted in parcels to certain freemen of a borough to hold at a rent, observing certain rules, as long as they (the tenants) should be willing, a power of re-entry being reserved to the deputies in case any freeman should be in arrear for fourteen days, or should fail to conform to the rules, it was held, that the allottees had an estate of such uncertain duration as to amount to a freehold. Beeson v. Burton, 12 C. B. 647; 22 Ashmore v. Lees, 2 C. B. So where the bedesmen L. J., C. P. 33; 2 Lutw. 225; and see Where the owners of a freehold rent-charge of 1207. per annum conveyed it to themselves as trustees for thirty-four persons, to each a 54th share at the price of 521. 58. per share (20 shares being retained by the trustees), "their heirs and assigns absolutely," with power to such persons to sell their shares, subject Percival, 18 C. B., N. S. 45, 46; H. & P. 130, 131; 34 L. J., C. P. 87; and Bovill, C. J., in Hadfield's case, L. R. 8, C. P. 311; 2 H. & C. 89. FREEHOLD INTEREST. FREEHOLD to a right of pre-emption by the trustees: but the deed also re INTEREST Benefice (m). Perpetual or curate. served an absolute power of sale of the rent-charge by the trustees without the consent of any one; it was held nevertheless that the trustees could not exercise such power without being accountable to the cestui que trusts for the proceeds, and therefore that each of the thirty-four persons was entitled to a sufficient freehold interest to confer the franchise. Ashworth v. Hopper, 1, C. P. D. 178; 2 H. & C. 283; 45 L. J., C. P. D. 99. A benefice, or office to be holden for life, and having certain fixed emoluments attached to it (arising out of land), is a freehold entitling the owner to vote. Middlesex, 2 Peck. 93. So also, if the condition on which he holds his appointment be quamdiu se bene gesserit, he has a freehold; for the law will not presume that a person will forfeit for misconduct. But where there appear, either in the deed (n) creating the office, or the usages connected with it, to be any circumstance or condition militating against the supposition that the holding depends on the officer's life or good conduct, e.g., that he holds at the will of others, or that he can be removed for any other cause than his own misconduct, there the office loses its freehold character. A perpetual curate appointed by the lay impropriator, where there stipendiary is no spiritual rector or vicar, has a benefice for life; and, if he have a house or land assigned to him, or a fixed salary charged upon land to the value of 40s. per annum, is entitled to vote, whether his title to such salary or charge be legal or equitable only. Male. 273. Wallis v. Birks, L. R. 5, C. P. 222. A perpetual curate, however, whose only income is derived from Queen Anne's Bounty and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, paid out of funds which do not arise from land within the parish for which he claims, to fees for burials in a cemetery, also out of such parish, is not entitled, although he may also be entitled to fees for marriages, baptisms, and churchings, performed within his church, such fees being for (m) The word "benefice" is now limited to ecclesiastical preferments, comprehending not only churches parochial, but also dignities, such as deaneries, archdeaconries, canonries, prebends, &c. 3 Inst. 156. (n) In strictness the appointment to an office should be by deed, as being an incorporeal hereditament of which it is impossible to give seisin. Burton R. Pro. 395. However, in R. v. Bobbing, 1 N. & P. 166; 5 A. & E. 682, a parol appointment by the parson not signified to the parish was held to be sufficient. Acc. Roberts v. Drewitt, post, p. 15. But there must be some evidence to found the inference of an appointment having been made. R. v. Stogarsey, 1 B. & Ad. 795. An appointment of a parish clerk by the curate, licensed by the bishop to officiate during the suspension of the vicar, is good. Pinder v. Barr, 4 E. & B. 105. INTEREST. his personal services only, by custom or Acts of Parliament, and FREEHOLD not arising out of land. Kirton v. Dear, L. R 5, C. P. 217; 1 H. & C. 349; 39 L. J., C. P. 36. masters. A mere stipendiary curate of course has no freehold. Schoolmaster "from time to time to be put there by approba- Schooltion of J. N. and his heirs." Vote bad. Bedfordshire, 2 Lud. 428. The appointment recited that no person qualified according to the will of the founder having offered himself, W. I. was appointed, till a person properly qualified shall offer. Vote bad. Ibid. 429. Ibid. 430.-G. and M., appointed by the lord of the manor of S. who thought he had no power to remove. Vote good. Ibid. 431.-P. T., appointed under a deed whereby an estate was settled on the rector on condition that he should “apply out of the rents 51. per annum to one or more schoolmasters or mistresses." The rector did not know that he had the power of removal, and never knew an instance of it. Vote good. Ibid. 497.-W. G., appointed by the vicar, received 40s. per annum, issuing out of lands charged "for the benefit of the school." Vote good. Sed quære; for the receipt of the salary seems to have been independent of any right which the voter had to demand it, or of any obligation on the vicar to pay it. Under the words of the deed, the vicar might have applied the rentcharge to any other purpose beneficial to the school, such as repairs, clothing, &c. And see R. v. Owersley-le-Moor, 15 East, 356. Middlesex, 2 Peck. 92.-Licensed clerk, appointed by the parson generally; license from the bishop, confirming the appointment, Parish "during our pleasure, and no longer." Argued, that the office clerks. was held at the pleasure of the bishop; and no evidence of an appointment by the parson. Answered, that the license was not necessary; and that a general appointment is prima facie for life. Vote good. And see R. v. Warren, Cowp. 371; R. v. Gaskin, 8 T. R. 209; 1 P. Wms. 2; 29 Salk. 536; Strange, 942; in notis infra. Acc. Roberts v. Drewitt, 18 C. B., N. S. 48; H. & P. 132. See Nichols v. Davis, L. R. 4, C. P. 80. The above cases only decide that the office of parish clerk shall prima facie be taken to be for life, and therefore that it possesses one of the requisites for a vote; viz., a freehold interest. The interest must still be in land in right of his office; Middlesex, 2 Peck. 93. In Bushell v. Eastes, K. & G. 484 ; 31 L. J., C. P. 44, it was decided, that a parish clerk, who received, as of right, certain fees of sufficient amount, for assisting at burials, was not entitled to vote, as the holder of an interest in land. But a parish clerk entitled, in right of his office, to one-twelfth part of a piece of land of sufficient value is entitled. Roberts v. Drewitt, supra. FREEHOLD Sextons. Vestry elerk. Clerk to justice. Town clerk. Clerk to poor-law guardians. Clerk to road trus tees. Clerk of the peace. Dissenting ministers (o). Middlesex, 2 Peck. 91.—Merrick's case. He was elected generally, but no proof of an appointment for life. Vote bad. Acc. ibid. (Gladman's case). The appointment of sexton does not seem to be primâ facie for life: it may be so by express words; or perhaps by general words, if there be a custom in the parish to appoint for life. See Bushell v. Eastes, supra. Vestry clerks cannot be appointed for life. 5 T. R. 713. R. v. Croydon, So a clerk to justices in petty sessions appointed by order of such sessions has no legal hold of his office. Ex parte Sandys, 4 B. & Ad. 863. So a mandamus does not lie to admit a town clerk. R. v. Stratford-upon-Avon, 1 Lev. 291; see Dighton's case, 1 Vent. 82. Nor to admit a clerk and treasurer of poor law guardians. R. v. St. Nicholas, Rochester, 4 M. & S. 324. But it does to admit a clerk to trustees under the General Turnpike Acts. R. v. Cheshunt, 5 B. & Ad. 438. A clerk of the peace has no freehold interest in house or land in right of his office. Middlesex, 2 Peck. 93 (Selby's case). There can be no general rule applicable to all cases of dissenting ministers each case must be judged of according to its own circumstances, the terms of the appointment, or the customs of the particular body by whom the appointment is made. See Gloucestershire, 2 Lud. 430; Bedfordshire, ibid. 432. In the absence of any specific provision in the deed, it seems that usage, and any agreement or understanding entered into between the minister and the parishioners for the time being as to the duration of the office, are the points for inquiry by the barrister. The test is, whether, if the trustees brought ejectment against the minister without any legal cause for removal, a Court of Equity would grant an injunction to restrain it. Collier v. King, K. & G. 400; 11 C. B. 14; 31 L. J., C. P. 80, per Cur. In some congregations, the first call to a minister is for a limited and probationary term; when, if approved, he receives a second call in general terms to become the minister of the congregation in the latter cases there can be little doubt that, by analogy to other appointments in general terms, such an appointment is, in law, for life (p). In others, again the minister holds (0) In R. v. Jotham, 3 T. R. 575, it was held that a mandamus does not lie to admit a dissenting minister who has not complied with the preliminary ceremonies which the particular sect requires in order to give him a prima facie title. (p) But this is not, it seems, a necessary inference; Collier v. King (infra); in which case the circumstances of the call were as above. INTEREST. throughout at the will of the trustees or congregation. Some- PREEHOLD times the trustees of chapels, having the sole interest in themDissenting selves, subject to the condition of allowing the use to some ministers. congregation mentioned in the deed, or will permit a particular minister to use the chapel in such cases there would be nothing to warrant the presumption of an appointment for life. See Doe v. Jones, 10 B. & C. 718; and Doe v. Mackay, ib. 721. It may be assumed that whenever lands are held by A., in trust to pay the rents to C., a person named in the deed, so long as C. shall officiate as the minister of a particular congregation, C. is the cestui que trust under the deed, and has an equitable estate in the lands. In such a case, although it may have been stipulated that he should be removable at the will of the congregation, C. would still have a freehold interest by the express words of the deed which though defeasible by the congregation, would still be an indeterminate interest, and consequently an estate of freehold. The ordinary provisions of such deeds, however, are, not to pay to a person specially named in the deed, but to pay to the person, without naming him, who shall be the minister of the particular congregation. The distinction between the two cases is obvious: in the latter, the trust is created for the support of the office, in the former for the individual benefit of the person whilst he holds the office. Wherever, therefore, the office is the object of the provision in the deed, the question whether the holder of the office has or has not a freehold in such rents and profits, depends upon the estate he has in the office; and hence it is necessary to ascertain the interest he has in the office itself, for he has no interest in the rents themselves, except so far as incidental to his office. And if the appointment be permanent or general quamdiu se bene gesserit, the holder of the office, the other requisites of the qualification being satisfied, will be entitled to vote. Where, however, the minister holds at the will of the congregation, or under any other circumstances inconsistent with a permanent interest in the office, he will not, it seems be entitled. Where a minister was invited to become pastor by the deacons, and upon this invitation took possession of a house vested in trustees, on trust to permit the minister of the chapel during his life "if he should so long continue pastor," to occupy the same without paying any rent; and the minister stated that his appointment was general, and for life, the Court held that he had an equitable estate for life in the house, &c., and was entitled to vote. Burton v. Brooks, 21 L. J., C. P. 7; 11 C. B. 41; 2 Lutw. 197. But where the deed was upon trust to permit a dwelling-house to be occupied by the minister for the time being as his residence, and was silent as to the manner and duration of his appointment, |