in Chief, either in time of peace or war, is under the supreme control of Congress. The Constitution need not have made the President the Commander in Chief. Wisely, however, it did so, combining with executive power the power of command. It is conceded by the distinguished Senator from Ohio that in the absence of Congressional rules the President is Commander in Chief. Congress having raised and appropriated money for the support of an army, but having failed to make rules for its government would, ex necessitate rei, have the power to make those necessary for the government of the Army and Navy. That would not be simply because of necessity, I think, but because the Constitution has made the President Commander in Chief without defining the functions. This involves the power to do those things which inhere in the office or are necessary to the discharge of the duties of the office. The Constitution is to be read as a whole, and provisions pari materia are to be read together, each in the light of the other. No clause in the Constitution is to be so construed as to destroy another clause or clauses. Now, I admit the power of Congress over the subject of enlistment. I admit Congress may say properly that no enlisted man shall be discharged before the expiration of his term of enlistment except upon the finding of a board of officers. I admit that the Congress may provide that no man shall be reënlisted unless his service during the preceding term was honest and faithful. This is one of the "rules" made by Congress now in force. I admit that Congress might provide it would not that men who shall have been dishonorably discharged by sentence of court-martial may be reënlisted in the Army of the United States upon making satisfactory proof to a board or complying with such other terms as the Congress might provide as showing changed behavior.

But there must be a distinction between the words "Congress may make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces" and the words Congress shall govern the land and naval forces." The one would make the power to govern absolute; the other is restrictive as to the manner in which the governmental power of Congress shall be exercised. I repeat on the point a few sentences already read, which certainly declare the law.

It is true that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress the exclusive power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces"; that the two powers are distinct; neither can trench upon the other; the President can not, under the disguise of military orders, evade the legislative regulations by which he in common with the Army must be governed, and Congress can not in the disguise of "rules for the government" of the Army impair the authority of the President as Commander in Chief. (28 Court of Claims, 221.)

Mr. FORAKER. Will the Senator give the citation?

Mr. SPOONER. It is 28 Court of Claims, the Swaim case, page 221.

In that case it was held, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, that the President by virtue of his function as Commander in Chief may order a general court-martial.

Now, Mr. President, is there no function that is not subject to the control of Congress involved in the designation Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States? I have never heard it denied until yesterday that the assignment of officers to particular commands and the disposition of troops throughout the country was not a part of the power of command, and I was amazed that a lawyer of the great ability of my friend from Georgia should suggest — I do not know that he would contend for it - that Congress can provide that a particular officer shall be assigned to a particular troop or that where a regiment or a company has been assigned by the Commander in Chief to a particular State Congress can by resolution, which has the effect of law, countermand that order. If that is correct, it may fix the designation or location to which that command shall be transferred. I never heard it suggested before, Mr. President, that as commander of the Army and Navy the President had not the power to send the war ships hither and yon as in his judgment is best for the country and the people. The President, as Commander in Chief, acting through the Secretary of War, having lawfully assigned a colored battalion or a colored regiment to Texas for duty, Congress could not constitutionally pass a resolution revoking that order, or, if it had been executed, requiring the President to transfer those troops from Texas to some other State. If the intense construction which the Senator from Georgia puts upon the word "government" in this clause is the law, the Constitution did not constitute the President Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, but constituted him the Adjutant-General of the Congress, and gave him no power to issue a military order in time of peace not revocable and supplantable by a joint resolution of Congress.

Pomeroy says of the powers of the Commander in Chief, inter alia, on page 472:

The President's duties in respect to these various subjects may thus be clearly defined and controlled by the legislature

Indicating matters of Congressional jurisdiction with which I agree

But in time of peace he has an independent function. He commands the Army and Navy; Congress does not. He may make all dispositions of troops and officers, stationing them now at this post, now at that; he may send out naval vessels to such parts of the world as he pleases; he may distribute the arms, ammunition, and supplies in such quantities and at such arsenals and depositories as he deems best. All this is a work of ordinary routine in time of peace, and is probably left, in fact, to the Secretaries of War and of the Navy and to military officers high in command.

The inevitable effect of the construction contended for by the Senator must lead to its rejection. If the power of Congress over the Army and over the Commander in Chief of the Army is as broad as he suggests, there is no order in time of peace which the President can make himself or through the Secretary of War which can not be countermanded or set aside by an act of Congress dealing solely with that order. If the Commander in Chief makes a lawful order discharging A. B. from the Army for the good of the service, he or some friend appeals to a Senator or Member of Congress to introduce and work for the passage of a joint resolution restoring A. B. to the army, or, in effect, revoking the order of the Commander in Chief. It would be contended that a stigma had been put unjustly upon this man; that he had been discharged from the Army without a hearing; that he had been denied the right, which all men should have, to a "day in court." There would be no limit to the cases in which Congress would be asked to sit as a court of appeals for the review of errors committed by the Commander in Chief in individual cases and to set them aside. All through the Army the Congress, not the Commander in Chief, would be the ultimate power in the minds of enlisted men, and if anything can be imagined which would be destructive of discipline in the Army it would be such a system. Does the Senator think that an order lawfully made by the Commander in Chief, discharging without honor A. B. could be revoked by the Congress.

Mr. BACON. I do not want to interrupt the Senator; I did not expect to take any part in this debate; I am agreeing with the Senator upon the conclusion he reaches; but I am simply differing from him as to the particular road over which he travels to reach it. But as the Senator directs himself to me so pointedly in the inquiry he has just propounded, without undertaking to go into any general discussion of the matter which I am sure he recognizes would be improper and which I would not desire to do at this time - I simply call his attention, in response to the inquiry directly addressed to me by the Senator himself, to the fact that I presume he has in innumerable instances voted to correct the military record of soldiers who have been convicted by courts-martial of desertion.

Mr. SPOONER. Yes.

Mr. BACON. And correcting their record by name, legislating directly upon the point.

Mr. BACON. Of course, the Senator will excuse me from elaborating or answering at large; but I simply suggest the possibility that that may be a reply to the inquiry propounded to me by the Senator.

Mr. SPOONER. Well, Mr. President, there can be no question but that would not be a rule for the regulation and government of the Army. Mr. BACON. No; but, as I understood the Senator, his inquiry was addressed to the point whether or not Congress could legislate as to the

particular individual, regarding anything which had been done by the direct order of the President. An order of a court-martial is under the authority of the President; and when a man is discharged by the judgment of a court-martial, he is practically discharged by order of the President. The inquiry of the Senator was, whether or not Congress could by legislation directly overturn the order of the President dismissing a man. It can overturn the order of a court-martial and restore a man to the rolls with honor, and make him eligible to draw a pension. It seems to me that that probably would be a case such as the Senator suggests.

Mr. SPOONER. No, Mr. President. There are a great many cases, thousands of them, cases that occurred during the war, cases, as to officers and cases as to enlisted men, having nothing whatever to do with the current discipline of the Army, cases in which, during the excitement and the haste and the tumult of war, injustice has been done to soldiers, dishonorable discharges and dismissals from the Army by the President, and all that, in which Congress has afforded relief. But Congress has never passed an act upon the theory that it restored those men to the Army; that it made void the act of the President or the act of the court-martial.

GROVER CLEVELAND, THE GOVERNMENT IN THE

CHICAGO STRIKE OF 18941

[One of the acts of the federal executive which aroused the greatest amount of discussion was President Cleveland's use of the military forces in the suppression of the Chicago strike of 1894. The action of the President in this matter was carried out under his constitutional power "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The interference of the federal government rested upon the necessity of protecting the mail service. The bringing of federal troops into a commonwealth for this purpose aroused strong opposition as it was claimed that the state should have been allowed singly to deal with the disturbance. All phases of this most interesting action and controversy are brought out in the account subsequently written by President Cleveland, the most important parts of which are here reproduced.]

THE President inaugurated on the 4th day of March, 1893, and those associated with him as cabinet officials, encountered, during their term of executive duty, unusual and especially perplexing difficulties. The members of that administration who still survive, in recalling the events of this laborious service, can not fail to fix upon the year 1894 as the most troublous and anxious of their incumbency. During that year unhappy currency complications compelled executive resort to heroic

1

1 McClure's Magazine (July, 1004), 23: 227. Reproduced in part, with permission. Copyright 1904, by the S. S. McClure Co.

treatment for the preservation of our nation's financial integrity, and forced upon the administration a constant, unrelenting struggle for sound money; a long and persistent executive effort to accomplish beneficent and satisfactory tariff reform so nearly miscarried as to bring depression and disappointment to the verge of discouragement; and it was at the close of the year 1894 that executive insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine culminated in a situation that gave birth to solemn thoughts of war. Without attempting to complete the list of troubles and embarrassments that beset the administration during this luckless year, I have reserved for separate and more detailed treatment one of its incidents not yet mentioned, which immensely increased executive anxiety and foreboded the most calamitous and far-reaching consequences. In the last days of June, 1894, a very determined and ugly labor disturbance broke out in the City of Chicago. Almost in a night it grew to full proportions of malevolence and danger. Rioting and violence were its early accompaniments; and it spread so swiftly that within a few days it had reached nearly the entire Western and Southwestern sections of our country. Railroad transportation was especially involved in its attacks. The carriage of United States mails was interrupted, interstate commerce was obstructed, and railroad property was riotously destroyed.

This disturbance is often called "The Chicago Strike." It is true that its beginning was in that city; and the headquarters of those who inaugurated it and directed its operations were located there; but the name thus given to it is an entire misnomer so far as it applies to the scope and reach of the trouble. Railroad operations were more or less affected in twenty-seven states and territories; and in all these the interposition of the General Government was to a greater or less extent invoked.

This widespread trouble had its inception in a strike by the employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company, a corporation located and doing business at the town of Pullman, which is within the limits. of the City of Chicago. This company was a manufacturing corporation or at least it was not a railroad corporation. Its main object was the operation and running of sleeping and parlor cars upon railroads under written contracts; but its charter contemplated the manufacture of cars as well; and soon after its incorporation it began the manufacture of its own cars and, subsequently, the manufacture of cars for the general market.

The strike on the part of the employees of this company began on the 11th day of May, 1894, and was provoked by a reduction of wages.

This strike led to a general strike declared by the American Railway Union, and commencing June 26, 1894.