locutory order or decree granting or continuing an injunction in any suit, but shall lie only to the Supreme Court of the United States: Provided further, that the appeal must be taken within thirty days from the entry of such order or decree and it shall take precedence in the appellate court over all other causes, except causes of like character and criminal causes.

Schedules and returns of carrier's evidence.-"The copies of schedules and tariffs of rates, fares, and charges, and of all contracts, agreements or arrangements between common carriers filed with the Commission as herein provided, and the statistics, tables, and figures contained in the annual reports of carriers made to the Commission, as required by the provisions of this Act, shall be preserved as public records in the custody of the secretary of the Commission, and shall be received as prima facie evidence of what they purport to be for the purpose of investigations by the Commission and in all judicial proceedings; and copies of or extracts from any of said schedules, tariffs, contracts, agreements, arrangements, or reports made public records as aforesaid, certified by the secretary under its seal, shall be received in evidence with like effect as the originals." [Interstate Commerce Act, section 16, as amended by Act of June 29, 1906, section 5.]

Mandamus to compel transportation or facilities.-That the Circuit and District Courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction upon the relation of any person or persons, firm, or corporation, alleging such violation by a common carrier, of any of the provisions of the Act to which this is a supplement, and all acts amendatory thereof, as prevents the relator from having interstate traffic moved by said common carrier at the same rates as are charged, or upon terms or conditions as favorable as those given by said common carrier for like traffic under similar conditions to any other shipper, to issue a writ or writs of mandamus against said common carrier, commanding such common carrier to move and transport the traffic, or to furnish cars or other facilities for transportation for the party applying for

the writ. Provided, that if any question of fact as to the proper compensation to the common carrier for the service to be enforced by the writ is raised by the pleadings, the writ of peremptory mandamus may issue, notwithstanding such question of fact is undetermined, upon such terms as to security, payment of money into the court, or otherwise, as the court may think proper, pending the determination of the question of fact: Provided, that the remedy hereby given by writ of mandamus shall be cumulative, and shall not be held to exclude or interfere with other remedies provided by this Act or the act to which it is a supplement. [Act of March 2, 1889, being section 23 of the Interstate Commerce Act.]

That all existing laws relating to the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence and the compelling of testimony under the Act to regulate commerce and all acts amendatory thereof shall apply to any and all proceedings and hearings under this Act. [An Act of June 29, 1906, section 9.]

That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, but the amendments herein provided for shall not affect causes now pending in courts of the United States, but such causes shall be prosecuted to a conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law. [Act of June 29, 1906, section 10.]

1092. Amendments of 1906.

Sections 8, 9, 10, 12 of the original act, sections 2 to 4 of the Elkins act, the act of February 11, 1903, for expediting trials, and the act of March 2, 1889, granting mandamus to compel transportation, are unamended. The principal amendments to section 1 of the Elkins act and to section 16 of the original act, are as follows:

1. The punishment of imprisonment for giving or receiving rebates is restored.

2. An additional penalty is imposed on the shipper in the form of the forfeiture of three times the amount received by way of rebate.

3. A statute of limitations is provided. In the original act no provision for limitation of suits was included.

4. A penalty is imposed for failure by a carrier to comply with the

order of the Commission, and provision is made for recovery of the penalty at suit of the Attorney-General.

5. Court review of the orders of the Commission is regulated. Procedure being by injunction against the enforcement of such orders, it is provided that such injunction shall be granted only upon hearing and after due notice to the Commission.

1093. Jurisdiction and general principles.

The jurisdiction of the Federal courts under this section does not depend upon diverse citizenship, but upon the jurisdiction over commerce; and this is sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, independent of the citizenship of the parties to the controversy, since it involves a federal question. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 37 Fed. 567, 2 L. R. A. 289, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 351 (1889). Indeed, even if it is begun in a State court, a suit to recover damages for acts which constitute a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, the construction of which is in dispute between the parties, present a Federal question for which it may be removed to a Federal court. Lowry v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 46 Fed. 83, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 435 (1891). Even if the remedies prescribed by the act are not applicable to a particular case arising under its provisions, this does not deprive the United States Circuit Court of jurisdiction, since by the Judiciary Act such courts are given jurisdiction of all controversies arising under any act of Congress. Little Rock & M. R. R. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. R., 47 Fed. 771, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 261 (1891). And the remedies given by the act are intended to supplement, not to supplant, the existing remedies. Little Rock & M. R. R. v. East Tenn. V. & G. R. R., 47 Fed. 771, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 261 (1891); Tift v. Southern Ry., 123 Fed. 789 (1903). And the United States Circuit Court has jurisdiction to enforce any rights arising under the interstate commerce law, although the same rights may have existed at common law. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. R. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 522 (1893).

The principal office is the one where its principal officers have their business domicil, the meetings of stockholders, directors, and executive committee are held, the stock books, kept and the dividends declared, rather than the place where the subordinate officers in charge of the operating, traffic, and accounting departments of the business, discharge their duties. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & P. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 62 (1892). A United States Circuit Court has jurisdiction of a bill by the Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce its order against a railroad company which has its principal office in another district, where such company in connection with other companies operates all their roads under a common management or arrangement in making the interdicted rates, although such company by itself has been guilty of no violation of

the order in the district. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 74 Fed. 42 (1896).

Newly organized companies into which the railroads of two companies, violating an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission in pursuance of a common arrangement between them and other roads, pass, are properly made defendants in a suit to enforce the order of the Commission. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western N. Y. & P. R. R., 82 Fed. 192 (1897).

The statute of limitations of the State in which the offense was committed applies in actions under the Interstate Commerce Act to recover back freight paid to a carrier in excess of that charged other shippers, since no period of limitation is named in the act itself. Copp v. Louisville & N. R. R., 50 Fed. 164, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 805 (1892); Ratican v. Terminal Assoc., 114 Fed. 666 (1902). See Carter v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R., 143 Fed. 99 (1906). Under the amendments of 1906 a two-year term of limitation is provided.

The Judiciary Act of 1887, passed subsequently to the Interstate Commerce Act, modified the procedure on appeal provided in the latter; and the appeal now lies from the Circuit Court to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 149 U. S. 264, 37 L. Ed. 727, 13 Sup. Ct. 837, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 347 (1893). If the decision of the Circuit Court, affirming the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, made under a misconception of the extent of its powers, is erroneous, it should be reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals and the order set aside and the cause remanded to the Commission in order that the latter, if it saw fit, might proceed therein according to law; and the Circuit Court of Appeals should not undertake of its own motion to find and pass upon the questions of fact involved which were not considered by the Commission. Texas & P. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. Ed. 940, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 405 (1896). By an amendment of 1903, an appeal lies directly from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court.

1094. Remedy in equity.

A mandatory injunction, compelling the carrier to carry at a certain rate, cannot be issued, since the court has no greater power than the Commission to fix a rate. Southern Pac. Co. v. Colorado F. & I. Co., 101 Fed. 779, 42 C. C. A. 12 (1900). An injunction against violating a proper order of the Commission will be granted, nor will it alter the duty of the court to enjoin the violation of the order that another wrongdoer is also violating it. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & P. R. R., 52 Fed. 187, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 114 (1892). See Re Transportation of Coal & Mine Supplies, 10 I. C. C. Rep. 473 (1905). The injunction must be directed against specific acts; a carrier cannot be enjoined in general from

violating the act in any particular. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct. 272 (1906).

A preliminary injunction never issues as of right, but rests in the sound discretion of the court. In order to obtain it, the plaintiff should show either that his right is very clear, or that the injunction will operate with but little injury to the defendant, if granted, and that, if refused, the injury to himself will be very great. Where the inconvenience to result is equally divided, or the preponderance is in favor of the defendant, it will be refused. Neither is a plaintiff entitled to preliminary injunction where his rights depend upon unsettled and disputable questions of law. Upon a motion for preliminary injunction the comparative inconvenience and injury to the parties must be looked at, and the injunction will not be granted when the injury to the defendant is likely to be greater than the benefit to the complainant.

It has therefore been held that under section 16 of the act no preliminary injunction will be issued. The questions involved are for the first time presented for judicial determination, as the Interstate Commerce Commission is an administrative body, and not a court. In the first place, the petitioner is entitled to a speedy hearing, and delay of the injunction for a short time will not seriously injure him; while on the other hand the injury to the defendant will be serious if it finally appears that the injunction is not warranted. The injunction, if issued, would stand for some time, and the total amount of money lost by the carrier will be very large, and not possible otherwise to collect; a long adherence to the lower schedule of rates will make it very difficult to restore the old rates; and the establishment of the lower rates may involve a readjustment of rates over a large territory. As a result of such considerations the courts have held that only a final injunction after hearing on pleadings and proofs would be granted. Shinkle, W. & K. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 62 Fed. 690, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 282 (1894); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 64 Fed. 981, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 131 (1894).

§ 1095. Mandamus.

The Federal courts have no power, on application by the Commission, to compel a carrier to file the reports called for by section 20 of the act. Knapp v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 197 U. S. 536, 49 L. Ed. 870, 25 Sup. Ct. 538 (1905).

The act itself confers authority on the courts to grant a writ of mandamus on relation of an individual where unjust discrimination is made out, but only when that is done. United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 40 Fed. 101 (1889); In re Morris, 40 Fed. 824, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 617 (1889). It will not lie to enforce mere private contractural obligations, and therefore the writ was refused where the relator complained that he did not receive his fair share of cars according to a contract between the