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than is required by the conditions. Brady v. Pennsylvania R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 78, 2 I. C. C. 131 (1888).

§ 983. Competition.

It is now well settled that competition with other carriers at a certain point justifies a lower rate at that point than at neighboring non-competitive points. The Interstate Commerce Commission at first allowed this with some reluctance, though on the whole, following the English authorities, they allowed it to be considered; but the matter is now settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which allow competition full play. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935, B. & W. 424 (1896); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, 42 L. Ed. 414, B. & W. 433 (1897); Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 209, 44 L. Ed. 309 (1900); East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 516, 45 L. Ed. 719 (1901); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940 (1896); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 190 U. S. 273, 23 Sup. Ct. 687, 47 L. Ed. 1047 (1903); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 120 Fed. 934, 57 C. C. A. 224 (1903); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, P. & V. R. R., 124 Fed. 624 (1903); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 141 Fed. 1003 (1905); Savannah Bureau v. Charleston & S. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 458 (1897); Cattle Raisers' Assoc. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 513 (1898); Ulric & Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 495 (1903); Wichita v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 558 (1903); Wichita v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 9 I. C. C. 569 (1903); G. C. Pratt Lumber Co. v. Chicago, I. & LR.y., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 29 (1904); Chattanooga Chamber of Commerce v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 111 (1904); Aberdeen Group Com. Assoc. v. Mobile & O. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 289 (1904); Charlotte Shippers' Assoc. v. Southern Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 108 (1905); Spiegle v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 367 (1905); Griffin Grocery Co. v. Southern Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 522 (1906). But the amount of discrimination must be no greater than is necessary to meet the competition, the lower rate must be remunerative and the higher rate reasonable. Grain Shippers' Assoc. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 158 (1899); Holdzkom v. Michigan Cent. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 42 (1901); Marten v. Louisville & N. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 581 (1903); Gardner v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 342 (1904); Mershon S. P. & Co. v. Central R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 456 (1905); Lehmann-Higginson Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 460 (1905); Cannon Falls F. E. Co. v. Chicago G. W. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 650 (1905). Efforts have been made to limit this rule, as by estimating the

force of the competition, but they seem to have been unsuccessful. See George Tileston Milling Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 346 (1899). As between two points where there is free competition there must be no discrimination. Dawson Board of Trade v. Central of Georgia R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 142 (1899); Hilton Lumber Co. v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 17 (1901).

TOPIC CLONG AND SHORT HAUL.

[See, generally, Chapter XXV.]

§ 984. General principles governing the section.

The statute forbids the charge of greater rate for longer haul in all cases unless the circumstances are shown to be substantially similar. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Texas & P. Ry., 31 Fed. 862 (1887); Re Southern R. & S. Assoc., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 278 (1887); Calloway v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 431 (1897). It is not a violation of the act to charge the same for the short as for the longer haul. Milk Producers' Assoc. v. Delaware L. & W. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 92 (1897). The charge is for transportation; demurrage charges are not included in this section. Pennsylvania Millers' State Assoc. v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 531 (1900). Nor is it to be determined by the proportion of a through rate received. Imperial Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 436 (1889).

The question whether a haul is shorter or longer should be determined by the length of the shortest route in each case. Ulric v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 495 (1903). See Hill v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 343 (1895).

Though the long and short haul section does not apply because of dissimilar circumstances the preceeding sections of the act apply. Re Louisville & N. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 278 (1887).

That there is a greater market for the commodity at the longer than at the shorter distance point does not create a substantial dissimilarity in circumstances and conditions. Fewell v. Richmond & D. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 354 (1897). Nor do joint tariffs nor an arrangement by the carriers with a wagon transportation company extending through lines to points not reached by railroads. Cary v. Eureka Springs Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 286 (1897). But where two railroad companies owning connecting lines of road unite in a joint through tariff, they form for the connected roads a new and independent line, and the through tariff on the joint line is not the standard by which the separate tariff of either company is to be measured in determining whether such separate tariff violates the long and short haul clause. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Osborne, 52 Fed. 912, 3 C. C. A. 347 (1892) reversing Osborne v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 48 Fed. 49 (1891). and Junod v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 47 Fed. 290 (1891); United States v. Mellen, 53 Fed. 229 (1892).

§ 985. Competition.

As is the case with section 3 of the act (ante, § 983), competition constitutes a dissimilar circumstance and justifies a less charge for the longer than for the shorter haul. This has been so thoroughly established by the decisions of the Supreme ourt that the earlier holdings of the Commission are unimportant. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U. S. 144, 42 L. Ed. 414, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, B. & W. 433 (1897); East Tenn. V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 719, 21 Sup. Ct. 516 (1901); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Clyde S. S. Co., 181 U. S. 29, 45 L. Ed. 729, 21 Sup. Ct. 512 (1901); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R., 190 U. S. 273, 47 L. Ed. 1047, 23 Sup. Ct. 687 (1903); Ex parte Koehler, 31 Fed. 315 (1887); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry., 105 Fed. 703 (1900); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry., 122 Fed. 800 (1903); Rocky Hill Buggy Co. v. Southern Ry., 11 I. C. C. Rep. 229 (1905).

The competition may be that of other carriers subject to the act. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Clyde S. S. Co., 181 U. S. 29, 45 L. Ed. 729, 21 Sup. Ct. 512 (1901). And it is effective for the purpose, though there was once competition at the non-competitive point which has been prevented by a consolidation of the railroads at that point. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Ry., 117 Fed. 741 (1902). The competition must be real and substantial. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 719, 21 Sup. 516 (1901). The question will be found fully discussed elsewhere (ante, §§ 854-861.)

§ 986. Relief from operation of the section.

The power given by the statute to the Commission to give relief from the long and short haul clause has been made practically useless by the decisions of the courts that where dissimilar circumstances exist it is not

necessary to apply to the Commission for relief. East Tenn. V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 719, 21 Sup. Ct. 516 (1901); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 50 Fed. 295 (1892), appeal dismissed 81 Fed. 1005, 26 C. C. A. 685 (1896). The application has accordingly been made of late years only in extraordinary cases, such as failure of crops. Re Fremont E. & M. V. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 293 (1895); World's Fair, Re Rome, W. & O. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 328 (1895). Sudden resort to the Klondike. Re Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 593 (1898). No general rule can be laid down for such cases. Re Cincinnati, H. & D. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 323 (1895).

The act does not authorize the Commission to require exceptions. Thatcher v. Fitchburg R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 356 (1887).

CHAPTER XXXI,

INTERCHANGE OF TRAFFIC AND POOLING AGREEMENTS.

§ 991. Provisions of the statute.

992. Amendments of 1906.

TOPIC A REASONABLE FACILITIES FOR INTERCHANGE.

§ 993. Extent of application of the provision.

994. Carriage through in same car.

995. Continuous carriage.

996. Discrimination between connecting lines.

997. Discrimination in furnishing optional facilities.

998. Use of tracks or terminal facilities.

TOPIC B-THROUGH ROUTING AND RATING.

§ 999. Carriers not compelled to route, bill or rate through. 1000. Carrier may select connecting line.

1001. Establishment of through route by agreement.

1002. Pooling.

TOPIC C-PROHIBITION OF POOLING.

§ 991. Provisions of the statute.

Facilities for interchange of traffic: discrimination between connecting lines: use of tracks and terminal facilities.—Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this

shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business. [Interstate Commerce Act, section 3.]

Duty to establish through routes and rates.-It shall be the duty of every carrier subject to the provisions of this Act-to establish through routes and just and reasonable rates applicable thereto. [Act of June 29, 1906, section 1.]

Routes specified in schedule: consent of connecting carriers. -The names of the several carriers which are parties to any joint tariff shall be specified therein, and each of the parties thereto, other than the one filing the same, shall file with the Commission such evidence of concurrence therein or acceptance thereof as may be required or approved by the Commission, and where such evidence of concurrence or acceptance is filed it shall not be necessary for the carriers filing the same to also file copies of the tariffs in which they are named as parties. [Act of June 29, 1906, section 2.]

Joint routes and rates ordered by Commission.-The Commission may also, after hearing on a complaint, establish through routes and joint rates as the maximum to be charged and prescribe the division of such rates as hereinbefore provided, and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated, when that may be necessary to give effect to any provision of this Act, and the carriers complained. of have refused or neglected to voluntarily establish such through routes and joint rates, provided no reasonable or satisfactory through route exists, and this provision shall apply when one of the connecting carriers is a water line. [Interstate Commerce Act, section 15, as amended by Act of June 29, 1906, section 4.]

Through billing, liability for loss on connecting line.-Any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point. in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor

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