the making of joint rates for through shipments, where the haul was in part on one, and in part on the other, of two connecting roads. There are no facts here which take this case out of the operation of the rule thus established, and we must abide by it as perfectly legitimate, until the federal court declares that an error has been committed. We hold, therefore, Laws 1895, chap. 91, is constitutional." CHAPTER XXV. DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN LOCALITIES. TOPIC A-DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN LOCALITIES AT COMMON LAW. § 831. Locality has no right to complain of rates at common law. 832. Discrimination as evidence that the higher charge is unreasonable. 833. Weight to be given to such evidence. 834. Lower rate as evidence of unreasonableness of higher. 835. Higher rate not necessarily unreasonable. 836. What circumstances may be considered. 837. Elements affecting cost of service at one point. TOPIC BUNDUE PREFERENCE OF LOCALITIES UNDER STATUTE. § 838. General principles of statutory regulation. 839. Reasonableness of rate per se immaterial under statute. 840. Interdependence of rates to various localities. 841. What preferential rates are obnoxious. 842. Discrimination explained by circumstances. TOPIC C-WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY PREFERENTIAL RATES. § 843. Equalization of commercial advantages. 844. Equalizing rates sometimes may be established. 845. Public policy for equalization. 846. Grouping by reason of competition in the articles transported. 847. Burden upon the railroad to defend discriminatory rates. 848. Question of dissimilarity of condition one of fact. TOPIC D-LONG AND SHORT HAUL. § 849. Statutes regulating rates for long and short haul. 850. Various systems of making distance rates. 851. Long and short haul at common law. 852. Limitations upon charging less for longer haul. 853. Competition justifies reduction. TOPIC E-COMPETITION AS A FACTOR. § 854. Competitive rate must be reasonable. 855. Non-competitive rate must not be extortionate. 856. Competition may affect all parts of a joint rate. 857. Potential competition. 858. Competition artificially removed at the nearer point. 859. Nominal competition as justifying lower rate for longer haul. 860. Stifling of competition by consideration. 861. Carrier need not consider competition. TOPIC A--DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN LOCALITIES AT COMMON LAW. 831. Locality has no right to complain of rates at common law. At common law the carrier deals with individuals, not with cities or towns, and no one but a person has a right to complain that rates are too high. Except under a statute, a city or locality or the citizens in general cannot complain of the rates charged by a carrier. At common law the wrong, if any, is against the individual shippers at the various stations. They may complain if the rates charged them are unreasonable. While discrimination in rates between individuals is illegal, even if the higher rate is reasonable in itself, this is not true as to discrimination between localities. If a general rate charged to all shippers in a certain place is reasonable in itself it is not rendered illegal merely because shippers in another place are charged a lower rate. § 832. Discrimination as evidence that the higher charge is unreasonable. When, however, a rate between two points is attacked by an individual shipper as unreasonable in itself, as evidence in support of the complaint he may show that rates are lower for a similar haul between other points.1 1 State v. Minneapolis & S. L. Ry., 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60 (1900); Cordele Machine Shop v. Louisville & N. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 361 (1895). "In determining what would be fair and equitable rates to Norfolk a comparison of population and of rates and distances between eastern points and Norfolk and Columbus may be of some advantage. The two cities are located about 50 miles apart, Columbus being a little east of a north and south line through Norfolk. By the census of 1900 the population of Platte County, in which Columbus is located, was 10,542, while the population of Madison County, in which Norfolk is located, was 9,255. The population of Columbus was 3,522, and that of Norfolk was 3,883. The former is the junction point of the Union Pacific and Burlington roads, and the latter the junction of the C., St. P., M. & O. and the F., E. & M. V. roads. The railway distances from eastern points are as follows: The rates between Chicago and Norfolk, however, are considerably higher than between Chicago and Columbus, and the difference furnishes an indication of the extent to which we regard the Norfolk rates as excessive. In other words, taking all the facts and circumstances into account, the reduction which we think should be made would give Norfolk the same Chicago rates as Columbus now enjoys."2 Except so far as it has an evidentiary bearing on the reasonableness of the rate in question, rates to other places or from other points of shipment are not material at common law.3 $833. Weight to be given to such evidence. How much weight shall be given to such evidence must, of course, depend on the facts of each case. When rates to Dan 2 Yeomans, Com. in Johnson v. Chicago, S. P., M. & O. Ry., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 221, 244 (1902). 3 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. R., 73 Fed. 409 (1896). ville were in question the Court gave considerable weight to rates charged for similar hauls. "Whether or not the Danville rates are reasonable per se is a question that has given me no small amount of trouble. That the cost of transporting freight by wagons is not a proper test is very clear. The rates at Lynchburg cannot be alone used as a basis of comparison. The criteria to which I think the greatest weight should be given are as follows: The opinions of expert witnesses; the effect of the present rates on the growth and prosperity of Danville; the cost of transportation as compared with the rates charged; and the rates in force at numerous other cities, where the circumstances are as nearly similar as may be to those prevailing at Danville. . . . The inconclusive and unsatisfactory results, and the inherent difficulties in applying the above-mentioned tests, have led me to the conclusion that the most satisfactory test to be applied in this case is to compare the Danville rates with those in force at numerous other cities and towns in the South, where the circumstances are as nearly as may be similar to those at Danville. This has been done by numerous witnesses for the defense. The rates to and from a great number of towns and cities in the South-some larger and some smaller, some of more and some of less commercial importance, than Danville; some inland and some having water as well as rail transportation; some being on only one railroad and some having more than one road-have been shown. The result of comparisons between these rates and the Danville rates is the conclusion that the latter compare favorably with the former. It may be said that the rates used for comparison are themselves unreasonably high. But the expert witnesses for the defense who alone testify on the point—are of opinion that they are not; and, if it be true that they are unreasonably high, evidence to this effect should have been introduced by the complainant. Again, it may be true that there are many cities in the South that are fairly to be compared with Danville, the rates at which are much lower than the Dan |