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as the producing community must be taken into account; and that there was no hard and fast rule which prohibited the carrier, in furtherance of its own interest and the interests of its patrons, from accepting a less sum for the transportation of imported merchandise from the port of entry to an interior point than it charged for the transportation of domestic merchandise between the same points. Regarding the whole charge, from originating point to destination as a single through charge, therefore, there is nothing in the law to prevent the domstic carrier from receiving as his share of the through charge less than his local charge for the same haul.3

§ 651. Export rates regulated by competition.

In the same way it is clear that export rates may be regulated by competition, and that the inland portion of a through export rate may reasonably be less, in a proper case, than the rate for the same haul when the traffic terminates at the exporting port. This was thoroughly considered by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the case of Kemble v. Boston & Albany Railroad. In that case it appeared that the inland rate from Chicago to Boston was two cents higher than the rate from Chicago to New York; but the export rate to the two ports was the same. This was managed by allowing a rebate of two cents on goods which after arriving at Boston were actually shipped abroad. The Commission held the practice legal; Mr. Commissioner Prouty saying: "Taking Chicago as the point of origin, Liverpool as the point of destination, and grain, which is the most important item of export, as the subject of traffic, it is evident that grain can pass from Chicago to Liverpool, either through the port of New York or through the port of Boston, and that in so doing it is transported to such port by rail and from such port by ship. It is also evident that it

3 See, to the same effect, Mansion House Assoc. v. London & S. W. Ry., 9 Ry. & Can. Tr. Cas. 20 (1895).

48 I. C. C. Rep. 110 (1899).

will choose the route by which it can go the most cheaply. Investigations in other cases before the Commission show that a difference in the freight rate of between one-fourth and one-eighth of a cent per bushel determines the route by which grain shall be exported. Now, the ocean freights from Boston and New York are substantially the same. It follows, therefore, that the inland rate must also be the same. It has been decided that a differential of substantially 2 cents per hundred pounds may be properly made on domestic grain against Boston, but if the export rate were 2 cents higher to Boston than to New York, no traffic would move through the port of Boston. The object of these two rates, therefore, is to equalize the export rate between the ports of Boston and New York. The export rate to Boston is not in reality a Boston rate at all, but is in essence the inland division of a through rate through that port to foreign ports. That the inland carrier may receive in such case for its division a sum less than the domestic rate has been, as we have just seen, determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; hence the thing accomplished by the making of these two rates is not, as a matter of law, illegal."

§ 652. Foreign competition justifies only necessary difference in rates.

But while foreign competition may be considered in fixing the inland share of the through rate, the difference thus justified between the inland and the export or import rate is only such difference as is necessary to meet the competition. The Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission distinctly pointed out that this was a question of fact to be determined in each case, and a question which was not raised in the actual litigation. "The questions. whether certain charges were reasonable or otherwise, whether certain discriminations were due or undue, were questions of

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5 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. Ed. 940, 16 Sup. Ct. 666 (1896).

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fact, to be passed upon by the Commission in the light of all facts duly alleged and supported by competent evidence. The mere fact that the disparity between the through and the local rates was considerable did not, of itself, warrant the court in finding that such disparity constituted an undue discrimination; much less did it justify the court in finding that the entire difference between the two rates was undue or unreasonable, especially as there was no person, firm, or corporation complaining that he or they had been aggrieved by such disparity."

§ 653. Limitations upon making export and import rates. That foreign business must not be unduly favored at the expense of domestic business was expressly pointed out by the Interstate Commerce Commission."

"The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra, has been understood in some quarters as virtually removing import and export traffic from the jurisdiction of the Commission. Such is not by any means its scope or effect. That decision simply broadened the power of the Commission in reference to such traffic. If any individual or locality feels itself aggrieved by the rates made upon export or import business as compared with domestic business, the Commission has full authority to consider and pass upon that grievance. The propriety, as a matter of fact, of the rates maintained by the Texas & Pacific Railway Company has never been upheld by the decision of any tribunal. It has never been decided that that company may transport boots and shoes for the English manufacturer from New Orleans to San Francisco for one-sixth the amount charged the American manufacturer for the same service, but merely that, in determining whether such rate constitutes an unjust discrimination or an

6 Kemble v. Boston & A. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 110, 115 (1899).

undue preference, the interest of the carrier and the consumer should be taken into account as well as that of the producer."

It was accordingly held by the Commission, in the case of New York Produce Exchange v. New York Central & H. R. Railroad, that the inland portion of an export rate through New York must be no less than the inland rate from the originating point to New York. Nothing was shown in the case to justify a difference in rates; and it is no doubt the fact that no differential is needed in order to secure shipments for export through New York.8

73 I. C. C. Rep. 138, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 553 (1889).

8 Acc. Mansion House Assoc. v. London & S. W. Ry., 9 Ry. & Can. T. Cas. 20 (1895).

CHAPTER XX.

THE RATE AS AN ENTIRETY.

§ 661. Nature of a rate.

TOPIC A-THE UNIT FIXED BY REGULATION.

§ 662. Characteristics of the rate as a regulation.

663. Established classification prima facie reasonable.

664. No presumption from continuance of classification under order of commission.

665. Publication of change of rate requisite.

666. Classification sheet not varied by contract or representation.

667. Methods of charging in rate making.

668. A minimum rate is justifiable.

669. Where minimum is fixed excess may be charged for.

670. Minimum weights with provision for refund of excess.

TOPIC B-THE JOURNEY THE UNIT IN PASSENGER SERVICE.

§ 671. The journey is a single entire unit.

672. Fare demanded at any point on the journey.

673. Ticket entitles passenger to carriage for a single journey.

674. Passenger cannot take two journeys for a single fare.

675. Passenger cannot pay two partial fares for a single journey. 676. Part of journey completed before collection of fare.

677. Resumption of journey by rejected passenger.

678. Passenger expelled at a regular station.

679. Change of destination during the journey.

680. Second journey on same train.

681. Non-payment of charges for prior carriages.

682. Effect of repudiation upon the applicants rights.

TOPIC CTHE SHIPMENT THE UNIT IN THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS.

§ 683. Maritime freight.

684. Right to compensation by agreement in case of carriage by sea. 685. Right to freight on land.

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