METRE V.

Quam uariis terris animalia permeant figuris.

The beestes passen by the erthes by ful diverse figures. For som of hem han hir bodies straught and crepen in the dust, and drawen after hem a tras or a foruh 5 y-continued; that is to seyn, as nadres or snakes. And other beestes, by the wandringe lightnesse of hir winges, beten the windes, and over-swimmen the spaces of the longe eyr by moist fleeinge. And other 10 beestes gladen hem-self to diggen hir tras or hir steppes in the erthe with hir goings or with hir feet, and to goon either by the grene feldes, or elles to walken under the wodes. And al-be-it so that thou 15 seest that they alle discorden by diverse formes, algates hir faces, enclined, hevieth hir dulle wittes. Only the linage of man heveth heyeste his heye heved, and stondeth light with his up-right body, 20 and biholdeth the erthes under him. And, but-yif thou, erthely man, wexest yvel out of thy wit, this figure amonesteth thee, that axest the hevene with thy righte visage, and hast areysed thy fore25 heved, to beren up a-heigh thy corage;

so that thy thoght ne be nat y-hevied ne put lowe under fote, sin that thy body is so heye areysed.

PROSE VI. Quoniam igitur, uti paullo ante.

Therfor thanne, as I have shewed a litel her-biforn, that al thing that is y-wist nis nat knowen by his nature propre, but by the nature of hem that 5 comprehenden it, lat us loke now, in as mochel as it is leveful to us, as who seith, lat us loke now as we mowen, which that the estat is of the devyne substaunce; so that we mowen eek knowen what his 10 science is. The commune jugement of alle creatures resonables thanne is this: that god is eterne. Lat us considere thanne what is eternitee; for certes that shal shewen us to-gidere the devyne 15 nature and the devyne science. Eternitee, thanne, is parfit possessioun and al

For

togidere of lyf interminable; and that sheweth more cleerly by the comparisoun or the collacioun of temporel thinges. For al thing that liveth in tyme it is present, and procedeth fro preterits in-to 20 futures, that is to seyn, fro tyme passed in-to tyme cominge; ne ther nis no-thing establisshed in tyme that may embracen For to-gider al the space of his lyf. certes, yit ne hath it taken the tyme of 25 to-morwe, and it hath lost the tyme of yisterday. And certes, in the lyf of this day, ye ne liven no more but right as in the moevable and transitoriê moment. Thanne thilke thing that suffreth tem- 30 porel condicioun, al-thogh that it never bigan to be, ne thogh it never cese for to be, as Aristotle demed of the world, and al-thogh that the lyf of it be strecched with infinitee of tyme, yit algates nis 35 it no swich thing that men mighten trowen by right that it is eterne. al-thogh that it comprehende and embrace the space of lyf infinit, yit algates ne embraceth it nat the space of the lyf 40 al-togider; for it ne hath nat the futures that ne ben nat yit, ne it ne hath no lenger the preterits that ben y-doon or y-passed. But thilke thing thanne, that hath and comprehendeth to-gider al the plentee of 45 the lyf interminable, to whom ther ne faileth naught of the future, and to whom ther nis naught of the preterit escaped nor y-passed, thilke same is y-witnessed and y-proeved by right to be eterne. And 50 it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke thing be al-wey present to him-self, and compotent; as who seith, al-wey present to him-self, and so mighty that al be right at his plesaunce; and that he have al present 55 the infinitee of the moevable tyme. Wher-for som men trowen wrongfully that, whan they heren that it semede to Plato that this world ne hadde never beginninge of tyme, ne that it never 60 shal han failinge, they wenen in this maner that this world be maked coeterne with his maker; as who seith, they wene that this world and god ben maked togider eterne, and that is a wrongful weninge. 65 For other thing is it to ben y-lad by lyf

interminable, as Plato graunted to the world, and other thing is it to embrace to-gider al the present of the lyf inter70 minable, the whiche thing it is cleer and manifest that it is propre to the devyne thoght.

Ne it ne sholde nat semen to us, that god is elder thanne thinges that ben y-maked 75 by quantitee of tyme, but rather by the propretee of his simple nature. For this ilke infinit moevinge of temporel thinges folweth this presentarie estat of lyf unmoevable; and so as it ne may nat 80 countrefeten it ne feynen it ne be evenlyke to it for the inmoevabletee, that is to seyn, that is in the eternitee of god, it faileth and falleth in-to moevinge fro the simplicitee of the presence of god, and 85 disencreseth in-to the infinit quantitee of future and of preterit: and so as it ne may nat han to-gider al the plentee of the lyf, algates yit, for as moche as it ne ceseth never for to ben in som maner, it 90 semeth som-del to us, that it folweth and resembleth thilke thing that it ne may nat atayne to ne fulfillen, and bindeth it-self to som maner presence of this litel and swifte moment: the which presence 95 of this litel and swifte moment, for that it bereth a maner image or lyknesse of the ay-dwellinge presence of god, it graunteth, to swiche maner thinges as it bitydeth to, that it semeth hem as thise thinges 100 han y-ben, and ben.

And, for that the presence of swich litel moment ne may nat dwelle, ther-for it ravisshed and took the infinit wey of tyme, that is to seyn, by successioun; and 105 by this maner is it y-doon, for that it

sholde continue the lyf in goinge, of the whiche lyf it ne mighte nat enbrace the plentee in dwellinge. And for-thy, yif we wollen putten worthy names to 110 thinges, and folwen Plato, lat us seye

thanne soothly, that god is eterne, and the world is perpetuel. Thanne, sin that every jugement knoweth and comprehendeth by his owne nature thinges that ben 115 subject un-to him, ther is soothly to god, al-weys, an eterne and presentarie estat; and the science of him, that over-passeth

al temporel moevement, dwelleth in the simplicitee of his presence, and embraceth and considereth alle the infinit spaces of 120 tymes, preterits and futures, and loketh, in his simple knowinge, alle thinges of preterit right as they weren y-doon presently right now. Yif thou wolt thanne thenken and avyse the prescience, by 125 which it knoweth alle thinges, thou ne shal nat demen it as prescience of thinges to comen, but thou shalt demen it more rightfully that it is science of presence or of instaunce, that never ne faileth. For 130 which it nis nat y-cleped "previdence," but it sholde rather ben cleped purviaunce," that is establisshed ful fer fro right lowe thinges, and biholdeth from a-fer alle thinges, right as it were fro the 135 heye heighte of thinges. Why axestow thanne, or why desputestow thanne, that thilke thinges ben doon by necessitee whiche that ben y-seyn and knowen by the devyne sighte, sin that, forsothe, men 140 ne maken nat thilke thinges necessarie which that they seen ben y-doon in hir sighte? For addeth thy biholdinge any necessitee to thilke thinges that thou biholdest presente?' 'Nay,' quod I.

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Philosophie. Certes, thanne, if men mighte maken any digne comparisoun or collacioun of the presence devyne and of the presence of mankinde, right so as ye seen some thinges in this temporel pre- 150 sent, right so seeth god alle thinges by his eterne present. Wher-fore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth nat the nature ne the propretee of thinges, but biholdeth swiche thinges present to him- 155 ward as they shullen bityde to yow-ward in tyme to comen. Ne it confoundeth nat the jugement of thinges; but by o sighte of his thought, he knoweth the thinges to comen, as wel necessarie as nat 160 necessarie. Right so as whan ye seen to-gider a man walken on the erthe and the sonne arysen in the hevene, al-be-it so that ye seen and biholden that oon and that other to-gider, yit natheles ye demen 165 and discernen that that oon is voluntarie and that other necessarie. Right so thanne the devyne lookinge, biholdinge

alle thinges under him, ne troubleth nat 170 the qualitee of thinges that ben certeinly present to him-ward; but, as to the condicioun of tyme, forsothe, they ben future. For which it folweth, that this nis noon opinioun, but rather a stedefast 175 knowinge, y-strengthed by soothnesse, that, whanne that god knoweth anything to be, he ne unwot nat that thilke thing wanteth necessitee to be; this is to seyn, that, whan that god knoweth any thing to 180 bityde, he wot wel that it ne hath no necessitee to bityde. And yif thou seyst heer, that thilke thing that god seeth to bityde, it ne may nat unbityde (as who seith, it mot bityde), and thilke thing that 185 ne may nat unbityde it mot bityde by necessitee, and that thou streyne me by this name of necessitee: certes, I wol wel confessen and biknowe a thing of ful sad trouthe, but unnethe shal ther any wight 190 mowe seen it or come ther-to, but-yif that he be biholder of the devyne thoght. For I wol answeren thee thus: that thilke thing that is future, whan it is referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne is it 195 necessarie; but certes, whan it is under

stonden in his owne kinde, men seen it is outrely free, and absolut fro alle necessitee.

For certes, ther ben two maneres of 200 necessitee. That oon necessitee is simple,

as thus that it bihoveth by necessitee, that alle men be mortal or deedly. Another necessitee is conditionel, as thus: yif thou wost that a man walketh, it 205 bihoveth by necessitee that he walke.

Thilke thing thanne that any wight hath y-knowe to be, it ne may ben non other weyes thanne he knoweth it to be. But this condicioun ne draweth nat with hir 210 thilke necessitee simple. For certes, this necessitee conditionel, the propre nature of it ne maketh it nat, but the adjeccioun of the condicioun maketh it. For no necessitee ne constreyneth a man to gon, 215 that goth by his propre wil; al-be-it so that, whan he goth, that it is necessarie that he goth. Right on this same maner thanne, yif that the purviaunce of god seeth any thing present, than mot thilke

thing ben by necessitee, al-thogh that it 220 ne have no necessitee of his owne nature. But certes, the futures that bityden by freedom of arbitre, god seeth hem alle to-gider present. Thise thinges thanne, yif they ben referred to the devyne sighte, thanne 225 ben they maked necessarie by the condicioun of the devyne knowinge. But certes, yif thilke thinges be considered by hem-self, they ben absolut of necessitee, and ne forleten nat ne cesen nat of the 230 libertee of hir owne nature. Thanne, certes, with-oute doute, alle the thinges shollen ben doon which that god wot biforn that they ben to comen. But som of hem comen and bityden of free arbitre 235 or of free wille, that, al-be-it so that they bityden, yit algates ne lese they nat hir propre nature in beinge; by the which first, or that they weren y-doon, they hadden power nat to han bitid.' Boece. 240 'What is this to seyn thanne,' quod I, 'that thinges ne ben nat necessarie by hir propre nature, so as they comen in alle maneres in the lyknesse of necessitee by the condicioun of the devyne science?'

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"This is the difference,' quod she; 'that tho thinges that I purposede thee a litel heer-biforn, that is to seyn, the sonne arysinge and the man walkinge, that, ther-whyles that thilke thinges been y- 250 doon, they ne mighte nat ben undoon; natheles, that oon of hem, or it was y-doon, it bihoved by necessitee that it was y-doon, but nat that other. Right so is it here, that the thinges that god hath 255 present, with-oute doute they shollen been. But som of hem descendeth of the nature of thinges, as the sonne arysinge ; and som descendeth of the power of the doeres, as the man walkinge. Thanne 260 seide I no wrong, that yif these thinges ben referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne ben they necessarie; and yif they ben considered by hem-self, thanne ben they absolut fro the bond of necessitee. 265 Right so as alle thinges that apereth or sheweth to the wittes, yif thou referre it to resoun, it is universel; and yif thou referre it or loke it to it-self, than is it singuler. But now, yif thou seyst thus, 270

that yif it be in my power to chaunge my purpos, than shal I voide the purviaunce of god, whan that, peraventure, I shal han chaunged the thinges that he know275 eth biforn, thanne shal I answere thee thus. Certes, thou mayst wel chaunge thy purpos; but, for as mochel as the present soothnesse of the devyne purviaunce biholdeth that thou mayst 280 chaunge thy purpos, and whether thou wolt chaunge it or no, and whiderward that thou torne it, thou ne mayst nat eschuen the devyne prescience; right as thou ne mayst nat fleen the sighte of the 285 presente eye, al-though that thou torne thy-self by thy free wil in-to dyverse acciouns. But thou mayst seyn ayein: "How shal it thanne be? Shal nat the devyne science be chaunged by my dis290 posicioun, whan that I wol o thing now, and now another? And thilke prescience, ne semeth it nat to entrechaunge stoundes of knowinge ;"' as who seith, ne shal it nat seme to us, that the devyne prescience entre295 chaungeth hise dyverse stoundes of knowinge, so that it knowe sum-tyme o thing and sum-tyme the contrarie of that thing? 'No, forsothe,' quod I.

Philosophie. For the devyne sighte 300 renneth to-forn and seeth alle futures, and clepeth hem ayein, and retorneth hem to the presence of his propre knowinge; ne he ne entrechaungeth nat, so as thou wenest, the stoundes of forknow305 inge, as now this, now that; but he aydwellinge comth biforn, and embraceth at o strook alle thy mutaciouns. And this presence to comprehenden and to seen alle thinges, god ne hath nat taken it of 310 the bitydinge of thinges to come, but of his

propre simplicitee. And her-by is assoiled thilke thing that thou puttest a litel her-biforn, that is to seyn, that it is unworthy thing to seyn, that our futures yeven cause of the science of god. For 315 certes, this strengthe of the devyne science, which that embraceth alle thinges by his presentarie knowinge, establissheth maner to alle thinges, and it ne oweth naught to latter thinges; and 320 sin that these thinges ben thus, that is to seyn, sin that necessitee nis nat in thinges by the devyne prescience, than is ther freedom of arbitre, that dwelleth hool and unwemmed to mortal men. Ne the lawes ne 325 purposen nat wikkedly medes and peynes to the willinges of men that ben unbounden and quite of alle necessitee. And god, biholder and for-witer of alle thinges, dwelleth above; and the present eternitee 330 of his sighte renneth alwey with the dyverse qualitee of oure dedes, dispensinge and ordeyninge medes to goode men, and torments to wikked men. Ne in ydel ne in veyn ne ben ther nat put in god 335 hope and preyeres, that ne mowen nat ben unspeedful ne with-oute effect, whan they ben rightful. 'Withstond thanne and eschue thou vyces; worshipe and love thou virtues; areys thy corage to right- 340 ful hopes; yilde thou humble preyeres a-heigh. Gret necessitee of prowesse and vertu is encharged and commaunded to yow, yif ye nil nat dissimulen; sin that ᎩᎾ worken and doon, that is to seyn, 345 your dedes or your workes, biforn the eyen of the juge that seeth and demeth alle thinges.' To whom be glorye and worshipe by infinit tymes. AMEN.

nesse,

If any drope of pitee in yow be, Remembreth yow on passed hevinesse That ye han felt, and on the adversitee 25 Of othere folk, and thenketh how that ye Han felt that Love dorste yow displese; Or ye han wonne him with to greet an ese.

And wryte hir wo, and live in charitee.

8. And for to have of hem compassioun 50 As though I were hir owene brother dere. Now herkeneth with a gode entencioun, For now wol I gon streight to my matere, In whiche ye may the double sorwes here