and diftrefs--The enemy was hovering round us, ready to attack us on whatever fide there fhould appear an opening---our legiflatures were fometimes, during the very act of framing our conflitutions, driven from their places of deliberating; but as we had been forced to that point, where we muft throw from our fhoulders the oppreffive government of a tyrant, it became abfolute neceffary, that we fhould immediately fubftitute another in its flead. Our preffing neceflities, if we expected to make a fuccessful oppofition, pointed out to us, the aid of foreign powers---this could not be obtained, while we called ourselves fubjects of Great Britain; it was therefore indifpenfibly neceffary to declare ourfelves an independent nation. This was wifely done, although we were no: all aware of the great difficulties we had to encounter. Our national fhip was launched into a wide ocean in the midst of storms, before she was well equipped, or had collected fufficient materials for her voyage---the has been toffed and buffeted about for feveral years, and often times in the extremeft danger; but at length, by her own ftrength, and the aid of thofe who came to her relief, fhe has been conducted fafely into port. However, on the infpection and examination of our mafter builders, the timbers are found fo disjoined and decayed, that it is believed the cannot, without great rifk, bear a fecond voyage, unless the undergoes the moft thorough repairs.

It is not my intention now to confider minutely either the defects of our prefent confederation, or particularly to obferve upon that plan which has been lately offered to us by thofe diftinguished patriots and faviours of our country. My daily avocations allow me not much time for the ftudy of politics. I fhall, therefore, throw together, in hafte, only a few general obfervations.

I take it for granted, that fcarce

any thing new can be faid on this fubject by way of investigation; but I cannot keep ftill the pulfations of my heart, nor reftrain the defire I. feel of endeavouring to forward our fpeedy progress to a government which promifes fair, from its excellent ingredients, to compofe a most valuable and durable cement to the different flates of the union-to eftablish a fleady system of justice and good faith among ourfelves, and to give us refpectability and credit among the nations of the earth.

The great advantages which would be the refult of the adoption of the propofed conftitution, are almost innumerable. I will inention a few among the many. In the first place, the proper regulation of our commerce would be infured-the impofts on all foreign merchandize, imported into America, would still effectually aid our continental treafury. This power has been heretofore held back by fome ftates on narrow and miftaken principles; the amount of the duties fince the peace, would proba bly by this time have nearly paid our national debt. By the proper regulation of our commerce, our own manufactures would be alfo much promoted and encouraged; heavy duties would difcourage the confumption of articles of foreign growth; this would induce us more to work up our raw materials, and prevent European manufacturers from dragging them from us, in order to beflow upon them their own labour, and a high price before they are returned into our hands. Agriculture and population will alfo find improvement and increafe-agriculture is natural to America, and will always ferve as an increafing fource of commerce, while the produce of our farms furnishes fo confiderable a portion of it. Induced by the goodly profpects of a happy and durable government, by which life, religion freedom, and property would be we

Another good confequence of the new conftitution, will be the power given to congrefs folely of coining money. By this means there will be one general currency throughout the united flates. The citizens of each ftate will be well acquainted with the money of the others, which will give it great facility and convenience to trade and all negociations in bunefs. The creditor and debtor, though in different ftates, will equally know the value of what each receives or pays-the ftranger and the traveller will have no difficulty or embarraffment on account of the difference of coins. However flender this tie may apper to fome, I have no doubt but the fameness of money in every flate, will have a powerful influence on our union.

Needlefs alarms and fears have been endeavoured to be excited, as well, no doubt, by our enemies and thofe among us difaffected to our caufe, as by fome who act from better principles. Let us take a very fhort and fummary view of the plan. The power of congrefs to lay and collect taxes, duties, impofts, and excifes, has been objected to. Bv whom are thofe taxes to be laid? by the reprefentatives of the feveral ftates in congrefs. This is then in perfect conformity to that juft maxim in free governments, that taxation and reprefentation fhould go hand in hand." To what purpofe are thefe taxes to be applied? It is exprefsly prefcribed by the conltitution, "to

pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare the united ftates." What, would you faddle congrefs with the burden and expenfe of providing for the com mon fafety, and not give them the power of raifing any money? This would be requiring impoffibilities indeed. Congrefs will alfo have the pow er to raife and fupport armies. What evil can refult from this? Even fuppofing, altho' it is fcarcely fuppofable, that the reprefentatives of the peo ple fhould form defigns of enflaving their conflituents, how is it poffible they could effect their fcheme? It is provided by the conftitution, "That no appropriation of money to that ufe fhall be for a longer term than two years, "An army fufficient for fuch a purpose could not be raised in two years, much lefs could they complete the bufinefs in that time. Eve ry two years the people may change their reprefentatives if they pleafe and they certainly would pleafe to change those who fhould act with fo much bafenefs and treachery. If the prefident fhould have fuch defigns, without the concurrence of congres, he might have the honour of com manding an army as long as they would itay with him, but it common for an army to remain long in the field without the profpect of any pay. The power of the prefident of the united flates will not be fo great as many have reprefented. His confent is not neceffary in paffing any law-if he difapproves, has only a right to flate his objecti ons: but if two thirds of both houfes do not join with him, it will be law notwithstanding. He is to be commander in chief, and fhall take care that the laws be faithfully exe cuted. It will be readily agreed that it would be highly ridiculous to fend reprefentatives, and be at the expense of maintaining them, to make laws for us, if we did not give power to fome perfon or perfons to fee them

not

be

duly executed: The wifdom and prudence is to be fhown in the framing laws the complete execution of them ought to follow of course. The prefident, together with the fenate, may appoint the officers of the united ftates. We find, in practice, that, generally speaking, perfons beft qualified are appointed to offices, where the number who appoint, are few. They feel their refponfibility to the public to be more immediate and certain for if the appointment be wrong, and the object of it unworthy, the cenfure can be eafily fixed; the confequence will be, a greater care and circumfpection in the choice. This we clearly faw, at a time, during the late war, when the new modelling of our army having become abfolutely neceffary, the appointment of our officers was given folely to our worthy general. He alone became refponfible: the confequences were important and happy for America.

The power of the prefident is ftill guarded further by the oath which he is bound to take, before he enters on the execution of his office, where he fwears that he will, to the beft of his ability, preferve, protect, and defend the conftitution of the united flates.

It is faid by fome of the oppofers of the new plan of government, that in the perfon of the prefident, it verges to a monarchy-by others it is faid, that it approaches to an ariftocracy through the fenate. The fenators are to be alfo bound by an oath or affination to support the conftitution and though their appointments will be for fix years, yet the rotation of the new choice of one third of them every fecond year not only provides for experience in bufinefs by thofe who remain, but alfo against any evil fchemes which require time and extenlive connexions. As to the danger of our ftate governments being annihilated, the

fourth fection of the fourth article declares that "the united ftates fhall guarantee to every ftate in the union a republican form of government." Thus every guard, which can be reasonably required, feems to be made againft improper encroachments. Now let me afk what will be the probable confequences of not adopting the propofed conftitution ?with respect to ourselves in the first place, fcenes of injuftice between man and man may difclofe themfelves, contracts may be broken, and the means of redrefs poffibly not in the power of our legislatures, notwithstanding their belt intentions: befides, there are greater difficulties than many people imagine in procu ring national movements; and the probability is, that all the ftates would not be forward again in coming speedily into fuch a measure as forming another federal convention -The fatigue and difguft of our celebrated fatefman, who have lately gone through a four months labour of inveftigation, would alfo tend to prevent the attempt-Thefe men of acknowledged abilities and difinterefted patriotifm-if the refult of their deliberations is not attended to, who will undertake again the arduous tafk? The fame difference of interefts, in different flates, will remain: but the fame friendliness and wifh for compromife and accommodation will not exift, after repeated vexatious trials and disappoint

ments.

were

laugh at our folly? They will in a fhort time do fomething more difagreeable to us-they will do juftice to themselves by feizing our merchants' fhips and making reprisals on our property. Well but, fay thofe who are more fuccefsful in alarming and railing objections, than in propofing better conftitutions-would you have us adopt this without making alterations, when there are feveral things in it which had better be mended? Yes, I would-and for the following reafons.

Which flate convention will undertake to amend it? It is probable that any one ftate would fooner hit upon what should be for the general good of the union, than the late federal convention, which was compofed of reprefentatives from every flate? And if it was not for the benefit of the united flates in general, but only of the individual flate who propofed it, would it not in the first place immediately open a wide door for each flate to propofe many amendments which might be calculated only for the advancement of local interelt ? and in the next place, is it probable that a future convention (which at this rate would be neceffary) would agree on better ground for the whole, than the late one? No: it would be illé to fuppofe it. It would ferve but to procraftinate a delivery from our prefent diftreffes, and tend very much, by exciting diffentions and quarrels, to our total diffolution as a nation. Although I drew my first breath in New Jerfey, and have continued in it during my life, firmly attached to its local intereft, yet, when I confider the impoffibility of its exiftence at prefent, as a fovereign ftate, without a union with others, I wish to feel myself more a citizen of the united flates than of New Jerfey alone. Our advancement and profperity, nay, our very exiflence as

́a nation, depends on our union, and that union mult have for its founda tion the good of the whole collectively confidered. This, I think, is effectually done in the new conttitution. In pourtraying this plan, the collective intereft is fo mixed, and blended in the general picture of the union, that happily the individa. al ftates are only diftinguifhed as branches of that general family, without the whole of which, the painting would be incomplete.

In many publications against the propofed fyftem, the writers argue on a prefumption that congrefs wil fet themfelves up againft the liberties of their country. Their proceedings will not be fecret-their journals are ordered, in this very conftitution, t be published, from time to time, fr the infpection of all of whom will that body be compofed ? Of a fenate, who are to be appointed by the legiflatures, who will be chosen by the people, and of a houfe of reprefentatives alfo chofen by the people: if either act wrong, they would doubtlefs be left out in their next choice.

While virtue and patriotifm r main in the people, it will always, with due care, be found in the prefentatives: when the fountain pure, the streams that iffue from it, must be clear.

It is high time to shake off unmanly fears and fneaking jealoufies you have, my countrymen, long been fenfible of the infufficiency of our prefent government. You have fest your belt and ableft friends to form another-after four months close ap plication, they have completed that which they now offer. Make a far experiment. Further alterations are provided for, when neceflary. This feriously and act like men.

A JERSEYMAN. November 5, 1787.