the collectors, if required, shall find good and sufficient security, by bond, in the manner prescribed, contains this proviso: "That no such bond shall be put in suit against any surety or sureties for any deficiencies, other than what shall remain unsatisfied after sale of the lands, tenements, goods, and chattels of such collector, in pursuance and by virtue of the directions and powers given to the respective commissioners by this act."

Upon the construction of this clause opposite inconveniences have been suggested in the course of the argument. On the one side it has been said, that if the sale above alluded to be held a condition precedent, the consequence must be, that a remedy intended for the relief of the parish may be suspended or wholly lost whilst the commissioners are engaged in an endless and fruitless inquiry into the state of the collector's possessions. And, on the other, that if it be merely discretionary with the commissioners, whether they sue first and sell after, or do not sell at all, the surety may be harassed with the costs of an action, whilst the collector is, at the same time, in possession of property ten times more than the amount of his arrears. These extreme cases seem to be pretty nearly balanced, and are not very safe criteria for ascertaining the true decision; though it is observable that the first-mentioned inconvenience seems to have had a very full, if not somewhat undue, share in producing the judgment of the Court below. The true construction of a statute is to give effect to the intent and object of the legislature, as far as it is possible, and, if there be provisions seemingly inconsistent or contradictory, to reconcile them so as to further that intent. This is not only the proper mode of construction in this instance, but is so generally, and the proposition, I presume, need only to be stated in order to be assented to. Com. Dig. tit. Parlt. R. 10. Now it

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seems to me hardly doubtful but that the provision in question was introduced expressly for the protection and benefit of the surety.. To me, at least, its introduction is unintelligible, except that be the meaning. The language, with the exception of the expression "put in suit," upon which I shall observe presently, is perfectly plain and appropriate. This object also, it is to be observed, is quite consistent with the position of the surety and his relation to the principal; because, neither from the general nature of the bond, nor that relation, is there any thing to raise the slightest inference that the former should become responsible except upon the failure of the latter; the nature of the thing implies it. The position also, of this provision, is quite consistent with this view of the subject. In the earlier part of the section the liability of the surety is described, and then comes this proviso containing the restriction upon that liability; and, except it was intended to afford some special protection to the surety, why, it may be asked, was it introduced at all? It seems to me, therefore, that we have the intention of the legislature clear and explicit, to relieve the surety. Except, therefore, the application of the funds (land and goods) of the collector be deemed a condition precedent to calling upon the surety to make good "the deficiency," which, I think, (with that hesitation, however, which becomes one when aware of opposite opinions,) is the true construction, no effect whatever is given to this part of the section, introduced expressly for the surety's benefit, and, so far as he is concerned, it might as well be expunged from the statute altogether. This observation is strictly true, supposing the commissioners not to be compellable to levy contributions in aid of the surety upon the property of the collector, after the former has been sued for arrears. And it is true, to a considerable extent, if (which may be questionable) the commissioners may be compelled

by mandamus, or otherwise, to reimburse the surety by sale, &c. Up to the extent of the costs of the action, upon this supposition, rightly brought against the surety in the first instance, he would be without remedy. And this, which, I confess, seems to me to be the obvious. meaning of this proviso, is rather confirmed by attending to the particular expressions in which that meaning is conveyed. The words are, "No bond shall be put in suit for any deficiency other than what shall remain unsatisfied after sale of the lands, goods," &c., of the collector. That is, no bond shall be put in suit for the arrears of the collector, but only for the deficiency, if any, after his property has been applied, as in reason and justice it ought, to discharge those arrears, as far as it will go. And how is it possible to say that the arrears of the collector, and the arrears minus the proceeds of all his property, mean the same thing? Observations have been made upon the words "no bond shall be put in suit," as if they were distinguishable from "no action shall be brought," or "no proceedings shall be had or taken." I confess, however, that I am unable to comprehend any such distinction, and cannot but think that the three forms of expression above mentioned are perfectly equivalent both in a legal and a popular sense. About the latter, I presume, there can be no doubt, and, as it seems to me, there is scarcely less as to the former. In the case of Peppin and Others v. Cooper (a), to a plea similar to the present, that a collector had goods, &c., at the commencement of the action, the replication is "that there were not goods, &c. of the, collector sufficient to satisfy the deficiency, for which the bond had been put in suit;" which latter words seem to me, of necessity, to have the same meaning as "action had been brought." When, therefore, I see a provision,

(a) 2 B. & Ald. 431.

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expressed in plain terms, and, I think, with an obvious meaning in perfect conformity to the situation and rights of the parties (principal and surety), we are bound, as it seems to me, to give it effect, except there be collected, from some other part of the statute, a decisive reason to the contrary. Nor do I think that there is any thing in the fifty-second section, to which reference has been frequently made, inconsistent with the view which I have taken. It will be observed that the two sections (the thirteenth and fifty second) are directed to very different objects. The former describes, as I have said, the liabilities of the surety, and, in the proviso, restricts them in the manner already alluded to; the latter gives powers to the commissioners both over the person and the property of the collector, and all these seem quite consistent with, and in furtherance of, what I understand to be the object of the proviso. Powers are given to the commissioners to get at funds which are to be applicable in ease of the surety; but the question of priority, that is, whether seizure and sale should precede suit, seems to me not to be necessarily involved in considering the effect of the fifty-second section. It is true that different expressions are used in different parts of the section: the words first used are "authorised and empowered," then "empowered," and, lastly, "empowered and required." And some reliance has been placed upon the latter expression "required" not being employed instead of "authorised and empowered," in that part of the section where the seizure of the estate, real and personal, first occurs. I must own that this seems to me to be a very doubtful and precarious reliance. I very much doubt, and, in truth, do not believe, that the precise force and weight of those expressions were weighed with critical nicety before they were introduced into the clause; that they were used indiscriminately, and at random, I think much more probable.

It is observable, also, that the seizure of the person is first named in the section, to which object the terms "authorised and empowered" are properly applicable, and this, perhaps, may account for the omission of the word (of supposed superiority in pressure and cogency) required." Upon the whole, therefore, bearing in mind the distinct purposes of the two sections, I think there is nothing in the latter to supersede what I consider to be the plain intent and meaning of the proviso in the former.

Before I quit this part of the subject, I cannot help observing that rather too little importance has been attached to the case I have already referred to, of Peppin and Others v. Cooper. It is certainly true that the very point now under consideration was not before the Court, but it is equally so that the whole statute and this very question were brought under their notice. In that case two collectors were appointed, though one only acted, and the other was, in truth, only a surety. To an action on the bond similar to the present, the surety pleaded, amongst other things, that there were goods not sold belonging to the collector, who had not acted, and who, of course, was not in arrear; to which there was a demurrer. Whereupon Lord Tenterden and Holroyd J. are reported to have said, Not that the question of whether the collector's goods were sold or not was wholly immaterial; not that the statute was merely directory, and that the commissioners might either sue or sell at their pleasure; but that the goods which ought to be sold before the bond can be put in suit are the goods of the defaulting collector. Lord Tenterden says this, "I am clearly of opinion that the bond might be put in suit without selling the goods of Peppin, who was a mere surety; for though it appears on the face of the bond that he was a collector also, still he is not the collector con

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