Kerr V. Moon. 1824. Union, relating to any estate within that State, to be offered for probate in the Court of the county where the estate lies, and authorizes the same to be there recorded; and it then proceeds to declare the effect of such recording to be, to render the will good and valid, as if it had been made in the State, subject, nevertheless, to be contested as the original might have been. But it does not appear that the copy of this will was offered for probate and admitted to record. Had it been so offered, it might have been contested, and for any thing that we can say, the sentence of the Court of Probate might have been not to admit it to record. 3. The last point remains to be considered. That the objection to the validity of this will to pass the lands in controversy to the respondents, was not made in the Court below, is highly probable, as we observe that it is not noticed, much less relied upon, in the answer. Nevertheless, the will, duly proved and recorded, according to the laws of Ohio, constituted the sole title under which the plaintiffs in the Court below claimed the lands in dispute. It was as essential, therefore, to the establishment of that title, to allege in the bill, and to prove by the evidence, or by the admission of the defendant, that this will had been proved and recorded, according to the laws of Ohio, as to set forth and prove the existence of the will itself. The defect in the title of the respondents appears upon the face of the bill, and as it contains no allegation that a copy of the will had been duly proved and recorded, the de fendant cannot be said to have admitted those 1824. facts by not denying them in his answer. The Court erred, therefore, in decreeing an assignment of all the warrants, entries, and surveys under the warrants, to the complainants. Considering, as we must, in the present state of the cause, that A. Moon died intestate as to these lands, they of course descend to those persons whọ are entitled to the same according to the laws of Ohio; and this is a subject fit to be decided by the Court below, to which the cause must be remanded for further proceedings. Decree reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Meredith V. Picket. [LOCAL LAW.] MEREDITH and others, Appellants, V. PICKET and others, Respondents. Under the following entry, "H. R. enters 2000 acres in Kentucky, by virtue of a warrant for military services performed by him in the last war, in the fork of the first fork of Licking, running up cach fork for quantity;" it appeared in evidence, that at the first fork of Licking, the one fork was known and generally distinguished by the name of the South fork, and the other by the name of the main Licking, or the Blue Lick fork, and that some miles above this place the South fork again forked: held, that the entry could not be satisfied with lands lying in the first fork. 1824. Meredith V. Picket. Feb. 20th. Feb. 21st. In such a case, the entry could not be explained, and the survey supported, by oral testimony. The notoriety and names of places may be shown by such testimony, but the words of an entry are to be construed by the Court as any other written instrument. THIS cause was argued by Mr. Bibb, for the appellants, and by Mr. Talbot, for the respondents. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. This case depends entirely on the question, whether the entry under which the appellees claim has been surveyed on the land for which it calls. The entry is in these words: "Holt Richeson enters 2000 acres in Kentucky, by virtue of a warrant for military services performed by him in the last war, in the fork of the first fork of Licking, running up each fork for quantity." It is shown in testimony, that at the first fork of Licking, the one fork was known and generally distinguished by the name of the South fork, and the other by the name of the main Licking, or the Blue Lick fork. Some miles above this place the South fork again forks. The land of the appellees has been surveyed in the first fork. It is contended by the appellants,, that the entry calls for land in the second fork, and that the survey is made on land which will not satisfy its words. The Court concurs in this opinion. The first fork of the first fork cannot be the first fork itself. Whatever difficulties may attend the attempt to place the lands properly the Court feels none in saying, that the entry cannot be satisfied with lands 1824. lying in the first fork. Some other objections were made in argument, which it is unnecessary to notice, as this is completely decisive of the case. It may not, however, be improper to say, that the attempt of the appellees to explain their entry, and to support their survey, by depositions, cannot avail them. It is the proper province of testimony to show the notoriety and names of places, but not to explain a written instrument. That is the proper province of the Court. The Judges must construe the words of an entry, or of any other title paper, according to their own opinion of the words as they are found in the instrument itself, and not according to the opinion of witnesses, who may or may not be selected for the purpose. The decree of the Circuit Court, perpetuating the injunction awarded to the appellees to restrain the appellants from proceeding on their judgment in ejectment, is erroneous, and ought to be reversed, and the bill of the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court dismissed. Meredith V. Picket. In ejectment, an amendment, so as to enlarge the term laid in the ERROR to the Circuit Court of Kentucky. In 1797, John Den, lessee of Ambrose Walden, instituted an action of ejectment in the United States District Court of the District of Kentucky, against Richard Fen, as casual ejector. The declaration states a demise for the term of ten years from the 15th day of August, 1789. At March term, 1798, Lewis Craig and Jonathan Rose were admitted defendants, in the place of Richard Fen, the casual ejector; and entered into the usual rule, confessing the lease, entry, &c. At June term, 1800, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for his term yet to come, &c. and a writ of hab. fac. pos8. was awarded. On the 5th day of September, 1800, Thomas Bodley and others, claiming as landlords of Craig and Rose, obtained an injunction to the above judgment. At May term, 1809, the bill of injunction was dismissed, for want of jurisdiction. In September, 1811, Bodley and others obtained a second injunction to stay execution on the judgment at law in ejectment. At May term, 1812, the injunction was |