then 297. a year. In 1800 R. N. made a lease of the last-mentioned lands to G. M. for three lives, at the yearly rent of 351. In 1813 he made another lease to G. M. of the same premises and part of the excepted lands, for different lives, at the rent of 401. for the whole: Held, that the rent could not be apportioned, and that the last lease, being void for the excepted lands, was void as to all. Doe dem. Williams and Others v.

Matthews, T. 3 W. 4. Page 298

3. Premises were demised for a term at a certain rent, with a proviso for re-entry if the rent should be in arrear twenty-one days: the lessee covenanted to pay the rent, and the landlord covenanted that he, paying the rent at the appointed times should quietly enjoy, &c.:

Held, that the lessee having been disturbed in his possession, might bring covenant against the landlord, though at the time when the cause of action accrued, the rent had been in arrear more than twenty-one days; for that the payment of rent was not a condition precedent to the performance of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. Dawson v. Dyer, Bart. M. 4 W.4. 584

4. Where A. demises to B. for the term of his natural life, the demise is, primâ facie, for the life of B. But where A. demised to B. his executors and administrators, for the term of his natural life, and the lease contained a covenant by A. for quiet enjoyment of the premises by B., his executors. &c. during the natural life of A.:

Held, that the word "his" in the demising clause must be referred to 4. the grantor, and not to B., though his name was the last antecedent. Doe on the demises of Pritchard and Others against Dodd, M. 4 W. 4. 689 5. A power was reserved to grant

leases for a term not exceeding seven years, so as there was reserved in such leases the best rent that could be gotten for the same, without taking any premium for the making thereof. The donee of the power granted a lease for seven years, at a specified rent, which lease contained a covenant by the lessee, to find board, lodging, and wearing apparel during the term, for three children of the donee (if they wished it), at 71. a year each, and for the donee's son gratis: Held, by Parke and Patteson Js. (Taunton J. dissentiente) that assuming the power to require two conditions, first, that the rent reserved should be the best rent ; and, secondly, that there should be no fine or premium: it did not clearly appear on the face of the lease that either of those conditions had been broken, because the covenant to maintain the children was not necessarily beneficial to the lessor, and, therefore, parol evidence was admissible to shew that the rent reserved was the best that could be obtained. Doe dem. Rogers v. Rogers, M. 4 W. 4. Page 755 6. A lease for three lives contained a proviso, that if the lessee, his heirs, &c. should, during the continuance of the term, happen to become insolvent, and unable in circumstances to go on with the management of the farm, the demise should from thenceforth cease and be absolutely void. Tenant (being the second cestuique vie) under such lease, was attainted of felony, and transported. His mother and sister occupied the farm from that time, till the expiration of the third life named in the lease, and during that period the reserved rent was regularly paid to R. W. P., to whom the reversion had come by devise, and who knew all the facts. The time of

of his becoming entitled did not appear. The reversioner, on the expiration of the third life, supposing that the term was at an end in point of law, let the land to a new tenant, whom he afterwards ejected, the attainted party being still alive.

Quære, whether the attainder of the tenant was a forfeiture of the lease; but, held, that if it was a breach of the condition, it was not a continuing breach, but was contemporaneous with the conviction :

Quære also, if a forfeiture was committed, whether it was one of which an assignee of the reversion might take advantage by stat. 32 H. 8. c. 34.

Held, that if such a forfeiture was committed, the reversioner had waived it by accepting the reserved rent under the lease, from the parties occupying the premises:

Semble, that if the forfeiture had not been waived, a sufficient entry had been made to avoid the lease. Doe dem. Griffith v. Pritchard, M. 4 W. 4. Page 765 7. An instrument in writing, whereby A. agreed to let premises to B. for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years (commencing at Christmas Day then next), at the option of B. at the yearly rent of 241. payable quarterly, the first payment to be made at the ensuing Lady Day free of all rates and taxes, and whereby B. stipulated if he should be desirous of putting an end to the agreement at either of the terms before specified, to give six months' notice, and that he, B., should pay all the expences of preparing a lease for either of the terms above stated, is a lease, and not a mere agreement for a lease. Warman v. Faithful, H. 4 W. 4.

1042

LEASEHOLD.

See VENDOR AND VENDEE.

LEET.

See CUSTOM, 2.

LEGACY DUTY.

See DEVISE, 2.

LICENCE.

See ACTION ON THE CASE, 1.

LIEN.

See STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU, 1, 2.

A. wishing to borrow money on a mortgage of land, delivered the title-deeds to B., the intended mortgagee, for examination, and said that he would pay all expences. B. handed the deeds to his own attornies to be investigated. The negotiation went off, and the attornies being requested by A. to return his deeds, refused to do so till he paid their bill of costs. On assumpsit brought by A. against the attornies, to recover back the money so paid:

Held that the defendants could not be considered as having acted for both parties in the negotiation, and therefore had not a lien against A. as his attornies: that, supposing A. liable to B. for the costs incurred, B. could not communicate to his own attornies a lien upon A.'s deeds, by handing them to the attornies for investigation that the undertaking of A. to B., if it amounted to a promise to pay these costs, did not entitle B.'s attornies to detain the deeds, as it established no privity between them and A.: And that A. might have brought trover for the deeds, and was entitled to re

Cover

of 161. 58., but instructed the bailiff who made the arrest, to allow the set-off in case the debtor would settle the debt; and the Judge, upon the proof of these facts, was of opinion that there was no probable cause for the arrest, and that there was malice in law, inasmuch as the act of causing the party to be arrested for a larger sum than he owed was wrongful, and therefore told the jury that the only question for them was the amount of damages; the Court granted a new trial, on the ground that it ought to have been left to the jury to find whether there was malice or not. Mitchell v. Jenkins, Clerk, M. 4 W. 4. Page 588

MANDAMUS.

1. By custom the court of mayor and aldermen of London have always had authority to examine and determine whether or not any person returned to them by the court of wardmote as an alderman is, according to the discretion and sound consciences of the mayor and aldermen, a fit and proper person, and duly qualified in that behalf, whensoever the fitness and qualification of the person so returned has been brought into question. In February, 1831, M. S. was elected alderman by the citizens, and returned as elected to the court of mayor and aldermen. That court, on the petition of persons interested in the election, adjudged and determined that M. S. was not a person fit and proper to discharge the duties of alderman. In January 1832, M. S. was a second time elected alderman by a majority of votes, and returned so elected to the court of mayor and aldermen, but they again refused to admit him to the office.

A rule nisi having been obtained

for

for a mandamus to admit M. S. to the office:

Held, that an affidavit stating that the court of mayor and aldermen had again determined that he was not a fit and proper person to be admitted, is no ground for refusing the mandamus, because the prosecutor has a right to have the facts stated in the return, in order that he may have an opportunity of controverting the truth of them :

Held, at all events, that the affidavits in answer to the rule ought to show that the court of mayor and aldermen had, on the second occasion, come to the conclusion that M. S. was not a fit and proper person to be admitted to the office, on a fresh investigation.

A mandamus having issued, the return stated that M. S. was elected by a majority of votes, and returned as so elected to the court of mayor and aldermen ; that a petition was presented to that court against M. S.'s admission to the office, whereupon they examined the merits of the petition according to custom, and determined that he was not a fit and proper person to be admitted to the office, nor duly elected; and further, that he was not in fact duly elected: Held, that this return was not inconsistent. The King v. The Mayor and Aldermen of London, T. 3 W 4. Page 233 2. Mandamus lies to admit a clerk of trustees under the general turnpike acts. The King v. The Trustees of the Cheshunt Turnpike Roads, T. 3 W. 4. Page 438 2. Where the quarter sessions have improperly decided against an appeal on a preliminary objection, the Court of King's Bench will grant a mandamus to them to enter continuances and hear the appeal; but where an objection has

been made during the trial of an

appeal to the reception of a particular piece of evidence, and the sessions have held such objection valid, in consequence of which the appeal has been dismissed, this Court will not interfere, unless the sessions send up a case. The King v. The Inhabitants of Frieston, M. 4 W. 4. Page 597 4. By statute, parties were enabled, in certain cases, to appeal to the 'quarter sessions for a particular district, giving ten days' notice. The act said nothing as to further notice in the event of such appeal being respited, nor did it appear that there was any rule of practice on the subject at those sessions. An appeal under the statute, of which due notice had been given, was respited, and came on at a subsequent sessions, pursuant to the respite. The appellant was called upon to prove that he had given notice of trial of the respited appeal, and on his failing to do so, the appeal was dismissed:

Held, that the sessions were wrong in requiring such notice, and that the case was one in which this Court might overrule their decision. Mandamus granted to hear the appeal. The King v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire, M. 4 W. 4. 667 5. To ground an application for a

mandamus to inspect books, quære, whether it is sufficient to show that the party entitled to inspect demanded liberty to do so, that his claim was disputed, but inspection offered him as a favour, and that he refused to accept it otherwise than as a right. Per Denman C. J. The King v. The Trustees of the North Leach and Witney Roads, H. 4 W.4. 978 6. A rule nisi was granted for a mandamus to the Principal of Clifford's Inn, to attend the benchers of the Inner Temple, and produce the rules and regu

lations

lations of the society of Clifford's Inn, to enable the benchers to decide on the validity of his election to that office. But on cause shown, the rule was discharged, no sufficient proof appearing, that the benchers of the Inner Temple had a compulsory authority over Clifford's Inn for this purpose. The King v. Allen, Gent., H. 4 W. 4. Page 984

7. A resolution of a court of quarter sessions, that whenever an appeal against an order of removal shall be entered and respited, notice thereof shall, within one month after such entry and respite, be given to the officers of the removing parish, is void; and where the court of quarter sessions had dismissed an appeal for want of such notice, this Court granted a mandamus to them to hear it. The King v. The Justices of Norfolk, H. 4 W.4. 990

8. Under stat. 1 W. 4. c. 21. s. 6., the costs of a mandamus, and of applying for it, may be obtained of the Court by a distinct motion after issuing of the writ.

And upon such motion for costs, the Court will refer for its guidance to the affidavits filed in support of the application for a mandamus, if it be clear that both applications are made by the same parties. The King v. Kirke, H. 4 W. 4. 1089 9. A party found guilty by a jury at a session irregularly holden is entitled to have the record of the proceedings correctly made up according to the fact, and this Court will grant a mandamus to the justices to make up such record. Rex v. the Justices of Middlesex, in re Bowman

1113

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. A father, seised in fee, executed a deed of settlement on the marriage of his son, containing the following

clause : "Whereas it is agreed upon by and between the parties to these presents, that the said A. J. (the father) giveth and settleth upon his said son Griffith J. all and singular the premises, &c. from Michaelmas next for the term of his natural life; and from and immediately after his decease, to the use of the first son of the body of the said Griffith J. on the body of J. J. (his intended wife) to be lawfully begotten, and so on successively for all and every other son," &c.; and in default of such issue male, the like limitation to the daughters; and for want of such issue, to the use of the settlor's right heirs: Held, that this clause was not a mere executory agreement, but operated, in law, as a covenant by the settlor to stand seised to the uses declared by the settlement. Namely, to the uses of the first and other sons of Griffith J. successively for their respective lives. Doe dem. Jones v. Williams, M. 4 W. 4. Page 783

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. In an action for wages by a servant, who was dismissed, the proof was, that he was to have wages at the rate of 801. per annum: Held that the prima facie presumption was, that the hiring was for a year; and that having been rightfully dismissed for misconduct before the year expired, he could not recover wages pro ratâ. And this, although the master had brought an action against him for the misconduct, and recovered damages. Turner v. Robinson, M. 4 W. 4. 789

2. On the 5th of March 1832, A. entered as warehouseman into the service of B., the latter engaging to pay A. at the rate of 127. 10s. per month for the first year, and to advance 101. per annum until

the