1833. The KING the original order, and proved his notice of appeal; but the respondents contended that the second order was the only one of which the Court could take notice; and the sessions so held. The new order was then confirmed without opposition (a). (a) The original order was intended to follow the precedent (No. 9.) in 1 Chitty's Burn, p. 1009., tit. Distress for Rent, xxi., but was inaccurately framed. The amended order was as follows: : "Whereas T. IV. of P., in the county of Chester, Gent., agent for and on behalf of Sir Thomas S. M. Stanley, Bart., did, on, &c. at, &c., duly make and exhibit before me the Rev. R. M. F., clerk, being one of his Majesty's justices, &c. residing near the place whence the goods and chattels hereafter mentioned were removed, and not being interested in the premises hereinafter mentioned whence the same were removed, his complaint and information in writing against R. O. of, &c. labourer, thereby setting forth," &c. (stating the charge laid in the information, viz. that one W. O. was indebted to Sir T. S. M. S. for rent of certain premises occupied by the said W. O., and that the said rent being in arrear R. 0. did wilfully and knowingly assist him in fraudulently removing from the premises six cows, the goods and chattels of the said W. O., being under the value of 50l., and of the value, &c. with intent to prevent their being distrained for the said rent.) "And thereupon the said R. O. being duly summoned to appear before two of his Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the county of Chester, on, &c. at, &c. to answer the said complaint and information; and the said R. O. having appeared accordingly before us the said R. M. F. and the Rev. U. C., clerk, being two of his Majesty's justices, &c. : now we the said justices residing, &c. and not being either of us interested, &c. in the presence of the said R. O., having heard and examined the witnesses produced by the said T. W. upon oath (we the said justices having then and there full power and authority to administer the oaths to the said witnesses) touching the said complaint and information, and having heard what was alleged by the said R. O. in his defence, and having also enquired in better manner upon oath the value of the said cows, and upon due consideration had in the premises, do hereby adjudge that the said R. O. is guilty of the offence with which he is charged in and by the said complaint and information, according to the form of the statute, &c.; and the said justices do adjudge and order the said R. O. to pay to the said Sir T. S. M. S., Bart., the sum of 721. 5s., being double the value of the said cows, goods, and chattels in the said complaint mentioned, on or before the 18th day of February now next, &c. In witness whereof we the said justices to this order have put our hands and seals, at, &c. on," &c. Signed and sealed by the two justices. Col Cottingham now shewed cause against the rule. Justices may return a conviction to the sessions in a more formal shape than that in which it was drawn up, although a copy has been delivered to the party convicted, Rex v. Barker (a); and the copy so returned to the sessions is the only one which that Court ought to notice, Rex v. Allen (b). The instrument returned here, is drawn up as an order, because the statute so directs, but it is in substance a conviction. [Parke J. The moment the justices have put their hands and seals to it, meaning it to be an order, it is one, and must be subject to the same rules.] Being substantially a conviction, it is within the reason of Rex v. Barker (a), and ought, like a conviction, to be returnable in an amended form. The error here, in the original instrument, was a mere mistake, and if it could not have been corrected, the sessions would have had to adjudicate upon an order which was absurd on the face of it. [Denman C. J. They must have done so if it was the order appealed against. If an order of removal were absurd, could a new one be filed at the sessions? absurdity of the instrument cannot increase the power of the justices. Patteson J. In Rex v. Bissex (c) it was expressly held that an instrument of this kind was to be treated as an order, and not as a conviction.] Whitcombe, contrà, was stopped by the Court, The DENMAN C.J. The strongest point in favour of the respondents is, that the statute directs the justices to (c) 1 Chitty's Burn, 985. note (a), tit. Distress for Rent, V. Sayer's Rep. 304. 1833. The KING VOL. V. Gg determine 1833. The KING The Justices of determine whether or not the person be guilty, which certainly makes the proceeding very like a conviction. But still the adjudication is to be by an order. One distinction between an order and a conviction is decisive; namely, that, in a conviction, evidence is set out, upon which the court of appeal is to form a judgment: in an order, none is stated. The document here is only an order; and the consequence is, that the party affected had a right to appeal against it in the form in which it was made. The rule must be absolute. LITTLEDALE, PARKE, and PATTESON Js. concurred. Rule absolute. Wednesday, A custom for the jurors of a court leet holden for a borough and manor, to pre be admitted The KING against The Duke of BEAUFORT. MANDAMUS to the defendant, lord of the borough and manor of Loughor, in the county of Glamorgan, and to the steward and port-reeve, recited that the and sent persons to borough and manor of Loughor was an ancient borough manor, and, by immemorial usage and custom used in the borough, the jurors of the court leet holden for burgesses of the borough, and for the persons so presented to the borough and manor of Loughor have and exercise, be admitted and sworn in burgesses, was and of right ought, &c. the privilege and authority of held, on motion presenting persons to be admitted burgesses of the said borough; and by such immemorial usage and custom in arrest of judgment, to be valid in law. the persons so presented by the jury to be admitted burgesses have been used to be and of right ought to be sworn in by the steward of the borough and manor, and admitted burgesses thereof; and further recited that that one T. Walters, on the 2d of May 1828, was, by 1833. The KING against The Duke of BEAUFORT. 1833. The KING The Duke of admitted. The return of the port-reeve is not material. The prosecutor, by his plea, denied that the custom was limited, as in the return was alleged; and upon that issue was tendered and joined. At the trial before Alderson J., at the Spring assizes for the county of Glamorgan, 1832, the jury found a verdict for the crown. A rule nisi was afterwards obtained to arrest the judgment, upon the ground that the custom stated in the mandamus was bad, inasmuch as the effect of it was to constitute the leet jury of the borough and manor of Loughor electors of the freemen for that borough, which jury might possibly consist of persons, none of whom were corporators, or even inhabitants of the borough. E. V. Williams in this term shewed cause. The custom stated in the mandamus is good. In Rex v. Rowland (a), a plea to a quo warranto stated that a court leet was, in part, holden in the morning and in part in the evening; and that the usage had been to elect a burgess to be mayor at the morning court; and it was proved, in addition, that a jury of the leet used to present the person elected to be sworn in by the steward at the evening court, which burgess had been accustomed to be sworn into the office of mayor, at such evening court, by the steward or his deputy; and the only objection there taken was, that the latter usage ought to have been stated in pleading, as a necessary part of the custom. In Rex v. Joliffe (b), a similar custom, as to the nomination of jurors, was stated, and no objection taken. There is no reason why the king should not grant to the court leet for the manor and borough, authority to (a) 3 B. & A. 130. (b) 2 B. & C. 54. present |