only an assistant overseer. I think, however, that as to
him, nothing depends on the strict legal character in
which he acted; if, indeed, he had said, "I act only as
servant or assistant to the overseers," that would have
been a warning to the creditor not to consider him as
one of the parties contracting; but that was not done.
I think the jury were right in the verdict they found.
The cases which have been cited do not apply. In
Leigh v. Taylor (a), the defendant was bound as surety
that an
overseer should account for all sums which
should come to his hands by virtue of his office; and
the surety was held not to be liable for the repayment
of a sum advanced to the overseer by way of loan, and
applied by him to parochial purposes. That is very
different from the question whether or not a creditor
may look personally to an overseer who has obtained
goods from him under circumstances like the present;
and I think no difference ought to be made as to the
advances of money in this case; a slight accommodation
in money rendered as this was, may be considered in
the same light as the supply of goods.

LITTLEDALE J. It is not necessary that the assistant overseer should be shewn to have had a particular authority as such, if he has made himself personally liable. A tradesman is not bound to look to the legal character which the party holds, if such party has put him in a situation in which the tradesman may be authorised to consider him as his debtor: and I think that was so in the present case, though the defendant Chapman sometimes signed himself "overseer," sometimes "clerk,"

1834.

KIRBY

against BANISTER.

and though the orders were given sometimes by one officer and sometimes by another. It was a joint concern among the parties. As to the money advanced, it would be extraordinary if overseers, instead of suffering the paupers to come to their houses, sent them to a shop to receive their weekly or monthly payments, and it was then held that the shopkeeper could not recover against the overseers for the money paid on those occasions, as well as for goods supplied. The rule must be discharged.

concurred. 1997

i

3 PATTESON J. It was necessary to the plaintiffs case that all the defendants should have rendered themselves liable but upon this subject the jury were sufficiently directed, and gave their opinion. It was not requisite that all five should have been present when each order was given, or should have actually made a promise respecting such order. If it were so, there would be great inconvenience where five parish officers were concerned, and it might even be arranged so that the whole five should never interfere on any occasion. It was for the jury to say to whom credit was given. It has been made a question as to Chapman, whether his authority, as assistant overseer, was not so limited that he could not bind himself. But if he promised the plaintiff to pay, we are not to assume that he was restricted by his appointment from so engaging. He might have authority to do so, and we are not to take it for granted that he had not.

Rule discharged.

1834

Ex parte PITT.

R. CHARLES PITT in this term (January 14th) moved in person for a rule, calling upon an attorney of this court to answer certain matters alleged against him on affidavit.

DENMAN C. J. We think that we cannot hear an application calling upon an attorney to answer matters seriously affecting his character, unless such application be made by a gentleman of the bar. It is like a motion for a criminal information; we ought to have the opinion of a barrister that there is ground for the proceeding. There was, indeed, a rule lately granted on the motion of the present party in person, by which attornies were called upon to answer the matters of an affidavit; but the application for that purpose was appended to another, by which the party claimed the protection of the Court in certain proceedings against him, as to which there appeared to be ground for calling upon the attornies to make a statement, and, therefore, the rule was granted in its whole extent. The present is a different case.

LITTLEDALE J. In the principal matter depending in that case (a), much turned upon the question whether a certain document originally bore date of the 7th or 8th of June; and I granted Mr. Pitt a rule calling on

(a) Pill v. Coomes.

A motion calling upon an attorney to

answer matters

alleged against

him on affidavit must be made by a barrister.

the

1834.

Ex parte
PITT.

the attornies to answer as to that, and also as to the matters alleged against them in his affidavits, both being intimately connected; but perhaps it was wrong to do so. The present rule cannot be granted.

TAUNTON and PATTESON Js. concurred.

Rule refused.

Tuesday, Jan. 28th.

A person having made a motion in a

cause to which he was party, left the court,

and, in his way home, called at

an office where he kept his papers but did not reside, to refresh himself and sort his papers: he

remained there

between one

and two hours,

PITT against COOMES.

THE plaintiff applied (January 27th) to be discharged out of the custody of the sheriff of Middlesex, upon affidavits which stated the following circumstances:-The plaintiff lived at a place called The Polygon in the parish of St. Pancras, and had an office in Adam Street, Adelphi, where he kept his papers of business. On the 22d of January he called at his office for some papers, and proceeded thence to the Court of King's Bench, where, in the evening of the same day, he obtained a rule absolute in the cause, Pitt v. Coomes. He then left the court, with a person named King, who had accompanied him, and proceeded directly to his office, where he sorted his papers, and he and King took some refreshment, having had none during the day. It was near six in the evening when they arrived at the office, and before seven the plaintiff left it in company with King, when an officer of the sheriff of Middlesex, about seven o'clock, arrested the plaintiff on an attachment issued in a cause in chancery, Pitt v. Tokelove. The plaintiff was at this sheriff's officer, time going home to The Polygon, intending only to call

and then left the office, and went into a

tailor's shop in

the same street, intending, however, to proceed home immediately, and being on his way thither

when he so deviated. soon as he

entered the

shop he was

As

arrested by a

who had

watched him

from the court.

Held, that the privilege of the party, redeundo from the court, had not ceased when he was arrested, and that he was entitled to be discharged.

at

at the Rule office, Symond's Inn (which lay in his way), for the purpose of drawing up his rule.

1834.

PITT

The affi

against

COOMES.

The Court granted a rule to shew cause. davits in answer to the rule (sworn by the sheriff's officer and others) stated that the officer had seen the plaintiff in court, and watched him from thence to his office; that he entered the office about twenty minutes after five, and remained there till a little after seven, when he came out and went into a tailor's shop in the same street, near the office, and the sheriff's officer also entered the shop and there arrested him.

Dampier now shewed cause. The plaintiff was no longer privileged at the time of the arrest. He had gone from the Court to his office, remained there nearly two hours, and then proceeded, not to his home, but to a tradesman's shop. [Denman C. J. mentioned the case of Lightfoot v. Cameron (a).] There it is merely stated that the party, after leaving the Court, went to a tavern to take refreshment, and was arrested while doing so. Here the plaintiff after refreshing himself, left his office, and instead of going directly home, deviated, and, upon that deviation, was arrested. The moment he went out of his way, the protection redeundo ceased; it is immaterial whether the deviation lasted a minute or an hour.

DENMAN C. J. The doctrine of deviation might become very alarming if carried to such an extent, that whenever the officer saw the party going one yard out of his way home, he might immediately arrest him.

(a) 2 W. Bla. 1113.

The