the prescribed minimum weights for carloads, for which excess no charge
is made by the carriers, the exceptional character of the service, which
involves fast time and prompt delivery at destination, the carriage of a
large amount of nonpaying freight, return of cars without loads, and many
other conditions relating to the highly perishable nature of the traffic,-
Held, that neither the minimum carload weight nor the transportation
charge established by the defendants engaged in the carriage of peaches
in refrigerator cars from Georgia points to New York, based upon a rate
of 81 cents from Atlanta to New York, is unreasonable or unjust. Geor-
gia Peach Growers' Asso. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 255.
5. Defendant's rate of $1.25 per 100 lbs. on oranges in carloads carried
from southern California to points on and east of the Missouri River is
unreasonable and unjust. Consolidated Forwarding Co. v. Southern P.
Co. 590.
6. Defendants' minimum carload weight of 26,000 lbs. for the carriage
of citrus fruit in refrigerator or ventilator cars from southern California
points to eastern destinations is not unreasonable, with the 40-foot car in
general use. Id.
7. Defendants' present rate of $1.00 per 100 lbs. on lemons in carloads
from southern California to points on and east of the Missouri River is
apparently reasonable. Id.
8. The Texas & Pacific Railway Company's rate on beef cattle in car-
loads from Ft. Worth Tex., to New Orleans, La., is 42 cents per 100 lbs.,
and $15 per car additional when shipment is made in lots of less than
ten carloads. Upon complaint against the imposition of the additional $15
per car,-Held, that the charge of $15 per car in addition to the rate of
42 cents per 100 lbs. is unreasonable when applied to single carload ship-
ments. New Orleans Live Stock Exch. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 327.
9. No undue discrimination results to Sheridan by reason of the fact
that the rate from that place to Boston is 2 cents per 100 lbs. more than
from Indianapolis to Boston, although the latter is the longer-distance
point by the defendant's line, which runs north from Indianapolis through
Sheridan, connecting at various points with lines to Boston; as Indian-
apolis is a competitive point, and the short lines from Sheridan to the
east are through Indianapolis, and by those lines Sheridan is a longer-
distance point. G. C. Pratt Lumber Co. v. Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. 29.
10. There has been no such change in conditions governing the traffic
as to warrant the Commission in interfering with its previous holding,
whereby it declared that there was nothing unlawful in the fact that the
rates from points in Kansas and in Missouri to points in Texas are 5
cents per 100 lbs. higher on flour than on wheat, and that such differential
is not applied on flour or wheat carried in any other direction. Wichita v.
Missouri P. R. Co. 35.
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN COMMODITIES.
11. The defendants, by charging a higher rate on shingles than on lumber
in carloads from Duluth, Minn., to Chicago, Ill., unjustly discriminated
against shingles in favor of lumber. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S.
& A. R. Co. 489.
12. The rate on rye, barley, and other coarse grain from Cannon Falls
to Louisville or East St. Louis is wrongfully higher than the rate on wheat
between the same points. Cannon Falls Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago
G. W. R. Co. 650.
13. The traffic in cattle and hogs in Chicago and other points is dis-
criminated against by the exaction of higher rates for transporting cattle
and hogs than for transporting live stock products to Chicago from points
west, northwest, and southwest thereof, including Missouri River points
and South St. Paul, Minnesota. Chicago Live Stock Exchange v. Chi-
cago G. W. R. Co. 428.
14. The desire of a carrier to secure additional business does not justify
a change in the relation of rates, resulting in a higher rate upon cattle
and hogs, the raw material, than upon live stock product, the manufac-
tured article, where, as in this case, the articles are in sharp competition
with each other in markets of purchase and sale, where it appears that
upon other lines and in other sections rates are generally no higher, and
in many instances much lower, on the traffic prejudiced than on that
favored by the change, and where numerous and important industries,
which have been built up and maintained under the former adjustment,
and those interested in such industries, will be injuriously affected by the
action taken. Id.
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PASSENGERS.
15. It is not a violation of law to charge a higher parlor car rate in one
direction on certain trains than is charged in the other direction on all
trains between the same points, provided the carrier furnishes adequate
parlor car accommodations at the lower rates. Hewins v. New York, N. H.
& H. R. Co. 221.
16. A discrimination against passengers by reason of charging on three
of defendants' trains a parlor car rate higher than the regular parlor
car rate is not undue or unreasonable, where the defendants run
merous trains daily on which parlor car seats may be had at the lower
rates. Id.
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN PLACES.
17. The rule laid down in Johnston-Larimer D. Co. v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. R. Co. 6 I. C. C. Rep. 586, forbidding any higher charge to Wichita
than to Kansas City on shipments from Galveston, is, in the light of the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, no longer applicable; and
defendants operating lines through Wichita to Kansas City are not pro-
hibited from charging a higher rate to Wichita than to Kansas City, so
long as the Wichita rate is reasonable. Lehman-Higginson Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 460.
18. The competitive conditions applying in the transportation of sugar
to Wichita and Kansas City do not justify the 15 cent differential against
Wichita; such differential should not be more than 8 cents per 100 lbs. Id.
19. Prior to April 25, 1903, defendant had in effect rates per 100 lbs.
on bananas in carloads from Charleston, which were 43 cents to Danville
and 20 cents to Lynchburg. The rate of 20 cents to Lynchburg was 13
cents below the rate which was justified by competition from Baltimore or
elsewhere. Such relation of rates was in violation of section three of the
Act to regulate commerce. Gardner & Clark v. Southern R. Co. 342.
20. An undue discrimination is made by the defendants in fixing their
rates for transporting lumber to points on the New York & Long Branch
Railroad by adding to the rate to New York city an arbitrary charge of 5
cents per 100 lbs. when the shipping point is Saginaw, Mich., but only 2
cents per 100 lbs. when the shipping point is Buffalo, N. Y. Water com-
petition between Buffalo and New York affects the rates to New York, but
it justifies no wider difference in the rates from Saginaw and Buffalo to
these interior destinations than exists in the rates from these shipping
points to New York. Mershon S. P. & Co. v. Central R. Co. 456.
21. The defendants by charging a higher rate on shingles than on lumber
in carloads from Duluth, Minn., to Chicago, Ill., subject Duluth and its
shingle shippers to undue prejudice and disadvantage, and afford undue
preference and advantage to other places from which shingles are carried
at rates as low as those applied on lumber therefrom. Duluth Shingle Co.
v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. 489.
22. The rates from New York and other eastern points to Chattanooga
are not shown to be unreasonable within the meaning of section one of the
Act, although they are higher than the rates from the same points through
Chattanooga to Nashville, the longer distance, as the traffic from New
York and other eastern points is carried to Nashville and Chattanooga
under substantially different circumstances and conditions. Chamber of
Commerce of Chattanooga v. Southern R. Co. 111.
23. Applying the law as construed by the United States Supreme Court,
the traffic from New York and other eastern points is carried to Nash-
ville through Chattanooga under substantially different circumstances and
conditions than those pertaining to traffic from the same points to Chatta-
nooga, the short distance, and consequently the higher rate to Chatta-
nooga is not unlawful under section four of the statute. Id.
24. The share of the through rate for the transportation of salt from
producing points in Michigan to points on the Missouri River, which is
allowed to the boat line on Lake Michigan, the controlling interest in
which is owned by the same persons who own a controlling interest in
the corporations producing salt at the point named, and which share
amounts to from 30 to 33 per cent of the through rate, and is consid-
erably higher than the former charge for carrying salt on Lake Michigan,
but which increase is partly accounted for by the fact that additional
services are included, is not so grossly disproportionate to the value of
the additional through services as to amount to a rebate in favor of the
salt interests which control the boat line. Re Transportation of Salt, 148.
25. It is no part of the duty of the Commission to equalize differences
in the natural advantages of localities through the adjustment of tariff
rates. Id.
26. No unlawful discrimination against localities is made by defendants
in the granting of divisions in the rates to lumber mills owning or con-
trolling short originating roads called "tap lines," while other carriers
fail or refuse to allow like concessions to members of the complaining
association located in a different section of the country. Central Yellow
Pine Asso. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. 193.
27. There is no discrimination against localities by an arrangement
among carriers dividing the traffic of transporting immigrants from Atlan-
tic ports westward in agreed proportions, where the immigrants are trans-
ported at domestic published rates. Re Transportation of Immigrants from
New York, 13.
28. No undue discrimination results to Sheridan by reason of the fact
that the rate from that place to Boston is 2 cents per 100 lbs. more than
from Indianapolis to Boston, although the latter is the longer distance
point by the defendant's line, which runs north from Indianapolis through
Sheridan, connecting at various points with lines to Boston; as Indian-
apolis is a competitive point, and the short lines from Sheridan to the
east are through Indianapolis, and by those lines Sheridan is a longer dis-
tance point. G. C. Pratt Lumber Co. v. Chicago I. & L. R. Co. 29.
29. It is the province of the Commission to interfere and secure, if possi-
ble, a fair adjustment in cases of unreasonable rates or unjust discrim-
ination; but the Commission has no more authority to place competing
millers in different states upon precisely the same footing than it has to
equalize conditions in all localities and in every industry. Wichita v.
Missouri P. R. Co. 35.
30. There has been no such change in conditions governing the traffic
as to warrant the Commission in interfering with its previous holding,
whereby it declared that there was nothing unlawful in the fact that the
rates from points in Kansas and in Missouri to points in Texas are 5
cents per 100 lbs. higher on flour than on wheat, and that such differential
is not applied on flour or wheat carried in any other direction. Id.
31. The combination of rates on rye and other coarse grain from Can-
non Falls to Minneapolis and thence to Chicago iscent less than the
straight rate from Cannon Falls to Chicago, which is without justifica-
tion. Cannon Falls Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 650.
32. The rates from Cannon Falls, a point in Minnesota 48 miles from
Minneapolis, to Chicago, East St. Louis, and Louisville, are competitive
rates, as are also the rates from Minneapolis. And Cannon Falls, with
its competition with Minneapolis, is entitled to as low a rate to common
points as the difference in conditions will permit. In view, however, of
the desirability of keeping open the Minneapolis market to Cannon Falls
grain, the short distance between those points, and the low rate from
Minneapolis forced by competition, it is apparently not unjust that the
grain rate from Cannon Falls should be as high as the local rate to Min-
neapolis plus a 7-cent rate therefrom to Chicago, provided the Cannon
Falls dealer is not thereby subjected to disadvantage as compared with
the Minneapolis grain dealer. Id.
33. The favorable location of Cannon Falls with reference to Minneapolis
and Duluth, and the competitive advantage to which the Cannon Falls
dealer is entitled by reason of the route via Duluth, are neutralized to an
extent by manipulation of billing at Minneapolis, whereby Cannon Falls
grain sold in Minneapolis can be reconsigned to Duluth under a substi-
tuted billing and the balance of a through rate, resulting in a less total
charge from Cannon Falls to Duluth than the charge on a through ship-
ment from Cannon Falls to Duluth. Id.
34. A ruling that an antecedent haul to one locality, and no previous
transportation to a competing locality, constitute justification for a lower
charge from the former to a common market, would be in effect to approve
the equalization of natural advantages and disadvantages as between locali-
ties; and such equalization is not sanctioned by the Act to Regulate Com-
merce. Id.
35. The traffic in cattle and hogs in Chicago and other points is dis-
criminated against by the exaction of higher rates for transporting cattle
and hogs than for transporting live stock products to Chicago from points
west, northwest, and southwest thereof, including Missouri River points
and South St. Paul, Minnesota. Chicago Live Stock Exchange v. Chicago
G. W. R. Co. 428.
36. Shippers are not entitled, as a matter of fact, to mill grain in transit,
and forward the milled product under the through rate in force on the
grain from the point of origin to the place of ultimate destination; but
allowance of the privilege by a carrier to shippers in one section must
be without wrongful prejudice to the rights of shippers in another section
served by its line. Koch v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 675.
37. Considering the defendants as a single line, the granting of transit
milling west of Pittsburg and denying it to millers at Harrisburg is not
necessarily unlawful, because conditions on that line in Ohio and Indiana
may be very different from conditions in eastern Pennsylvania; but such
differences have not been shown, nor their bearing explained, and upon
the meager and incomplete facts now appearing the Commission is not
warranted in making a decision which in principle, if complainant's con-
tention is well founded, would involve a general extension of transit priv-
ileges into a large territory where heretofore such privileges have not
been allowed. Id.
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN SHIPPERS.
38. The logging roads, or “tap lines," to which the defendant, the Mobile
& Ohio Railroad Company, grants allowances from its published rates, are
not common carriers, but such tap lines are the private property of mill
owners, and the allowances are therefore unlawful. Central Yellow Pine
Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 505.
39. The Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fé Railway Company grossly and con-
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