Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 505.
Richmond Elevator Co. v. Pere Marquette R. Co. 629.
Thompson v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 640.
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION FOUR.
Chamber of Commerce of Chattanooga v. Southern R. Co. 111.
Gardner & Clark v. Southern R. Co. 342.
Wrigley v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 412.
Lehman-Higginson Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 460.
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION FIVE.
Re Transportation of Immigrants from New York, 13.
Consolidated Forwarding Co. v. Southern P. Co. 590.
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION SIX.
Davis v. Pere Marquette R. Co. 405.
Paxton Tie Co. v. Detroit S. R. Co. 422.
Re Transportation of Coal & Mine Supplies, 473.
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION SEVEN.
Railroad Commission of Kentucky v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 173.
Hope Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 696.
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION EIGHT.
Cattle Raisers' Asso. v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. 83.
Davies v. Pere Marquette R. Co. 405.
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION THIRTEEN.
Chicago Live Stock Exchange v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 429.
ADVANCES IN FREIGHT RATES.
1. While the hauling of flat cars empty to the mills, and the practice
of shippers to load cars below their capacity, are conditions which, to the
extent they exist, are properly taken into account by carriers in fixing
rates, it must be assumed that they were considered by defendants in
making and maintaining the rates so long in force prior to the advance
complained of. Tift v. Southern R. Co. 548.
2. The rates on lumber, in force prior to the defendants' advance of 2
cents per 100 lbs. on shipments from Georgia points to Ohio River des-
tinations, which advance was made on June 22, 1903, were reasonably
high in comparison with the rates on other commodities which are at all
analogous to lumber in respect to value, volume, risk, cost of handling, and
other circumstances and conditions affecting the transportation of the
traffic; and such advance was not warranted, and the increased rates thus
in force are unreasonable and unjust. Id.
3. Carriers have no right to advance a rate which is already reasonably
high and yields an adequate return for the service rendered, solely because
additional revenue is needed. Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R.
Co. 505; Tift v. Southern R. Co. 548.
4. The mere fact of the need of additional revenue to meet increased
expenses does not justify the advance in rates on lumber shipments from
Georgia to and beyond the Ohio River, which are, for the most part, of
low grade and of comparatively small value. Tift v. Southern R. Co. 548.
5. Where an advance is made in rates which have been long maintained.
and the evidence shows that the traffic affected is large, important, and
constantly increasing, the advance will be held unjust unless it is satis-
factorily explained. Id.
6. The advance of rates by defendants was the result of concerted
action by them and other carriers; and, while the question whether such
concert of action is in violation of the anti-trust act is for the determina-
tion of the courts, it is the province and duty of this Commission, when
the reasonableness of rates is in issue before it, to consider whether the
advanced rates resulted from untrammeled competition, or were fixed by
concert of action or combination of carriers. Central Yellow Pine Asso. v.
Illinois C. R. Co. 505; Tift v. Southern R. Co. 548.
7. The advances in freight rates by defendants were not justified by
the increased cost of operating the roads, where, although the operating
expenses have constantly increased, they have been enlarged by the inclu-
sion therein of large expenditures for permanent improvements, and defend-
ants' gross earnings have increased from year to year to such extent as to
result in a constant increase of net earnings. Id.
8. When a railroad company advances a rate which has been for some
time in force, the fact of its continuance is in the nature of an admission
against that company, which tends to show the unreasonableness of the ad-
vance. Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 505.
9. The rates in effect for long periods prior to the advance made by de-
fendants of 2 cents per 100 lbs. on April 15, 1903, and the rates on lumber
in car loads from points in lumber-producing territories east of the Mis-
sissippi River in Louisiana, Mississippi, and part of Alabama served by
defendant roads, to Ohio River points, were remunerative to the defend-
ant carriers, and the advance was unreasonable. Id.
10. If carriers are to any extent relieved from giving the notice now
required, of advances and reductions in rates upon foreign commerce, they
should in all cases file with the Commission the rates actually made, and
give such further notice to the public as may be possible. Re Publication
& Filing of Tariffs, 55.
Rates on. Chamber of Commerce of Chattanooga v. Southern R. Co. 117.
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS.
Table showing comparison of total annual tonnage of agricultural im-
plements with that of other commodities. Tift v. Southern R. Co. 568.
Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 534.
Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. 489.
Table showing comparison of total annual tonnage of anthracite coal
with that of other commodities. Tift v. Southern R. Co. 568.
Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 534.
The advance of rates by defendants was the result of concerted action
by them and other carriers, and, while the question whether such concert
of action is in violation of the anti-trust act is for the determination of the
courts, it is the province and duty of this Commission, when the reason-
ableness of rates is in issue before it, to consider whether the advanced
rates resulted from untrammeled competition, or were fixed by concert of
action or combination of carriers. Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois
C. R. Co. 505; Tift v. Southern R. Co. 548.
Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. 489.
Rates on. Chamber of Commerce of Chattanooga v. Southern R. Co. 117.
Rates on. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. 489.
Gardner & Clark v. Southern R. Co. 342.
Cannon Falls Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago G. W. R.
Freight classification of. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth S. S. & A. R.
Co. 489.
Freight classification of. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R.
Rates on. Chamber of Commerce of Chattanooga v. Southern R. Co. 117.
BED SLATS.
Freight classification of. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R.
Co. 489.
New Orleans Live Stock Exch. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 327.
Table showing comparison of total annual tonnage of bituminous coal
with that of other commodities. Tift v. Southern R. Co. 568.
Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 534.
Rates on. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. 489.
Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 519.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See EVIDENCE.
Freight classification of. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R.
Rates on. Chamber of Commerce of Chattanooga v. Southern R. Co. 111.
CAR LINE COMPANIES. See REFRIGERATOR CARS.
Carload rates, see RATES.
Freight classification of. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R.
Co. 489.
Rates on. Duluth Shingle Co. v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. 489.
1. The complainant was not unjustly discriminated against by failure
to furnish him with cars for the shipment of grain, while supplying a com-
petitor doing business in the same town with cars, where it appeared that
complainant desired to ship grain mainly to eastern points, concerning the
transportation of which an embargo had been established by eastern lines,
while his competitor in that business shipped largely by defendant's line
to local points for which complainant had no shipments. Parks v. Cin-
cinnati & M. Valley R. Co. 47.
2. Under the conditions that attended the anthracite coal strike of
1902, and which resulted in a great demand for bituminous coal, subject-
ing railroad equipments to a great tax and causing congestion of lines,
yards, and terminals, the defendant's temporary rule limiting its coal cars
to mines having track connection with its road, thereby confining its com-
paratively few available cars to mines generally in operation, where quick
loading could be accomplished, and declining to permit its sidings or
switches to be further congested by loading coal from wagons, was calcu-
lated to hasten, rather than retard, the movement of coal for public use,
and was not unreasonable or unjust. Thompson v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 640.
3. No opinion is expressed upon the point whether a railroad may,
under ordinary conditions, discriminate in furnishing cars as between the
methods of loading by tipple and wagon, or whether, without a rule, it
may, even in a great emergency, discriminate between the two classes of
4. The right of complainant to ship coal was not barred by the fact
that he was a druggist by occupation, or that he loaded coal cars from
wagons, for a large part of the commerce of the country is handled in
that way;
and when he tendered freight for transportation he was en-
titled to the same facilities furnished to other shippers in like condi-
tions. Id.
5. Merely putting in evidence defendant's rule of car apportionment is
insufficient to show discrimination against the complainant; the actual
effect of the rule, during the time covered by the complaint, is necessary to
a determination of the question of unfairness in the distribution of cars.
Richmond Elevator Co. v. Pere Marquette R. Co. 629.
6. Every shipper is legally entitled to fair opportunity and treatment
in the use of the carrier's utilities, and any discrimination which in a sub-
stantial degree deprives shippers of such use must be considered unjust,
unless forced by justifying conditions. In such a case the burden of proof
is upon the complainant for the purpose of showing discrimination, and
then upon the carrier to show that the discrimination was justified. Id.
7. In the furnishing of cars, defendant unjustly discriminated against
the complainant, which desired to ship hay from various points in Michi-
gan, but the proof fails to indicate with any degree of certainty the dam-
age caused by the wrongful discrimination, and the amount which the
complainant was entitled to recover by way of reparation. Id.
8. Complainant was unjustly discriminated against by defendant's re-
fusal to provide cars for the shipment of cross ties, while it did furnish
cars to other persons for the interstate shipment of lumber, stone, and
many other freight articles, and also supplied cars for the shipment of
cross ties destined almost entirely for its own use. Paxton Tie Co. v. De-
troit S. R. Co. 422.
9. Reparation awarded to complainant for defendant's refusal to furnish
cars for the shipment of cross ties while it did furnish cars to other per-
sons for the interstate shipment of lumber, stone, and many other freight
articles, and also supplied cars for the shipment of cross ties destined
almost entirely for its own use. Id.
10. While the Act to Regulate Commerce contains no provision which,
expressly or by proper implication, gives this Commission jurisdiction in
cases merely showing delay or negligence in the receipt, forwarding, or de-
livery of property offered for transportation, including the furnishing of
cars, the regulating statute does prohibit any unjust discrimination or
wrongful prejudice in the provision of cars or other transportation facili-
ties, as well as in the fixing and application of transportation charges.
Richmond Elevator Co. v. Pere Marquette R. Co. 629.
11. Making certain charges for the transportation of coal shipped in
car loads when the coal is loaded by tipple, and exacting a higher charge
when the coal is loaded in some other way, is unreasonable and consti-
tutes an unjust discrimination. Glade Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R.
12. Defendant's refusal to furnish cars to complainants between Feb-
ruary 23 and March 26 on the Deal side track at Meyersdale and the side
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