the execution of every judgment so appealed from shall be 6 Geo. 4, suspended in case the person so convicted shall immediately (g) c. 129. enter into recognizances before such justices (which they are Recognizhereby authorized and required to take) himself in the penal ance. sum of ten pounds with two sufficient sureties in the penal sum Security to of ten pounds of lawful money of Great Britain, upon condi- prosecutor. tion to prosecute such appeal with effect, and to be forthcoming to abide the judgment and determination of the said next general sessions or general quarter sessions, and to pay such costs as the said court shall award on such occasion, and the justices in the said next court of general sessions or general quarter sessions are hereby authorized and required to hear and determine the matter of the said appeal, and to award such costs as Costs. to them shall appear just and reasonable to be paid by either party, which decision shall be final; and if upon hearing the Decision said appeal the judgment of the justices before whom the appellant shall have been convicted shall be affirmed, such appellant shall immediately be committed by the said court to Imprisonthe common gaol or house of correction, without bail or main- ment. prize, according to such conviction, and for the space of time therein mentioned. final. to act as 13. Provided also, that no justice of the peace, being also a No master master in the particular trade or manufacture in or concerning justice. which any offence is charged to have been committed under this act, shall act as such justice under this act. OBSERVATIONS ON 6 GEO. 4, c. 129. Since the passing of this Act of Parliament, it is perfectly Mere comclear that a mere combination either of masters for the purpose bination not of lowering wages (h), or of workmen for the illegal. of raising purpose them (i), is quite legal, and so long as such persons content themselves with merely combining to effect the object they have in view, they will be guilty of no offence. But if, in order when it more effectually to attain their object, whether of lowering or becomes raising wages, they proceed to use violence, threats, intimida- illegal. (g) In R. v. Aston, 1 L. M. & P. 491, Wightman, J., held that this word "immediately" here means "promptly and expediti.. ously," having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case. In that case the prisoner was convicted on Thursday at Tunstall, in Staffordshire, and committed to Stafford Gaol, though defended by an attorney, who left the court before sentence was pronounced. On the Saturday following another attorney, who lived at Manchester, was consulted on his behalf, and that attorney on the Monday ap- Charge of ford, 1842. tion, molestation or obstruction (k), with a view to force others to adopt their views, they will be guilty of an offence against this Act of Parliament (1); and, as we shall presently see, may also render themselves liable to an indictment for conspiracy. That the above is the effect of the stat. of Geo. 4, will be perTindal, C. J.,ceived from the following observations of Tindal, C. J., who, in to the grand jury at Staf- charging the grand jury at the Stafford Special Commission, in 1842 (m), whilst alluding to the various charges which would be brought before them, arising out of combinations of workmen, observed: "If the workmen of the several collieries and manufactories, who complained that the wages which they received were inadequate to the value of their services, had assembled themselves peaceably together for the purpose of consulting upon and determining the rate of wages or prices which the persons present at the meeting should require for their work, and had entered into an agreement amongst themselves for the purpose of fixing such rate, they would have done no more than the law allowed. A combination for that purpose and to that extent (if indeed it is to be called by that name) is no more than is recognized as legal by the stat. 6 Geo. 4; by which statute, also, exactly the same right of combination, to the same extent and no further, is given to the masters when met together, if they are of opinion the rate of wages is too high. In the case supposed-that is, a dispute between the masters and the workmen as to the proper amount of wages to be given – it was probably thought by the Legislature, that if the workmen on the one part refused to work, or the masters on the other refused to employ, as such a state of things could not continue long, it might fairly be expected that the party must ultimately give way whose pretensions were not founded in reason and justice the masters if they offered too little, the workmen if they demanded too much. But, unfortunately for themselves and others, those who were discontented did not rest here. Not satisfied with the exercise of their own right to withhold their own labour if they were discontented with the price they received for it, they assumed the power of interfering with the rights which others possessed of exercising their discretion upon the same point; (k) As to the meaning of these words, see 22 Vict. c. 34, ante, p. 352, note. (1) See sect. 3; R. v. Rowlands, 17 Q. B. 671; S. C. 2 Den. C. C. 364 Administering an oath not to work under certain prices and to keep the secrets of a lodge, is administering an unlawful oath within the statutes 37 Geo. 3, c. 123; 39 Geo. 3, c. 79; 52 Geo. 3, c. 104; and 57 Geo. 3, c. 19; not as has been ignorantly supposed because it has reference to any matter respecting wages, but on the ground that every asso ciation of that kind bound together by an oath not to disclose the proceedings of that society is for that reason, and not for the other, an unlawful combination within the meaning of the statutes, R. v. Ball, 6 C. & P. 563; R. v. Lovelass, 6 C. & P. 596; S. C. 1 M. & Rob. 349; R. v. Dixon, 6 C. & P. 601. (m) See Carr. & M. 662, note. It is thought desirable to give this and the following extract, as the law as to combination is in practice not well known or understood; at least by workmen. and accordingly you will have numerous cases laid before you in which large bodies of dissatisfied workmen interfered by personal violence, and by threats and intimidation, to compel others who were perfectly willing to continue to labour in their callings at the rate of wages then paid, to desist from their work, to leave the mine or manufactory, and against their own will to add themselves to the numbers of the discontented party, than which a more glaring act of tyranny and despotism by one set of men over their fellows cannot be conceived. If there is one right which beyond all others the labourer ought to be able to call his own, it is the right of the exertion of his own personal strength and skill in the full enjoyment of his own free will, altogether unshackled by the control or dictates of his fellow-workmen; yet, strange to say, this very right which the discontented workman claims for himself to it fullest extent, he does, by a blind perversity and unaccountable selfishness, entirely refuse to his fellows who differ in opinion from himself. It is unnecessary to say that a course of proceeding so utterly unreasonable in itself, so injurious to society, so detrimental to the interests of trade, and so oppressive against the rights of the poor man, must be a gross and flagrant violation of the law, and must be put down, when the guilt is established, by a proper measure of punishment." And similar principles were also laid down by Patteson, J., in R. v. Rowpassing sentence upon some prisoners who had been convicted lands. upon an indictment under the stat. of Geo. 4 (n). "The object of the Legislature," said he, "was, that all masters and workmen should be left free in the conduct of their business. The masters were at liberty to give what rate of wages they liked, and to agree among themselves what wages they would pay. In like manner, the workmen were at liberty to agree among themselves for what wages they would work, and were not restricted in so doing by the circumstances that they were in the employ of one or other of the masters. The intention of the Legislature was to make them quite free, but seeing that intimidation might be used to carry out such agreements, it was enacted by 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, s. 3 (o), that (the learned judge here read that section, and added) the offence did not consist in the combination to raise their wages, but in the use of threats, intimidation, molestation and obstruction." CONSPIRACIES AMONGST MASTERS AND master what Since the above-mentioned stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, it has also Conspiracy been held that a combination (p) of workmen for the purpose of to dictate to dictating to masters what workmen they shall employ is in- workmen he dictable (q). And an indictment for conspiring to prevent the shall employ. workmen of J. G. from continuing to work was held to be sup- R. v. Bykerported by evidence of a conspiracy to procure the discharge of dike. (n) R. v. Rowlands, Q. B., Mich. Term, 1851; 17 Q. B. 671; S. C. 5 Cox, C. C. 436. (o) See the section, ante, p. 352. (p) That a combination bond is illegal and void, see Hilton v. Rob. 179. Club fining men who worked for obnoxious master. any of the workmen, as the indictment did not necessarily lay the intent as to all the workmen (r). In the case of R. v. Hewitt (s) where it appeared that a club of workmen had been formed, and was empowered to inflict fines upon persons who worked for obnoxious masters, and that a person so fined refused to pay, whereupon his fellow-workmen R. v. Hewitt. would not work with him, and by that means compelled his master to dismiss him, Lord Campbell, C. J., held such conduct of the men to be illegal. Conspiracy increase rate of wages. Moreover, if either masters or servants conspire to effect a reto reduce or duction or increase of wages by the use of violence, threats, intimidation or other unlawful means, they will be guilty of an illegal act, and may be indicted for such conspiracy (t). It is not, however, thought necessary further to advert in this place to the law applicable to the crime of conspiracy, as a discussion of it would lead us beyond the proper limits of this work (u). It may, however, perhaps with propriety, be here stated that a conspiracy has been defined to be "an agreement for an unlawful purpose, or to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means" (x). But Lord Denman, C. J., in one case (y), said he thought the antithesis not very correct; and, in another (z), said the words "at least" should accompany the definition. Discontented workmen riotously "beginning master's house. R. v. Batt. Where a party of coal-whippers having a feeling of ill-will to a coal-lumper who paid less than the usual wages, created a mob, and riotously went to the house where he kept his pay-table, and to demolish" cried out that they would murder him, and began to throw stones, brickbats, &c., and broke windows, and partitions, and part of a wall, and continued after his escape throwing stones at the house till they were compelled to desist by the threats of the police, it was held by Gurney, B., that they might be convicted of beginning to demolish under the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, though their principal object was to injure the lumper, provided it was also their object to demolish the house, either on account of its being used by him or his men, and though they had not any ill-will against the owner of the house personally (a). (r) Ibid.; and see R. v. Ferguson, 2 Stark. 489, where an indictment against workmen for conspiring to prevent their masters from taking any apprentices, was held to be supported by proof of a conspiracy to prevent their taking more than a certain number, in proportion to the number of journeymen employed. (s) 5 Cox, Crim. Cas. 162. (t) See R. v. Duffield, 5 Cox, Cr. C. 404; R. v. Rowlands, ibid. 436. (u) See further on this subject 2 Russ. on Crimes, by Greaves, bk. 2, ch. 2, p. 674; and R. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 49 ; R. v. Button, 11 Q. B. 929, where other authorities upon the subject may also be found. See also a learned note to Mr. Justice Coleridge's edition of Blackst. Comm. vol. iv. p. 136, where he explains the confusion which has arisen in many cases from the fallacy of separating the means from the end; and considering that any means could possibly be lawful, of which the end was unlawful, or on the other hand any end lawful, the means to which were unlawful. (x) R. v. Jones, 4 B. & Ad. 349; R. v. Seward, 1 A. & E. 713; O'Connell v. R., 11 Cl. & F. 233. (y) R. v. Peck, 9 A. & E. 690. CHAPTER XI. LEGACIES TO SERVANTS. 66 "servants" the testator. IT is thought convenient to collect into a separate chapter the who entitled various decisions upon this subject, as the question, Whether par- to legacies as ticular individuals are entitled to legacies left to a class of persons as servants," frequently arises; and the answer to it rather depends upon the words of the will and the intention of depends on the testator in each case, than upon the strict legal construction intention of of the contract into which he has entered with the persons claiming the legacy. For it by no means follows that every person with whom a testator had entered into a contract of hiring and service, was an object of his testamentary bounty; although, in many cases, a clue to his intention may be found by ascertaining the exact nature of such contracts. For similar reasons no rule can be laid down which will be applicable to all cases. Each case must depend upon its own particular circumstances. It is, however, of course, necessary that a person claiming to be entitled to a legacy left to each one of a class of persons, should be one of that class to whom the legacy is leftthat a person claiming a legacy as a servant should be a servant-otherwise he cannot be entitled to it. It has, therefore, But servant been held (a) that a person who was not obliged to give up his must serve whole time to his master, although in some sense he might be clusively; called a servant, was yet not entitled to a legacy left to servants. testator ex live in his Thus where (b) the Duke of Bolton by his will devised Townshend "unto such of my servants as shall be living with me at the v. Windham. time of my death one year's wages:" The Lord Keeper said, but need not "stewards of courts, and such who are not obliged to spend house or be their whole time with their master, but may also serve any fed by him. other master, are not servants within the intention of the will, but I will not narrow it to such servants only that lived in the testator's house or had diet from him." of any one Upon similar principles it has been held that a servant to be so, he must entitled to a legacy left to "servants," must not be subject to not be subthe orders of any other person than the testator. That is, that ject to orders a person serving the testator under a contract made by the tes- but testator. tator with that person's master, does not come within the class of persons contemplated by the will, although the testator might in some sense be considered his dominus pro tempore. Thus where (c) a testator, after bequeathing legacies to two Coachman (a) This is in accordance with the decisions on the law of settlement, ante, p. 49. (b) Townshend v. Windham, 2 Vern. 546. (c) Chilcot v. Bromley, 12 Ves. 114; and see Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499, ante, p. 199. R |