to any given time, without any condition to defeat, or collateral limitation to determine the estate in the mean time, from an estate subject to a condition or collateral limitation. The term absolute is of the same signification with the word pure, or simple, a word which expresses that the estate is not determinable by any event besides the event marked by the clause of limitation.

These observations apply to all the variety of estates which give an interest of any duration; and all estates give an interest of some duration, unless they are estates at will.

An estate to a man and his heirs for ever, generally, is a simple, pure, and absolute estate.

Again, an estate for twenty years, and which in point of limitation will certainly continue to the end of that period, is of the like quality; because that time may not be abridged by any event expressed in any clause of condition or collateral determination, or implied by law.

In this sense, an estate which is absolute differs from

A determinable estate, which, according to the express terms of the limitation thereof, when it is first taken, or the construction of law on the nature of the estate after it is created, may determine, by some event, before the period shall be completed through which it is extended, and during which it may continue.

An estate to A and his heirs, tenants of the manor of Dale, is a determinable estate.

Though in point of duration and extent of time, the right of holding the land, in virtue of the limitation to the heirs, may continue for ever, the estate which passes by this limitation is subject to be determined by the event marked by the words of qualification.

Also, an estate to A, during her widowhood, is a determinable estate. In construction of law she has an estate for life, determinable on her marriage: her marriage will put an end to her estate sooner than it would otherwise expire: on that account her estate is classed among determinable interests.

Also, when a lease is made to B for twenty years, if A should live so long, the period of enjoyment under that title may be shortened by the death of A in the mean time; and therefore a determinable estate passes by a lease in these terms.

Every particular estate is, from its nature, necessarily a determinable one; but those estates alone which have, by limitation, a collateral determination annexed to the disposition of the land, or which, from the nature of the original estate, fall within the description, according to the common acceptation of the term, are the objects of the present remarks.

The terms absoluté and determinable are contrasted with the term conditional; and

A conditional estate may, by reason of the condition annexed to the same, be defeated

before it shall have completed the period for which it may continue under the limitation.

A grant to A for twenty years, provided that if C should pay 20l. to A on the first day of next May, the term shall cease, is at first an estate on condition, and not an absolute estate.

Suppose the estate to be absolute, it would continue under the stipulation of the parties to the end of the twenty years; but as a condition is annexed to the estate, to defeat it before the end of that term, by effluxion of time, in case the event marked by the condition should arise within the term, the estate is subject to a condition, and not absolute.

The quality which gives to an estate the denomination of determinable or conditional is, whilst annexed to the estate, so incompatible and wholly inconsistent with a simple, a pure, or an absolute estate, that the existence of the one quality negatives the other. But some estates, which are determinable or conditional, may eventually become absolute: thus an estate to A, subject to be void on payment of a sum on a given day, will become absolute by default in payment of the money on that day.

Also, an estate to A, or to A and his heirs, till B shall return from Rome, will become absolute, by the death of B, before his return; since it becomes impossible that the estate should determine by the event fixed on for the collateral determination of the estate.

Also, an estate whicn is conditional may bccome simple, or absolute, by release of the condition; or a determinable estate may become simple, and absolute, by conformation, or release from the person interested in taking advantage of this collateral quality.

And a determinable estate-tail will become an absolute fee-simple, by a recovery duly suffered by the tenant in tail; since the recovery will bar all conditions and collateral limitations annexed to the estate-tail (r).

It is sometimes a question of construction, whether certain words are of limitation or of condition when they are of limitation, they circumscribe the continuance of the estate, and mark the period which is to determine the estate; when they are of condition, they render the estate liable to be defeated, in case the event expressed in the condition should arise before the determination of the estate. The instances in which this question can arise in deeds are not very numerous. The following is the most remarkable case which has occurred:

A lease was made to a widow for forty years, with the words, in Latin, added to the limitation: "under this condition, that she shall so long continue a widow, and inhabit the premises." She died within the term, and, according to Moor, it was held that the term was not

(r) Driver v. Edgar, Cowp. 379; Benson and Hodson, 1 Mod. 108; Page v. Hayward, 2 Salk. 570.

determined by her death, but transmitted to her executors (rr).

According to the opinion of Popham and Clench, had the word "if" been omitted, the superadded clause would have been clearly a condition; and had the words "under this condition, that," &c. been omitted, the superadded words would have formed part of the limitation. According to Goldsborough (s), the whole clause was considered to be insensible, and for that reason the term was held to continue.

But the question, whether words are of limitation or condition, more frequently arises in construing wills. In these instances the question is, whether the estate is to commence, on the contingency; or is to vest immediately in interest, subject to be defeated in the event expressed as a condition annexed to the estate (t).

When one has the right of enjoyment solely, he is said to have a sole or several estate, to distinguish his interest from a joint-tenancy; and he is said to have the possession of the land separately by himself, to distinguish his right from a tenancy in common, or in joint-tenancy, or coparcenary, or by entireties.

Even a tenant in common has a sole or several estate in his share; there is a severalty

(rr) Sawyer v. Hardy, Moor, 400, pl. 525.

(s) Goldsb. 179; 10 Vin. Abr. 222.

(t) Doe v. Nowell, 1 Mau. & Selw. 327; Spring v. Cæsar, Sir W. Jones, 389.