And so of the rest. We think the charge was a fair one, and gave the defendant the full benefit of any falsity contained in the answers given by the applicant. Under the charge as given, we do not see how the evidence of the physician, even if irrelevant, could injure the defendant. Other points were raised, but it is unnecessary to discuss them. From a careful examination of the whole case, as presented, we are satisfied that there is no error in the record. Judgment affirmed. WHERE A WOMAN IS ENGAGED TO A MAN, SHE HAS AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN HIS LIFE CHISHOLM, RESPONDENT, V. NATIONAL CAPITOL LIFE 52 Mo. 213 (1873) Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court. WAGNER, J. The main error assigned and relied upon for the reversal of this case is the action of the court in refusing to declare that the plaintiff had no such insurable interest in the life of the person insured as would entitle her to recover. The record shows that there was a contract of marriage existing between plaintiff and Robert Peel Clark, and that on the 17th day of July, 1869, the defendant made and delivered to plaintiff its policy of insurance whereby it insured the life of the said Clark for the term of his natural life, for the sum of $5000. The policy was issued and delivered to plaintiff and made payable to her as the intended wife of Clark, she paying the annual premium of $90.20. The first premium was duly paid by her, and on the 12th day of January 1870, whilst the policy was in full force, but before the contemplated marriage had been solemnized, Clark died. What interest or whether any is necessary in the life of the person insured to support the contract of insurance is left in some confusion by the adjudged cases, as the authorities are contradictory. In this State we have no statute on the subject covering the case, and as the policy is not void by the common law, it can only be declared so on the ground that it is against public policy. There is nothing to show that the contract was a mere wagering one, or that it is in any wise against or contrary to public policy. The insurance was not a mere wagering contract, and therefore cannot be said to contravene any principle of public policy. The plaintiff had an interest in the life of Clark; a valid contract of marriage was subsisting between them. Had he lived, and violated the contract, she would have had her action for damages. Had he observed and kept the same, then as his wife she would have been entitled to support. In my opinion she had such an interest as was entirely sufficient to render the contract valid. The defence in this case is devoid of merit, and is not creditable to the defendant making it. There is no pretence that there was any concealment of facts at the time of making the contract. Upon the facts there was no hesitation in entering into the agreement, and obtaining the premium and issuing the policy. Had the defendant been as willing to observe and fulfill its obligations as it was to receive premiums, then this case would have never occupied the time of the courts. The judgment should be affirmed. A CREDITOR HAS AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE LIFE OF THE DEBTOR ANDERSON V. ERIE Nisi Prius, King's Bench, 1795. 2 Park Ins. (8th ed.) 914 In an action on a policy of insurance on the life of Lord Newhaven from the 1st December 1792, to the 1st of December, 1793, the only question made by the defendant was as to the plaintiff's interest, which it was contended was not sufficient to take this case out of the statute 14 Geo. 3, c. 48. It appeared in evidence that Lord Newhaven was indebted to the plaintiff and a Mr. Mitchell in a large sum of money, part of which debt had been assigned by them to another person; the remainder, being more than the amount of the sum insured, was upon a settlement of accounts between the plaintiff and Mitchell, agreed by them to remain to the account of Mitchell alone. Lord Kenyon was of opinion that this debt was a sufficient interest, and said that it was singular that this question had never been directly decided before. That a creditor had certainly an interest in the life of his debtor; the means by which he was to be satisfied may materially depend upon it, and at all events the death must in all cases in some degree lessen the security. Verdict for the plaintiff. RIGHT OF A STOCKHOLDER TO INSURE THE PROPERTY RIGGS V. THE COMMERCIAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. One Tobias was owner of thirty-six shares of stock in a steamship corporation. This corporation was the owner and operator of a steamer, "Falcon." Tobias applied to the insurance company for insurance in his own name upon this steamer. The policy was issued to him in accordance with this request. Thereafter, the vessel was destroyed by fire. The policy was assigned to Riggs, who brings this action. The company contended that Riggs could not recover, because Tobias had no insurable interest in the steamer when the policy was issued to him. Mr. Justice Andrews said: "The stockholder in a corporation has no legal title to the corporate assets in property, nor any equitable title which he can convert into a legal title. The corporation itself is the legal owner and can deal with corporate property as owner, subject only to the restrictions of the charter. But stockholders in a corporation have equitable rights of pecuniary nature growing out of their situation as stockholders which may be prejudiced by the destruction of the corporate property. The object of business corporations is to make profits, through the exercise of the (divisio) corporate franchises, and gains so made are distributable among the stockholders, according to their respective interests, although the time of the division is ordinarily in the discretion of the managing body. It is this right to share in the profits which constitutes the inducement to become stockholders; also at the settlement of the affairs of the corporation, the assets, after payment of the debts, are divisible among the stockholders. Therefore the right to dividends and the right to share in the fiscal distribution of the corporate property may be prejudiced by its destruction." Judgment was given for plaintiff. WHERE PLAINTIFF MISREPRESENTS THE FACT THAT HE HAS BEEN DENIED INSURANCE BY OTHER COMPANIES, THE COMPANY HAS THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE POLICY CANCELLED ON RETURNING THE PREMIUM LONDON ASSURANCE V. MANSEL 11 Chancery Division, 363 (1879) This was an action by the plaintiffs, who were duly incorporated by the name of "The London Assurance," and were empowered to grant assurances on lives, to set aside an agreement to grant a policy of life insurance to the defendant. On the 16th of August, 1878, the plaintiffs, on the application of the defendant's solicitor, sent him forms of proposals for life assurance, and on the 20th of August, 1878, the defendant left with the plaintiffs at their office a proposal for assurance on his life for £10,000 filled up on one of the plaintiff's forms of proposal, and signed by the defendant. The questions and answers contained in this proposal, so far as material were as follows: At the foot of the proposal the defendant signed the following declaration: "I declare that the above written particulars are true, and I agree that this proposal and declaration shall be the basis of the contract between me and the London Assurance." On the same day the defendant had an interview with the medical officer of the plaintiffs, and in reply to his inquiries gave substantially the same answers as those in the proposal before stated. The plaintiffs being, as they alleged, satisfied with and relying upon the said proposal, and with the report of their medical officer, and with the answers they had received from two friends of the defendant to whom he had referred them, sent to the defendant's solicitor a written acceptance of the proposal for an assurance of £10,000 on the defendant's life, and, on the 23rd of August, 1878, received from him a check for the first year's premium, and on the 24th of August, 1878, the plaintiffs sent him the usual certificate as to the assurance being effected. The plaintiffs alleged that shortly after the last-mentioned date, they discovered that, though the defendant's life had been assured for £10,000 in the Rock Life Assurance Company, and also for £6,000 in the Equity and Law Life Assurance Society, the last-named assurance society had in November, 1877, when the defendant applied for a further assurance of £3,000, decided not to increase the amount at risk on his life; also that the defendant had shortly afterwards made proposals to the Scottish Equitable Society and to the Crown Insurance Society, who had respectively declined his proposals, to the North British and Mercantile Insurance Society, which proposal was withdrawn, and to the Liverpool, London, and Globe Company, by whom the proposal was not accepted; that in June, 1878, the English and Scottish Law Life Assurance Association, after accepting a proposal for an assurance of £5,000 on the life of the defendant, had refused to proceed with it on learning that the Equity and Law Life Society had declined the further assurance of the defendant's life; also, that in August, 1878, the defendant had applied for assurances on his life to the Clerical, Medical, and General Life Assurance Society, to the Scottish Amicable Assurance Society, and the Law Life Assurance Society, but that each of the said offices had declined his proposals. The plaintiffs alleged that they thereupon determined not to proceed with the assurance, and that their solicitors wrote to the defendant's solicitor to that effect and sent a check for the amount of the premium, which was returned by the defendant. The plaintiffs then brought their action, setting out in their statement of claim the facts before stated, and alleging that it was the duty of the defendant to have informed them that his life had been refused by the said several offices; that such fact was a very material fact in a contract of life assurance, and that the plaintiffs would not have entertained the defendant's proposal for assurance had he informed them that his life had been refused by other offices, which the defendant had concealed. The plaintiffs claimed a declaration that the acceptance by the plaintiffs of the defendant's proposal for assurance on his life for £10,000, and the contract by the plaintiffs for the assurance on the life of the defendant, were void. JESSEL, M. R. The action in this case is to set aside an agreement for assurance for life on the ground of concealment of a material fact in effecting the assurance. The first question to be decided is, what is the principle on which the court acts in setting aside contracts of assurance? As regards the general principle, I am not prepared to lay down the law as making any difference in substance between one contract of assurance and another. Whether it is life, or fire, or marine assurance, I take it good faith is required in all cases and though there may be certain circum |