And the nature of commerce, not its mere accidents, must determine whether a shipment is local or foreign.85 A railroad company whose road lies entirely within the limits of a single State becomes subject to the Act by participating in a through movement of traffic from a point in another State to a point in the State within which it is located, although its own service is performed entirely within the latter State.86 The theory is that the movement of freight from a point in one State to a point in another State by rail must be regarded as an entirety; and every railroad participating in that movement thereby becomes subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce, even though its service is performed entirely within a single State.87 Interesting questions arise as to transit when a point is at the boundary; and with boundary cities one must often be very exact as to the point of consignment.88 But if coal is mined in Kentucky and loaded there by carrier, the fact that it is billed from a point in Tennessee to Kentucky does not make it an interstate shipment.89 § 125. Termini within a single State routed through another State. The Commission has always held that commerce between points in the same State, but which in being carried from one place to the other passed through another State, is interstate commerce, and subject to regulation by the provisions of the Act.90 The Commission logically 85 Port Arthur Rice Milling Co. v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 28 I. C. C. 697. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Mo. P. R. Co., 11 I. C. C. 329. Leonard v. Kansas City S. R. Co., 11 I. C. C. 573. 88 Texarkana Freight Bureau v. St. L., I. M. & So. Ry., 28 I. C. C. 569. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Vancleave, 110 Ky. 968, 63 S. W. 23. New Orleans Cotton Exch. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 519, 2 I. C. C. 375; goes to the length of holding traffic from points of origin in West Virginia to destinations in the same State, necessarily passing in transit about 1,500 feet through Kentucky to be subject to its jurisdiction.91 But recently a petition to establish between two points in same State a through route and joint rate via a circuitous interstate route was properly dismissed.92 The Commission also considers as within its jurisdiction a shipment between two points in Maine which passes through a portion of the Dominion of Canada.93 At all events it deals on that basis with a "transit rate" used in sense of rate applicable to business originating in United States, going through Mexico, destined to points in United States.94 The decisions of 'the courts upon these particular questions have been conflicting, and even at the present day are still apparently inconsistent on different phases of the wider problem. At one time it seemed that such commerce as now under consideration would not be held interstate commerce.95 But there were always cases in the State courts to the contrary; and comparatively recently this particular point has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in favor of the jurisdiction of the federal Commission over such commerce as against the claims of the State commissions.96 25 I. C. C. 281; Board of Trade of Winston-Salem v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 26 I. C. C. 146. 91 West Va. R. Co. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 26 I. C. C. 622. 92 Haverhill Box Board Co. v. B. & A. R. R. Co., 28 I. C. C. 336. 98 American Agricultural Chem. Co. v. B. & A. R. R. Co., 28 I. C. C. 398. 94 Steinfeld & Co. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 20 I. C. C. R. 12. 95 Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 36 L. ed. 672, 12 Sup. Ct. 806, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 87; United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 115 Fed. 373; Seawell v. Kansas City, F. S. & M. R. R., 119 Mo. 222, 24 S. W. 1002, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 262; Dillon v. Erie R. R., 19 N. Y. Misc. 116, 43 N. Y. Supp. 320; Railroad Com. v. Telegraph Co., 113 N. C. 213, 18 S. E. 389. In Ewing v. Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464, 33 Sup. Ct. 81, State authorities were permitted to tax such business. 96 Hanley v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 187 U. S. 617, 47 L. ed. 333, 23 Sup. Ct. 214; State v. Chicago, S. P., M. & O. R. R. Co., 40 Minn. 267, 3 L. R. A. 238; Sternberger v. Cape § 126. Carriage wholly within a State. Carriage performed wholly within a State is not within the Interstate Commerce Act by explicit proviso in the Act itself, and indeed could not well be subjected by the federal government to regulation since it does not constitute interstate commerce. Thus it has several times been held by the federal courts that a railroad company whose line is wholly within a single State, and which, although it carries freight destined to points beyond such State, never issues bills of lading to points beyond its own line, receives no freight on through bills of lading, and has no arrangement with other roads for a convention division of charges, or for a common control or management, it is not within the provision of the Interstate Commerce Act or similar legislation regulating commerce by railroad.97 A railroad, lying wholly within a State and keeping itself from entangling concurrences with other railroads, which transports freight, whether coming from within or without the State, solely on local bills of lading, under a special contract limited to its own line, and without dividing charges with any other carriers or assuming any other obligations to or for them, does not come within the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, and is not bound to make any report of its business to the Commission.9 The Commission, consequently, has frequently held that it has no jurisdiction to order any reduction in rates for transportation wholly intrastate.99 And likewise when a discrimination complained of does not affect interstate service, the Commission has ruled that it has no jurisdiction, unless a preference in that service is directly effected thereby.1 § 127. Local carriage when through transportation contemplated. Even though passengers or goods are being carried between two States, a carrier transporting them may nevertheless not be engaged in interstate commerce. Though a carrier receives goods directed to a point outside the State, he is not an interstate carrier if he is only to carry within the State, and there deliver to an entirely independent succeeding carrier, with whom he has no common arrangement. The same rule applies if the carrier receives within the State of destination goods brought from without the State by an entirely independent course of commerce.3 So where goods were shipped in New Jersey, directed to a consignee in New York, but carried only to Jersey City and there received by the consignees, the shipment was not considered interstate. Mere intention on the part of a shipper to export his traffic, unaccompanied by any circumstance or outward indication that the traffic is in fact for export, is not sufficient to stamp it as foreign commerce. It has always been the understanding of the Commission that no jurisdiction has been given it over a shipment moving from one point to another in same State, though intended to go beyond the State and subsequently rebilled beyond State. And, 5 233; Pierce Co. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 19 I. C. C. 579; Wells-Higman Co. v. G. R. & I. Ry. Co., 19 I. C. C. 487; Roberts Cotton Oil Co. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 21 I. C. C. 248. 1 Local Commercial Telephone Service in Pittsburgh, 27 I. C. C. 622; Arkansas Fertilizer Co. v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 25 I. C. C. 645. 'Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. 867. 4 Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Whitehead, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 595, 26 S. W. 172. New Jersey Fruit Exchange v. Central R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 84, 2 I. C. C. 142. 5 Port Arthur Milling Co. v. T. & F. S. Ry. Co., 28 I. C. C. 697. Big Canon Ranch Co. v. G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 20 I. C. C. R. 523. indeed, a movement in fact interstate has been held by intervening possession of an independent sort to have been converted into two local movements.7 § 128. Beginning and ending of interstate transit. On the principles already examined, if the transit is a single unit, continuing from the time of the original shipment to the ultimate end of the carriage, with the beginning and ending in different States, the entire transit from beginning to end is regarded as interstate; it does not cease to be interstate when the goods finally enter the State of destination, but continues an interstate transit even within that State until delivery. Indeed, under the Act, it appears that it was the purpose of Congress to assume jurisdiction over the entire subject matter relative to interstate shipments, from the time of the origin of such shipment down to the point where the shipment is entirely at an end, and its character as a transaction of interstate commerce ceases.9 On the other hand, the movement of a shipment between points in a State, and a subsequent movement out of the State, is as to the first shipment not interstate commerce, where there is nothing to connect the two shipments, whether in the billing or the charges imposed. 10 And correspondingly where goods which had been consigned to one point within a State were afterwards sold and forwarded to another point, the final movement is intrastate commerce and subject to the rates established by the State commission.11 There is no arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment from one State to another between a carrier by railroad and a & S. F. R. R. Co. v. State, 26 Okla. 62, 72, 107 Pac. 929. 7 Southwestern Shippers' Traffic Asso. v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 24 I. C. C. 570. 8 Cattle Raisers' Assoc. v. F. W. & D. C. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 513. See also State v. Southern P. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.), 49 S. W. 252. 'Pittsburgh Vein Operators v. Pa. Co., 24 I. C. C. 280. See also St. L. 10 Johnson v. M. St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 255. 11 Acme Cement Co. v. C. & A. R. R., 17 I. C. C. 220. See also Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 51 L. ed. 540, 27 Sup. Ct. 360. |