receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for transportation for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance. The Commission was confirmed in its jurisdiction to authorize carriers to make charges which would otherwise be in violation of this section, by acting upon applications from time to time and thereupon determining the extent to which a designated common carrier might be relieved from the operation of the section It was provided as a temporary measure that rates lawfully in effect at the time of the passage of the Act might be kept in force provided applications under the section covering them had been duly filed; and this situation has not altogether been cleared up at present.

§ 88. Establishment of through routes.

The limitations which the Supreme Court had found in the power of the Commission, to establish through routes only when no satisfactory through route existed as the courts themselves viewed the evidence, was eliminated by making the clause read so that the Commission, in its own discretion as to the necessity therefor, might act at any time in this matter after hearing, whenever the carriers had failed to establish joint rates themselves. However, a railroad was protected against being shorthauled by an explicit clause to the effect that, in establishing such through route, the Commission shall not require any company, without its consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through routes, unless to do so would make such through route unreasonably long as compared with another practicable through route which could otherwise be established.

§ 89. Suspension of rate advances.

Perhaps the most consequential change in the Act was the provision giving the Commission special powers in the case of new schedules filed with it. The Commission may thereupon, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative, without complaint at once and, if it so orders, without answer being filed by the interested carriers provided they have had reasonable notice, enter upon a hearing concerning the propriety of the change proposed. Pending hearing and decision thereon, the Commission may by simply delivering to the carriers the reasons for taking action suspend the operation of such schedule for four months beyond the time when it would otherwise go into effect; and if the hearing is not completed the time may be further extended for a period not exceeding six months. After full hearing, whether completed before or after the rate goes into effect, the Commission may make such order as lies within its jurisdiction over rates. At any hearing involving a rate sought to be increased after the passage of the Act of 1910 the burden of proof to show that the increased rate or proposed increased rates is just and reasonable shall be upon the common carriers, and the Commission shall give to the hearing and decision of such questions preference over all other questions pending before it, and decide the same as speedily as possible.

§ 90. The Hadley Commission.

Furthermore the Mann Act provided for the appointment by the President of a special commission to investigate questions pertaining to the issuance of stocks and bonds by carriers subject to the Act, and the power of Congress to regulate the same. The Commission was authorized to employ experts and assistants, and the several departments and bureaus of the Government were to furnish it officials and employees specially detailed to this work. The Commission as constituted by the President, came to be known as the Hadley Commission

by reason of the prominence in it of President Hadley of Yale University. It made a report setting forth the practices of the American States in regard to regulating the issuance of securities; and in general advised against any legislation by Congress involving regulation by its authority.

91. The Commerce Court.

The legislation of 1910 also provided for the establishment of a commerce court, composed of five circuit judges, appointed thereto, and thereafter assigned for that service. This court was to have the jurisdiction formerly possessed by the circuit courts over cases for the enforcement of any order of the Commission except for the payment of money, and as thus limited it had no functions over forfeitures and penalties. It was thought that there would be an advantage in securing the prompt decision of the fundamental questions of traffic law, but in the actual result the decisions seemed to point out in a way which had not perhaps been anticipated the jurisdictional limitations upon Commission action, both constitutional and statutory. That these points, generally speaking, were well taken, would undoubtedly be the opinion of most lawyers; but the policy of the court in holding the Commission to the limits of the law was hardly popular. At all events, by the Urgent Deficiency Act of 1913, the commerce court was abolished, and the jurisdiction of the several courts restored to what it was before.

§ 92. The Panama Act.

Included in the Panama Act of 1912 were various clauses of great importance in extending the power of the Commission over transportation by water, although the commerce moving wholly by water is still excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission. The sections referred to provide that where property is being transported from point to point in the United States by rail and water the Commission shall have jurisdiction: (a) To establish physi

cal connection by spur tracks between the lines of a rail carrier and the docks of a water carrier, whenever such connection is practicable and the amount of business offered is sufficient to justify it; (b) to establish through routes and maximum joint rates between and over such rail and water lines, and to determine all the terms and conditions under which such lines shall be operated in the handling of the traffic embraced; (c) to establish maximum proportional rates by rail to and from the ports to which the traffic is brought, or from which it is taken by the water carrier, and to determine to what traffic and in connection with what vessels and upon what terms and conditions such rates shall apply; (d) if any rail carrier subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce enters into arrangements with any water carrier operating from a port in the United States to a foreign country, for the handling of through business between interior points of the United States and such foreign country, the Commission may require such railway to enter into similar arrangements with any or all other lines of steamships operating from said port to the same foreign country.

§ 93. The Valuation Act.

By another amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1913, the Commission was directed to proceed forthwith to investigate and ascertain the value of all the property owned or used by every common carrier subject to its jurisdiction. Every fact of any sort relating to the properties of the carrier at any time in their existence which might be pertinent is demanded specially; not only the original cost, as nearly as that can be ascertained, but the present value as exactly as that can be appraised. Nor is Congress contented with this determination of actual conditions, past and present, so far as by human assiduity and ingenuity the past can be unravelled and the present be estimated. The Commission is asked further what it would cost to reproduce these properties new at the pres

And

ent time, and what figure would be set upon them if from the estimated cost of reproduction were deducted their indicated depreciation in their present state. then follow other questions as to past operations and present conditions of still more difficulty, designed to meet problems of valuation which are bothering even those most conversant with these matters. The Commission is not merely asked to collect all this data and make all these appraisals as to things tangible and intangible, actual and hypothetical. It is told to classify all these things and make comparisons between them, and to state the reasons of these differences and the basis of these values.

Topic F. Recent Decisions Defining Jurisdiction

§ 94. The Abilene Oil case.

During the past few years there have been a succession of cases fixing limitations upon the jurisdiction of the Commission within the powers now conferred upon it by the Act. Of course, these leading cases receive appropriate treatment in later chapters in their proper place; but there are a few of them which have such a part in the history of the development of the functions intrusted by Congress to the Commission as to make it fitting that they should receive mention here. It is now realized that in regard to the whole field of the determination of the reasonableness of the rates the provisions which Congress has made show plainly enough that the jurisdiction of the Commission is designed to be exclusive, and the end of trial of such matters before any other tribunal, otherwise than by recourse to the proper court, to set the order of the Commission aside as in excess of jurisdiction. How far the courts will go in working out such intent is seen in the leading case of Texas & Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Company, 16 where it was held that, as to wrongs done shippers for which redress was provided by the processes of the Commission, no suit could be brought

16 204 U. S. 426, 51 L. ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. 350 (1907).