riers which lacked them; 15 and it held, therefore, that the very business of such terminals is to furnish facilities for railroads entering the city, and that section 3 obviously could have application only to railroads as such. To be contrasted with this is the Pittsburgh case later, where the refusal of the Pennsylvania railroad to open its terminals interchangeably with other systems entering the city, while arrangements to that end with its own family lines were made, was held not to constitute undue discrimination. 16 For it would seem clear that to claim that a railroad is required to handle the cars of another over its terminal trackage for a switching charge, however fair the allowance might be, would undoubtedly be to give the use of those terminals to its competitor, unless the through rate is divided. Since the Amendments to section 1 of 1906 the proviso in section 3 of the Act has been necessarily modified, and it is now well settled, with the Commission at least, that a carrier cannot close any of its trackage or its terminals to the uses of the public in through commerce, where fair compensation in one way or another is allowed, and restrict service thereon to shippers or receivers upon its own lines.

§ 177. Switching.

Fundamentally, as the courts hold, a railroad is under no obligation to deliver beyond its own trackage; at least it is not bound to make delivery at its own cost beyond its own lines. 18 But, if a railroad goes so far in its schedules as to undertake delivery within switching limits defined therein, such track delivery becomes part of the transportation service undertaken under the through rate. 19 Consequently, as the Commission has decided, in

15 St. Louis, S. & P. R. R. v. P. & P. U. Ry., 26 I. C. C. 226.

16 Waverly Oil Works v. P. R. R. Co., 28 I. C. C. 621.

17 Iowa & G. M. Ry. v. C., B. & Q. Ry., 32 I. C. C. 172.

18 Banner Grain Co. v. Gt. Northern Ry., 119 Minn. 68, 137 N. W. 161.

19 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 234 U. S. 294, 34 Sup. Ct. 814.

the absence of tariff provision to the contrary, rates to a given point include delivery only on a carrier's own rails. 20 But where a wider delivery is scheduled, the switching between the tracks of a carrier and the loading and unloading points of an industry becomes part of interstate transportation.21 Granting free transfer service to private sidings of some consignees and refusing it to complainants is, therefore, held to be unjust discrimination under the Act.22 And in the case of a reciprocal switching arrangement, which excluded shipments of ice from its operation, it was held that this constituted an unjust discrimination against that traffic. 23 Undue disadvantage also results, as will be seen later, from failure to accord a terminal switching allowance to complainant, while granting it to competing industries performing similar services. 24 But refusal to switch to its own team track a car received from a connecting line is held not unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that through mistake defendant had on several occasions performed such service for others. 25 Of course, a railroad may not reasonably be required to accept and deliver free of charge traffic moved by its competitor. 26 And it may charge for foreign line switching, when it makes no charge for similar delivery when it gets the line haul. 27 What amounts to a belt line haul justifies an additional transportation charge. 28 And a delivering road performing only switching service is entitled to due compensation therefor. 29 But it would be plain discrimination in service to deliver under the rate on switching cars only

20 Ohio Iron & Metal Co. v. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 28 I. C. C. 703.

21 Alan, Wood Iron & Steel Co. v. P. R. R., 24 I. C. C. 27.

22 Pierce Co. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 19 I. C. C. R. 579.

22 In re Advances on Ice, 24 I. C. C. 660.

24 Buffalo Union Furnace Co. v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 21 I. C. C. R. 620.

25 Railroad Commission of Ark. v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 24 I. C. C. 292.

26 Laning-Harris Coal & Grain Co. v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 12 I. C. C. 479.

Pacific Coast Jobbers & Mfgrs. Assn. v. S. P., 18 I. C. C. 33.

28 Pierce v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Ry., 23 I. C. C. 89.

29 Curtis Bros. Co. v. So. Pac. R. R., 23 I. C. C. 372.

for one concern and not for another across the street. 30 It is held by the Commission to be discriminatory to perform switching under an arrangement with one road at a certain point, while refusing to enter into similar arrangements with another. 31 And a carrier may not cancel switching arrangements with one carrier, while maintaining former arrangements with another. 32

$178. Lighterage.

Problems as to lighterage cannot be solved in any case until the basis upon which it is being rendered is examined. Railroads terminating in a port may establish a zone of delivery by water, within which they will deliver such freight consigned within the limits set, using lighters owned by them or operated under their auspices.33 On the other hand, lighterage may be performed to and from water terminals by independent companies, operating as common carriers subject to the Act, and, as such, entitled to through routes and joint rates with a rail line, so long as such rail line makes similar joint arrangements with complainant's competitors.34 If, by the schedules of the railroad, delivery within the port by water is undertaken, the carrier may either lighter the goods itself at its own cost, or allow each shipper to do it in his own way, making an allowance to the shipper for performing the service. The 15th section of the Act as amended clearly implies that a just and reasonable allowance may be made to the owner of property transported, when such owner renders a service connected with or furnishes an instrumentality used in the transportation.35 The Sugar Lighterage Case recently decided by the Supreme Court, after a long course of litigation beginning in proceedings before the Commission,

30 United States Button Co. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry., 32 I. C. C. 149.

31 Buffalo, R. & Pitts. R. R. v. Pa. Ry., 29 I. C. C. 114.

32 Switching at Galesburg, Ill., 31 I. C. C. 294.

33 Chicago Lighterage Charges, 30 I. C. C. 390.

34 Murray Lighterage & Tr. Co. v. D. & H. Co., 25 I. C. C. 388.

35 Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 40.

is the last word on this subject.36 It was there held that the interstate trunk railway companies whose freight rail terminals are at the New Jersey shore of New York harbor, having established a zone covering substantially the commercial and manufacturing river front of Greater New York, within which, as a part of the transportation, they perform lighterage service without additional charge to and from any public or private dock, may pay a reasonable compensation upon the tonnage basis to the owners of a water front within such zone, who are operating a sugar refinery near by, for the maintenance by them of a public freight terminal station there, and for lightering all freight between that station and the rail terminals, without allowing similar compensation to sugar refiners whose plant is situated some ten miles beyond the limits of the free lighterage zone for lightering their sugar from refinery to such terminals.

§ 179. Drayage.

Railroads, however, commonly do not undertake delivery beyond points reached by their own rails; and, generally speaking, transfer service beyond a station is no part of the transportation service they offer. 37 But a railroad may undertake delivery by wagon to the consignee at his address; and there are instances of store door delivery in particular localities, although such a service, even if once generally furnished, may later be altogether discontinued.38 It would necessarily be illegal discrimination between shippers in the same community to make an allowance for cartage to one, and not to all others.39 But it would not inevitably be undue preference to include drayage in the service to one locality, while not performing it in another.40 While such delivery service is offered

36 United States v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 231 U. S. 274, 56 L. ed. 1107, 34 Sup. Ct. 75.

"Southwestern Produce Distributors v. W. R. R., 20 I. C. C. R. 458.

38 Washington Store Door Delivery, 27 I. C. C. 347.

39 Wright v. U. S., 167 U. S. 512, 42 L. ed. 258, 17 Sup. Ct. 822.

40 Interstate Com. Comm. v. De

H

there must be no discrimination within the territory thus served; merchants in one part of Washington, D. C., have been held to be subjected to undue prejudice by being compelled to pay a drayage charge while merchants located in Georgetown, D. C., are given free pick-up and delivery service. But a carrier was not required to resume delivery of melons at piers in New York, conditions justifying change of delivery from New York City to Jersey City.42 Free drayage service may be necessitated by comparative disadvantage of location of station with competitor to the industrial section of city.43 But discrimination cannot be justified against one locality merely because it is smaller than another locality.44 A drayman may be a common carrier and treated as such in his relation with the railroads; 45 but, short of this actual participation in a through route being shown, the Commission has no jurisdiction over a common-carrier transfer company. 46 And a railroad itself undertaking delivery by wagon may enter into exclusive arrangements with one concern to perform the trucking for it.47

§ 180. Loading.

The present idea as to carload rates is that the consignees will unload the cars, and that freight shipped under such rates will not be required to pass through the carrier's freight houses. 47a Loading by the consignor is a longrecognized rule of carload transportation.47b It follows that loading and unloading carload freight is an extra

troit, G. H. & M. Ry., 167 U. S. 633, 42 L. ed. 406, 17 Sup. Ct. 986.

41 Merchants & M. Assn. v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 30 I. C. C. 388.

42 Casassa v. P. R. R., 24 I. C. C. 629.

43 Bahrenburg Bros. & Co. v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 24 I. C. C. 561.

44 Kansas City & M. Ry. Rate Cancellation, 28 I. C. C. 640.

45 Harbor City Wholesale Co. of

San Pedro v. S. P. Co., 19 I. C. C. 323.

46 Anacostia Citizens Asso. v. B. & O. R. R., 25 I. C. C. 411.

47 S. Louis Drayage Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 65 Fed. 39.

470 In re Advances in Demurrage Charges, 25 I. C. C. 314.

47b National Wholesale Lumber Co. v. A. X. C. L. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 154.