S.C. 1901. V. Proclamation, from the date named in the Proclamation. Any person who has, or conceives that he has, any estate or interest in the land taken may thereupon lodge a claim. In due course HALLENSTEIN such claim must be investigated by a Compensation Court, MAYOR, &c., which must make an award as to the amount of compensation OF payable. Such an award is final as to the amount awarded, but it is expressly provided that it shall not be final as regards the right or title of the claimant or any other person to receive the same or any part thereof. Up to this point, therefore, the public authority taking the land is not concerned to inquire into the title. The land is vested in the public authority, which has a good title as against all the world. When the amount of compensation is assessed it becomes, however, necessary that the public authority should obtain a valid discharge upon payment thereof. It then becomes necessary for the public authority to inquire into the title of the claimant. Accordingly the statute provides that the award shall not have the effect of a judgment of this Court until the expiration of sixty days after it has been filed. This period is obviously intended to give the public authority an opportunity of inquiring into the title of the claimant; for by section 77 it is provided that if any doubt or dispute arise as to the right or title of any person to receive any compensation awarded under the Act, the public authority may cause the amount awarded to be paid into the Public Trust Office. The Public Trustee is directed, after such payment, to deal with and apply such moneys, and to pay the same to such persons as this Court, upon the application of any of the parties interested, may order. Any abuse by the public authority of these provisions is provided for by the 3rd subsection of section 77, which enables this Court, upon any application with respect to moneys so paid into the Public Trust Office, to order all or any of the costs incurred in relation to such case, not only in this Court but before the Compensation Court, to be paid by the public authority, and for that purpose to vary or revoke any order previously made by a Compensation Court as to costs. A public authority paying money into the Public Trust Office does so at the peril of an order against it under this subsection. The public authority ought not, therefore, to pay moneys awarded under the statute into the Public Trust Office without previously ascertaining that some doubt or dispute really arises as to who is entitled to receive the moneys awarded as compensation. The period of sixty days has ac VOL. XXI-5. WELLINGTON. S.C. 1901. - v. cordingly been fixed to enable the public authority to make the necessary inquiries to satisfy itself upon this point. If, HALLENSTEIN however, it appears that a doubt or dispute really exists as to MAYOR, &c., the ownership of the moneys awarded as compensation, then it is the duty of the public authority to pay such moneys into WELLINGTON. the Public Trust Office. It is plain that upon such payment the whole liability of the public authority ceases, except its liability to be ordered to pay costs in case the Court shall consider that the power has been abused. It is inconceivable that the Legislature should have intended that the right to interest of the persons entitled to the moneys awarded should depend upon whether or not there was a doubt or dispute as to the ownership of such moneys. Further, it is plain that if the public body should neither pay the moneys awarded into the Public Trust Office nor to the claimant within sixty days after the filing of the award, and the claimant should proceed to enforce the award as a judgment of this Court, he could enforce it only as from the date when it took effect as such judgment. To recover interest for the intervening period of sixty days he would be compelled to resort to some separate proceeding. This, plainly, was not in the contemplation of the Legislature. Interest is not ordinarily recoverable, even upon a debt presently payable, without some evidence of a contract to pay interest, or unless the debt is due upon some mercantile instrument, or is within the terms of the statute of William IV., which allows interest to be recovered in certain cases— -Reid v. The Bank of New Zealand(1)—or unless under some special branch of the common law, as in the case of a vendor against a purchaser in possession, or under some special statutory enactment. On none of these grounds is interest recoverable in this case. The statute has given to the public authority the power to withhold payment for sixty days, and has made no provision for payment of interest. There must therefore be judgment for the defendants. The case is not one for costs. Judgment for defendants. Solicitors for the plaintiff: Chapman & Tripp (Wellington). (1) 3 N.Z. Jur. N.S. C. A. 40. CUTBUSH v. GROVE. Defamation of Character-Slander-Qualified Privilege-Malice cases. S.C. HEARING. AUCKLAND. 1901. September 27 G., an importer of fruit from the South Sea Islands, received a large consignment of oranges, in cases marked with various brands. In accordance with the Government regulations, these cases, together with cases belonging to other consignees, were stacked in the Government CONOLLY, J fumigator for fumigation, under the direction of the officials of the Stock Department. G., on taking delivery of his oranges from the fumigator, found that he was a number of cases short. On making complaint to the officials of the Stock Department he became associated with them, in conjunction with the police, in making inquiries as to the missing It was ascertained that C., an auctioneer and fruit-merchant, had purchased from another importer a portion of a shipment of oranges, also stacked in the fumigator, and had taken delivery of the same. C. had sold some of these oranges to S., a fruiterer. G., on making inquiries from S., found that the latter had two cases bearing the brand of some of the cases which were missing. In the course of separate conversations with S. at different times G. asserted that C. had stolen the missing oranges. On another occasion, in the course of a conversation with the late partner of C., G. asserted that C. had also stolen two cases belonging to another importer. Evidence was adduced showing that two cases marked with another importer's brand were found in C.'s store, and that he had also shown to a witness a number of cases bearing some of G.'s brands, at the same time telling the witness that these were the cases for which the Stock Department officials had just previously been looking. Held, That the conversations with S. and with C.'s late partner were privileged; that the evidence showed that G. had strong grounds for his suspicions against C.; and that, the words complained of being spoken bona fide and without malice, the plaintiff could not recover. THIS was an action for defamation of character, tried before Conolly, J., without a jury. Plaintiff, Thomas Watson Cutbush, was an auctioneer and island-produce dealer, of Auckland, and defendant, William Henry Grove, was a fruitimporter, of the same place. In his amended statement of claim the plaintiff alleged that on the morning of the 4th of July, 1901, defendant said to one Seeley, a fruiterer carrying on business in Auckland, "I "have lost twenty-odd cases of oranges, and Cutbush has "stolen them"; that on the afternoon of the same day defendant said to Seeley, "The Agricultural Department has 'taken out a warrant for Cutbush's arrest at 2.30 this after 66 S.C. 1901. CUTBUSH V. GROVE. "noon"; and that on the morning of the 5th of July defendant The plaintiff further alleged that on the 9th of July, 1901, defendant said to Rupert S. Griffiths and Charles A. Griffiths, 1 caught him" [plaintiff] "red - handed stealing cases of 'fruit." 66 As a matter of fact, no warrant was issued for the arrest of the plaintiff. Defendant in his amended statement of defence denied that he spoke and published the words complained of, and also denied that he spoke and published them maliciously. The statement of defence also set out that both plaintiff and defendant, and other fruit-importers, were required by law to have all scaly fruit imported by them fumigated by the Government officials of the Stock Department; that on or about the 2nd of July certain cases of fruit belonging to defendant and to one Messenger were missing and removed from the fumigator; that the officials caused investigations to be made with a view to discover the missing cases, and possibly to institute a prosecution, in making which investigations defendant, as owner of some of the missing cases, and with the knowledge and concurrence of the officials, assisted them in obtaining information relating to the cases; that on the 2nd of July certain cases belonging to defendant and to Messenger were discovered on plaintiff's premises; that in the course of the investigations, on or about the 4th or 5th of July, defendant had conversation with and made inquiries from Seeley, but only as to cases of fruit, and the marks thereon, then in Seeley's possession, and bought by him from the plaintiff; that Seeley showed defendant two cases bearing defendant's brand; that Charles A. Griffiths was in partnership with plaintiff, and defendant on the 9th of July had conversation with and made inquiries from him in the course of his investigations as a person likely to afford information with reference to the cases discovered on plaintiff's premises; that the several occasions of the conversatious with Seeley and Griffiths were, under the circumstances stated, privileged occasions; and that the words alleged in the statement of claim to have beer spoken and published were (if any) spoken and published by defendant in good faith as a person interested in the recovery of the missing cases of fruit, solely for the purpose of recovering the cases, under a sense of duty, and in the course and furtherance of the investigation instituted by the Stock Department, and without malice towards the plaintiff, in the honest belief that the words were true. From the evidence adduced it appeared that the s.s. "Taviuni" arrived at Auckland from Rarotonga on the 28th of June with a cargo of oranges, the bulk of which were consigned to the defendant by various shippers under different brands. A small line was consigned to Messenger, a fruiterer, and a larger line, marked "J. K. & Co.," to one Goldsboro. Of this line the plaintiff purchased from Goldsboro 167 cases, and took delivery of them from the fumigator, through which the rest of the fruit also had to pass. Plaintiff took away his last load from the fumigator on the 2nd of July, and remarked to one Johnson, an employee of Goldsboro, that although seventeen cases would have completed his 167, he really had twenty cases on the cart. Seeley purchased from the plaintiff twenty cases of the shipment, and when defendant visited his shop to make inquiries Seeley showed him two cases which defendant identified as his, but which Seeley was not sure had been amongst the cases bought by himself from plaintiff. Seeley's statement as to what defendant said concerning plaintiff was corroborated by Mrs. Seeley. On the Stock Department being informed that a number of cases belonging to defendant and to Messenger were missing, Stone, the officer in charge of the fumigator, proceeded to plaintiff's store, and saw there two cases bearing Messenger's brand. Immediately after he left the store, plaintiff, turning to Johnson, who was in the store at the time, pulled out several cases from a corner, bearing some of defendant's brands, and said, "Here are the cases they were looking for." Defendant, in giving evidence as to his interview with the Griffiths brothers, stated that the words he actually said to Charles A. Griffiths were, "How do you account for your partner' [Cutbush] being caught red-handed with two of Messenger's cases in his store?" Griffiths then informed defendant that the partnership between himself and plaintiff had been dissolved. 66 Evidence was given by Evans, a fruiterer, to the effect that defendant had made statements to him similar to those testified to by Seeley; and McDonald, a carter, who had been employed to take the fruit purchased by Seeley to the latter's shop, deposed to defendant offering him a cheque for £10 if he could get sufficient evidence to convict plaintiff of theft. S.C. 1901. CUTBUSH ບ. GROVE. |