S.C. 1902. v. MAYOR, &C., OF been made under the latter Act. The appellant, as lessee, executed the memorandum of lease on the 25th of April, EDGECUMBE 1893, and it was then forwarded to Wellington for execution by the Governor on behalf of the Crown. It was not returned for upwards of a year. In the meantime the BOROUGH following words had been interlined, as an addition to the HAMILTON. provision for renewal: "for a further term not exceeding "fourteen years, upon such terms and conditions as the "Governor shall approve"; "last mentioned"; "for the "like term of years and upon the like conditions in all respects as the said lands were previously offered upon this "condition." The memorandum of lease had not been ratified by the appellant after the amendment in the instrument had been made, nor had the lease been registered. The claim of th plaintiffs was for £55 11s. 6d., rent under the memorandum of lease, less £30 14s. 3d. for payments made; and, in the alternative, £24 17s. 3d. for use and occupation of the land. 66 66 At the hearing the plaintiffs were represented by C. J. W. Barton, duly appointed in writing under section 14 of The Public Domains Act, 1881." Appellant's counsel having objected that the Mayor, &c., of the Borough of Hamilton had no right to sue in their own names on the claim, the Court, on the application of Barton, substituted the King as plaintiff. Appellant's counsel objected that the amendment was improper, and that Barton had no right to appear for the King without a warrant from the Governor or other express authority. The objection was overruled by the Court, and also a later objection, based on the alteration of the memorandum of lease. No evidence was adduced of any use or occupation of the lands by the appellant, and it appeared that the payments on account of rent had been made by one George Edgecumbe, the appellant's brother. The Magistrate gave judgment for plaintiffs for the amount claimed and costs. Swarbrick, for the appellant, was not called upon to support the appeal. Baume, for the respondents, on being called on to support the judgment: The powers vested in the Crown under section 11 of "The Public Domains Act, 1860," including the power to sue for rent, were delegated to the Domain Board by Order in Coun S.C. 1902. v. OF BOBOUGH OF cil of the 20th of May, 1879. Under section 19 of "The Public Domains Act, 1881," all the delegations made under the previous Act are to be construed as if made under that EDGECUMBE Act. The delegation, thus comprising all the powers of the MAYOR, &O., Crown, is confirmed, except the power to lease, &c., under section 5 of the earlier Act. The Mayor and Councillors, &c., had, as the Domain Board, the right to sue under such dele- HAMILTON. gation. If this be not so, then under section 14 of "The Public Domains Act, 1881," a person appointed in writing by the delegates may exercise, with respect to the lands controlled by the delegates, any of the powers, duties, &c., of a Commissioner of Crown Lands; and under section 28 of "The Land Act, 1892," a Commissioner can sue for and on behalf of the King. Barton, who was authorised in writing by the Mayor and Councillors acting as the Domain Board, could therefore sue for and on behalf of the King, which power entitled him to choose either his own name, or the name of the Domain Board, or that of the King as plaintiff. plaintiff. As to the amendment in the lease, it is not material, as it does not affect the question of rent: Earl of Falmouth v. Roberts(1); Foa on Landlord and Tenant(2); Hutchins v. Scott(3) Counsel for the appellant was not required to reply. CONOLLY, J.:— I think this appeal must be allowed. There are several grounds for allowing it. The first of these is the error committed by the Magistrate, as it appears to me, in changing the name of the plaintiffs. Although the change was made on an objection raised by the defendant's counsel, it would be the same if the Magistrate had acted on his own motion and authority. He did wrong in two respects. In the first place, the original plaintiffs were, it appears to me, the right plaintiffs. The Crown had delegated to the Mayor and Councillors of Hamilton, as the Domain Board, its powers, which included, amongst other things, the right to recover rent. In the second place, the large powers conferred on Magistrates by section 1 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, even if they would authorise substituting one sole plaintiff for another, which I do not think they do, certainly do not include the power of substituting the name of the King. With regard to the other point, I think that the Magistrate was probably right, from the cases which have been quoted. The amendment in the lease was not, I think, on the authorities cited, EDGECUMBE an alteration which would bar recovery of rent. S.C. 1902. v. MAYOR, &C., OF The other question is as to whether the document, although executed as a lease, has ever become a lease under the Land Transfer Act, because it has not been registered, and therefore HAMILTON, was only an agreement to lease and not a lease. This being BOROUGH OF so, there should have been some evidence to show that there was use and occupation or the payment of rent, and the recognition of it; whereas the case simply shows that there was no evidence of any occupation or of any payment of rent by the defendant. The appeal must therefore be allowed, with costs, £10 10s. Solicitor for the appellant: A. Swarbrick (Hamilton).. S.C. IN CHAMBERS. In re GRAY. WELLINGTON. Lunatic not so found by Inquisition-Order authorising Public Trustee to 1901. December 3. STOUT, C.J. execute Mortgage—Appointment of Receiver. An order made, on the petition of a brother of a lunatic not so found by inquisition, appointing the petitioner receiver, and authorising the Public Trustee to execute a mortgage on behalf of the lunatic, for the purpose of raising money to partly rebuild a hotel, in which the lunatic was interested, in accordance with a requirement by the Licensing Committee; the lunatic's interest in that and other property not exceeding £200 in value in all, and the Public Trustee consenting to the application. THIS HIS was a petition by W. F. Gray, a brother of W. H. L. Gray, a lunatic not so found by inquisition, to be appointed committee of the estate of his brother, and to be authorised to execute a deed of mortgage of his interest in certain land and premises. The affidavits showed that W. H. L. Gray had been, on the 23rd of October, 1901, committed to the Mount View Lunatic Asylum, Wellington, by an order of the Stipendiary Magistrate, Wellington, upon a certificate of two medical men. He was unmarried and without children. The only property which he had was an undivided sixth share in certain parcels of land belonging to him and his brothers and sisters. The affidavits showed that the total value of his interest in these lands did not exceed £200. On one of the pieces of At a land, situated at Foxton, there was a licensed hotel. M. F. Luckie, for the petitioner, on the hearing of the petition, after some discussion of the matter, asked that the Public Trustee should be authorised to concur in the mortgage, and that the petitioner should be appointed receiver. He referred to sections 265, 266, 283, 292, and 297 of "The Lunatics Act, 1882," and to section 3 of "The Lunatics Act Amendment Act, 1895"; also to Wood Renton on Lunacy (1) as to the powers and duties of a receiver. STOUT, C.J., made an order that the Public Trustee should concur in the mortgage and that the petitioner be appointed receiver, and ordered the costs of the petitioner to be taxed by the Registrar and paid out of the estate. Order accordingly. Solicitor for the petitioner: M. F. Luckie (Wellington). S.C. 1901. In re GRAY. (1). p. 363. S.C. IN BANCO. DALGETY & CO. (LIMITED) v. LATTER. CHRISTCHURCH. Sale of Goods-Non-delivery-Measure of Damages-Market Price at Place of Delivery-Agreement as to Amount of Damages—Forbearance. 1902. May 1, 27. DENNISTON, J. It is a reasonable assumption that on the sale of sheep to a sheepdealer for forward delivery the seller knows that they are bought with the intention and for the purpose of resale, and in the event of the vendor failing to deliver and of there being no market in which the buyer can readily obtain them, then, whether the seller did or did not know of any particular sub-contract existing or contemplated, the inference is that the seller contracts to be liable for the increased damages which will flow from a breach of the contract under the special circumstances; and, applying the second rule laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale (1), those damages may reasonably be supposed to be within the contemplation of the parties. In the absence of special circumstances the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of the breach at the place where the goods were to be delivered. Vendors wrote to the purchaser saying the subject-matter of the contract was not up to description, and advising withdrawal. The purchaser replied that he had resold and must insist on delivery. The vendors replied asking what amount he and his sub-purchaser claimed, to which the purchaser wired that he claimed 2s. per head, and his sub-purchaser 18. per head, for non-delivery. In reply they asked him to write to them demanding delivery or claiming 38. per head. The purchaser did not reply, but shortly after his solicitor wrote demanding 3s. per head-£150 -in lieu of non-performance. To this the vendors replied that they had forwarded the claim to their principal and awaited his reply. . Held, That the negotiations disclosed no agreement by the vendors as to the amount of damages payable by them for the breach of contract, nor did the negotiations disclose anything whereby they could have been estopped from denying that they had so agreed; and Held, also, That there was no forbearance on the part of the purchaser to go into the market and purchase other sheep, at the request or for the convenience of the vendors. (1) 9 Ex. 341. APPEAL from the decision of H. W. Bishop, Esq., Stipendiary Magistrate, given at Christchurch on the 10th of February, 1902. At the hearing the correspondence set out in the judgment was put in. It was proved that at the time of the breach similar sheep could have been purchased at the Spit, Napier, at a lower price than the contract price. There was no evidence that at the time of entering into the contract the vendors knew of any subsale by the purchaser, nor for what |