in which it was contemplated by the letter that they should be accepted. There is, therefore, in my opinion, evidence that there was a bet made by the accused with Greany. Then, is there any evidence that the amount of the bet was to be dependent upon the result of the working of the totalisator? The particular bet the defendant is charged with having made is that of 10s. on Royal Artillery in the Stewards' Handicap. The letter,, however, refers to other bets, and the writer evidently did not contemplate that there should be any difference between the conditions of the several bets. What the Justices had to do was to determine the meaning of the entries against Greany on the pages in the defendant's books under the head of "Stewards' Handicap." In order to do that they were justified in looking at the whole page and at all the entries. More than that, I think they were justified in looking in a similar way at the pages in the defendant's books under the headings "New Zealand Cup," "Welcome Stakes," and "Riccarton Welter." The Justices had also before them the names of the first and second horses in each of these races, and the dividends paid by the totalisator. Greany's letter was evidently a proposal for a wagering contract. Either it left the odds to be settled by the defendant-which is out of the question or the terms of the bet were to be settled by some definite plan known both to Greany and the defendant. The problem which the Justices had to solve was to determine from the materials legitimately before them whether there was primâ facie evidence hat the plan was that the amount to be paid was to be dependent upon the result of the working of the totalisator. In order to determine this they were at liberty to exercise their common-sense, and in so doing have come to a not unreasonable conclusion. Greany himself was called, and refused to give evidence, on the ground that he might criminate himself. That circumstance certainly did not weaken the other evidence against the defendant. I think, therefore, that there was sufficient evidence to establish a primâ facie case against the defendant, which he has left unanswered, and that the rule for a prohibition must be discharged, with costs, six guineas. Solicitors for Grant: Mondy, Sim, & Stephens (Dunedin). Solicitor for the Crown: Crown Solicitor (Dunedin). S.C. 1902. REX บ. GRANT. S.C. HEARING. DUNEDIN. 1901. March 12. WILLIAMS, J. EDGAR . THE MATAKITAKI GOLD DREDGING COMPANY (LIMITED). "The Mining Act, 1898," Section 171-Lien for Wages - Registration Holder of Mining Privilege—Priority, Section 172. Workmen employed by a mining company which is entitled to a special claim registered in the name of a bare trustee for the company are not employed by or under the holder of the special claim within the meaning of section 171 of The Mining Act, 1898.". ACTION by the plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other holders of debentures issued by the defendant company, for a declaration of their rights and to have their security enforced. A former manager of the company, one William Faithfull, took up in his own name a claim on behalf of the company and became the registered holder thereof. Some time after taking up the claim Faithfull ceased to be manager, but the claim was not transferred by him to the company, and while he remained registered holder thereof the workmen employed on the company's dredge registered liens against the claim under subsection 7 of section 171 of "The Mining Act, 1898." The only question involved was whether these liens were, under section 172, entitled to priority to the debentures. The workmen claim that the liens were served on Faithfull, the registered owner, as servant of the company; but at the time of service he was not in the employment of the company. Faithfull was a bare trustee, and the registration of the liens was ineffective, as the workmen were not employed by or under Faithfull, but by the company. If the lienees claim the benefit of section 179 they are in a dilemma, as, if Faithfull is the holder of the claim, the dredge does not belong to him; if the company is the holder, they have not been served. White, for the workmen : The workmen are entitled to enforce their liens. They were employed by or under the holder of the mining privilege, and this, by section 179, includes plant and machinery. The intention of the Act is to give a lien to the workmen, and it should be construed in their favour: Maxwell on Statutes(1). Gallaway, for the company, submitted to the decision of the Court. (1) 3rd ed. 527. Stephens, in reply: S.C. 1901. EDGAR บ. There must be some connection between the holder as employer and the workmen. Here there was none. WILLIAMS, J.:— The question to be decided is whether the proceeds of sale of the claim of the plaintiff are subject to certain liens for wages purporting to have been registered under section 171 of " The Mining Act, 1898." If Faithfull was not the holder of the claim, then the regulations as to the registration of liens have not been complied with, and the registration is void. Faithfull, therefore, for the purposes of the case, must be treated as the holder of the claim, even if in fact he were not the holder. Section 83 of the Act defines who is the holder. Now, the wages-men were admittedly employed by the company and not by Faithfull. The question, then, is whether, notwithstanding that they were not employed by Faithfull, they can claim a lien by the terms of section 171. That section is as follows: "Every person who is employed by or under "the holder of any mining privilege to work thereon on wages "or on contract shall by force of this Act have a lien on such “mining privilege." The section then provides how far the lien is to extend, and how it is to operate. In my opinion, the true construction of the section, and indeed the only construction by which the whole of it can be made intelligible, is that every person who is employed by the holder of any mining privilege to work thereon on wages, and every person who is employed under the holder of any mining privilege to work thereon on contract, is entitled to the lien. The word "by" refers to the men employed by the holder on wages; the word "under" refers to men employed under the holder on contract. The men here were admittedly neither employed by Faithfull on wages nor were they employed under him on contract. They have therefore no right to a lien against Faithfull, and no other lien has been registered. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment irrespective of the claims of lien. Solicitors for the plaintiff: Mondy, Sim, & Stephens (Dunedin). Solicitors for the company: Callan & Gallaway (Dunedin). : DREDGING COMPANY. S.C. IN BANCO. 1902. April 17. WILLIAMS, J. In re THE GREENVALE GOLD-DREDGING COMPANY (LIMITED). Mining Law "The Mining Act, 1898," Sections 171 to 179-Workman's Lien A person who has an equitable right to a mining privilege is not the holder of a mining privilege within the meaning of the term "holder" in section 171 of "The Mining Act, 1898." An application under section 174 of "The Mining Act, 1898," to enforce a lien is a civil proceeding within the meaning of section 280 of that Act, and the Warden's Court has power to reserve a case for the opinion of the Supreme Court in such a proceeding. SPECIAL PECIAL case stating questions reserved by George Cruickshank, a Warden of the Otago Mining District, under section 280 of "The Mining Act, 1898." From the case it appeared that the Greenvale Dredging Company (Limited) had, on the 27th of November, 1900, entered into an agreement with one Daniel Docherty whereby the vendor agreed to sell and the company agreed to purchase the mining privileges therein mentioned for the sum of £1,500, to be satisfied by the allotment of 1,500 fully-paid-up shares of £1 each in the capital of the company, as therein mentioned; and by such agreement it was provided that the vendor would, at the expense of the company, so soon as the company should have commenced the erection of a dredge on a special claim (being one of the properties agreed to be sold), assign the said mining privileges to the company, and that, in the event of the said mining privileges being assigned to the company, and the company going into liquidation within twelve months of the dredge starting work, the company would, on request, reassign the same to the vendor. The company had previously purchased a dredge from the liquidator of the Bengerburn Gold-dredging Company (Limited), which was, about the 20th of July, 1901, placed on the special claim. Such dredge was then subject to a mortgage of the Bengerburn Gold-dredging Company (Limited) to secure payment of £1,250, being the balance of the purchase-money of the dredge, and interest. After placing the dredge on the claim the said Greenvale Dredging Company commenced mining operations thereon. Docherty was aware that the Greenvale Dredging Company was in actual possession of the mining privileges, and was employing workmen and others thereon, or in connection therewith, for the purpose of dredging therein for gold. Docherty was not in any way interested in the dredge, or in any appliances or plant for mining upon the said mining privileges, save as vendor under the agreement. In December, 1901, and January, 1902, several liens were registered in the Warden's Office at Tapanui under section 171 of "The Mining Act, 1898." In all these liens Docherty was described as the holder of the mining privileges, and the Greenvale Dredging Company (Limited) as the employer of the claimants. On the 21st of January, 1902, a motion was made to the Warden for a sale of the mining privileges and appurtenances. On the hearing of such motion it was contended, on behalf of the mortgagee and of Docherty, that, as Docherty was not the employer of the lienors, their liens could not attach against the mining privileges held by him, and that the Greenvale Dredging Company (Limited) could not be said to be the holder of these mining privileges within the meaning of the Act. The Warden was of opinion that the Greenvale Dredging Company was not the holder of the mining privileges within the meaning of the Act, but, at the request of the lienors, reserved for the opinion of the Supreme Court, amongst others, the following questions: 1. Does the word "holder" under the Mining Act include an equitable holder? 2. Was the Greenvale Dredging Company the holder of the aforesaid mining privileges within the meaning of section 83 of "The Mining Act, 1898?" F. R. Chapman, for the mortgagee : There is a preliminary question. The proceedings before the Warden's Court were not civil proceedings within the meaning of section 280 of "The Mining Act, 1898," and that Court has no power to state a case under that section. The jurisdiction as to liens is given to the Warden alone, and is exercisable only by application (section 174). Applications are regulated by section 136. As to the jurisdiction of the Warden's Court and Warden respectively, see sections 48 and 49, which give jurisdiction to the Court; Part IV., which applies only to the VOL. XXI.-9. S.C. 1902. In re GREENVALE GOLDDREDGING COMPANY. |