THE BLUE DISPOSITIONS

337

battleships for attacks upon the line of the Red Admiral's communications."

Regarded in the abstract as a means for the interception and destruction of floating commerce, nothing could be better than the disposition adopted by the Blue Commander-in-Chief, the nature of which may be gathered from the annexed chart reproduced from the official report on the operations. It spread a net through which no merchant vessel could pass without being detected in ordinary weather, because if any one line was passed in the night, the next, which was about a hundred and thirty miles distant, must be passed in the daytime. It permitted of rapid concentration by one line or another if the merchant vessels were accompanied by warships, and though it exposed the battleship line to some risk of being overpowered in detail before the ships could be effectively concentrated for action, yet it placed a screen of cruisers so far ahead and astern of this line as to render such a risk almost infinitesimal in these days of wireless telegraphy. But, regarded in the concrete, the disposition is open to the fatal criticism that it must forthwith be dislocated and broken up as soon as the enemy appears in force. If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, this criticism is conclusive and final. It was not until the morning of June 27 that the ships were all in their stations. Before dark on that same day scarcely one of them remained there. The Battle Squadron was partly concentrated and partly captured or dispersed. The Fifth Cruiser Squadron was flying in all directions. The Second Cruiser Squadron was steaming as hard as it could for Lagos.

In making this ill-fated disposition the Blue Commander-in-Chief was no doubt largely influenced by the instructions he had received from the Admiralty, which were in effect-as defined by myself as the correspondent of The Times attached to the Blue side-" to endeavour to use his fleets, as a real enemy would

in like circumstances, for the purpose of causing a commercial crisis in England by the destruction rather than the capture of British merchant steamers, with a view to employing his fleets to advantage at a later stage if this measure had the desired effect of causing any dispersal of the British forces." But if this was his purpose it was not fulfilled. The dispositions made off the coast of Portugal were very ineffectual for the destruction of commerce, as may be seen from the list of captures, and very disastrous to the ships and squadrons taking part in them. Nor had they any appreciable effect in causing a dispersal of the British forces. Hence there is no little force in the suggestion of the Admiralty that the Blue Commander-in-Chief might have "achieved a greater measure of success by the employment of his cruisers only for the guerre de course and the concentration of his battleships for attacks upon the Red Admiral's communications."

It remains to give the results of the campaign as tabulated in the official "Summary of Red and Blue losses," and then, to quote the comments of the Admiralty. The comparative losses of the two sides are given in the following table :

COMMENTS OF THE ADMIRALTY

339

comments also speak for themselves; the only remark to be made on them is that the destruction of commerce in the face of a hostile command of the sea would probably be found in actual war to be a much more difficult business than the manœuvres made it appear. If that is so, it would seem that the risks involved are not likely to be greater than could be covered by insurance, if only owners and underwriters can be induced to keep their heads.

ADMIRALTY REMARKS

The manœuvres were deprived of much of their value owing to the small proportion of merchant vessels which accepted the Admiralty terms for taking part.

The percentage of loss of merchant vessels was high (55 per cent.), and would appear alarming were it not for the fact that this success of Blue was only achieved at the expense of the complete disorganisation of his fighting forces, and that, as stated by the chief umpire, had hostilities continued, "it is practically certain that the commencement of the third week of the war would have seen all commerce-destroying ships either captured or blockaded in their defended ports."

It is probable also that the percentage of loss would have been very considerably lower had it been possible for all the merchant ships traversing the manœuvre area, to the number of upwards of four hundred, to take a part in the proceedings. As it was, the attack of the twenty-seven battleships and cruisers and thirty destroyers of the Blue Fleet was concentrated upon the inadequate number of sixty merchant steamers and thirty-four gunboats and destroyers representing merchant steamers; in consequence, the actual percentage of loss is misleading, and affords little or no basis for calculation of the risks of shipping in time of war. It should also be noted that considerations of expense and the fact that the attacking fleet was on the seaward flank of the trade routes prevented wide detours being made for the purpose of avoiding capture.

The summary of Red and Blue losses will show the cost of a guerre de course against a superior naval power, and proves that although a temporary commercial crisis might possibly be caused in London by this form of attack, the complete defeat of the aggressor could not be long delayed, with the result that public confidence would be quickly re-established and the security of British trade assured.

To make an enemy's trade the main object of attack, while endeavouring to elude his fighting ships, is generally recognised as being strategically incorrect from the purely naval point of view, and this procedure could only be justified if there were reason to suppose the hostile Government could, by such action be coerced into a mis-direction of their strategy or premature negotiations for conclusion of hostilities.

As it was considered desirable, however, that the risks to British shipping should be examined under the most unfavourable conditions conceivable, the Blue Commander-in-Chief was directed to carry out a plan of campaign which is generally allowed to be strategically unsound, and there is no doubt that, fettered as he was by these limitations, he achieved his mission with great ability, though it is open to question whether he might not have achieved a greater measure of success by the employment of his cruisers only for the guerre de course and the concentration of his battleships for attacks upon the line of the Red Admiral's communications.

I

THE HIGHER POLICY OF

DEFENCE1

MUST begin my lecture with an acknowledgment and an apology-an acknowledgment of the high honour done me by your commandant and your professor of military history in inviting me to address so well-informed and, I hope, so critical a professional audience as yourselves on a subject connected with your profession; and an apology for my audacity in accepting their invitation. I am neither a sailor nor a soldier; I am an outsider to both those noble professions, though I have devoted some time and thought to the study of their higher functions and relations. You will bear with me if I say many things which you know as well as I do, and some things which may provoke your dissent. I have no dogmas to propound. My sole object is to offer you some food for reflection and, perhaps, some material for profitable discussion among yourselves. If I can attain that object I shall not regret my audacity, and I am sure you will forgive it.

The subject of my lecture is what has been called "The Higher Policy of Defence." By this I understand the due co-ordination of all the agencies of warfare, naval and military, offensive and defensive, and their intelligent adaptation to the conditions historical, geographical, political, and economical, of the countries, states, or Powers supposed to be

1 A lecture delivered by request at the Royal Staff College, Camberley, on December 9, 1902, and printed in the National Review, January, 1903.