bids the use of every description of fraudulent device or contrivance whereby voters are hindered in the free exercise of their franchise. Were a voter, known to be a determined partizan of one side, to be reduced by the devices of the other side to such a state of intoxication as to be unable to poll, would this be a case of undue influence within the statute? Probably, if any device were made use of to make the man drunk, it would be so; without this it might be said volenti non fit injuria.

The abduction of voters, whether done with force or by stratagem, as in the Cockermouth case before cited, where the voter was taken away in a state of intoxication, will be equally criminal. Some care will be necessary in the application of this part of the section, as well in regard to its criminal or penal consequences, as in a parliamentary investigation into the validity of an election. It will be necessary to distinguish between those cases where voters are decoyed away, or dragged away half consenting, and those where the voters voluntarily leave the place of election in order to avoid the importunity of persons who have influence over them, and take refuge in the house of a friend until they can come to the poll without molestation. This is, no doubt, the common excuse made in all cases where voters have been carried off, and afterwards cooped, or secreted; at the same time, whenever the practice of "kidnapping" voters has begun, or there has been an unfair use of influence by persons in authority upon the minds of the voters, this system of hiding until the hour of polling becomes excusable. It will be the duty of juries and of election committees to examine carefully

into the matter, and determine the real character of each case.

The penalty.] The act imposes serious penalties upon all persons hereafter infringing its provisions. The offence of undue influence is a misdemeanor, punishable with fine and imprisonment, and every person guilty of it is also liable to forfeit fifty pounds in a penal action to any one who shall sue for it.

Moreover, every person convicted of undue influence by a jury, or sentenced to pay the penal sum on an action brought against him for such offence, will be liable to have his name excluded from every register of voters, and to be placed in a separate list to be entitled "The list of persons disqualified for bribery, treating and undue influence." This list will be printed and published along with the register for the place for which the person so offending had or claimed to have a right to vote. Sect. 6.

The consequences to a candidate having recourse to such practices, so far as the validity of his election and his subsequent eligibility are concerned, will be the same as in cases of bribery and treating. The candidate will in this respect suffer not only for his own acts, and for those of others to which he was accessory, but also for the acts of all such persons as by the law of Parliament will be deemed his agents.

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What Corrupt Acts avoid an Election.

4. What Corrupt Acts avoid an Election.

The penalties attendant upon the commission of corrupt practices have been already pointed out. Bribery and undue influence are indictable offences, and they also, as well as treating, may be made the subject-matter of penal actions. No person, however, will be subject to either the pecuniary penalties or the criminal consequences here imposed, unless he has himself engaged in the corrupt transactions, or authorised them, or subsequently sanctioned them. No man can be indicted for the act of another unless he has been accessory to it. The parliamentary consequences of corrupt practices, however, are widely different. When the inquiry is no longer as to the personal guilt of the party, but whether an election is a valid one or not, the responsibility for the acts of others becomes much more extended. The candidate then, in a certain sense, becomes responsible for the acts of agents done without his knowledge or authority. The inquiry, in these cases, is not so much into the personal guilt or innocence of the candidate as into the sufficiency and validity of the election. The principal inquiry, and therefore the chief finding of the committee, is, whether the election was a void one or not (a). It is true that, in modern practice, they

(a) In the Hertford case, P. & K. 553, the finding was that the election was void, and that bribery and treating prevailed previously to and during the last election. There was no allusion to the candidates at all. Montgomery, ib. 173; Oxford, ib. 58, and in many other cases no notice is taken in the report of the conduct of the member returned.

What Corrupt Acts avoid an Election.

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go on to report whether the sitting member has been guilty by himself or his agents; and it is this mode of finding, probably, which has given rise to the complaint that a candidate is pronounced guilty of criminal acts, done by others, but of which he was entirely ignorant. The extent of this responsibility is a matter of such great importance in election inquiries, that it is proposed to consider in detail the authorities on which it rests. The proposition to be established is this, that an election may be avoided, and a candidate may be rendered ineligible, by reason of the acts of other persons, unsanctioned by him. In cases of bribery this has been hardly ever disputed. The common practice, prior to the passing of the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 57, was for committees to report simply, " that A. B. was not duly elected," and sometimes they went on to state that by his agents he had been guilty of bribery or treating. This latter part of the finding was more frequently omitted. Since the passing of the statute last mentioned, committees have, in accordance with its requirements, reported separately and distinctly upon the facts of bribery proved, and also whether it had been proved that such bribery was committed with the knowledge and consent of the sitting member or candidate. This statute was a distinct recognition by the Legislature of the principle, that a candidate may be disqualified by acts of bribery committed without his knowledge or consent.

An attempt, however, has recently been made to limit the extent of this responsibility in cases of treating, and to confine it to those cases where the candidate knew of the treating at the time, or sanctioned it subsequently by paying for it. This has been

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Acts of Agent avoid the Election.

already adverted to in the section on "treating." It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider whether the words "by any other person on his behalf" have a different signification in the fourth section of the new act defining treating, from what they have in the second, which defines bribery.

The expression in the 7 Wm. 3, c. 4, was, "by himself, or by any other ways or means on his behalf;" that in the new statute is similar: "by himself, or by or with any person, or by any ways or means on his behalf." The meaning of the words " on his behalf," in the statute of Wm. 3, have been discussed in one or two cases before the courts of law. These cases are not much in point, for the question in all of them was, whether the plaintiff had given credit to the person sued or to some one else.

A case of Smith v. Rose (a) tried before Lord Kenyon, in 1789, is sometimes quoted, in which a publican recovered the amount of his bill for refreshments supplied to voters, in order to show that there is no illegality in acts done without the knowledge or consent of the candidate. But this case proves nothing, for there was no evidence that Mr. Rose, who was at the time secretary of the Treasury, was in any way agent for, or connected with Lord Hood, who was the candidate at the election: and the law has only forbidden candidates and their agents to treat electors. Another case which is frequently brought forward to show that the parliamentary rule with regard to election agency is inconsistent with the principles of the courts of law, is the case of

(a) Clifford, 103; 1 Peck. 205.