ent's recognized muniment of title, and by the even more significant fact that the city itself deliberately ratified its original grant to Carpentier.

The power to ratify was necessarily a power conferred by the state under the act of 1868 authorizing the city to settle, adjust, and compromise and the ratification is as complete when made by an authorized agent of the authority having the power to ratify as though made by that authority itself. (Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 24 How. 126, [16 L. Ed. 664].) Nor can any exposition be needed of the well-settled principle that ratification operates as of the date of the originally invalid act. (1 Abbott on Municipal Corporations, sec. 281; Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279; Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96, [81 Am. Dec. 96]; City of Monterey v. Jacks, 139 Cal. 542, [53 Pac. 436].) There is then a declaration by the city of Oakland that the grant by itself to Carpentier of 1852 is in all respects binding. This declaration, in the absence of express reservation, negatives the idea of any encumbrances by easements or otherwise upon the property, and by the very use of the word "grant" the city "is estopped as against its grantee to assert anything in derogation of its deed." (10 Cyc. 626.) It was a covenant on the part of the city that the water front was not burdened with encumbrances by way of easements or otherwise, for that a public highway is an encumbrance which will be held to be a breach of a covenant stipulating that there are no encumbrances is well settled. (Kellogg v. Ingersoll, 2 Mass. 96; Pritchard v. Atkinson, 3 N. H. 335; Kellogg v. Molin, 50 Mo. 496, [11 Am. Rep. 426].)

As little question can there be over the intent appearing in these compromise ordinances to revoke any such dedications. If what has already been pointed out does not make this plain, there is the added consideration that a deed in solido without reservation of easements or streets, such a deed as was here made, itself operates as a revocation. (Hayward v. Manzer, 70 Cal. 476, [13 Pac. 141]; Schmitt v. City and County of San Francisco, 100 Cal. 302, [34 Pac. 961]; Sacramento v. Clunie, 120 Cal. 29, [52 Pac. 44; Los Angeles v. Kysor, 125 Cal. 463, [58 Pac. 90]; Myers v. City of Oceanside, 7 Cal. App. 87, [93 Pac. 686]; San Francisco v. Calderwood, 31 Cal. 585, [91 Am. Dec. 542]; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42

Cal. 541; People v. Williams, 64 Cal. 498, [2 Pac. 393]; Demartini v. San Francisco, 107 Cal. 402, [40 Pac. 496]; Shulz v. Redondo Improvement Co., 156 Cal. 439, [105 Pac. 118].) Instructive upon this is the case of Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 124 U. S. 656, [31 L. Ed. 543, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 643], which offers some features of great similarity to those presented in this consideration. The original owner of the land upon which the city of Hoboken stands, Stevens by name, caused a plan of the city to be made and filed, which plan exhibited numbers of streets running north and south and east and west, which latter streets upon the map terminated at the eastern end of the high-water mark of the Hudson River. Lots were sold in accordance with the plan. Stevens's title went to high water and subsequently the state sold certain of the lands below high water to the Hoboken Land and Improvement Company. The latter filled in its property and claimed title in fee simple. The claim of the city was that the land lying at the extremities of the streets was subject to an easement in favor of the public for street purposes under the principle that when a street is carried to high water an easement attaches in favor of the public for wharf and similar purposes to the lands under the waters beyond, and this easement will be continued over any filled land which otherwise would cut off access from the street to the water. But the supreme court of the United States, all the judges concurring, declared that if any such easements existed, they were extinguished by the action of the state in conveying the property to the Hoboken Land and Improvement Company without reservation of such easements, the court saying: "The grant, being from the state, creates an estoppel against the estoppel; for the state, in respect to the easements claimed, is the representative of the public, superior in authority and paramount in right to the city of Hoboken; and, as we have already seen, the existence of the easement defeats the grant of the state. The state, therefore, being estopped by its grant is estopped to deny its effect to extinguish the public right to the easement claimed. The right insisted upon in these actions by the city of Hoboken is the public right, and not the right of the individual citizens, claiming by virtue of conveyances of lots abutting on streets made by Stevens or his successors in the title. The public right represented by the

plaintiff is subordinate to the state, and subject to its control. The state may release the obligation to the public, may discharge the land of the burden of the easement, and extinguish the public, right to its enjoyment. Whatever it may do in that behalf conclusively binds the local authorities when, as in the present cases, the rights of action asserted are based exclusively on the public right.”

Again, it is to be remembered that the act of 1868 authorized the compromise, adjustment, and settlement of all "causes of action" in which the city was interested. There can be no question but that a consent judgment becomes res adjudicata between the parties. (Holmes v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 191; Semple v. Wright, 32 Cal. 659; McCreery v. Fuller, 63 Cal. 31; Crossman v. Davis, 79 Cal. 603, [21 Pac. 963]; Nashville etc. Ry. Co. v. United States, 113 U. S. 261, [28 L. Ed. 971, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460].) In City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Company (No. 115, superior court of Alameda County), the city stipulated that the respondent herein should "have a final judgment against plaintiff quieting the title to the lands described in its cross-bill or complaint." These lands were all of the property here in controversy without reservation as to the streets.

Again, in the cases of Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Oakland (No. 5330, superior court of Alameda County), Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Oakland (No. 5331, superior court of Alameda County), and Huntington v. City of Oakland (No. 2209, United States circuit court, ninth circuit), under disclaimers filed by the city pursuant to an ordinance of the city council, it was adjudged and decreed that the city of Oakland had no right or title or interest in or to any of the lands there in question which are included in the property involved in the present appeal. Says the supreme court of Indiana (Parrish v. Ferris, 2 Black, (U. S.) 606, [17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317]): “If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff and declares that he has title in fee simple, and that the defendant's claim is unjust and unfounded, every possible interest of the latter in the land is cut off. He cannot afterwards assert that he has an easement in the land."

We need not consider how far these judgments operate to estop the appellant. They are certainly strong evidence upon the matter of revocation. They show that in none of these

instances was the city endeavoring to protect what it now claims to be its streets, though it is inconceivable that if it had believed it had any streets it would not have done so. Aside from the plain language of the ordinances and from the other considerations above discussed, the interpretation by conduct of one or the other of the parties is always of value. And so further in this connection it may be pointed out that the city repeatedly made efforts to condemn for street purposes the very property which it here claims was dedicated to street purposes. It has assessed and collected taxes upon the property claimed as streets. It has sold this property for the non-payment of taxes assessed thereon. It has taken conveyances from respondent for street purposes of some of the property within the lines of some of the asserted streets. All these matters and things, with the language of the compromise itself and the provisions of the agreement of compromise to the effect that the city of Oakland "should perfect, complete and make good" the title of respondent to the property conveyed to it by Carpentier, make it manifest not only that the city did revoke its dedications, complete or inchoate, but that it thoroughly understood that it had done so and continuously acted upon such understanding.

For these reasons the order appealed from is affirmed.

Beatty, C. J., did not participate in the foregoing decision.

[Crim. No. 1686. In Bank.-May 27, 1912.]

In the Matter of the Application of F. A. MILLER for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN-EIGHT HOURS LAW-ACT OF MARCH 22, 1911, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.-The act of March 22, 1911, (Stats. 1911, p. 437), forbidding the employment of women for more than eight hours a day in certain places, is constitutional, so far as it applies to women employed in hotels. ID.-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROVISIONS OF STATE CONSTITUTION NOT VIOLATED. The act is not in violation either of section 18 of article XX of the state constitution, providing that "no person shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business, vocation or profession"; or of section 1 of article

I, declaring that all persons have an inalienable right to enjoy life and liberty and to acquire and possess property; or of section 11 of article I, requiring that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; or of section 21 of article I, prohibiting the granting of privileges or immunities to any citizens, or class of citizens, which, upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens; or of section 25 of article IV, prohibiting the passing of special laws, granting to any individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.

ID. DISCRIMINATIONS ON ACCOUNT OF SEX-VALID POLICE REGULATIONS -HOURS OF LABOR.-Section 18 of article XX of the constitution, prohibiting any such discrimination based solely on distinctions of sex, like other constitutional guarantees, is subject to such reasonable regulations as may be imposed in the exercise of police powers. It does not forbid such reasonable restrictions upon the hours of labor of women as may be necessary for the protection and preservation of the public health.

ID. RIGHT OF CONTRACT SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS UNDER POLICE POWER. -Although the act provides a punishment only for the employer, its prohibition applies to both employer and employee, and it clearly restricts the liberty of both, in the specified establishments, to freely contract with each other as to the length of a day's service or to perform such contract when made. ID.-PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, AND MORALS-LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION.-The right of an individual to so contract is in itself subject to certain limitations which the state may lawfully impose in the exercise of its police powers, for the purpose of preserving public health, safety, or morals, and a large discretion is vested in the legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protec tion of such interests.

ID. LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWERS REASONABLE ASSUMPTION OF INJURY TO PUBLIC.-The police powers of the legislature in this connection are not absolute or unlimited, and the personal right to contract cannot be taken away or impaired at its mere will, nor af all, unless the public welfare demands it. So far as the effect on himself alone is concerned, each person has the absolute right to judge for himself whether the hard labor which he voluntarily performs is for his best interest or not. The legislature cannot judge for persons in this respect and interfere solely to prevent them from injuring themselves by excessive labor. The injury must be of such character and extent and to such a number of persons that it may be reasonably supposed that it will cause injury to others, that is, to the community in general, or, as it is expressed, to the public health and general welfare.

ID. LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY COURTS.-The means adopted to produce the public benefit intended, or to prevent the public injury, must be reasonably necessary to accomplish that