QUEEN'S BENCH.

notice ought to expire in time to enable the plaintiff to give notice of trial after the expiration of the twenty days; so that in country causes, when full notice of trial was necessary, the defendant was bound to give his notice thirty days before the assizes; and that in the present case he had failed to do so.

Cowling showed cause, and contended that, both according to strict grammatical construction and also according to the evident intention of the Legislature, the word "afterwards" meant after service of the notice, and not after the expiration of the twenty days. The object was to save the defendant the expense of carrying the case down by proviso, or having a rule for judgment discharged upon a peremptory undertaking. Pearson, contrà.-The word afterwards refers to the last antecedent words, which are "after the expiration of the notice."

Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-I have no doubt that Mr. Cowling's is the reasonable construction. "Afterwards" is after the service of the twenty days' notice by the defendant; and, if after that the plaintiff does not proceed to trial, he is in the same situation as a plaintiff formerly was if he made default after a peremptory undertaking.

QUEEN'S BENCH.

Wroth, in

SMITH V. DODGE.-Demurrer to a rejoinder. support of the demurrer. Power, contrà, was not called upon. Judgment for the defendant. COLE V. BISHOP.-Tried before Wightman, J.: verdict for the plaintiff, 1007. damages. Needham moved for a new trial. Cur, adv. vult. Saturday, June 10.

REG. v. ALISON.-This was a case stated for the purpose of raising the question whether the tenant of a brewery was rateable in respect of the increased value of the brewery, by reason of the obligation imposed upon the lessees of thirtythree public-houses to deal exclusively at that brewery. Pashley (Grey with him), for the respondent. Heath (Watson with him), contrà.

Cur, adv. vult.

REG. . MONK HAZIEDINE.-Heath moved for a certiorari

Re

to remove an indictment from sessions, on the ground that difficult questions of law would arise, and a view was Writ granted. required Shee, Serjt. moved for a rule, calling upon an attorney to pay over a sum of 15004 Rule nisi. KIDD . SERGEFIELD.--Shee, Serjt. moved to reduce the damages from 1007. to 50%, or for a new trial, on the ground of the reception in evidence of a letter from the defendant to his own attorney, which was privileged. Cur. adv, vull. Re H. T. ROBERTS.-Keane moved for a rule for an attachment for disobedience of an order of a judge for payment of money.

Rule nisi.

SCHEYDT. MITCHELL.-Willes moved on behalf of the plaintiff, who was an allottee of shares in an alleged abortive company, seeking to recover the amount of his deposit, for an inspection and copy of the subscribers' agreement and schedule thereto. granted all that the plaintiff had asked for, except the Crompton, J. at chambers had names of the parties who had signed the subscribers' agreement; and he withheld that, because no good reason was assigned for the production of those names; and it was sug

COLERIDGE, J.-It seems clear if you look at the previous words: "The defendant may give twenty days' notice to the plaintiff to bring the issue on to be tried at the sittings or assizes next after the expiration of the notice." Now, upon those words standing alone, we should surely be bound to say that if the next sittings occurred on the twenty-first day, those would be the sittings at which the plaintiff would be required to try; but, if that is the correct interpre-authority of Steadman v. Arden, 15 M. & W. 587, and Ley v. tation of those words, it becomes clear that the plaintiff must, within the twenty days, do what is necessary to bring it to trial at the next sittings.

gested that they were wanted for the purpose of involving other parties in litigation. It was now contended, upon the Barlow, 1 Exch. 800, that the plaintiff was entitled to inspect and take a copy of the whole document. By the CoURT.Enough has already been given to enable him to show the scheme abortive, if it really were so; and no reason is given for any further inspection. Rule refused.

REG. v. LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH OF SWANSEA.-Willes applied for leave to set down this case in the Crown Paper, that it might be argued during the sittings after term.

ERLE, J.-I also think that the plaintiff was bound to take the necessary steps within the twenty days to bring the case to trial at the assizes next after the expiration of the twenty days; and a strong reason against Mr. Pearson's construction is, that the time required for notice of trial varies considerably; so that, if the defendant's notice under sect. 101 was to be twenty days plus the time requisite for notice of against the defendant for noncompliance with a rule of court. trial, it would be a fluctuating and uncertain period. CROMPTON, J. concurred. Rule discharged.(a)

PLOWDEN v. CAMPBELL.

Practice-Security for costs-Plaintiff engaged in public service abroad.

The Court refused to set aside an order of a judge requiring the plaintiff to give security for costs, he being resident in India, and employed in the civil service of the East India Company.

Hawkins moved for a rule to show cause why an order of Crompton, J., requiring the plaintiff to give security for costs, should not be rescinded. The affidavits disclosed that the plaintiff was employed in the civil service of the East India Company, as a civil and sessions judge, and was temporarily resident in Bengal, in discharge of the duties of his office. It was submitted therefore that this case fell within the exception to the general rule, whereby persons engaged in the public service abroad were exonerated from the necessity of giving security for costs. In Garwood v. Bradburn, 9 Dowl. 1031, a private soldier, enlisted for life in the military service of the East India Company, was considered not liable to find security for costs; and in Lord Nugent v.. Harcourt, 2 Dowl. 578, the same was held respecting a commissioner of the Ionian Islands. [Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-Here the domicile is changed. In the case of military service it is not. There is a very remote prospect of the plaintiff's return.] The prospect was even more remote in the case of the private soldier. [Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-Suppose an engineer, sent out to superintend a railway for twenty years, could not he be required to give security for costs?] That would not be an employment in the public service. This is the case of a judge. [Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.— The local judges in India are tc-day merchants, tomorrow collectors of revenue, and the day after judges. CROMPTON, J.-I wanted to see an authority applicable to such an office as this.] There is no authority more closely applicable than those cited. Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-We think that the plaintiff ought to give security for costs. Rule refused.

sittings or assizes, or to proceed to trial in pursuance of the said notice given by the defendant, the defendant may suggest on the record that the plaintiff has failed to proceed to trial, although duly required so to do (which suggestion shall not be traversable, but only be subject to be set aside if untrue), and may sign judgment for his costs; provided that the court or a judge shall have power to extend the time for proceeding to trial with or without terms.

(a) Pearson applied to be let in to try at the next assizes; but the court refused without an affidavit of merits,

Application granted, PAYNE . HEDGECOCK-Willes moved for an attachment

Rule nisi Monday, June 12. WATTS V. PORTER.-The COURT delivered judgment herein, Erle, J. dissentiente. Rule discharged. REG. v. RUSSELL.-M'Intyre showed cause; and Morgan supported the rule. Rule discharged. PINDAR. BARR. Stands over. BOTT . STANCLIFFE.-Cowling showed cause; and H. Hill supported the rule. Rule discharged. AITKEN . BARKER.-II. IIill showed cause; and T. Jones supported the rule. Rule discharged. Milward showed Rule absolute. and Henderson Part heard.

HUGHES . HUMPHREYS. ——— Welsby and cause. The other side not called upon. SMITH. COOKE-Welsby showed cause;

supported the rule.

Tuesday, June 13.

SILLEM T. THORNTON.- Lord CAMPBELL, C.J., delivered the

judgment of the court, holding that there had been a breach

of warranty, and that the assured was not entitled to recover. Judgment for defendant.

R. v. LEIGH TRAFFORD AND ANOTHER, Justices, &c.—Pashley showed cause against a rule for a certiorari to bring up an order of justices made under the Friendly Societies Acts. Couling and Hodgson, contrà. Cur, adv. vult.

GILL . POWELL.-This was an action to recover a sum of money agreed to be paid in consideration of the plaintiff recommending the defendant to practise as a surgeon at Cobham. At the trial before Coleridge, J., the defendant endeavoured to show that the agreement was obtained by fraud; but the jury found that issue for the plaintiff. It appeared, however, that the plaintiff only remained at Cob

ham for eleven months after the date of the agreement; and it was contended that, as the plaintiff would be entitled to a share of the profits under the agreement for a period of three years, he was bound to remain and continue his recommendations for the like period; but the learned judge considered that there was no such obligation. Prendergast now moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. By the COURT. -There was clearly nothing to bind the plaintiff to continue for three years; and he appears to have done all that the agreement required. He was zealous in his recommendation of the defendant.

Rule refused.

VIDI . SMITH.-Willes showed cause against a rule for an account of all past sales by the defendant of aneroid barometers patented by the plaintiff, and of the profits made by such sales; and also for an interim account to be kept until judgment; and also for an inspection of defendant's books.

Grove, contrà.

Cur, adv. vult.

TAYLOR . TINDAL-Watson moved for a new trial upon an Rule nisi. affidavit.

HUGHES & HOPKINS.-M. Smith moved to enlarge a rule for setting aside a distringas nuper vice comitem. P. Thompson,

contra.

Rule enlarged. Wednesday, June 14. REG. V. THE INHABITANTS OF EARDISLAND. -To be reported. Rule discharged. LANET. THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND.-No cause shown against rule for an attachment. Rule absolute. REG. v. ALLEYNE AND OTHERS, Stands over. REG. on the prosecution of LAING V. THE INHABITANTS OF ALLER-Kinglake, Serjt. showed cause; and M. Smith, in support of the rule. Rule absolute.

REG. v. HAMP AND OTHERS The Attorney-General ap

peared for Proberts, one of the defendants, who appeared to receive judgment. Judgment respited until further order. PHELPS v. ST. JOHN-Montague Smith showed cause against a rule calling on the Bishop of Salisbury for a return to a writ of sequestration. Cooke, in support.

EARL ROMNEY v. THE INCLOSURE COMMISSIONERS.-Brangeli and Bovill showed cause against a rule to review the Master's taxation. Chambers and Raymond, contrà (To be reported) Rule discharged. REG. v. HAMP. To stand over till next term. ABERNETHY C. THE TRUSTEES OF THE BIRKENHEAD Dock -M. Smith showed cause. Buller, contrà. The matter in dispute related to a sum of 117.; and, as it arose between two attorneys, it was agreed to be referred to a London soliciter, Referred.

BOHN V. LAYCOCK. The Attorney-General, Sewell, and Karslake showed cause against a rule for leave to add a ples. Bramwell and Quain, contrà, not called upon. Rule absolute REG. T. LUCKETT.-Welsby moved to enlarge the rule Rule enlarged herein, service having been evaded.

REG. . THE TRUSTEES OF ST. LUKE's. Watson showed cause against a rule to rescind so much of the order of court herein as gave costs. By agreement at the sessions a case was to be brought up without costs on either side. Hu ston, contrà. Rule absolute. PAYNE V. HEDGECOCK.-Blackburn moved to enlarge a rale, service having been evaded. Rule enlarged

REG. . DENT AND OTHERS, Justices, &c-Watson and Overend showed cause against a rule to strike out so much of had exercised their discretion in refusing to issue a warrant a return to a writ of mandamus as alleged that the justices of distress. Sir F. Thesiger, Addison, and Hall, contrà

Writ to be amended; and return to stand, subject to such alterations as the amendment of the writ shomi render necessary.

REG. . THE LORDS, BAILIFFS, AND STEWARDS OF ROMNEY MARSH.-Pashley moved for a rule to inspect the scot-rates assessed upon the owners and occupiers of land in the Marsh; and for a mandamus to fill up the proper number of jurats. Rule nisi.

REG. v. NEWTON.-The Attorney-General and Hudson appeared to show cause against a rule for the postponement of the trial; but consented that it should be absolute, up the court ordering that all the other indictments arising out of the same matters should also stand over till next term | Hawkins, contrà. Rule absolute BAKER V. AVERY.-Collyer applied for leave to turn the special case into a special verdict. Leave granted. BOWDEN v. TUCKER-Hawkins moved to enter a verdict for the defendant, upon a replication to a plea of the Statate of Limitations. Rule refus

COURT OF COMMON BENCH.
Reported by DANIEL THOMAS EVANS and R. VAUGHAN
WILLIAMS, Esqrs., Barristers-at-law.

Tuesday, Jan. 31.
GREENAWAY v. HART.
Ejectment-Lease-Forfeiture.

A lease, made under a power in a settlement, recited title of the lessor, and showed that he had only an equitable interest. In case of a breach of the cont nants of the lease, a right of re-entry was reserved to the lessor and his assigns:

Held, that there was no estoppel on the lessee prohibiting him from disputing the title of the lessor so disclosed

in the lease.

Secondly, that the word "assigns," as used in the lease, meant assigns of the settlor; and that, although the right of re-entry could not well be reserved to the lessor, yet the owners of the reversion under the settlement for the time being were entitled to take adrantage of it as "assigns."

This was an action of ejectment, in the recent form under the Common Law Procedure Act, brought to recover possession of certain lands and premises at Hackney, under a power of re-entry contained in a lease on a breach of covenant to rebuild. The cause was tried before Jervis, C.J., at the sittings in Westminster in Hilary Term last, and a verdict found for the plaintiffs, with leave reserved to move the full

rule.

COMMON BENCH.

JUDGMENT.

COMMON BENCH.

seised in fee, levied a fine, and settled the estate to CRESSWELL, J.-This was an action of ejectment the use of himself for life, and afterwards to the use founded upon a forfeiture and a breach of covenant to of William Whitlock the younger, afterwards to the convey contained in a lease granted in 1788 to the use of John Whitlock, reserving to himself power to plaintiffs as assignees of the reversion, and it was grant leases. William Whitlock the elder afterwards contended at the trial that they could not take ad- granted a lease to Christian Hearne, yielding and Fantage of the condition for re-entry, and a verdict paying to the persons to whom the inheritance as of was taken for the plaintiff. It is not necessary right belongs during the term a certain rent; and, to enter into the whole case; a rule for the purpose after the death of William Whitlock the elder, Wilhaving been granted, the matter was very fully and liam Whitlock the younger distrained for rent in ably argued on Wednesday last. The lease in ques- arrear. "It was resolved that the reversion in granted on the 14th May 1788, amongst other the case at bar is good. For the said lease things recited indentures of lease and release of Jan. hath not its essence from the estate of the 188, naming the tenants of the præcipe, and that lessor, which he hath for life; but the lease Thomas Dorey was demandant, and other mat- hath its essence out of the said fine, and in conters to which it is not material to refer, "to the use struction of law precedes the estate for life and all sach person and persons, and for such estate and the remainders; for after the lease made, it is as States, as the said Thomas Triquet by any deed or much as if the use had been limited originally to the deeds, instrument or instruments in writing, to be lessee for the said term, and then the other limitasealed and delivered by him in the presence of, and to tions in construction of law follow it; so that the De attested by, two or more credible witnesses, or by lessee, in the case at bar, derives his estate out of the at last will and testament, as is therein mentioned, estate which passed by the fine. Then, when the should direct, limit, or appoint; and in default of and lessor reserves rent to him, his heirs and assigns, it is til such direction, limitation, or appointment, to good; for that, by construction of law, precedes the use of the said John Fasson, his heirs and as- the limitations of the uses; and then, it being well signs." I do not meddle with the other moiety of it, reserved, it is well transferred to every one to whom because it is agreed that no question arises on the any use is limited. So, if the reservation be to the end of it being divided into two portions. The lessor, and to every person to whom the inheritance or lease went on, showing in the first instance that reversion of the premises shall appertain during the Triquet had an equitable estate, and reciting this term, that is likewise good, for the law will distribute power: That in pursuance of the said recited ar- it to every one to whom any limitation of the use eles, and in consideration of the yearly rents, cove- shall be made." This case then determined that if A., marts, and agreements, hereinafter reserved and con- seised in fee, makes a lease reserving rent to himself, tained by and on the part and behalf of the said or his heirs, or to himself and to all persons to whom Jeremiah Clegg, his executors, administrators, and the inheritance in the reversion shall come, and afterassigns, to be paid and performed, the said T. Triquet wards assigns the reversion, the reservation of the and T. Fasson, in pursuance and by force and virtue rent is good, and the assignee of the reversion shall of the said several recited powers or authorities to have it. Glover v. Cope does not appear to have any them respectively reserved and given in and by the material bearing on the present question. The quessal indenture of five parts, and of all and every tion there was whether the assignee of a corresponding power and powers, authority and authorities, them or term can sue under the stat. 32 Hen. 8. But Sachererell Either of them enabling in this behalf." Then the party v. Froggatt, 2 Wms. Saund. is an instance where a who professes to act under this power made this lease, covenant to repair made with the lessor, and exe"yielding and paying therefor, yearly and every year cuted, was held to operate in favour of the heir, during the said term of sixty-eight years and a half, because the party himself had so intended. Before we to the said Thomas Triquet, his heirs and assigns, the proceed to consider the case of Isherwood v. Oldknow, it Clear yearly rent or sum of 251. 108. of lawful money may be as well to notice the case of Berry v. White, of Great Britain (being a moiety of the said yearly rent in Sir Orlando Bridgman's judgments, p. 82. In of 5); and unto the said Thomas Fasson, his heirs that it appears that Sir Charles Howard was seised and assigns, the like yearly rent or sum of 251. 10s. of in fee, and levied a fine to the use of himself for life, e lawful money (being the other moiety of the said and remainder to the use of Sir Robert Howard for yearly rent of 51)" Then the lessee does "covenant, life, remainder to the use of Sir W. Howard, and so gomise, and agree to and with the said Thomas forth, with a power to any tenant for life to grant Triquet, his heirs and assigns, and also to and with leases on certain terms. After Sir Charles Howard's he said Thomas Fasson, his heirs and assigns, by death, Sir Robert Howard, being seised of the freebese presents, in manner following, that is to say: hold, granted a lease for ninety-nine years, reserving That he the said Jeremiah Clegg, his executors, ad- rent during the term to Sir Robert and his heirs and ministrators, or assigns, shall and will, yearly and assigns. It was objected to this lease that the very year during the said term hereby demised, well rent was not reserved according to the power, for Sir nd truly pay, or cause to be paid, unto the said R. Howard and his heirs could not have it. Sir homas Triquet, his heirs or assigns, the said other Orlando Bridgman observes, the very ground assigned art." There is then a covenant that Clegg will, for the decision in Whitlock's case made a great doubt aring the term, well and sufficiently repair the pre- in this case; for there the lease was held to precede ises, and keep them up till the expiration of the the other limitations of the uses, and was limited rm. Then comes this proviso for re-entry: "Pro to the owner in fee, and so the rent was well reded always that if the said yearly rents hereby served to him, his heirs and assigns, and is well served, or either of them, or any part thereof re- transferred to every one to whom any use is limited. ectively, shall be behind or unpaid by the space of Nevertheless, he goes on to say, "I hold such a irty days next after either of the days or times reservation good enough; and ground it upon reinbefore mentioned or appointed for the payment this difference: Where the words of reservation are reof (being lawfully demanded); or if the said sufficient to carry the rent according to the power, remiah Clegg, his executors, administrators, or there the addition contrary to it shall not vitiate the ns, do not or shall not at all times hereafter well reservation; but the addition shall be void and the d truly observe, perform, fulfil, and keep all and reservation good; for it appeared that the intent gular the covenants and agreements herein con- was to make an estate according to the power, and ned, which, on his and their part and behalf, are without which he could not make it; and then the dought to be observed, performed, fulfilled, and rule holds, utile per inutile non vitiatur. That is our t; then and in either of such cases it may and case; here are words enough in the reservation, for it ll be lawful to and for the said Thomas Triquet is reddendo post exceptionem termini et durante conThomas Fasson respectively, and their respective tinuatione inde (that is, reddendo durante termino rs and assigns, into and upon the said demised pre- prædicto 26s. 8d. annatim,)" which was the old rent at to re-enter, and the same to have, regain, re- the usual times. These words alone, he says, had , and enjoy as in their respective former estate." been clearly a good reservation, to leave it to the conepoint to be determined is, whether the plaintiffs, struction of law; then the addition of these words, assignees of the reversion, can take advantage of "to him, his heirs and assigns," being void in proviso for re-entry. For the defendant it was themselves, shall not vitiate the reservation, which tended that they could not; for the lessors, is good without them. He afterwards adds, "I hold mas Triquet and John Fasson, having re-entered, that if Sir Robert had reserved the rent to him, his recovered the equitable estate; and no right of executors and assigns during the term, or to him and Entry can be reserved to a stranger-for which his wife during the term, which are all the cases ghv. Haynes, Cro. J. 76, was cited as an autho- that have been put; or to him during the term; -It is settled that it is a direct authority on that the law would have rejected that which is void, and, t; and also that no question of estoppel arises, there being enough in the reservation to satisfy the, much as the title of the lessor is disclosed in the words of the power, the law will construe such a reservae. But it was argued on the other side that the tion to be good." Thus far, then, the judgment in Berry e also showed, by the execution of the power con- v. White proceeds altogether upon the idea of rejecting ed in the deed to the uses of the covenantees, that the words "to him, his heirs and assigns," as void, being rm haing been created, the execution or power incapable of receiving a construction consistent with the st be considered as inserted in the original settle- due execution of the powers. But he afterwards proit and therefore granted out of the legal estate; and, ceeds: "Another reason may be given why this reservasequently, the rent reserved in the covenants and tion to Sir Robert, his heirs and assigns during the ition must go with the reversion. For this term, may be good is, the words "his heirs and assigns" lock's case, 8 Coke, Glover v. Cope, and Isher- do not denote any person certain, as if he had reserved v. Oldknow, were relied on. It is necessary it to his wife or daughter, or the like, but properly xamine those cases with much care, to ascer- intend only the duration of the estate in the rents; how far they are applicable to the pre- that is so long as the estate lasts." And he recited In the first case William Whitlock, being a case where they had been so treated. But, in

COMMON BENCH.

conclusion, he relies principally on the ground that the words may be rejected. The report of Hotley v. Scott was not very clear; but the decision proceeds upon the ground that a construction may be put on the words as to the condition for re-entry, and the condition enabling Sir John Astley and his heirs and assigns to re-enter was construed to mean "the heirs and assigns" of the grantor of the power, and this is the party making the lease. This is recognised by Ashurst, J. in Goodtitle v. Finucan, 1 Doug. 572. The last case material to notice is Isherwood v. Oldknow, 3 M. & S. There, Thomas Isherwood being seised in fee, with limitation to Henry B. Isherwood for life, with several limited powers to grant leases for certain terms, to be incident and belong to and from time to time go along with the several uses therein before mentioned, and so as there were a condition for re-entry-Thomas Isherwood died, and H. B. Isherwood became seised for life, and by virtue of the said power granted a lease, under a yearly rent of 100/., payable to the said H. B. Isherwood and to such other persons as for the time being should be entitled to the freehold and inheritance; and the defendant covenanted with H. B. Isherwood and his heirs and assigns for payment of rent to H. B. Isherwood, and to such other person as should be entitled to the freehold, &c., and for keeping and yielding up the premises in repair, and a covenant in case of nonpayment of rent and nonrepair. The plaintiff averred the death of H. B. Isherwood, whereupon he took possession of the premises, and remained under the will of Thomas Isherwood. Two years' rent after that became due, and the premises were out of repair. On motion in arrest of judgment, it was contended that, the covenant being made with H. B. Isherwood, his heirs and assigns, the plaintiff could not sue on it, as he was neither heir nor assign of H. B. Isherwood. After hearing the case very elaborately argued, the court held, according to the principle laid down in Whitlock's case, that the lease must be considered as emanating from the party who created the power; and the plaintiff claiming the remainder was assignee of the term, though not the person executing the lease, and the covenant must be construed to be made with him as such assignee. By these cases it may be considered as established that if a person seised in fee of an estate devises it with remainder to other persons, reserving a leasing power, which he afterwards exercises, reserving a rent to himself, his heirs and assigns, those in remainder shall have the rent. So also, when a person seised in fee, subject to an estate for life in remainder, which gives him a leasing power, which he exercises, reserves a rent during the term to his heirs and assigns, the remainderman shall take the rent, although neither heirs nor assigns of A.:-according to some authorities, because the reservation of the rent during the term would give it to him, and, according to others, because "assigns" shall be construed "assigns of the party out of whose estate the term is supposed to emanate.' Let us see how these principles affect the present case- The lease is granted to the lessee, "yielding and paying yearly and every year during the term a certain sum." That would of itself enure to give the rent to the party having the reversion. Those words would not alter the case, for they may be rejected. Then comes the covenant to pay rent during the term, and to repair, &c. during the term. This covenant, however, is not made generally to pay rent and repair, &c. during the term, but is expressed to be a covenant to Thomas Triquet, his heirs and assigns; but, as far as payment of rent is concerned, it would seem that this covenant must be construed in the same manner as a general covenant is to be implied in the words yielding and paying, &c., and for breach, &c.→ as a general covenant by the parties, not prejudiced by the introduction of the words "Thomas Triquet, his heirs and assigns. If that be so, here is a general covenant to pay rent and repair, available to the assignee of the reversion. Then comes a clause for re-entry, on breach of any of the covenants-not in general terms that the lease shall be subject to the proviso, but that it shall be lawful to and for Thomas Triquet, his heirs and assigns, to re-enter. If these words are rejected, it may be said no general power of re-entry would remain, and therefore the rule as to receipt of rent under general powers would hardly be applied. If that be clearly so, it would remain to be considered whether the words used can be construed to mean "the parties entitled to the reversion." If Thomas Triquet had been tenant for life with an estate in remainder, there would have been abundant authority for holding the word "assigns" means assigns of the settlor, and the remainderman would be a party to the proviso, and so get rid of the difficulty arising from the circumstance of his having no legal estate; and therefore a right of re-entry could not, for any time, be reserved to him. If, however, the reservation of rent is to be treated as general, and the covenant to pay rent and repair is such as a person entitled to the reversion would take advantage of, there can be no doubt that the right of re-entry for breach of these was intended to be given to the same person; and, it having been held the word "assigns" can be construed to mean a party entitled to the reversion, the power of re-entry may be considered as given to Thomas Triquet (who could not avail himself of it), and so the owner of the reversion, who could, and the

COMMON BENCH.

plaintiffs now filling that character, are entitled to recover. This is consistent with what is said by Lord Hardwick, C.J. in Bassett v. Bassett, to be found in Mr. Blunt's edition of Ambler, p. 843, where he says, "Whatsoever arises on a lease by way of reservation of a condition or power goes along with, and is attendant upon the reversion, and not to the heir general of the tenant for life." For these reasons we are of opinion the plaintiffs are entitled to recover in this action, and the rule must therefore be discharged. Rule discharged.

Thursday, June 8.

NICHOLSON V. MORGAN.

New trial-Motion for, after four days. Thompson Chitty moved for a rule for a new trial in this cause, notwithstanding the four days within which the rule should be moved had expired. The cause was tried before Williams, J. at the present sittings, who had expressed a wish that the opinion of the court above should be taken on his ruling. By an accident Wilkins, Serjt., who had been engaged in the cause, was not instructed to move this rule until too late. [JERVIS, C.J.-That is a good ground of action against the attorney.] The time to move expired yesterday; Wilkins, Serjt. was in the city, at Guildhall; and I came here to move the rule. [JERVIS, C.J.-You must have come late, then.] Yes, it was after four o'clock. It is prayed that the rule may now be moved; judgment is not yet signed; and the judge expressly said he desired the court should review his ruling.

JERVIS, C.J.-Then the attorney is the more censurable; we cannot permit the irregularity.

Rule refused.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. Thursday, June 8.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS OF ENGLAND. THE LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.-This case being called on, Channel, Serjt. prayed that it might be allowed to stand over, Hugh Hill, Q.C. for the other side, not being present.

Stands over. WILKINSON. HARVEY.-This was a demurrer. Prentice asked the court to allow it to stand over, and to fix a day for the argument. JERVIS, C.J.-Let it be heard on Tuesday.

Stands over.

CHARLES V. ALTIN.-This was an action on a charter-party containing the common money counts, and a count on an account stated. The defendant pleaded several pleas, to the second and ninth of which the plaintiff demurred. Channel, Serjt. argued in support of the demurrer, and New in support of the pleas. The COURT gave judgment for the plaintiff. (To be reported.) Judgment for the plaintiff.

Re THE ARBITRATION IN BEHRENS v. BREMNER.- Willis moved that the submission to arbitration between these parties should be made a rule of court. The motion is made on behalf of defendant Bremner, with the view of setting aside the award. Rule nisi.

JAY V. HALKSWORTH,This was a special case, the question for the opinion of the court being, whether certain precincts and places, whereof Serjeants'-inn is one, and probably the Temple may be another, are liable under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 94 (the New Police Act for the City of London), to be assessed for police-rate and ward-rate. J. Wilde (Prendergast, Q.C. with him) was part heard. Part heard.

WENHAM . BAUER.-D. T. Evans moved herein for a rule calling on the defendant to show cause why the plaintiff or his attorney should not be at liberty to take out of court the sum of 74. deposited with the sheriff by the defendant in lieu of ball on his arrest on a capias issued by order of Williams, J. in a case of Wenham v. Bauer, bail above not having been put in. The affidavits of plaintiff's attorney stated, that on or about the 26th May the above-named defendant, Theodore Bauer, was arrested by officer of Sheriff of London, at suit of above-mentioned plaintiff, by virtue of certain writ of capius issued by virtue of an order of Hon. Mr. Justice Williams (under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 3), at suit of plaintiff against Theodore Bauer, the said writ and order being dated and issued respectively on said 26th May last, and the said writ of capias issuing out of this honourable court, and indorsed for bail for 644; and the said Theodore Bauer, therefore, in lieu of giving bail to said sheriff, deposited with sheriff's officer atoresaid the sum indorsed on the said writ, together with 107. for costs; and deponent further stated that bail above had not been put in in this action for said defendant; and, further, that he has searched at the proper offices of this honourable court, and he finds that the said several sums above-mentioned have been paid into court, and that defendants herein have by their attorney entered an appearance in this action. An authority for this application is Tutor v. Dale, 1 Dowl. N. P. C. 323. JERVIS, C.J.-You may take your rule, the affidavit being right. Rule nisi.

Friday, June 9. GAY. HALKESWORTH.-Channel, Serjt. was heard for the defendant; J. Wylde replied. Cur, ade, vull.

Re THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT of ELLEN, the wife of JouN ÖLLERTON, on behalf of ELLEN BANKS.-Knowles, Q.C. moved for a rule, calling upon J. Ollerton to show cause why the acknowledgment of a deed by his late wite should not be taken off the file, on the ground that one of the commissioners before whom the acknowledgment was made was interested in the transaction, being, in fact, the mortgagee of the lands the subject-matter of the deed. It appeared that a life-interest in these lands had been bequeathed to Ellen Flemming, afterwards Ollerton, before her marriage, with power of appointment to her children, and, in default of appointment, to one Ellen Banks for life; there being no disposal of the ultimate remainder, which would, therefore, revert to Ellen Flemming, being the heir-at-law of the testator, so as to enable her to destroy the contingent remainder bequeathed to Ellen Banks. After the marriage of Ellen Flemming, she, with the concurrence of her husband, executed and acknowledged the deed in question, by which the property was mortgaged to John Lord, one of the commissioners before whom the acknowledgment was made. After the death of Ellen Flemming, then Ollerton, Ellen

COMMON BENCH.

or

COMMON BENCH.

tiff; Tomlinson, for the defendant. After a partial argument as to whether such contracts were subject to the contingency of the subject-matter of the contract being the property of the person purporting to sell, it was arranged that the pleadings should be amended by the defendant pleading that of the 150 hogsheads expected to arrive, 34 caly arrived, and that they were offered to the plaintiff and refused." Amendment on payment of costs. Part heard

HILLS v. HUNT.

Tuesday, June 13. HILL . HUNT.-This was an action by one of the free fishermen of Faversham, in Kent (who are an incorporate body), against the clerk of the corporation, for excluding him from his turn or rotation in carrying the oysters of the corporation to Billingsgate for sale. The cause had been tried in 1850, and a verdict had been taken for the plaintiff subject to a special case stated for the opinion of this court. The case set forth, that certain "water courts" (as they were called), according to the usage of the corporation con firmed by Act of Parliament, made orders and rules for the government of its affairs, and imposed fines and penalties These water courts assemble regularly every half-year, and oftener when specially convened. The ordinary regu tion of the business of the corporation was committed to a body called the "foreman and jury," who had power of making rules necessary to regulate its trade; but it did net appear they had ever imposed penalties or forfeitures by their own authority. In 1790 a water-court order was made, that free men should share the work of the company in carrying the

in the transaction as an attorney. I never receive an appli- oysters to market, according to their rotation on the lists to

cation for an attorney to be made a commissioner without it being stated as one of the grounds of the application that the applicant is in large practice, and that it would be convenient to his clients that he should be one of the commissioners before whom such deed might be acknowledged. I have always thought that rather a ground for not appointing him. This is a very serious matter, and has given me great uneasiness, for it may shake half the titles in the country. I think, where one of the commissioners is interested, there is no such security as was intended by the Act; for, without intending to reflect upon those who drew up the rules, they would not be in reality two commissioners. The one attorney might have a wrong impression of the meaning of the deed, and, the other not being competent to act, the deed would not be explained to the woman at all. Rule nisi.

Ex parte ARMSTRONG.-Byles, Serjt. (J. A. Russell with him) also moved for a writ of habeas corpus to bring up the body of Katherine Armstrong, now confined in the establishment of Mr. Lord, with the view to her discharge. The motion, upon suggestion from the court, was withdrawn. (To be reported.) Motion withdrawn.

SLIM V. THE GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.-This was an action to recover the value of six pigs which had been forwarded, with a greater number, by the Great Northern Railway from Hitchen for delivery in London to the plaintiff, but which never were delivered to him. The company denied their liability, on the ground that there had been no ticket taken for, or receipt given for, the pigs, as required by their regulations; and consequently that they had never received the pigs to convey them for hire, as alleged in the declaration, which contained counts in a special contract and in trover. The cause was tried before Williams, J.: verdict for the plaintiff, damages 147. with leave to enter a nonsuit. A rule nisi having been granted to set aside the verdict, and enter a nonsuit accordingly. Byles, Sejt. and Charnock showed cause; and M. Chambers and Wordsworth were heard in support of the rule. (The case will be duly reported.)

Rule absolute. BEHRENS V. BREMER.-Byles, Serjt. moved on behalf of the defendant for a rule to show cause why the award in this case should not be enlarged on the ground that the party has not been heard, and that the attorney on the other side has improperly interfered in drawing up the award.

Monday, June 12.

Rule nisi.

ELSAM V. DENNIE. JERVIS, C.J. delivered judgment. Rule absolute. WOOD. THE COPPER MINERS COMPANY.-CROWDER, J. delivered judgment upon this demurrer-on some pleas, for the plaintiff; on the 4th and 5th, for the defendants.

WOOD. THE COPPER MINERS COMPANY.-Borill moved for a rule calling on the plaintiff to show cause why the judginent in this case (being between the same parties as that

be kept for that purpose. In 1797, a water-court order, referring to that order, reserved to the foreman and juries their "ancient and accustomed power" of making rules for the regulation of the corporate business. In 1848, the "re man and jury" made a rule, that the freemen who wished to do this carrying work should give in their names by a certain day, and that notice of this rule should be posted up. Ak days after, some freemen having sent in their namies by the time fixed, and others not having done so, it was declared by another order that the former only should be allowed to work for the next seven "terms," which compose the chi part of the oyster season. Previously to this, the custom had been for each freeman to give notice when he was ready for the work, and after standing by a "turn," to come in next after in his order. There was no evidence that thera had been due notice of these rules or orders; and, though it was proved that the plaintiff had heard of some such orders it appeared that he was under the impression that they haed no time; and no evidence was given that the notices of them did fix a time. However, not having sent in his name by the time fixed in the first order, he was excluded for seven turus in pursuance of its terms; and for this he brought hisaction. Quain (with whom were Byles, Serjt, and Finlason) argued the case for the plaintiff. Baddeley (with whom was M. Chambers, Q.C.), for the defendant. The questions argued were whether the first order was in the nature of a by-law, and whether it were reasonable; whether it ought to Lave announced the consequence of disobedience to it; whether the foreman and jury had power to make it; and whether there had been due notice of it. The COURT gave judgment for the plaintiff upon the latter point; there being no ev dence of due notice of either of the orders, and therefore no justification of the exclusion of the plaintiff under them.

Judgment for the plasti

Ex parte WILSON.-Finlason, on the part of a person named Wilson, applied for a rule calling on an attorney to readers bill of his costs and charges for any business he had de for the applicant as his attorney, and an account of aå moneys received from him in that capacity. The appli tion had been made at chambers before Williams, J.; and, being answered by an affidavit of the attorney-to which, by the rules of practice, no affidavit in reply could be offered and which alleged an understanding with the applicant tha no account should be kept of the charges and expenses the business done for him (which was defending him at a police-office in 1848 on a criminal charge)-the learned Judge made no order, without prejudice to any application to the court. The present application was accordingly made on a fresh affidavit of the applicant, from whence it appeared that, on retaining the attorney to defend him from the charge, the latter had demanded and received from him 200 for the expenses of the defence. The charge was disused, and from that time to the present applications for an accoust had been made by the client without success. He distincty denied the understanding alluded to. Finlason subated that the application was, under such circumstances, cleary sustainable. [JERVIS, C.J.-How do you come to this court? ought you not to go to Chancery?] It is submitted that this court has jurisdiction to order the bill to be delivered to be taxed under the 6 & 7 Vict. [MAULE, J.-Where was the business done?] It would rather appear at the police-court [JERVIS, C.J.-That would appear from the bill; it is wh you want to know.] Precisely so. [JERVIS, C.J.-And t it will appear where it is to be taxed?] Yes; and more assuming the business to have been done in the police-cont it comes plainly within the statute; for a police-court is "court of law," and in that case the jurisdiction is in Superior Courts of law. Then, secondly, it is apprehen that the court has power to make the order under the general jurisdiction of the Superior Courts over the st neys, who are their officers. There is an affidavit that attorney is on the rolls of this court. The cases seem to bear out the application on that ground apart from the Au Ruleatis Parliament. By the COURT.-Take a rule.

upon which the judgment of the court had been just delivered) and the writ of fi. fia, or the writ of fi. fa., should not be set aside, or why satisfaction of the judgment as to the damages should not be entered, and why all further proceedings should not be stayed till after the arbitrator should have made his final award. The cause and all matters in difference were referred at Nisi Prius to an arbitrator. It was afterwards agreed that he should state a case for the opinion of the court upon some points, and after that make his final award. Upon the case the court came to a decision in favour of the plaintiff, making him entitled to 22721. 2s. Afterwards an Act of Parliament was passed to settle the affairs of the company. The arbitrator had not yet made his final award. The plaintiff had signed judgment this year, being more than six years after the decision upon the case submitted to the court. It was now contended that the plaintiff could not have execution until after the final award; secondly, that he is not entitled to the costs under the Act. That the case stated was merely a preliminary award; deciding some of the matters, and not to be treated as a final award; and, independently of that, that by the Act what-Q. B. had held that the Bishop was not sufficiently Interest ever he is entitled to must be taken in shares.

Rule nisi.

COSTER . BARING.-Phinn moved for a rule calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why an order of Williams, J. for

an inspection of deeds should not be set aside. Rochefort Clarke appeared to show cause in the first instance. But the matter was arranged between the counsel.

GISKELL . SCOTT.- Declaration upon a contract to deliver 150 hogsheads of oil, expected to arrive by the ship Resolute from Madras; allegations that the oil arrived, and that the plaintiff was ready to receive, but the plaintiff refused to deliver. Plea, that the oil arrived by the Resolute, which was a general ship; but that thirty-four hogsheads only were

ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS v. LONDON AND S WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. On this case being called Jervis, C.J. said he was one of the commissioners, and there fore should decline to sit on the case. Hugh Hill QC. hoped that the Lord Chief Justice would not consider it necessary to withdraw. Finlason reminded the court of the case of Whiston v. The Dean of Rochester, in which the Cour

to exclude his jurisdiction as visitor. JERVIS, C.J. said, but ever, that his was a clearer case; he was actually one of th parties suing. The Lord Chief Justice accordingly withdry and the case was heard before Maule, Cresswell, and Crowder JJ. The case stated that the plaintiffs were lords of a manor in Middlesex, some land holden of which had been by the tenant to the company under the Lands Cla: 4 Consolidation Act of 1845, an indentare of convers being entered on the rolls The company in purs the Act, had demanded of the plaintiffs the enfranchisement" of the land on payment of due compensation according to th provisions of the Act. As part of this compensation the plaintiffs had demanded compensation for the loss of times an

EXCHEQUER.

against the owners and pilot of a vessel for damage done to an anchor-boat. At the trial, evidence was given to show that all the defendants were respon sible. The jury, by finding against all the defendants, thought that they were all implicated in the loss; but it was suggested that the employment of the pilot was compulsory, and that therefore, according to a case of Bennett v. Moita, which has been somewhat modified since its decision, the owners were entitled to the verdict. When the case came on, I was of opinion that the point was not reserved so beneficially for the defendants as it might have been; but the only point, in fact, is, whether the defendants the owners were obliged to have a pilot on board when the accident happened that is, whether the Liverpool Pilot Act makes it compulsory to have a pilot under the circumstances in which this vessel was at the time of the accident. I think it would have been better, and the Act would certainly have been more symmetrical, if the duties of the pilot, and of the owners in hiring him, had been correlative in the going out and coming into port. We are, however, not here to make the law, but to administer it as we find it. There are two sections of the Act to which it is necessary to refer. The 35th section says: [His Lordship read the 35th section.] What is the duty of the pilot is the measure of the obligation of the owners who take him on board. Then, was this vessel proceeding to sea? I think, if the cargo was on board, and everything was ready for her to commence her voyage forthwith, and she intended to sail immediately, that it might be said that she proceeded to sea from the moment she left her berth in the dock. But here the 4th June was her day for sailing; she was a post-office packet, and had not got her bags on board, nor was she in any way prepared to start on her voyage; and the onus is on the defendants the owners to prove that he was proceeding to sea within the words of the Act. Looking throughout to the words of the Act and the facts proved, I do not think this ship was proceeding to sea within the Act at the time of this accident.

PARKE, B.-I am of the same opinion. The case of Bennett v. Moita was overruled by the case of Hammond v. Rogers, Moore, P. C. C.; the latter case must now be taken as law. The provisions of this Act are obscure, and it is much to be lamented that the duties of the respective parties are not more clearly defined; but, looking to the facts of this case, I am clearly of opinion that this vessel was not proceeding to sea.

PLATT, B.-I think there may be a good reason for a difference in the Act when referring to outwardbound and inward-bound vessels, because inwardbound vessels are frequently navigated by foreigners unacquainted with the navigation of the Mersey; and that, I think, will account for the different expressions in this Act under the different circumstances provided for. With respect to the present case, I am clearly of opinion that this vessel was not proceeding to sea at the time of the accident, and that the owner was not, therefore, obliged to have a pilot on board.

Rule discharged.

Friday, June 9. THOMSON V. BELL, Public Officer of the National Provincial Bank.

Bankers-Partnership liabilities for acts of their

manager.

A lady placed a sum of money in a bank on a deposit account; the manager of that bank afterwards suggested to her a change of the investment to obtain more interest for her money, by paying off a mortgage-debt due to another person and a lien claimed on the premises by the bank; she adopted the recommendation, and gave the manager her deposit note for the purpose; he obtained the money and fraudulently appropriated it to his own use:

Held, that under the circumstances the bank was liable. This was an action brought against the bank by the plaintiff to recover the sum of 5951. It appeared that the plaintiff, who was abroad, left his wife in England, and she had what was called a deposit account, and had deposited 7751. at the Southampton branch (of which Mr. Kerr was local manager) of the National Provincial Bank; the deposit account being one on which interest is paid to the customer at a certain rate, and is liable to be withdrawn with interest up to the day by the depositor. Kerr represented to Mrs. Thomson she could get better interest for her money, and told her that the bank had a lien or mortgage on two houses of one Williams, at Southampton, for a debt due to the bank; that there was a mortgage on the property for 4007., which could be paid off; Williams was willing to sell his houses for 5957.; and if she chose to invest that amount he (Kerr) would pay off the mortgage and the debt to the bank, give the balance to Williams, and get her the convey ance. After some negotiation Mrs. Thomson, in the bank parlour, gave Mr. Kerr her deposit receipts, and he forthwith went and got out 5951. in notes and a new deposit receipt for 185/. Mr. Kerr, it seems, kept the money and the bank refused to bear the loss, whereupon this action was brought; the trial took place before Erle, J. at Winchester, and he left substantially the two following questions to the jury-First, whether this was an intended dealing by the plaintiff's

EXCHEQUER.

wife with Kerr in his private capacity or as manager of the bank? Secondly, if she intended to deal with him as manager, whether the assignment of an equitable mortgage was in the course of the ordinary business of a banker? The jury answered both questions in the affimative; a verdict was returned for the plaintiff; and, a rule nisi having been obtained to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, Bramwell, Q.C., and Barstow showed cause.-The real question in the cause was, whether Kerr acted in his private capacity during this negotiation with Mrs. Thomson, or as the manager of the bank. That was purely a question of fact, and for the jury alone to decide upon the evidence given before them: the learned judge left it very clearly to them upon that point, and they said he was acting at the time as manager of the bank. It would indeed have been extraordinary had the jury determined otherwise, for Mrs. Thomson knew nothing whatever of Kerr, except as manager of the bank, and in that capacity alone did she communicate with him. All that took place with reference to it occurred either at the bank or in the bank parlour. Upon Kerr's statement she gave him her deposit note for 7751.; he took it to the counter, obtained the money, and brought her back a new deposit note for 185l., with a representation that the difference would pay off the first mortgage of 400% on Williams's houses, and also the lien of the bank. As far as Mrs. Thomson was concerned, she treated the negotiation entirely as with the bank. All the evidence and facts were before the jury, and it was properly left to them. Bishop v. The Countess of Jersey, 22 L.T. Rep. 326, will be relied upon by the other side but it has no bearing on this case.

Kinglake, Serjt., and M. Smith, Q.C., in support of the rule. The correct facts of this case have not been yet brought before the court. It is a mistake to suppose Mrs. Thomson was an ordinary customer of the bank. She was not. She kept no drawing account, but had merely left this sum at the bank for interest, on what is called a deposit note or loan. Kerr may have named the subject to Mrs. Thomson relative to Williams's houses, and have said if she adopted it it would pay her a better interest; but, on behalf of the bank, he had no right or power whatever to enter into such a bargain as to bind them in the transaction

it was beyond his authority altogether. Bishop v. The Countess of Jersey, 22 L. T. Rep. 326, is an authority in the defendant's favour. In that case the plaintiff (a lady) authorised one of the partners in the bank to sell her Dutch Stock, and invest part of the purchase-money; but she subsequently lent him, for the benefit of his son, 5000% of the proceeds of the sale, on the security of his son's promissory note, and a policy of insurance on his son's life. The purchasemoney was paid into the bank to the credit of the plaintiff, who signed a check for the 5000.; the bank paid the amount of the check to the partner whom she had authorised to sell her Dutch Stock, who afterwards became insolvent, and absconded to America. It was held in that case, on a bill in Chancery being filed by the plaintiff to recover the 50001. from the bank, that the transaction was not within the ordinary scope of a banker's business; that there was nothing in the circumstances of the case to show that the other partners were cognisant of this particular partner's fraudulent proceedings; and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to recover her money from the bank. The defendant in this case says Kerr acted in the transaction beyond his duty or authority, either as clerk or manager, and he had no power to bind the partners by his advice, recommendation, or fraudulent proceedings. There were ninety-four of these district branch banks, and the question was a very important one; was Kerr during this transaction acting within the scope of his authority, and had he the power, by the course adopted, to bind the partners of the bank so as to render them liable for a fraud entirely of his own concocting?

EXCHEQUER.

is a question of fact entirely. It was a change of investment. This lady had this money in the bank on the security of their deposit note; this new arrangement was suggested by the manager; the bank was to pay off the 4007. mortgage on Williams's house, and he also owed the bank a sum which, together with the mortgage-money, amounted to 595.; the money is then given to Kerr, so to dispose of it as he had suggested. Accordingly he does not, in fact, do so. The money was paid to the bank to dispose of in a particular way. The bank does not so dispose of it. The money is still unappropriated. It must be he?? to be in the bank, as my brother Erle left it to the jury, and the bank is liable.

PLATT, B.-I am entirely of the same opinion. MARTIN, B. had left the court to go to chambers. Rule discharged.

BUSINESS OF THE WEEK. REG. . THE SHERIFF OF HANTS.-Hawkins showed caus

against a rule for an attachment against the Sheriff of Hants for not returning a writ of fi. fa.

Rule absolute BISHOP OF LONDON . M'NEAL.-H. I, Q.C. (Raymund with him) moved that the court would direct the Masterto assess substantial damages. The Master's report in this cas had been read on a previous day. Hayes showed cause in the first instance. Rule absehil

SWANN t. POOLEY. Referred to the Master to say what documents should be produced for inspection.

NEW TRIAL PAPER.

BEAVAN . M'DONNELL-This was a case which had been

partly heard on a previous day. It was an action to recover the amount of a deposit paid on the signing a contract ter the sale of an estate, on the ground that the plaintiff was the time a lunatic, and that the defendant had notice of sat lunacy. At the trial, evidence was received of acts if the

plaintiff before and after the making of the contract, to show his state of mind, such acts not being within the defendants knowledge. Whateley, Q.C. (Gray and Phipson with Lia) were called upon to support the rule obtained by them to st aside the verdiet, on the ground that such evidence was Rule discharged.

dence.

improperly admitted and the verdict was against the enFriday, June 9. GIBSON AND ANOTHER v. STURGE AND ANOTHER. Cur, ade, rull, Saturday, June 10. PADWICK . SUGAR AND ANOTHER— — moved to make a rule absolute for judgment as in case of a nonsult t rule had been moved more than six years ago. Rule abiplate Re THE STAMP DUTY PAYABLE ON A DEED OF SETTLINGT dated 31st Oct. 1853, and made between S. L. SASVILL the appellant, of the one part, and S. L. OPPENHEIM AND OTHERS of the other part. Cur, cd,

COURTEIS v. JOHNSON.-Slade, Q.C. (C. Saunders with him showed cause against a rule to set aside the verdict for the defendant, and for a new trial. M. Smith, Q.C. (Carter såd Kingdon with him), contrà.

Rule discharged:

SMITH T. CODD.-Tried at the Lincolnshire Spring Assis against a rule to set aside the nonsuit, and for a new tri before Jervis, C.J.: nonsuit, Miller, Serjt. showed cam Macaulay, Q.C. (Jos. Brown with him), contrà.

Rule discharged

CLAYTON . PERCY.-Cowling moved on behalf of de feruans to discharge an attachment for violating a rule of this et Rule for an attachment to be opened; defendant torbe it in to show cause on payment of costs. Monday, June 12.

REG., on the prosecution of CHAFFERS, T. S. C. E. Scortfor the demurrer. The question being whether the rap SAME. ROBERTS-Demurrer to the rejoinder. Je of one John Hunter could be taken under proccdines chr an outlawry against him, subsequent to a first and se mortgage and deed of receivership in respect of the propert from which the moneys were produced. Barstow, not called upon. Judgment for the defenda VASING WATSON.-Trespass for malicious prosecutka, Tried at Northampton, before Coleridge, J.: verdict for th plaintiff, damages 201. And a rule nisi having been obtai

to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, on three greundi -1. That the learned judge should have held that there w reasonable and probable cause; 2. That the judge filed t the verdict was against the weight of evidence--Mr. give proper direction upon the question of malice; a and O'Brien showed cause against the rule. Macay and Pield, contrà, not heard. The COURT said there app to be a reasonable cause of suspicion.

1 Rule absolute for aner tra CADDICK AND ANOTHER. HAINES AND OTHERS, -T:Lot 2.

Stafford before R. Gurney, Q.C. A rule had been alter to increase the damages by 1221. BEAVAN T. M'DONNELL.

Rule on t Part heard Tuesday, June 13. The COURT delivered judgment in the following cases, w will be duly reported:-

THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE LEIDES AD

POLLOCK, C.B.-We are all of opinion, I believe, that this rule ought to be discharged. We can only look to the report of the case from the learned judge before whom it was tried; and upon his representation it is that we act, especially so if there be any difference between the parties upon the subject. The question is, did Kerr intend and induce the plaintiff to believe that he was acting in the negotiation for and on behalf of the bank? If so, the money is still in the bank, as Kerr was their agent. It does not appear to me to be necessary to go further. Kerr was their manager, and left to conduct their business; he received themoney in the first instance, and gave the MINSTER UNION . THOMAS SOUTHGATE Rule refuse deposit note for it; he afterwards suggests an invest-dated 31st Oct, 1853, and made between S. L. SANVILL ment in a different way, and she gives the money back again to Kerr. If we were to hold otherwise it would be a handing over the public to the mercy of bankers' clerks. The manager must be considered as representing the bank partnership. Taking the fact that the money was paid out and given to Mrs. Thomson, still she gave it back to Kerr, and in his capacity of manager. The jury have expressly found that to be so upon the question submitted to them by the learned judge at the trial. It was the proper question to be left to them; the learned judge was quite right; the verdict appears to be correct, and the rule must be discharged.

ALDERSON, B.-I am also of the same opinion.

It

Re THE STAMP DUTY PAYABLE ON A DEED OF SETTLEDN the one part, and S. L. OPPENHEIM AND OTHERS of the the part.

LAKE. PLAXTON,

TOPPING. HETHERINGTON.' LIDDELL v.

Judgment for the appellend

Bule discharge Rule abiat Julgment for the plastifi THEOBALD . THE RAILWAY PASSENGERS INSURANCE C Rule to enter a verdict for the defendants dischar Rule absolute to reduce the damages to 342 19. WATSON V. SPRATLEY.-The COURT said they would dev judgment in this case in a few days

PANY.

were divided in opinion on the question of the admissi ATTORNEY-GENERAL. V. RADLOFF-The COURT said the of the evidence of the defendant on a trial at the suit of th Crown for penalties, two of the learned Barons berg favour of the admission of such evidence, and two agent the rule for a new trial would therefore drop Best-how