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v. c. WOOD'S COURT.

separate use for her life, with ultimate remainder to her trustees or administrators. After the marriage, the husband borrowed 10004, and his wife and her trustee respectively appointed and assigned the estate to the lender, in consideration of the sum of 10007. paid to the husband and wife. The husband coveanted to repay the money and interest, and the prois for redemption was in favour of the wife, her executors, administrators, or assigns. The receipt for the consideration-money was signed by both husband and wife. Mr. Carmichael, two years after, died, having made his will and appointed his wife execu. The suit was then instituted, and the common order was made. After this order was made, Mrs. Carmichael, out of the assets of her husband, paid of the mortgage-money and interest, and took a reonveyance of the leasehold property to herself. pon the production of the executrix's accounts before the chief clerk, she claimed to be allowed the l and interest as a proper payment, and supported her claim by an affidavit alleging that, although the mortgage was made as upon a joint payment of the 1000l. to her and her husband, and hough the receipt indorsed upon the mortgage was signed both by her and her husband, yet in point of fet the whole money was received by her husband, and applied by him to his own purposes, and not in payment of any of her debts contracted before the marriage.

The chief clerk, however, disallowed the claim, on the ground that the payment was made by her after the order for the administration of the estate; and the point was adjourned into the court, For the wife it is contended that, as the property was her own for For life, and as the money borrowed was applied for the benefit of her husband, the mortgage was only a pledge by way of suretyship for him, and therefore She was entitled to retain out of his assets sufficient to free her estate from the charge. For this proposition the case of Bagot v, Oughton, 1 P, Wms. 347, was cited. There, although it was held that, where a woman before marriage mortgages her property, and then marries, and her husband enters into a covenant to pay the money, his estate is not liable to pay, yet it would be otherwise if he had received the money and here Mr. Carmichael did receive the whole 1000Z In Astley v. The Earl of Tankerville, 3 Bro. C. C. 545, a mortgage-debt, secured, in effect, on the wife's estate, was held to be the husband's bt. The following cases, among others, were also cited and commented on: Lord Huntington's case, 1 Bro. P. C. 1; Pocock v. Lee, 2 Vern. 604; Robinson Gee, 1 Ves, sen. 252; Copis v. Middleton, Turn. & Bass. 221; and Lancaster v. Evors, 10 Beav. 266.

behalf of the creditors it was argued that the hole point was conclusively settled by the cases of Tate v. Austin, 1 P. Wms. 264; and Clinton v. Hooper, Ves. jun. 173. In the former case, the decision was hat, where a husband mortgages the wife's estate 1 dies, the mortgage is to be paid out of the peronal assets, but only after the husband's debts, even y simple contract, are paid, in preference to the ortgage-debt; and then many of the cases now reed upon on behalf of the wife were cited. In the se of Clinton v. Hooper, it was held that, where it is roved that the debt is the debt of the husband, his rsonal estate is bound to pay it in the first instance; at then the wife is not to be repaid in preference to "onerous creditors." In conclusion, the case of silv. Lister, 10 Hare, 140, was relied upon for the editors, where, although the point was one of mainmance out of a wife's estate, the whole doctrine of e court was reviewed incidentally.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I will consider the case, d state whether I require to hear a reply. June 1.-The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-I don't think it cessary to hear a reply. The point, which is in stance pretty clear upon the authorities, is, wheer a married woman who has leasehold property to r separate use, which is mortgaged for the husd's benefit, has, when the debt is discharged, a ht to get her estate exonerated as against the uple contract-creditors out of the husband's assets. he only difficulty arises from Tate v. Austin and ton. Hooper. The law is perfectly clear, except to her position with regard to creditors after her sband's death. The application of the money Esed-as to whether it was applied to pay the wife's bts, or debts affecting her estate before marriageopen for explanation by evidence; but, in the abce of such evidence, her estate is treated as a rety, of which position she has all the benefit. The int, as between creditors and the wife's estate, has rer, apparently, called for a decision. Lord Thur,in Clinton v. Hooper, observes, when speaking of d Kinnoul v. Money, that the court shall not infer equitable assumpsit, contrary to the tenor of the igation subsisting between husband and wife; and at is said in Tate v. Austin as to the wife being stponed to all the other creditors of the husband, is rely a dictum, and not altered by the fact of the e having been affirmed in the House of Lords. So Clinton v. Hooper, where the wife had so acted as to ive her claim to exoneration; and the present point s not material for decision. Whatever, then, may the ultimate decision as to the law on this subject, ere the court recognises the wife as a feme sole from

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her having property settled to her separate use, she is perfectly competent to deal with it; and there would be no difficulty as to assumpsit, which would arise as much as in the case of a stranger, in whose position she stands, though it would be difficult to say why she has this right, except by assumpsit. The heir could not assert his right against legatees; she can, and is, therefore, in a better position. The present case is very like that of Parteriche v. Powlet, 2 Atk. 383. The cases of Copis v. Middleton and Tidd v. Lister do not conclude this question; for in Copis v. Middleton the point was that, where two persons execute a bond, the one as principal, the other as surety, and no other assurance is executed at the time, the surety paying the bond is only a simple contractcreditor of the principal; but Lord Eldon said there that, had there been a mortgage, the surety would have been entitled to stand in the place of the mortgagee; and in the case of Tidd v. Lister the point now in dispute did not in any way arise. I am of opinion that the widow of Mr. Carmichael is entitled to stand in the place of a specialty-creditor for the mortgage-debt, and the certificate will be dealt with accordingly.

Common Law Courts.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Reported by ADAM BITTLESTON and JOHN THOMPSON, Esqrs.

Barristers-at-Law.

Tuesday, May 30.

REG v. THE TRUSTEES OF THE WORTHING AND LANCING TURNPIKE ROADS. Contribution out of highway-rates to the funds of turnpike trust-What is a turnpike-road within 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59-Public Health Act-Duties of local board as surveyors of highways.

By a local Act, entitled An Act for maintaining "a turnpike-road," and sea defences for protecting such road, and the lands adjoining, from the encroachments of the sea, power was given to trustees to make and maintain the road as a turnpike-road, and to take tolls thereon, and to erect sea defences for the protection of the road and the adjoining lands, with power to assess upon the owners of such lands annual taxes, which, together with the tolls, were to be applied to the general purposes of the trust:

Held, that the road so maintained was a turnpike-road within the operation of 4 5 Vict. c. 59. By a clause in the Turnpike Act all the powers of the commissioners, under a local Act for the government of the town of W., were preserved, "except that the commissioners should thenceforth be discharged from the expense of maintaining so much of the turnpikeroad as was situate in the town of W.": Held, that that provision did not exonerate the town of W. from liability to contribute to the repair of the road in case of the insufficiency of the funds of the

trust.

When a town, which is part only of a parish, becomes a district under the Public Health Act, the two parts are entirely distinct for the purpose of contributing to the repair of turnpike-roads, as well as for that of repairing the general highways. Within the district under the Public Health Act the local board are the surveyors of highways, and they may be ordered to contribute, and may make a highway-rate upon the district, for the purpose of contributing to the funds of a turnpike trust, pursuant to 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59. Within that part of the parish not included in the district, the parish surveyor may be ordered to pay out of the highwayrates raised upon that part of the parish.

This was an appeal against an order of two justices of the western division of the county of Sussex, dated 22nd June 1853, whereby it was adjudged and ordered that a certain portion, to wit, the sum of 2501., part of the rate or assessment to be levied by virtue of stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4. c. 50, in the said parish of Broadwater, should be paid by the surveyor or surveyors of the highways of the said parish unto the respondents, or unto their treasurers, on or before the 1st Aug. next, to be by the said respondents wholly laid out in the actual repair of such part of the said turnpike-road as lay within the said parish of Broadwater. The said order was quashed subject to the opinion of the Court of Q. B. on the following case.

The hamlet of Worthing has always been comprised within and formed part of the parish of Broadwater. In 1821, by a local Act (1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 59), certain commissioners were appointed for the general management of Worthing aforesaid, therein called and constituted the town of Worthing; and it was thereby enacted (sect. 3), that the said town should be coextensive with the said hamlet of Worthing, and that it should, notwithstanding the said Act, continue to be part of the parish of Broadwater and be subject to and charged with all rates, tithes, and other payments whatsoever, as part of the said parish in like manner as before the making and passing of the said

Act.

By sect. 30 of the said Act it was enacted that when and as soon as any of the streets, lanes, ways, passages, and places within the said town, which before the passing of certain other Acts relating to the

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management of the said town, and which were thereby repealed, were repairable by the surveyors of the highways of the said parish of Broadwater, should be repaired and amended by the commissioners of the said town, the said surveyor should, yearly and every year thereafter, so long as the said streets, lanes, ways, passages, and places should be kept repaired and amended by the said commissioners, pay or cause to be paid to the said commissioners a proportionate part, according to the respective lengths of such streets, lanes, ways, passages, and places, and of the other parts of the highways in the said parish, of the highway-rate annually raised in the said parish. Within the limits of the said town of Worthing, so defined as aforesaid, is a certain ancient road or public highway leading from Warwick-buildings in the said town towards the Horse Shoes inn in the parish of Lancing, which was repairable by the surveyor of the highways of the said parish of Broadwater prior to the passing of the said two Acts so repealed as aforesaid. In 1826 an Act of Parliament was passed, 7 Geo. 4, c. 59, intituled "An Act for maintaining a turnpikeroad from Worthing to Lancing, in the county of Sussex, and groynes, embankments, and other seadefences for protecting such roads, and the lands adjoining, from the future encroachments of the sea,' whereby, after reciting that many parts of the said road had of late years been frequently injured and rendered impassable by the overflowing of the sea, and certain lands adjoining such road, and situate in the said town of Worthing, and in the parishes of Broadwater, Lancing, and Sompting, and the hamlet of Cokeham, all in the said county, had been likewise damaged by the same means, and that the said roads and lands were still exposed to similar accidents; and that it was expedient, for the benefit and convenience of the public, that such road should be in some places diverted, widened, and raised, and that the said road, as well as the said lands, for the benefit of the owners thereof, should be effectually protected from the future overflowing and encroachment of the sea by groynes, embankments, and other sea-defences, and that the same should be made a turnpike-road; certain trustees were appointed for carrying out the objects of the said Acts, and powers for making and maintaining the said road, and for taking and regulating tolls, were given to the said trustees, and their successors, together with power to erect groynes, embankments, and other sea-defences, and for the protection of the said lands, to levy and assess upon the owners thereof annual rates, to be applied with the said tolls to the general purposes of the said trusts.

And it was also thereby provided and enacted (sect. 57) that nothing in that Act contained should extend or be deemed or construed to extend to prejudice, diminish, alter, or take away any of the rights, powers, or authorities vested in the commissioners for the time being, acting under the authority of the said Act of the 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 59, but all the rights, powers, and authorities vested in them should be as good, valid, and effectual as if the said Act now in recital had not been made, save and except that they the said commissioners should from thenceforth be discharged of and from the expense of making and maintaining so much of the said road as was situate within the said town of Worthing, and of making and maintaining groynes, embankments, and other sea-defences for the protecting of the same.

The said road was accordingly converted into a turnpike-road, and was widened, raised, and diverted in pursuance of the provisions of the said Act. The whole of that portion of it which forms the subject of the said order of justices, lies within the limits of the said town of Worthing, and from time to time during the last six years has been damaged by the encroachment of the sea; and at certain points the road itself has actually been carried away, and a new portion of road was in the winter of 1852 substituted. The surveyor of the said parish of Broadwater has annually paid, since the passing of the Worthing Town Act of 1 & 2 Geo. 4, a certain sum of money to the commissioners of the said town out of the general highway-rate of the said parish of Broadwater, as and by way of contribution towards the expense of repairing such parts of the highways lying within the limits of the said town as the said commissioners had taken upon themselves to repair; and the said surveyor has, from the year 1834, paid to the said respondents the yearly sum of 277. 10s. up to the month of Nov. 1852, when such payments altogether ceased.

In the last-mentioned year, 1852, by an Act of Parliament, the town of Worthing, as a district, was brought within the provisions of the Public Health Act 1848, and a local board was appointed, which, it was declared (sect. 117), should within the limits of their district, exclusively of any other person whatever, exercise the office of the surveyor of highways, and have all such powers, authorities, duties, and liabilities as any surveyor of highways in England was then or might thereafter be invested with or be liable to by virtue of his office, by the laws in force for the time being, except in so far as such powers, duties, or authorities were or might be inconsistent with the provisions of that Act; and the inhabitants of any district should not, in respect of any property situate therein, be liable to the payment of highway-rate or other payment not being a toll, in respect of making

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and repairing roads or highways within any parish, township, or place, or part of any parish, township, or place situate beyond the limits of such district. Portions of the original turnpike-road in question, as well as the substituted new parts of it within the town of Worthing, being out of repair, arising from the encroachments of the sea; and the revenues accruing to the said respondents by virtue of the said Act, 7 Geo. 4, having from divers causes become quite insufficient to maintain the said roads and keep up the said groynes and sea-defences: application was made to the justices aforesaid under 4 & 5 Vict, c. 59, and the order appealed against was made by them; the proper notice of such intended proceedings having been served upon the appellant, as surveyor of the highways of the said parish of Broadwater, but no notice thereof having been at any time served upon the Board of Health of Worthing.

The following, amongst others, were the material grounds of appeal :

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We construe

bution to that expense; and the saving clause in the Turnpike Act (7 Geo. 4, c. 59, s. 57) did not alter the liability either of the town or the outlying district. Then the local board is now substituted for the commissioners. [CROMPTON, J.-Can the local board repair turnpike-roads? Sect. 68 gives them authority to repair the streets; and "streets," by the interpretation clause, applies only to highways which are not turnpike-roads. It may be that the old parish surveyors still continue to have authority in the district so far as turnpike-roads are concerned.] The contribution-order under 5 & 6 Vict. has reference to the insolvent condition of the turnpike trust, whereby the road is remitted to its old condition as a highway repairable by the parish at large. [CROMPTON, J.The local board are not parish surveyors, but surveyors for their whole districts, as we held in The Corporation of Norwich v. Elmer, 22 L. T. Rep. 315. They could not make a rate over the whole parish; but perhaps the parish surveyor could.] Practically, the 1. That the road in question was not a turnpike-parish is separated from the town altogether; and, assuming, then, that the road in question was a turnpikeroad within the meaning of the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59. to this road, the matter rests wholly between the 2. That the appellant had no authority under trustees and the local board. Probably the proper 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, to pay the sum of 2501., or any mode of proceeding would be to give notice both to other sum, out of the highway-rates to be levied by the local board and to the surveyor, and to make the him by virtue of the last-mentioned Act of Parlia-order upon both; and then for both to join in making ment in the said parish of Broadwater for the repairs the rate. The third question is whether Sir Charles of the said road. Burrell's Act (4 & 5 Vict. e. 59) applies at all to this case, which is not that of a turnpike-trust simpliciter. The erection of sea-defences, and the levying of rates for that purpose, formed a principal feature of the Act of 1826. An incursion of the sea at a particular point might exhaust all the funds. It is found that part of the road had been washed away by the sea; and in R. v. Hornsea, 23 L. J. 59, M. Č. it was held that the liability to repair ceases when that is the case. [WIGHTMAN, J.-That was the case of a nonexistent road. Lord CAMPBELL, C. J.-The real question here is whether the surveyors can still make a general rate over the whole parish, as this order clearly contemplates. If they cannot the order is certainly bad.]

3. That, the town of Worthing, being a district under the Public Health Act, the local board of health for such district being under such Act the surveyors of the highways of such district, which is part of the parish of Broadwater, the said order was bad, because no notice was given to the said local board, as such surveyors, of the intended application

for such order.

4. That since the town of Worthing had been constituted a district under the Public Health Act, it was not competent to the said justices to make an order on the surveyor of highways of the said parish of Broadwater to raise money within the said district for the repairs of the said road,

5. That the appellant was only surveyor of that part of Broadwater which is not within the district of Worthing, and not of the whole parish, as supposed in the said order.

6. That the town of Worthing, part of the parish of Broadwater, was and is a district maintaining its own highway; and that the road in question is wholly situate within such town and district of Worthing; and that under stat. 4 & 5 Viet. c. 59, if the said order could be made on any one, it could only be made on the local board of health of such district of Worthing, as surveyors of the highways of such district.

7. That the said order was bad, inasmuch as it virtually repealed the 57th section of the said Worthing and Lancing Turnpike-road Act, and the 117th section of the Public Health Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict c63), and the provisions of the said Act of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50.

Each of the above-named Acts of Parliament to be deemed part of the present case, and to be referred to by the court and the counsel on either side during the argument.

: The questions for the opinion of the court areFirst, whether such notice ought to have been served upon the board of health of Worthing.

Secondly, whether the order was rightly made, or whether it ought to have been made on the board of health of Worthing alone, or on the said surveyor jointly with the said board of health.

Thirdly, whether the statute 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59, as continued by subsequent statutes, applies to the Worthing and Lancing turnpike-road.

If the court should be of opinion that notice need not have been served on the board of health of Worthing, and that the order of justices was rightly made, and that the stat. 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59, as continued by subsequent statutes, applies to the Worthing and Lancing turnpike-road- then the order of quarter sessions is to be quashed, and the original order of justices to be confirmed. But, if the court should be of opinion that notice ought to have been served on the board of health of Worthing, or that the order of justices ought to have been made on the said board, either alone or jointly with the said surveyor, and not as aforesaid, or that the statute does not apply to the Worthing and Lancing turnpikeroad, then the said order of sessions is to be confirmed, and the original order of justices is to remain quashed.

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May 6.Johnson and P. Wyatt, in support of the order of sessions. The first and second questions submitted to the court relate to the effect of the Public Health Act upon this case; and it is submitted that, as by sect. 117 the local board can alone exercise the office of surveyor of highways in Worthing, the order is made upon those who have no jurisdiction: here, and the payment is to be made out of funds contributed by those who derive the least benefit from the road. Originally the old highway was repairable by the whole parish; but when the local Act (1 & 2 Geo. 4) passed, the roads in Worthing were made repairable by the commissioners, and the outlying parts of the parish of Broadwater paid an annual sum by way of contri

Cowling and Gates, contrà.-First, this is clearly a turnpike road. It is expressly so called in the Act, which authorises tolls to be taken, and incorporates the provisions of the General Turnpike Acts; and no part of the money ordered to be paid by the surveyors could be applied to any other purpose than the repair of the road. Secondly, the order is perfectly good, although not made upon the local board; because turnpike roads are taken out of the jurisdiction of the local board; and sect. 117, which gives them the powers of surveyors, expressly excepts any power which would be inconsistent with that Act. As to turnpike-roads, therefore, the authority of the old surveyors remains; and they may make a rate upon the whole parish, for the purpose of contribution,

under 4 & 5 Vict, c. 59.

Cur, adv. vult. Lord CAMPBELL, C.J. now delivered the judgment of the Court (a).-In this case, at a special session of the highways, two justices made an order, under the 4 & 5 Vict. c. 59, upon the surveyor of the highways of the parish of Broadwater, for payment of a sum of money to the trustees of a turnpike-road, to be laid out in repair of a part of the turnpike-road within the town of Worthing, in the parish of Broadwater; the quarter sessions, upon appeal, quashed the order, subject to the opinion of this court upon the facts stated in the special case. Upon the argument of this case, three questions were raised for our consideration; first, as to whether the road in question was a turnpike-road, within the meaning of the 4 & 5 Vict.; secondly, as to the effect of the 57th section of 7 Geo. 4, c. 10, which, it was said, discharged the town of Worthing from the making and maintaining the road in question; and thirdly, and principally, upon the effect of the Public Health Act upon the liability to contribute to the repair of the road. With regard to the first question, we intimated our opinion during the argument that the road was a turnpike-road within the meaning of the 4th and 5th Vict. It was argued that the making of the groynes for the defence of the road was also an advantage to the owner of the land as a protection from the incursions of the sea; and that money expended by the trustees upon those groynes would enure to the benefit of those lands as well as to the benefit of the turnpike-road; but the owners were to pay a definite sum or rates, properly estimated, as we must suppose, with reference to the advantage they are to have. The Act expressly constitutes it a turnpike-road, and we see no reason whatever for thinking this is not a turnpike-trust within the meaning of the 4 & 5 Vict. With regard to the second point, it was contended that the exceptions at the end of the 57th section of this Turnpike Act had the effect of entirely relieving the town of Worthing from the liability of maintaining the road. The provision in question is expressly contained in a clause for saving the rights of the commissioners of the town of Worthing under the Act of Parliament. And the clause in question enacts that the rights, powers, and authorities vested in these commissioners shall be good and valid, save and except that the commissioners shall be discharged from the expense of making and maintain(a) Lord Campbell, C.J., and Wightman and Cromp

ton, JJ.

ing the roads of the town of Worthing, and making and
maintaining the groynes, embankments, and other sea-
defences for the protection of the same.
this enactment as taking the road entirely out of the
control of the commissioners, it being made by the
other clauses of the Act a turnpike-road under the
management of the turnpike trustees. Before the
passing of the Turnpike Act, the road was under the
management of the commissioners of the town under
private Act, but it was thereby made subject to the
management of the turnpike trustees, and so that the
commissioners should no longer have control over it,
and should be freed from the obligation. The effect
seems to be, that the management of the road was
transferred from the commissioners to the turnpike
trustees, and the road became in effect a turnpike-
road under the management of the trustees, having its
right under the statute to assistance from the parish,
in case of the deficiency of funds, the parish remaining
liable at common law for the repair of the road. As-
road within the meaning of the Act 4 & 5 Vict., and
that the liabilities of the trustees of the parish were,
after the passing of the Turnpike Act, the same as
they were in other ordinary cases, then the remain
ing question is one of some difficulty, and of very
general importance as to the effect of the Health of
Towns Act-when the town of Worthing became
a district under the provisions of that Act. By the
68th section of the Public Health Act, the highways
and streets, which by the interpretation clause includes
all highways not being turnpike-roads, are vested in
the local board, who are charged by the Act with the
levelling, paving, flagging, chanueling, altering, and
repairing the same. And turnpike-roads appear to
have been excluded from this for the purpose of their
being left under the control of the turnpike trustees
We held in Elmer v. The Norwich Board of Health
that the expenses of repairing the highways, which is
expressly directed by the Act to form part of the
duties of the local board of health, were to be de-
frayed by a district-rate under the Act, and not by a
highway-rate. We are now to consider how the con-
tributions for the repair of that part of a turnpike-road
which lies within the district of a local board of
health, being part of a parish, are to be raised. By
the 117th sect. of the Act, the local board within the
limits of the district are, exclusively of any other
person, to execute the office, and to be surveres
of highways, and to have all the powers, rights,
duties, and liabilities of surveyors of highways, ex-
cept so far as inconsistent with the provisions of the
Act. In the Norwich case, before referred to, we infi-
mated our opinion that the local board became sur-
veyors for the whole district, and not the surveyors
for particular parishes within the district. In the
present case no question as to different parishes within
the district arises, the whole district forming part of
the parish of Broadwater. By the express words of
the provision, the surveyor of the entire parish
was excluded from executing the office, and being
deemed the surveyor of highways within the dis-
trict, and the local board are to have the powers
and duties, privileges and liabilities of surveyors,
except where inconsistent with the provisions of
the Act. Then follows a very important part of
the 117th sect. on which the counsel for the
parish mainly relied. These are the words: "And
the inhabitants of any district shall not, in re-
spect of any property situated therein, be liable to
the payment of highway-rate, or other payment not
being a toll, in respect of making or repairing roads
or highways, within any parish, township, or place,
situate beyond the limits of such district." Nothing
can be more strong than that, to show that the local
district was to be entirely relieved from all rates and
payments, not being a toll, in respect of repairs of
all roads and highways in any spot beyond the
limits. The clause is not like the 68th sect, which
uses the word street, which is explained by the in-
terpretation clause to include highways, not being
turnpike-roads; but the clause uses the word road as
expressly extending to all roads, and is not to be con
fined to highways not being turnpike-roads, the
management of which is vested in the local board.
The exception also of the payment of tolls
appears to show that the turnpike-roads are
not excluded from the terms of this provision -
empting the district from payment for repairs done
out of the district. There can be no doubt that,
coupled with the preceding provision, by which the
duties and liabilities of the surveyors of the district
are exclusively conferred upon the local board, the
meaning is that the district is to contribute to re-
pair in the event of the deficiency of the turnpike-
rates, and that the part of the parish without the
district remains liable to contribute, in the case of
deficiency, to the repair of any part within the parish,
and not being within the district; while the district
remains alone liable to such contribution for the repair
of any part of the road within the district. After
the words of the 117th section, which so expressly
exclude the exercise of any of the powers of sur-
veyors except by the local board, and after the
immediate subsequent provision, which expressly
relieves the inhabitants of the district, as to any re-
pairs beyond the limits of the district, from liability

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to the payment of any rate, it seems to us quite impossible to hold that the former powers of the surveyors of the entire parish prevailed, so that they could make a general rate on the inhabitants of the parish including the district, for, any repair of any part of the road situate in the district; and if the whole parish cannot be made to contribute as to what lies within the district, it would be manifestly anjust to that part of the parish out of the district that the whole parish without the district should be taxed for the repair of the road within it. The only way to carry out the intention of the Legislature appears to us to be, by holding that the two parts of the parish become entirely distinct for the purpose of contributing towards the repair of the turnpike-roads, as well as for that of repairing the general highways; and we see no difficulty in the local board being ordered to make compensation, under the 4&3 Vict, in case of the deficiency of the turnpikerates. It will be sufficient for the decision of this case to say, that the powers of the parish surveyor to levy a rate upon the inhabitants for the repairs of the district have gone. We think it right to say, with reference to the questions proposed to us, and for the future guidance of the parties, that we think the local board of health may well make a highway-rate for the purpose of raising such a contribution as this. Their powers as surveyors within the district seem amply sufficient for the purpose. It will be seen that the effect of our decision in this and the Norwich case is, that, while the expenses of paving and doing other repairs to the streets and highways, which is expressly made a charge upon the local board by the Public Health Act, are in that case to be defrayed out of the general district-rate, any sum to be paid by way of contribution towards the deficiency of the turnpike funds under the 4 & 5 Vict. is to be raised by the local board as surveyors, by a highway-rate. This is ia conformity with an observation of the late Mr. Lawes, a most sensible and learned man, in the notes to his edition of the Health of Towns Act, and in one of which, under the note in p. 152, after stating the difficulties that had arisen, he comes to the conclusion that the expense of repairing and dealing with the streets, including highways, expressly charged on the local board by the Act, are to be defrayed out of the district-rate; while in p. 157, he observes that the local board may still make and levy highway-rates for purposes other than the matters thrown on the district-rate mentioned in the Act. The raising a sum of money for a contribution towards the repair of a turnpike-road seems a matter for which the local board would have to resort to the powers of rating under the Highway Act, transferred to them by the 117th section of the Health of Towns Act. The order of the justices in question having been made against parties having no funds applicable by law to the matter in question, and no power to raise such a fund, is bad; and the Court of Quartering to its charter, it falls within the exemption given Sessions was right in quashing the order. Our judg ment is, therefore, that the order of sessions quashing the order of justices be confirmed.

for life, with certain privileges. A fellow is entitled to a personal admission, with two friends, every day. He may also give written orders to two persons, instead of a personal introduction, on Saturdays; and on Sundays he may take two persons with him, and give two written orders for admission; he is also entitled to twenty tickets, each of which will admit one person; and on payment of 102 the fellows may have a transferable ivory ticket for two, available during the whole period of fellowship. On the ordinary weekdays the society admits strangers, on payment of an entrance-fee. Members and their friends alone are admitted on Sundays. Gratuitous admission is often given to charity schools. Students of the Royal Academy, foreign and native artists who are recommended as likely to benefit by the privilege, are also gratuitously admitted. The society sells skins, and also, at times, animals; and in one year, from such sales, realised as much as 7241. There are refreshment-rooms in the gardens, where confectionery and refreshments are provided; and, for the privilege of selling refreshments therein, a Mr. Masters pays an annual sum of 4001., with an additional sum if the visitors to the gardens exceed a certain number. The society allowed a Mr. Gould to erect a building on the grounds for the exhibition of humming-birds, and for the admission to see them the public was charged a certain sum, half of which went into the funds of the society. Part of the gardens, about three acres, not at present required for the animals, are laid out as a flower-garden, and there are greenhouses, pits, and other premises thereon, for the preservation of the garden-stock. A band of music attends in the gardens on every Saturday in the months of June, July, and August, and performs from four to six p.m. each day. Evening meetings of the society are also held. On such occasions tea and coffee are supplied to the members and their friends present. There is a rule of the society that no dividend, gift, division, or bonus, shall be made by the society among any of its members.

Wednesday, May 31.

REG . THE ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY. Rating-Pour-Scientific society-6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 36Zoological society.

A zoological society occupied grounds and buildings for housing the animals, &c., and for the residence of keepers. Part of the ground was cultivated as an ornamental flower-garden. Refreshment-rooms, for the members and visitors, were built on the grounds; and a party paid an annual sum for the privilege of selling the refreshments therein. Music also was performed at a certain season of the year. The income of the society was derived from the fellows and members, who paid either annual sums or compositions in lies thereof, and from the admission-money of strangers, the sale of animals and skins, and of books of the proceedings of the society. The fellones and members had the free privileges fo introducing friends to the gardens and meetings of the society. Held, that this was not a society for the purpose of science exclusively, supported by voluntary contributions, within the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, and therefore not exempted from rating.

This was an appeal under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, by The members of the Zoological Society, against rates or the relief of the poor imposed by the parishes of Marylebone and St. Pancras on the appellants. The sessions confirmed the rates, subject to the opinion of this court upon a case, which stated that the ociety was incorporated in 1829, for the purpose of The advancement of natural science. It occupies bout twenty-five acres of land in the Regent's-park, partly in the parish of St. Marylebone and partly in St. Pancras; and has thereon buildings for the abitations of animals, portions of which buildings are fitted up and used as the residences of keepers. It has also aviaries for rare and curious birds, and a museum for stuffed birds and animals. The management of the society is in a president, treasurer, secretary, and council, consisting of twenty-one fellows, elected by the members at large. Each fellow or member of the society pays an annual sum of 31. for his privileges; but there is also a class of fellows who pay one sum of 304, which constitutes the person paying a fellow

Pashley, for the respondents.-First, this is not an occupation by the society exclusively for the purposes of natural science. It is plain the gardens are rather a place of public amusement and resort, than one for the exclusive cultivation of science. Secondly, there is an underletting, from which the society derives part of its income. Masters could not be rated, because he does not occupy the refreshment-rooms; he only pays an annual sum for the privilege of selling refreshments in the rooms which are in the occupation of the society. So also with respect to the building of Mr. Gould; that was in the occupation of the society, and he gave up half the admission-money to the society. Thirdly, the payments by the fellows and members are not voluntary, but they are made to obtain personal advantage for themselves and friends.

Willes, contrà.-If this society is carried out accordby the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36. There is a rule of the society that no member shall derive any pecuniary benefit from the society. It is admitted that there is amusement combined with the objects of the society; but so there is in every chemical or philosophical lecture. The society does not cease to be a scientific society on that account; nor does this fact deprive it of the exemption from rates given by the above statute.

Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-This is a society deserving of the highest commendation, and one which does contribute most essentially to the purposes of science; but it is not a society under the Act of Parliament entitled to exemption from rating. The society does tend very much to the advancement of science: but can it be said that that is the sole object of the society? Although the society has science in its contemplation, its great object is the amusement of the people in a rational and most laudable manner. If I am called upon to decide, I should say that it is not a society instituted for the purposes of science and supported by voluntary contributions within the meaning of the Act. The contributions are made in respect of the amusement derived by the members, their families, and friends; and it is a good bargain for them. Then, again, these premises are not used exclusively for the purposes of science. They are not let off, as in the case of the Linnæan Society, to persons who might be rated in respect of what they occupy; nor is the present occupation of them ancillary to the purposes of science. I am therefore of opinion that the claim to exemption is not made out.

ERLE, J.-I am also of opinion that this is not a society within the exemption given by the Act. The society has done great good in giving a predilection to scientific pursuits, and is a society for an excellent purpose; but the premises are not occupied exclusively for the purposes of science. The contributions by the members are not voluntary within the meaning of the Act if there is value received for them. There are private conveniences derived by the members and their friends, and I therefore think the contributions are not voluntary.

CROMPTON, J.-I am of the same opinion. I am very glad that the society does not confine itself to a mere scientific purpose, and that it affords rational recreation to the people. It seems to me to partake rather of the character of a place of rational amusement and recreation than the character of a society

QUEEN'S BENCH.

exclusively for the purposes of science; and I think it is not a society which can claim exemption from rating under this Act. Rate confirmed.

Thursday, June 8.

THE TRUSTEES OF THE RIVER LEA v. THE NEW RIVER COMPANY. Construction of statutory arrangement for supply of water from the river Lea to the New River. This was a special case on the construction of a statutory arrangement between the plaintiffs and defendants, which was argued Tuesday, May 30, by Sir F. Kelly, for the plaintiffs; Sir F. Thesiger, for the defendants. Cur. adv. vult.

Lord CAMPBELL, C.J., now delivered the judgment of the court.-We are of opinion that the verdict ought to be entered for the plaintiffs upon the plea of not guilty in respect of the alterations alleged to have been wrongfully made by the defendants, both above and below the Marble Gauge, whereby they abstracted more water from the river Lea than they were entitled to. This case is not in any degree governed by the rules or decisions which regulate the rights to the water of a river between the riparian owners and co-proprietors. The defendants have no claim whatever to the property in, or to the use of any particle of water in the river Lea, except what they have obtained by the agreement confirmed by the statute 12 Geo. 2, c. 133. The preamble of this Act recites, "that it had been agreed that the navigation between Hertford and Warebridge might be fixed and ascertained in the present channel, and that the quantity of water which was to be taken from the river Lea to the said New River might be ascertained in the manner and upon the terms and considerations thereinafter mentioned." A limited and defined supply of water was to be furnished from the river Lea to the New River Company, upon the terms and considerations which the agreement was to specify. Accordingly, section 5 describes with great minuteness the works and machinery to be employed for this purpose, to the intent that the said company shall for ever after be supplied with a constant quantity and body of water, of the dimensions aforesaid, and no more, to run and pass from the said river Lea into the said New River, in a natural course, without any at the said gauge or trough; and that it shall not be lawful to or for the said governors and company at any time or times hereafter to take any more or other or greater quantity of water than as aforesaid out of and from the said river Lea, or Manford Ditch aforesaid, between the towns of Hertford and Warebridge, by or through any other passage, ditch, or cut, or in any other manner than in

this Act is mentioned." The other enactments of the

statute seem to show that the company were to maintain the works and machinery as described, and not to alter them, so as to take any more or other or greater quantity of water than as aforesaid; but by the defendants' alteration above the marble gauge stated in the special case, and delineated on the plan, the channel for conducting the water from the marble gauge was straightened, widened, and deepened, and thereby the water, probably in greater volume, was drawn off from the river Lea, and certainly in a manner different from that provided for by the Act orgParliament. The jury found that very nearly the same amount would have flowed without these alterations; and that there was no damage--which is, in effect, finding that a small quantity, not practically damaging the plaintiffs was taken. The quantity being minute, and no actual damage having been occasioned, is no answer to the right of action of the plaintiffs in the case of a parliamentary arrangement of this nature when the right of the plaintiffs is affected, and the manner of taking is different from that described by the Act. In the case of Dickenson v. The Grand Junction Canal Company, 7 Exch. 208, it was held that the right of action was not altered by the diminution of the water not having affected the working of the plaintiff's mills, although the defendants were there claiming the right of digging on their own lands, as they clearly might have done but for the arrangement and parliamentary contract settling their right. We are, therefore, of opinion that these plaintiff's are entitled to maintain the verdict for nominal damages on the first part of the case. On the other great question, the material facts found are, that at various places on the river, lower down the stream than the marble gauge, large works were done by the defendants at the bridges, culverts, and banks of the New River whereby a substantial alteration in its force, width, and depth was effected, and additional channels made for carrying away water for the supply of the public and of the metropolis with water; and the effect of these alterations had been that the water has flowed more rapidly along the New River. But they state that the level there is lower, and by reason thereof a greater quantity of water has passed through the marble gauge in a given time than could have passed before these alterations below the gauge were made. We are of opinion that these alterations, producing such effects, are not lawful, and that in respect of them the plaintiffs are entitled to the verdict, with 100% damages, which the jury awarded if they were not lawful. The level being thus lowered at the tail of the

QUEEN'S BENCH.

marble gauge, a greater quantity of water has thereby been abstracted from the river Lea and flowed through the marble gauge, in a given time, than before, and a constant quantity or body of water of the dimension aforesaid has not continued to run and pass from the river Lea into the New River in a natural course. If, as suggested at the bar, the lowering of the level at the tail of the marble gauge had been occasioned only by what might be considered a fair user in London of the water taken bona fide under the parliamentary arrangement, as by laying pipes in London for the distribution of the water, to meet the extraordinary demand-or had been occasioned by anything which could fairly be considered as done in the course of repairing and maintaining the New River, and the works connected with it-we might have thought that the defendants were not answerable for the consequences; but, as the necessary effect of these alterations was to lower the level, and to prevent the water flowing in a natural course, and to cause a greater quantity of water to be abstracted from the river Lea and to flow through the marble gauge in a given time, we consider them infractions of the Act of Parliament, and actionable. If they be necessary for the proper supplying of water to the metropolis, we hope that they may be legalised by a new arrangement between the parties on reasonable terms; and, if this be impossible, by the intervention of the Legislature. But, as they appear to us to be contrary to the existing arrangement, sanctioned by Act of Parliament, we feel ourselves bound to give judgment for the plaintiffs. Judgment for the plaintiffs.

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Streets-Railway carriages.

The 28 Geo. 3, c. 64 (for better paving, lighting, and
cleansing C.) enacted that for raising money for the
Act a rate should be levied upon the inhabitants, and
that for increasing that fund a toll should be paid upon
all stage-coaches, diligences, and other such public
carriages carrying passengers or parcels, and upon
all waggons, wains, carts, or other such carriages
laden with goods, and upon all horses, &c. laden with
goods coming to or going from or out of C. The
toll was to be called a paving toll, and to be col-
lected in the streets; but if not paid, a power of
distress of the carriages or cattle was given:
Held, that this toll was not payable upon railway
carriages or trucks carrying passengers and goods,
and passing along the railway coming into C., but
not touching any of the streets which were subject to
the provisions of the Act.

This was a writ of error upon a bill of exceptions to the ruling of the judge of the Borough Court, Cambridge.

The action was brought by the commissioners for putting in execution the Cambridge Improvement Act, to recover 24 for tolls upon certain railway carriages and trucks of the plaintiffs for carrying passengers and goods, and coming into the town of Cambridge on the 9th, 10th, and 11th Oct. 1851. The question was whether the railway carriages and trucks of the Newmarket Railway Company coming into and leaving the borough were liable to toll under the 28 Geo. 3, c. 64, s. 39. The judge at the trial ruled that they were, whereupon the defendants tendered a bill of exceptions. Verdict for the plaintiffs.

It appeared that the Newmarket Railway had a branch into the town of Cambridge of about 3300 feet; but not passing over or under any of the public streets or passages of the town before its junction Iwith the Eastern Counties Railway. The station at Cambridge belonged to the Eastern Counties Railway Company, and by agreement the Newmarket Company had the use of it. The Newmarket line came into the town of Cambridge in the parish of St. Andrew the Less, and there formed a junction with the Eastern Counties line, over which the carriages of the former company proceeded to the station in Cambridge.

QUEEN'S BENCH.

tion, and for increasing the fund for defraying the
charges of paving, cleansing, &c. the said town, there
shall be paid to the receivers appointed" for stage-
coaches and diligences, and also for all loaded wag-
gons, carts, wains, and other carriages, and also for
horses laden with any goods, &c. coming to or going
from or out of the said town of Cambridge and pre-
cincts thereof, the following tolls once in every day,
namely:-For every stage-coach, diligence, or other
such public carriage, carrying passengers or parcels
for hire, the sum of 18.; for every waggon, wain, cart,
or other such carriage, laden with goods, wares, or
other merchandise, the sum of 2d.; for every hore
or other beast of burden, laden with any goods, wares,
or other merchandise, the sum of d. Which said
sums shall and may be demanded and taken for and
in the name of a paving toll; and the persons ap-
pointed by the commissioners shall and may demand
and take the tolls, and levy the same upon any per-
sons liable to pay the same who, after demand, shall
neglect to pay, by distress of any carriage or cattle
upon which such tolls are imposed, &c. and which
several tolls so to be demanded, taken, and received,
shall be paid to the collectors within any of the streets
or other public passages of the said town of Cam-
bridge."

QUEEN'S BENCH.

would. An argument has been drawn in favour of the toll from 9 & 10 Vict. c. cccxlv.; but if the Legis lature has made a mistake in supposing that the toll existed, this statute would not impose it. If it has proceeded on a mistake of the law, it will not alter the law as it stood before this statute passed. But this statute only applies to the Eastern Counties Railway; and we have only to do with the Newmarket Railway Company. Looking, then, at the Act of 28 Geo. 3, c. 64, the bill of exceptions, and the facts, I am of opinion that a toll is not imposed on the carriages of the plaintiffs coming into the borough ch their railway. The court cannot derive any assist ance from the Carlisle and Linlithgow cases, to which we have been referred, as the one proceeded on the common law of England, and the other on the common law of Scotland, irrespective of any statute. The present case depends upon the construction of 28 Geo. 3, c. 64, s. 39; and I am of opinion that the intention of the Legislature is not expressed sufficiently plain to show that a toll was imposed on the carriages of the plaintiffs.

ERLE, J.-I am also of opinion that the judgment of the court below ought to be reversed; and that the carriages of the plaintiffs are not liable to toll within the meaning of the 28 Geo. 3, c. 64. The argoment By the 31 Geo. 3, c. civ. the powers of the 28 Geo. 3, in support of the toll must go the length of contendc. 64, were amended and enlarged; and by sect. 7 the ing that any kind of carriage which brings passentoll on stage-coaches, diligences, and other such pub-gers or goods into the borough is liable to pay toll. lic carriages, was increased from 18. to 18. 6d., and, am of opinion that it was not intended by the statute in case of nonpayment, to be demanded, levied, and to impose toll to that extent. We are to considér distrained for as directed by the 28 Geo. 3, c. 64. whether a railway-carriage is another such catIt appeared also that a lessee of the tolls had riage" as a stage-coach or diligence. It seems to we brought an action against the Eastern Counties Rail- that it is not. The case does not depend on the form way Company to recover tolls upon their carriages of the carriage or the mode of propelling it, but upon under similar circumstances to those in the present the relation in which it stands to the paving, &e of case, which was tried before Parke B., and that they the streets within the borough, the making use thereof recovered a verdict upon the ruling of the learned by proceeding along them, and the consequent duty judge, subject to a bill of exceptions; and that, before to contribute to the expense of the repairs. The raila writ of error was brought thereon, the 9 & 10 Vict. way-carriages of the plaintiffs come into and go out c. cccxlv. was passed, exempting the Eastern Counties of the borough without touching the streets or highRailway Company from toll under the above Acts on ways thereof, and therefore are not analogous to the payment of 1000% annually to the commissioners for carriages, diligences, &c. on which the toll is imposet putting those Acts in execution. by the Act. Looking at the Act, in the first place it J. Brown, for the plaintiffs in error.-The toll is gives a fund by a rate on all property within the preimposed only on carriages using the streets and high-cincts of the borough, for the improvement of which ways of the town, and not upon the railway-carriages the Act was passed; and then it gives an extra toll, t of the plaintiffs. The toll is called a paving toll by sect. 39, for the extra use of the pavement, &c., ami the Act, and the intention was to apply the Act to the extra expense occasioned by the extra use. But streets which might be paved. Brett v. Beales, 10 B. the railway-carriages of the plaintiff's do not use the & C. 508, shows how the case would have stood at pavements at all, and do not occasion any expense common law. The railway-carriages never touch any for repairs. part of the streets or highways to be paved, &c. under the Act. The toll is to be collected in the streets, and a power of distress on the carriages, &c. is given. The fund created by the Improvement Act is to be raised partly by a rate upon the inhabitants, and partly by a toll on strangers and others passing along the streets in carriages. The railway company bear the expense of their own ways, lighting, repairing, &c., and railways were not known when the Improvement Act passed. [There were two other points made; but it is unnecessary to notice them, as the case was decided upon the first point alone.]

Worlledge (W. H. Watson with him), for the defendants in error.-The railway-carriages come within the borough, and carry passengers and goods for hire. There is nothing said in the Improvement Act as to the manner in which the carriages taxed are to be propelled, or as to their shape; and the words of the Act are not, "coming into or going out of the town by the public streets," but merely "coming into or going out of the town or precincts thereof." This toll is not so much a charge on the carriages as on the goods and passengers. (The cases of The Mayor of Carlisle v. Wilson, 5 East. 2; and The Linlithgow case, now in the H. of L., were referred to.)

Lord CAMPBELL, C. J.-I am of opinion, upon the first objection, that the plaintiff in error is entitled to our judgment. The principle is laid down in the cases, clearly and indisputably, that a burden cannot be imposed upon the subject, whether that burden is for the benefit of the government or of a company, unless by clear and unequivocal language. When I look at sect. 39 of 28 Geo. 3, c. 64, the lan

By the 28 Geo. 3, c. 64, s. 1 "An Act for the better paving, lighting, and cleansing of the town of Cam-guage is by no means clear in laying the burden of bridge, for removing and preventing obstructions and annoyances, and for widening the streets, lanes, and other passages within the said town," commissioners are appointed for putting into execution the said Act. By subsequent sections enabling powers to carry out the objects of the Act are given to the commissioners.

Sect. 23 enacts that, "for raising money towards defraying the expenses of the Act, and carrying the same into execution, the commissioners are required once in every year to ascertain the sum to be paid, by rate or assessment on the several inhabitants of the town of Cambridge, and to levy such sum by a rate not exceeding 1s. in the pound for each year upon the several tenants or occupiers of all houses, &c. tenements, and hereditaments within the said town, according to the annual value of the same."

Sect. 28 gives a remedy for the recovery of such ates by distress-warrant of justices. Sect. 39 enacts that, "to the end that the useful oses of the Act may be better carried into execu

toll upon carriages, &c. that do not touch any part
of the streets or highways within the borough. No
benefit being conferred upon the railway company by
the exercise of this Act, we should be very cautious
to see that no burden is imposed upon them. It is
true that the railway-carriages of the company do
come into and go out of the borough; but they are
not carriages, as it seems to me, coming into and
going out of the borough within the meaning of the
enacting clause. This view is fortified by the remedy
given by distress for nonpayment of the tolls, which
could not be conveniently adopted unless the carriage
or horse, or other thing on which the toll was imposed,
was passing through the public streets or highways
of the borough. I certainly pay very great respect
to the opinion said to have been expressed by Parke,
B. in the case tried before him; but there was a bill
of exceptions tendered to his ruling, and it must be
considered that he gave his decision knowing that it
was not final; and he may not therefore have given
the case the anxious consideration that he otherwise

CROMPTON, J.-It appears to me that the railwaycarriages are not liable to the toll. The toll is to be paid by the rate upon the inhabitants principally, the Act is for the paving and accommodation of the inhabitants of the town. It is also just that stratgers should pay for the accommodation they have by using the street and highways of the town. I am of opinion that the Act applies only to carriages in actual motion upon the public streets and highways of the town. The railway-carriages come into the town upon an iron rail, and do not get any accommo dation from the paving of the streets; nor do they do any harm thereto. The decision of Parke, B., although entitled to great respect, must still be treated as a Nisi Prius decision in a case intended to be taken into a court of error. Judgment reversed.

Saturday, June 10.
REG. v. SHARPLEY, B

Parish-Union of parishes for sccular purposes-Re-
puted parish-Stat, 43 Eliz. c. 2.
Where a district had always been treated as one paridh
for the purpose of maintaining the poor and repairing
the roads, but there was evidence that there had for
merly been two churches and two rectories, and for
most ecclesiastical purposes the district had been
treated as two parishes:

The Court held, upon the facts stated, that the district
was still to be treated as one parish for the mainte
nance of the poor, it having been, at all events, e
reputed parish at the time of the passing of the
stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2.

On the 17th April 1854 a rate or assessment was made by the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Mablethorpe, and allowed by t justices in the parts of Lindsey and county of Lan coln, acting in and for the said parts and county.

Notice of appeal to the next general Quarter Se sions for the said parts and county was duly given by the said Roger Sharpley, an occupier of land in the said parish of Mablethorpe, against the said rate; and the parties to the said appeal thereupon, by consent and by order of a judge, have stated a special case for the opinion of the court, of which the following were the material parts:

The appellants' ground of appeal against the rate is, that the alleged parish of Mablethorpe in truth contains within itself, and consists of, two separate parishes, namely, the parish of Mablethorpe St Mary's and the parish of Mablethorpe St. Peter's, each of which ought to maintain its poor separately, and to appoint separate overseers of the poor, and to levy separate rates for their relief.

The respondents contend that, long before and at the time of passing 43 Eliz. c. 2, Mablethorpe was,

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Wither actually or by reputation, a parish, and was man was instituted to the rectory of Mablethorpe therefore entitled to have overseers appointed for it, St. Peter's. From this period, the institutions to the and to maintain the whole of its poor, whether resi-rectory of Mablethorpe St. Mary's are continued to dent in one part of the parish or another, from one the year 1661, after which time it was legally united to the adjoining rectory of Staine; and from the year common fand. Neither of the alleged parishes (of Mablethorpe 1687, down to the institution of the present incumSt. Mary's and St. Peter's), so far as evidence can be bent, the Rev. Thomas Lovick Cooper, on the 9th procared, has ever maintained its poor separately; Aug. 1831, the benefice to which the several rectors bat due rate has always been made for the whole of were instituted is described as Mablethorpe St. Mary the alleged parish of Mablethorpe, and the poor of with Staine. The institutions to the rectory of Mablethe alleged parishes of St. Mary and St. Peter's have thorpe St. Peter's are continued in the same form den jointly and indiscriminately relieved out of such from the year 1491 down to the year 1745; but in the te as one common fund, ever since the passing of institution of the next succeeding rector in the year the 43 Eliz. e. 2. There is no evidence tending to 1761, the benefice is described as Theddlethorpe St. show that at any time the alleged parishes of St. Peter's with Mablethorpe St. Peter, and is so continued Mary and St. Peter ever separately appointed over- until the institution, on the 6th Dec. 1820, of the Rev. sers, or levied rates for the relief of the poor. Two Payne Edmonds, the present incumbent. verseers have yearly been appointed for the whole of the alleged parish of Mablethorpe, The district containing both St. Mary and St. Peter has usually been alled in such rates the parish of Mablethorpe; but the rate for 1777 purports to be made for the town uf Mablethorpe. The churchwardens of the church of Mary's have acted as overseers of the poor of the hole of Mablethorpe. The constable's accounts, in the parish chest of Mablethorpe St. Mary, commencing with the year 1706, describe that officer as constable of the town of Mablethorpe. The roads of St. Mary's land St. Peter have always been maintained, as far as erince goes, by one rate, made for the parish of Mablethorpe, as in the case of the poor-rate; and the surveyors of the highways have always been selected discriminately from the inhabitants of St. Mary and St. Peter, and appointed by the justices to serve the office of surveyors of the highways for the whole of the alleged parish of Mablethorpe, including both

districts.

A few certificates of settlement and bastardy bonds yet exist in the parish church of Mablethorpe St. Mary's, given to the overseers of the parish of Mablethorpe. The eldest is 26th June 1711.

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(The case then set out portions of a deed of union executed by the Bishop of Lincoln in 1737, between the parishes of Theddlethorpe St. Helen, and Mablethorpe St. Peter.)

In these books of Institutions both Mablethorpe St. Peter's and Mablethorpe St. Mary's respectively are frequently described as parishes, and frequently as Mablethorpe St. Mary or St. Peter, omitting the word parish. The inhabitants of the alleged parish of Mablethorpe St. Peter's, as far as evidence exists, have not contributed towards the repair of the church situate in the alleged parish of Mablethorpe St. Mary's; but the church-rate that has occasionally been made for the repair of such church has been assessed on the occupiers of land wholly situated in the St. Mary's part of the parish, and on such occupiers alone. The tithes of the rectory of Mablethorpe St. Peter's have been commuted by the rector of Theddlethorpe St. Helen's with Mablethorpe St. Peter; the tithes of Mablethorpe St Mary's have also in like manner been commuted, and are paid to the rector of Mablethorpe St. Mary with Staine.

There are no parochial registers existing of earlier date than the year 1650, the oldest of which is deposited in the church of St. Mary, being entitled "A register of all the christenings, marriages, and burials within the parishes of Mablethorpe St. Mary and St Peter, from the 26th March, 1650." The modern register now in use is headed "Mablethorpe St. Mary and St. Peter, in the diocese of Lincoln, 1810."

that they ought by law to appoint separate overseers, and maintain their poor separately, then this rate to be quashed. If the court should be of a contrary opinion, the rate to be confirmed.

In all county records (which only go back about 100 years) preserved in the office of the clerk of the peace, such as jurors' lists, county rates, &c. there is o mention of any parish but that of Mablethorpe alone. In modern indictments it is the same. Mablethorpe St. Mary and St. Peter's were, by order of the Poor-Law Commissioners, bearing date the The entries in these registers frequently make a 18th March 1837, when the Louth Union was condistinction between the two places, and describe the stituted, included in the Louth Union, and described parties as of the parish of Mablethorpe St. Mary, or in the margin thus “ 36, Mablethorpe St. Mary and of the parish of Mablethorpe St. Peter with TheddleSt. Peter"—and one guardian only has ever been thorpe St. Helen, as the case may be. Two churchppointed or acted for both. This order has always wardens were, from 1601 down to 1712, appointed for been acquiesced in by the inhabitants of both. Ma- Mablethorpe St. Mary; but only one has been apblethorpe St. Mary contains 1780 acres of land, thirty-pointed for St. Peter's, and since 1834 none for St. four houses, and a population of about 261. Mable- Peter's. thorpe St. Peter's contains 1004 acres, fourteen houses, The question for the opinion of the court is whether, and a population of about 260. In the calendarium upon the grounds above mentioned, Mablethorpe St. inquisitonium post mortem, in the reign of Edward I. Mary and Mablethorpe St. Peter's ought by law to apare these entries: Henr. de Saltfleteby Malberthorpe point separate overseers, maintain and manage their ter de Philip de Kyme tenet in Malberthorpe, 14 feod.;" own poor separately, and have separate rates and assessind in the reign of Edward II. there are three entries ments levied on them for that purpose. It is agreed alike nature, where Mablerthorpe is named as by the parties that the court shall have all the power efore, without distinction of St. Mary or St. Peter. to draw inferences and conclusions from the facts in Pope Nicholas's taxation, under the head "Deca- above stated, which a jury upon the trial of a civil stus de Calsworth," appears: "Ecclesia de Mable-action would have. If the court shall be of opinion horpe S. Petri, 41. 68. 8d.; Ecclesia de Mablethorpe Maria, 8" In the Inquisitiones Nonarum, A.D. 341, under the head "Decanatus de Calseworth," is he following entry, "Malb'thorp. The two churches re taxed conjointly (conjunctim). The same assesits render account for 131., received from the ninth of he sheaves, fleeces, and lambs of the parish of falbthorp the two churches whereof are taxed morum parochie de Malberthorp cujus quidem ecclesiæ ratur) at 184 marks, as appears by the inquisition ken by the oath of Alan Ward, &c., and others eir fellows of the parish aforesaid, jurors (et aliorum ciorum suorum parochiæ prædicta juratorum). Of the two churches of the alleged parish of Mableorpe, so mentioned in the Inquisitiones nonarum, one destroyed before the year 1526, and has not been bujit, although Lord Willoughby de Eresby, the atron of that church, by his will dated in that year, Teated as follows:-Item, I will that my executors all in as convenyent and shorte tyme as they possi6 canne, purchas as muche lande as shall be necesfor the buylding and setting upp of a new urche and churchyard, to be made and holie Boden, for the appellant.-The case shows that St. elded at my cost and charge, to the value of CC. Mary and St. Peter are two rectories; and, if two rks within the towne of Mablethorpe, in the rectories, ex vi termini two parishes. [Lord CAMPtie of Lincoln, and that to be paid by my exe- BELL, C. J.-They have always been treated as one.] tors of the issues, revenues, and profits of all my If they were separate parishes when the statute of d manours, lands and tenements, those I have apElizabeth passed, they are so still. No authority inted for the execution of this my last will, in conexists for uniting them, and the cases cited do not eracion that I myselfe take to my own use all such apply, because they apply to the separation of parishies de as the said churche was coveryed with and of into parts. [Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-Suppose that ich churche I am patron." The Valor Ecclesias- there were two parishes in the reign of King John, 26th Hen. 8, under the general heading Malb-treated as one only in the reign of Edward VI. and pe contains a separate valuation of the two ever since, would they now be two parishes for the purtories of St. Peter and St. Mary. The several pose of maintaining the poor?] If once shown to be stitutions to these rectories, St. Peter's and St. Mary's, two parishes, mere user and acquiescence will not make separately recorded in the book of Institutions re- them one. (He referred to Hilton v. Pawle, Cro. Car. uning in the registry of the Bishop of Lincoln. 92.) the 27th Jan A.D. 1491; Edward Strangways was tituted to the rectory of Mablethorpe St. Mary, d'on the 30th Nov. in the same year, Thomas Kirk

Pushley (with him Flowers), for the respondents.Even conceding that these were two parishes for ecclesiastical purposes, they constitute but one parish for the purpose of maintaining the poor. [Lord ĈAMPBELL, C. J.-If, at the time of the passing of the stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2, this was a reputed parish, that is enough; and the evidence that it was so appears irresistible. ERLE, J.-I never heard of two parishes becoming by usage consolidated into one; though part of a parish may, by the stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12, s. 21, become, for the purposes of the poor-law, a separate parish.] The question is, whether the parish was considered as one, and treated as one, when the

stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2, passed: (Nichols v. Walker, Cro. Car. 394; R. v. Clayton, 13 Q. B. Rep. 354; R. v. Newell, 4 T. R. 266; Price v. Quarrell, 12 Ad. & Ell. 784.) [CROMPTON, J.-We are a jury; and there is the usage of 250 years for the status quo.]

Pashley, in reply, mentioned Weeden v. Walker, 2 Roll. Rep. 160.

Lord CAMPBELL, C.J.-I am of opinion that this

QUEEN'S BENCH.

rate should be confirmed, and that there is no reason to disturb the usage which has so long existed in this parish. The evidence is conflicting upon the point whether there ever were two parishes; there is strong evidence that from time immemorial there has been but one parish; there is also evidence of considerable weight that there were two parishes: but I think it is enough for the confirmation of the rate if, at the passing of the statute of Elizabeth, the districts were reputed to be one parish. It was not requisite for the inhabitants, before they availed themselves of that statute, to inquire whether the district was a strictly legal parish; if at that time it was considered as one, the statute applied to it. Then, upon the facts stated, the evidence is as strong as possible that at that time this district was treated as one parish for all secular purposes; it was therefore a reputed parish, and according to the just construction of the statute it is still to be so considered, and ought still to have only

one rate and one set of overseers.

ERLE, J.-I have arrived at the same conclusion, upon an examination of the evidence stated in this case. I can see no clear proof that there ever were two distinct parishes. Two rectories are spoken of; but in some very ancient documents the two rectories appear to be described as being in one parish; and for all secular purposes, as far as living memory extends, only one parish has been recognised. The question is, whether for secular matters they are now to be treated as one parish, and they certainly must be so treated unless it can be shown that they were separate parishes when the statute of Elizabeths passed, of which I see no evidence.

CROMPTON, J.-I am of the same opinion.-It is not necessary for us to say absolutely here whether there ever were two parishes, because there is evidence enough to support the ancient usage, and to justify a jury in finding that there was only one parish. There is an old document in which the place is treated as one parish, with two churches; and that may perhaps afford the true explanation of the matter. There is evidence upon both sides; but the preponderance is, I think, in favour of the respondents. But I am also strongly inclined to think that, even if there were two parishes, and they were reputed to be one when the statute passed, that is enough. The cases in Cro. Car. are important, and support that view. Judgment for respondents.

Thursday, June 15.

JUDKINS . ATHERTON.

Practice-Suggestion-Common Law Procedure ActNeglect of plaintiff to bring cause on for trial. By sect. 101 of the Common Law Procedure Act, if the plaintiff neglects to bring the issue on to be tried at the proper time, the defendant may give twenty days' notice requiring him to bring it on at the next sittings or assizes; and "if the plaintiff afterwards neglects to give notice of trial for such sittings or assizes, or to proceed to trial in pursuance of the notice given by the defendant," the neglect may be suggested on the record:

Held, that the word “afterwards" meant after the giving of the notice by the defendant, and not after the expiration of the twenty days; and that, if the defendunt gave twenty days' notice before the assizes or sittings, he was entitled to enter the suggestion if the plaintiff did not give due notice of trial and proceed to trial at the next sittings or assizes, although they should be held the day after the expiration of the twenty days.

This was a rule calling on the plaintiff to show cause why the suggestion entered by the defendant

under section 101 of the Common Law Procedure Act.

should not be set aside. The action was commenced in June 1852; in Dec. payment of 107. into court pleaded; in Jan. 1853 issue joined and notice of trial given for Liverpool Spring Assizes. The cause, however, was not taken down; but another notice of trial was given for the summer assizes, and it was taken down, but the record withdrawn. On the 21st Feb. the defendant gave notice under section 101, requiring the plaintiff to take it down to be tried at the next spring assizes, which commenced on the 21st March. The plaintiff did not take it down to be then tried, and, the defendant having suggested that default upon the record, the present rule was obtained, upon the ground that by section 101 (a) the twenty days"

(a) Sect. 101.-Where any issue is or shall be joined in any cause, and the plaintiff has neglected or shall neglect to bring such issue on to be tried, that is to say, in town causes where issue has been or shall be joined in, or in the vacation before, neglected, or shall neglect, to bring the issue on to be tried any term-for instance, Hilary Term-and the plaintiff has during or before the following term and vacation--for instance. Easter Term and vacation; and in country causes where issue has been or shall be joined in, or in the vacation before, Hilary or Trinity Term, and the plaintiff has neglected or shall neglect to bring the issue on to be tried at or before the second assizes following such term, or, if issue has been or shall be joined in, or in the vacation before, Easter or Michaelmas Term, then if the plaintiff has neglected or shall neglect to bring the issue on to be tried at or before the first assizes after such term; whether the plaintiff shall in the mean time have given notice of trial or not, the defenthe issue on to be tried at the sittings or assizes, as the case dant may give twenty days' notice to the plaintiff to bring may be, next after the expiration of the notice; and if the plaintiff afterwards neglects to give notice of trial for such

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