would make a settlement, and wanted him to take charge of the breaker for them. Cowan said if they could purchase the property, "they would want him to run the breaker for themsomething to that effect."

For the purposes of this case, it may be conceded that his testimony was sufficient to warrant a finding by the jury that Hendrick promised him employment in charge of a coal breaker. That employment was to be in the future, not till the mining of coal on the land should be commenced. Nothing was said respecting wages or the term of service, when the service was to begin or end, save that it was to begin when arrangements should be made with the Butler Coal Company. The inquiry is not whether an action would be for the breach of such a promise, or what is the measure of damages for the breach, but whether the plaintiff, holding and enjoying the tangible fruits of the compromise, may treat the sum paid as a mere credit on the amount of the judgment because of the breach of the promise.

The record shows that, at the time of the compromise, the dispute was not concerning the amount of the debt, but whether the stipulation that the lien and collection of the judgment should be restricted to certain property described in the bond should be enforced. It was as competent for the parties to agree upon that restriction as it was for one to convey his interest in the property to the other in consideration of the bond. As originally entered, the restriction was in the judgment. The judgment of revival was in default of a sufficient affidavit of defense, and it was in the power of the court to open it at any time for good cause. Instead of contesting the pending rule, the plaintiff agreed to receive, and did receive, six thousand dollars in satisfaction of the debt. The debt was for a larger sum, but the defendant had the option to pay it or suffer certain property to be sold in satisfaction. It is clearly shown by the learned president judge of the Common Pleas that a compromise and payment to the creditor of part of the amount of such a debt as this in satisfaction of the whole is upon sufficient consideration and is valid, even if it could be proved that the property out of which the debt is collectible is of greater value than the whole debt. But payment of an overdue and unrestricted debt, in a legal sense, is neither a benefit to

the creditor nor an injury to the debtor, and therefore is not a good consideration for a promise to receive it in satisfaction. But a part payment on account of a debt at any time before it is due will form a good consideration for an agreement for postponement of payment, or for its extinguishment. The law pays uo regard to the adequacy of the consideration if it is of some legal benefit to one party or injury to the other, though of the slightest kind it is sufficient. Hartman v. Danner, 74 Pa. St. 36. A sealed instrument is presumed to be for a good consideration, and therefore, upon part payment of a debt, a release under seal is valid. A release not under seal, supported by a legal consideration, is equally effective.

Thomas has made no attempt to impeach the settlement for fraud; the evidence fails to show fraud. He still holds the money he took from the defendant when he gave the written acknowledgment in satisfaction. The first act, more than a year after the making of the settlement, was to issue an execution as if the money he had received was only part payment of an ordinary judgment. The writ was stayed by the court, and this issue directed. Had he the right to rescind the agreement of compromise, and intended to exercise it, nothing was easier than to return the money to Hendrick, and place him in the same position as he held immediately before the compromise. It avails nothing that the restriction of lien and collection may yet be enforced as to the balance of the amount in excess of the six thousand dollars, for before the compromise Hendrick's right to pay, or let the land be sold in satisfaction, extended to the whole sum, not merely to one-third part. Upon the facts as shown by the record and Thomas' own testimony, if he is entitled to anything, it is for damages resulting from breach of a collateral agreement to give him employment. He cannot recover such damages in an issue in the nature of a scire facias to revive the judgment. The judgment is the foundation and extent of his claim. By compromise and payment accordingly, the judgment was satisfied. The settlement involved more than payment of part of an overdue debt, with a promise to give employment at some indefinite time in the future, which the creditor agreed to receive in full from the debtor. If the plaintiff is entitled to

recover in this issue, as the case stands, he has all the benefit of the settlement of the matter in dispute as a penalty on the defendant for the breach of such alleged promise. The compromise remains unrescinded, and the plaintiff has no right of action on the judgment.

The first three assignments of error must be sustained. It is unnecessary to remark the other assignments.

Judgment reversed.

E. L. Blakeslee and Michael Cannon, for plaintiff in error.
Q. A. Gates, contra.

Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County.

RINEHART & BRO. v. BODINE et al.

Where goods have been levied upon under different executions a claimant will only have to give one bond under the Interpleader Act, and not a bond for each execution.

Sheriff's interpleader. Feigned issue.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WALKER, J.-On the 4th of April, 1876, the sheriff leved upon certain articles as the property of Samuel Rinehart under four executions issued by Bodine & Warn, Clark, Holland & Co., The Lock Haven National Bank, and H. Merrimon & Son. Eight other executions were also issued. On the 6th of May, 1876, B. F. Rinehart & Bro. gave written notice to the sheriff that they claimed to own the property levied upon. Upon the application of the sheriff, the court granted the usual rule, and made it absolute, and ordered an issue to try the title to the property levied upon-the claimants to be plaintiffs, and the execution creditors to be defendants.

A bond was filed by the claimants in the sum of $1000 in all the cases in which executions had been issued. After this had been done, the counsel for Clark, Holland & Co, applied to the

court to have a separate and additional bond filed in his case, and that the amount be increased so as to correspond with the executions in the sheriff's hands.

On the 31st of March, 1876, Bodine & Warn's execution was placed in the sheriff's hands, and of course bound all the defendant's personal property within the sheriff's bailiwick. Pur. Dig. 643 pl. 44; Duncan v. McCumber, 10 Watts, 212; Earl's Appeal, 1 Harris, 483-5. On April 3, 1876, the other three fi. fas. of Clark, Holland & Co., The Lock Haven Bank, and H. Merrimon & Son came to hand; and on April 4, 1876, levies were made upon the property in dispute on all the four writs. On April 25 and May 1, three other writs came to hand; and on April 26 and May 2, levies upon the same articles were marked on each writ. The levies on the next batch of five writs were made subject to the first levies. The sheriff's endorsement on all these writs amounted to a re-seizure of the goods already taken on the former writs. Watmough v. Francis, 7 Barr, 206. There was but one claim made, and that was on the first writ. As the plaintiffs in this issue are the only claimants, it is very evident that there should be but a single issue formed in the cases in which the first levies were made, even though there are twelve executions in the sheriff's hands. If more than one issue were formed to determine the ownership of these goods, then in all probability we would have contradictory verdicts. The subsequent execution creditors are in no way injured by such a procedure, for their writs are liens upon the property subject to former levies. 7 Barr, 206; Bain v. Lyle, 18 P. F. S. 60. On the giving of the bond, the property is placed in the possession of the claimant ; his custody is substituted for the custody of the sheriff. The property is not withdrawn from the custody of the law. In the hands of the claimant under the bond, the property is as free from the reach of other process as it would have been in the hands of the sheriff. Johnson v. Miller, 1 T. & H. 903; Hogan v. Lucus, 10 Pet. 400; Purdon's Digest, 644, and notes. Neither can subsequent execution creditors be hindered or delayed, for it is the duty of the second execution creditor in such case to call on the first either to take issue on the claim or relinquish the levy. Howell v. Roberts, Leg, and Ins. R. 9. To require

a second bond (after one good and sufficient one for the forthcoming of the property has been approved and filed) would be entirely useless as a security to subsequent execution creditors, and might be oppressive to the claimants. It certainly is contrary to our practice, where there is but a single issue, and should not be required, unless some good reason existed for so doing, which does not now appear.

In all cases under the Sheriff's Interpleader Act the amount of the bond should be in double the value of the goods claimed or levied upon with sufficient and approved security without reference to the number and amount of the executions in the sheriff's hands.

We are therefore clearly of the opinion that this application for another bond should be refused.

Application refused.

Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County.

GOODMAN & Co. v. SONDHEIM.

Attachment-Act 1869.

1. It may be questioned whether a bare allegation of information and belief, unaccompanied by any statement of the facts or sources of the information or the grounds of belief, is sufficient in an affidavit upon which this writ is founded.

2. An allegation" that said goods were bought under false and fraudulent misrepresentations," while not in the exact language of the act, does in substance charge that the debt was fraudulently contracted.

3. More than one allegation of fraud may be included in the affidavit.

4. An affidavit which refers to an annexed statement which sufficiently describes the kind of property and the dates when purchased, held to be good.

Rule to show cause why attachment should not be dissolved. The opinion of the court was delivered April 21, 1884, by

RICE, P. J.-The affidavit upon which this writ was allowed to issue alleges "that said goods were bought under false and fraudulent misrepresentations," and "that deponent is informed and believes that said defendant is about to assign and transfer