CORONER. (Continued.)

8. Whether the stockholders could cumulate again to fill the vacancies, not decided.

Id.
9. Where a corporation is dissolved by the decrees of the courts of one state, a director of
such corporation cannot avoid the obligation to obey the injunction order by removal to another
Williams, Receiver, v. Hintermeister, 499.

state.

10. A foreign corporation carrying on business of a commercial nature in the state of Penn-
sylvania is not prohibited from doing business by reason of non-compliance with the laws of the
state requiring registration, etc. The legal capacity of a foreign corporation to transact business
in the state of Pennsylvania can only be inquired into upon complaint of the commonwealth. Id.
11. A foreign corporation which has not complied with the act of April 22, 1874, is not com-
petent to enter into a contract such as that involved in this case. Atherton et al. v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 402.

COUNTY. See CORONER. COSTS.

COUNTY BRIDGES.

1. The act of April 16, 1870, “providing the manner in which county bridges shall be built
in the county of Luzerne," construed, and said act held to apply to bridges across a stream
dividing a township from a borough or city. City of Wilkes-Barre v. County of Luserne, 302.
2. The court will refuse to approve the report of a grand jury in favor of building a county
bridge, where it appears that the foreman of the jury was one of the original petitioners for the
bridge. Bridge in Nescopeck, 410.

COUNTY OFFICER. See CENSUS. EVIDENCE.

1. The Act of Assembly of 12th June, 1878, which ascertained and appointed the fees to be
received by the various county officers of the commonwealth is not a repeal of the special act of
9th April, 1873, applicable to Luzerne county. O'Malley v. Luzerne County, 97.

COURTS. See ATTACHMENT AND ATTACHMENT EXECUTION. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Jus-
TICE OF THE PEACE. LICENSE.

1. The Court of Common Pleas has an inherent power to make rules for the transaction of
its business, not contradictory to the law of the land, and can therefore strike from the records a
judgment entered in violation of its rules. Coon v. Catten, 37.

2. The court has power to establish a rule governing the entry of judgments on notes con-
taining confessions; but if judgment is entered, in disregard of the rule, the court will make such
orders as will preserve the rights of the parties. Herman v. Rinker et al., 292.

3. The court will not re-consider a rule which has already been passed upon by a prior judge
of the court. Id.

4. The court may prescribe, by standing order, that the rule on a garnishee to answer inter.
rogatories, may issue as matter of course on filing præcipe therefor in the prothonotary's office.
Montanye v. Husted et al., 325.

5. In strict practice the rule should expressly state the time when, and the place where, the
answers shall be presented. Id.

COSTS. See ARBITRATION. AUDITOR. CERTIORARI. CORONER. HABEAS CORPUS. INSOLVENT.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. POOR. PLEADING AND PRACTICE. SHERIFF AND Sheriffs' SalES.
SHERIFF'S INTERPLEADER.

1. To appeal from an award of arbitration without payment of costs, the fact of poverty
should be established by some evidence produced to the court. Boyer v. Winters et al., 29.

2. An attorney fee is not taxable as part of the accrued costs which must be paid on an ap
peal from an award of arbitrators. Schooley et al. v. Turner, 150.

3. Defendant was convicted of seduction and sentenced to pay fine and undergo imprison-
ment. Having served his term and paid the fine he was discharged on habeas corpus; the
record of the sentence and the commitment showing no sentence for costs. Held, that the
county was liable for the costs. Zeis v. Luzerne County, 174.

4. The fees of a witness who is rejected at the trial cannot be taxed as part of the costs.
Fisher v. Scott et al., 216.

5. An agent for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals is a peace officer, and
should not be mulcted in costs when prosecution is begun in good faith. Commonwealth v.
Grim et al., 400.

6. The mileage to be allowed witnesses is according to the distance by the usual and ordinary
route of traveling by the common modes of conveyance. Because a railroad has been built which
is longer by several miles than the common road, that is no reason why mileage on the longer
(the railroad) route should be allowed. Johnson v. A. & N. P. R. R. Company, 401.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See COSTS. HABEas Corpus. INSOLVENT.

LICENSE.

1. It is a general rule in criminal pleading, that two distinct offences cannot be charged in
one and the same count of the indictment. Commonwealth v Schaub, 26.

2. The act of 26th February, 1855 (Pur. p. 946, pl. 38), so far as it was intended to apply to,
and forbid the sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday, was repealed by the act of 12th April, 1875
(Pur. 2031, pl. 16). Id.

3. An indictment which charges in the same count, the offence of selling liquor on Sunday,
and also the offence of allowing liquor to be drank "on or within the premises," on Sunday, is
bad for duplicity, and will be quashed. Id.

4. On an indictment for seduction, in the absence of testimony in corroboration of a positive
character, such as the evidence of witnesses who heard the promise, or of admissions of the de-
fendant either oral or written, the circumstances relied on must be such as are not merely con-
sistent with a matrimonial engagement, but such as viewed in the light of human experience,
positively tend to prove the fact. Taken together, they must be consistent with no other in-
ference. Commonwealth v. Hadfield, 121.

5. Where the evidence establishes such marked attentions on the part of the defendant as
raise a presumption of a promise of marriage on his part, the general fact that the lady en-
couraged and received these attentions is adequate to establish her assent and mutual
promise. Id.

6. It is incumbent on the commonwealth to give evidence of the " good repute" of the
prosecutrix. Id.

7. The defendant was a permanent boarder at the hotel of the prosecutor. He left without
saying to any person connected therewith that he was going, and without paying for the food or
accommodations furnished him. On argument of the rule for a new trial, counsel for the pris-
oner contended that a permanent boarder was not within the meaning of the statute of 1876, P.
L. 45, and that only a transitory guest who obtained food and accommodations within the mean-
ing of the statute could be convicted. Held, 1, that under this statute there is no distinction be-
tween a guest and a permanent boarder; and 2, that the statute includes "every person" who,
with intent to defraud, obtains food or accommodations. Commonwealth v. Gough, 148.
without a warrant,

8. Under the Criminal code of 1860 on officer has full authority to arrest,
any person found in the act of gambling. Shovlin et al. v. Commonwealth, 172.

9. On an indictment charging an officer with assault and battery for arresting a gambler
without a warrant, the question is not whether he was guilty of the assault in making the arrest,
but whether he was guilty of the offense for which he was indicted by reason of his having used
more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Id.

10. An officer authorized to arrest without warrant, is not bound before doing so to give
the party arrested notice of his purpose, nor is he bound to give notice of the fact that he is
legally qualified to make the arrest. Id.

11. Where it appears on the face of an indictment that the offense charged is barred by the
statute of limitations, the indictment may be quashed, and cannot be amended so as to bring the
case within the time when the offense can be prosecuted. Commonwealth v. Owens, 230.

12. A separate penalty may be imposed upon a merchant violating the Sunday laws for each
separate sale made to different persons, although upon the same day. Reiff v. Common-
wealth, 253.

13. An indictment for obtaining goods by false pretenses must state the goods to be the
property of some person named, and an omission of such allegation renders the indictment in-
curably defective. Commonwealth v. Graham, 289.

14. The destruction of a boat may be the subject of indictment for malicious mischief at com-
mon law. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 290.

15. Consent of the prosecutor is no defense to the crime of sodomy.

Smith, 414.

Commonwealth v.

16. But where the prosecutor consents he is treated as an accomplice and should be corrob.
orated. Id.

17. Where there is evidence tending to show his consent, and also evidence the other way,
it should be submitted to the jury, and its bearing explained by the court, with the advice, if
the jury should find that the prosecutor consented, not to convict on his uncorroborated testi-
mony. Id

18. In a prosecution for libel, where the alleged libellous matter is a privileged communica
tion, malice or negligence must be proved affirmatively, beyond a reasonable doubt, by extrinsic

CRIMINAL LAW. (Continued.)

evidence, and cannot be inferred from the language alone of the matter published. Common-
wealth v. McClure, 404.

19. Discussion in a newspaper of the character of a private citizen who advocates a candi-
date for federal appointment by circulating petition and by solicitation and other personal influ-
ence, is a privileged communication under Section 7, Article I., of the constitution of 1874 Id.
DAMAGES. See ROADS.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. TRUSTEES. WILLS.

1. A married woman died, leaving a will, and appointed an executor, who renounced. She
made her minor grand children residuary legatees, but gave nothing to her surviving husband.
The husband refused to accept the provisions of the will, and letters of administration c. t. a.
were granted to him. On appeal by the guardian of the minors, the Orphans' Court revoked
the letters, and directed that they be granted to the nominee of the guardian. Held, further,
that the second proviso of the 14th section, Act 1832, not only controls and limits the enacting
clause, but is also an exception to the first proviso. Gunton's Estate, 34

2. Stale claims against dead men's estates should not be encouraged. Peter's Appeal, 77.
3. The refunding bond which an executor is entitled to demand from the heirs, can be de-
manded where the executor makes distribution, but not where the distribution is made by an
auditor and confirmed by the court. Barlet's Estate, 241.

4. The inventory is a prima facie charge against executors, and credits cannot be allowed
in their account for worthless debts without proof of the insolvency of the debtors, where the
inventory is silent upon the subject. Estate of Jacob Billheimer, 278.

5. An account may be considered a final one from its nature and character, although it be
not so denominated. After the whole inventory has been accounted for, fees have been adjusted
and the whole matter has been treated by the court as finally settled, the accountants cannot,
after the lapse of five years, open the same by filing what they call a final account, so as to claim
credits which they allege were, by omission, left out of the former account. Id.

6. A residuary fund, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, must bear the
burden of payment of debts, legacies, and general expenses of the trust. Kidder Estate, 443.

7. Where an estate consists of proceeds of sales of real estate and from coal rents, they
must be accounted for separately. Id.

1. After testimony has been taken before an examiner in a divorce case and filed in court, it
is too late to demand an issue. Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 14.

2. It is the duty of the court to make a proper allowance to the wife, to enable her to main-
tain her suit for divorce. Walter v. Waiter, 39.

3. The discretion reposed in the court as to the amount of alimony to be allowed, must
have reference to the pecuniary ability of the husband. Id.

4. The adultery of the libellant is, in itself, a bar to a divorce only in cases where adultery
is alleged as cause for the divorce. Larson v. Larson, 215.

5. In cases based on desertion the adultery of the libellant may be shown as a cause justify-
ing the libellee in leaving the libellant. Id.

6. But in cases based on personal indignities, etc., the adultery of the libellant is not, in
itself, a defense, and cannot be set up as a justification. Id.

7. It is the uniform practice in divorce suits, if the wife has no separate estate, whether
she be libellant or respondent, to make an order for maintenance pendente lite, and expenses.
Renniman v. Renniman, 341.

8. Separate earnings (as a school teacher) and his indebtedness, are both proper facts to be
taken into account in determining the amount which ought to be allowed her for her mainte-
nance pending the litigation, but neither fact, nor both together, can be set up to entirely relieve
him from his legal and moral obligation so long as he is in undisturbed enjoyment of his estate
and in receipt of the income therefrom. Id.

9. The court has no jurisdiction in a suit for divorce where the alleged desertion on which,
proceedings were based took place in another state, without a change of domicil on the part of
the husband, he being the respondent. Marlin v. Marlin, 471.

DURESS.

I.

See VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

To constitute duress at law, the arrest must have been originally illegal, or have become
so by subsequent abuse of it. Lord v. Brezee et al., 358.

EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES. See INJUNCTION. WATER ANd Water Courses.
EJECTMENT. See EQUITABLE EJECTMENT.

1. In ejectment suits the only party entitled to demand an order for a second ejectment is
the party who has obtained the verdict in the first trial. Dewitt v. Serfoss, 153.

2. The plaintiff's devisor went into possession under a deed from the Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Company-the said corporation not having title-and she and those claiming under
her held the same for several years, when the defendant, without former possession, title, or color
of title, intruded into the possession and enclosed the land with his adjoining premises by a fence.
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in ejectment. Ackerman v. Nachbar, 188.

3. In estimating the fair rental or annual value of the premises, on a claim for mesne profits,
the referee or a jury had a right to consider what was their value as a part necessary to the en-
joyment of the larger premises, from which it was detached by the defendant's unauthorized
Id.

act.

ELECTION.

1. An affidavit of the requisite number of qualified electors is necessary to give jurisdiction
to the court in the matter of a contested election. Williams v. Johnson, 332.

2. An amendment to the petition and affidavit, by inserting after the time prescribed by the
statute the name of a qualified elector in the place of one who is found to be disqualified, will
not be allowed. Id.

ELECTION DISTRICTS.

1. The act of May 18, 1876, P. L. 178, applies not only to a general division of a township
into election districts, but also to the creation of an additional district out of a part of one of the
districts into which a township has already been divided. In re Erection of Additional Elec-
tion District in Huntington Township, 367.

2. The above act supersedes Sec. 1st, Rule III., Rules of Court of Luzerne County, in all
particulars where they are inconsistent. Id.

3. The petition must be signed by "twenty freeholders resident in the township." It need
not be averred that they are qualified voters of the district. Id.

4. Twenty of the petitioners must be residents, and each of the twenty must be the owner
of a freehold estate in possession in lands situated in the township to be divided. Id.

5. A petition was presented signed by fifty-seven persons, only nineteen of whom were
qualified as above required. After the commissioners had been appointed, but before they had
reported, the petition was amended, by leave of court, by the addition of three other names.
Held, that the court had power, upon discovery of the mistake, to permit the amendment.
Williams v. Johnson, 16 W. N. C. 223 distinguished. Id.

6. Where the evidence for and against the new district was evenly balanced, but it ap-
peared that a considerable number of the voters would be greatly convenienced thereby, and it
would not be feasible to accomplish the same result by a change of the polling place, the report
of the commissioners in favor of the district was confirmed. Id.

7. Erection of new election district refused where it appeared that the report of reviewers
was adverse to the same, that the whole number of votes polled in the township was only about
one hundred, that the present polling place was near the centre of the township and was con-
veniently reached by the public roads therein, and the division was opposed by a large number
of the inhabitants, including many of the original petitioners. In Re Division of Jackson
Township, 524. ·

EMINENT DOMAIN. See RAILROADS.

EQUITY. See INJUNCTION.

1. Where the master reports that an exception to the sufficiency of an answer is sustained,
and the defendant submits to the report, the costs of the reference will be imposed on him.
Myers v. Kingston Coal Co., 137.

2. The master reported that the exception for impertinence should be dismissed for want of
such clearness, precision, and particularity as the rules of equity practice require. Held, 1st,
That the terms of the reference did not preclude the master from so reporting; 2d, That even if
they did, the court might still dismiss the exceptions notwithstanding the reference. Id.

3. Where a demurrer to a bill in equity has been sustained, "with leave to the plaintiff to
move for amendment" within a certain time, and the time thus allowed has expired without
amendment, the defendant's right to a formal decree dismissing the bill was complete. Neither

EQUITY. (Continued.)

plaintiff nor court, on the facts of the present application, can deprive defendant of the benefit
of the decision upon the demurrer. Therefore, an order dismissing the suit upon plaintiff's
mption should be given the same effect as a dismissal of the bill upon the demurrer, and a motion
to dismiss "without prejudice" should be denied. Osborne, Trustee, v. Hollenback, 138.

4. The jurisdiction of the court to exercise the powers of a court of chancery, depends
upon statutory enactments. Filley et al. v. The Ithaca Organ and Piano Company, 3.
5. Our courts do not possess equitable jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, which has
failed to comply with our laws prohibiting such corporation from doing business in this state.

6. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is firmly fixed in our law, and where a contract pro-
hibited by law has been executed, and both parties are in pari delicto, neither can maintain an
action to rescind it. Where the contract is still executory, however, equity will interfere The
law will not lend its support to a claim founded on its own violation. Atherton et al. v. City
of Wilkes-Barre, et al., 402.

EQUITABLE EJECTMENT.

1. Where a vendee under articles of agreement for the sale of land confesses judgment in an
amicable action of ejectment, at the same time agreeing that the affidavit of the plaintiff filed
therewith shall be sufficient evidence of default in payment of the instalments, and shall entitle
him to issue a writ of habere facias at once, the writ may issue.without leave of court. Lan-
ning v. Davies, 319.

2. The court has power in an equitable ejectment to modify the conditions of the verdict of
a jury or of the report of a referee, in order more effectually to do equity. Moore v. Habel, 310.
3. Neither law nor equity will permit a vendee to hold the land and at the same time with-
hold payment of the purchase money upon the doubtful contingency that the land may at some
time be resorted to for pecuniary legacies which are, prima facie, presumed to be paid, provided
indemnity is given. Id.

4. Though equity will not compel a vende to take a defective title, it will compel him to
take a good title subject to a pecuniary charge against which adequate security has been given.
Id.

ERRORS AND APPEALS. See SUPERSEDEAS. SUMMARY CONVICTION.

1. An appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the court below upon a case stated
does not lie unless such right of appeal is reserved in the case stated. Shainline's Appeal, 301.
2. Where a party desiring to take an appeal from the judgment of a magistrate, calls at his
office for that purpose, it is the duty of the officer to give all the necessary information as to the
requirements and proper method of so doing. If he fails to do this the court will allow an ap-
peal nunc pro tunc. Vandermark v. Borough of Nanticoke, 457.

ESTOPPEL.

1. Admissions made in the course of judicial proceedings which have been held to be con-
clusive against the party, seem, for the most part, to be those on the faith of which a court has
been led to adopt a particular course of proceeding, or on which another person has been induced
to alter his condition. Treffeison Assignment, 308.

EVIDENCE.

See ASSUMPSIT.

ATTACHMENT AND ATACHMENT EXECUTION. ATTORNEY AND
CLIENT. CONFLICT OF LAWS. CONTRACT. CORONER. CRIMINAL LAW. DIVORCE, EJECT-
MENT. EQUITY. ESTOPPEL, GIFT. JUDGMENT. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. MARRIED
WOMEN. PAYMENT.

I.

Where plaintiff in judgment is dead, defendant cannot be a witness in proceeding to have
judgment opened, except as to transaction after the plaintiff's death with the administrator.
Everett, Executor, v. Cox, 7.

2. A witness who testifies erroneously may explain and correct at any time during the course
of the trial. Staub v. Wolfe, 70.

3. Whether the presumption of payment is sufficiently rebutted is a question of law for the
Peters' Appeal, 77.

court.

4. In actions arising ex contractu, the defendant, under the plea of payment, may give in
evidence, not only direct proof of payment, but may also prove bargains, the violation of which
has resulted in damages. Murran v. Plymouth Coal Co., 103.

5. Evidence of fraudulent assignment considered. Goldstein et al. v. Sondheim, 212.
6. The population of a county in any particular year is a matter susceptible of proof like