On the hearing of that rule the court declined to make the rule absolute, but directed that the judgment be opened and the defendants let into a defense. The counsel for the defendants thereupon excepted to so much of the ruling of the court as holds that the judgment should not be stricken off peremptorily. Conceding that the court had the power to strike off the judgment, was it bound to exercise it, there being no other reason for so doing, except that the rule of court had not been complied with? If so, the refusal was error which would entitle the defendants to redress by writ of error or other mode of removal to the Supreme Court. But if the making of the rule absolute and striking off the judgment was discretionary with the court, the matter must be considered as res adjudicata. Rules of court are indispensable aids in the routine business of the courts. Regularity, justice, and despatch of business are the chief objects of a general rule of court. When a rule has been established by a long course of practice or by a written order, it should, for the sake of certainty and safety, not be departed from; nevertheless, it is always in the power of a court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation whenever the purposes of justice require it. Magill's Appeal, 59 St. Rep. 430; United States v. Brerthing, 20 Howard, 252, note. In this case the court, by its order, preserved to the defendants all their rights of defense as fully as if an action had been brought against them on the note. By the entry of the judgment in the name of the administrator of the deceased payee of the note, the defendants are in no worse situation, in respect to the competency of themselves as witnesses, from what they would have been if the case were on trial in an action on the note. The affidavit on which the rule was granted complains of nothing, except that the rule of court has not been complied with. As before stated, Judge Ingham, in the exercise of the discretion with which the law invested him, decided on two occasions under the circumstances as they appeared before him, that the rights of the parties would be better preserved on both sides, by the orders which he made than by a rigid enforcement of the rule. It would be highly improper, if not error, for me now, after what has occurred since the discharge of the first rule, to review and reverse the decisions which have been made in the case. Since the order opening the judgment in issue has been made up informally in this form, the note (signed by the defendants and James W. Rinker, then and at the entry of the judgment, deceased) to stand as a declaration, defendants to plead the statute of limitations; and on the bench list it is entered defendants plead the statute of limitations. It thus appears that John W. Rinker was a party to the issue. It was so understood by the court. It was so understood by the counsel on the trial of the cause. The counsel for the plaintiff asked leave to amend by striking his name from the issue, to which the counsel for the defendants objected, and obtained a ruling of the court that it could not be done, and afterwards in the Supreme Court, as appears by their counter statement, insisted that he was a party to the issue. It was held by the Supreme Court, 14 W. N. C. 542, that plaintiff should have been permitted to amend by declaring against Abraham Rinker alone. But that was not done, nor has it yet been done, so that, in fact, now the case stands for trial on the original issue. The judge who delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court says: "There seems a propriety in the present case in opening the judgment to let in the plea of the statute, inasmuch as the judgment was entered without leave of court, or the affidavit required thereby, upon a note which upon its face was then barred by the statute. In any event it was a matter in the discretion of the court, and we see no error in opening the judgment." It is true this was said in answer to complaint by the plaintiff of the act of the court in opening the judgment. It, nevertheless, seems to indicate an opinion that up to the time of the passing of the issue, or rather up to the time of the trial, the action of the court below was approved. It is said that John W. Rinker was not an actor in the proceedings which have been had up to this time, and that his application now should be considered as if the court had made no decision in the case. I cannot concur in this view of the law or the facts. If the verdict and judgment obtained by the defendants on the trial of the issue had not been reversed, John W. Rinker would have been discharged from the debt equally with Abraham. He was interested in every movement made in the case, and as the record shows, was represented by counsel. The plea for the defendants referred to no other persons than the two named upon the record. But be that as it may, I decline to strike off this judgment for the reasons that a rule for that purpose has been heretofore considered by the court, and the application to strike off refused. And for the further reason that by the order of the court for an issue the defendants are protected as fully as they would have been if proceeded against by summons in an action of debt; so understanding the law, I hold that no injustice was done by the order heretofore made, and that none will be sustained by the discharge of this rule. Rule is discharged. William Piatt & Sons, for rule. John A. Sittser and Terry & Streeter, contra. Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. HOLLENBACK v. WELLER et al. 1. The action of trespass for cutting timber trees, if brought under the act of March 29, 1824, can only be maintained by the owner. 2. The plaintiff had the undisputed legal title to an undivided three-fifths part of the locus in quo, and by the express reservation of his deed to Osborne as trustee, he was to receive and receipt for the rents, issues, and profits arising from the whole estate or land, to develop, improve and sell the same, without joinder of the trustee, to expend such moneys thereon as he might deem necessary, and to account for and pay over to the trustee two-fifths of the rents, issues, and profits received. Held, that the possession and legal dominion of the plaintiff over the land were such as to constitute him the OWNER, and to entitle him to maintain the action under the act of 1824 against a trespasser. Motion for judgment on the verdict. The opinion of the court was delivered May 9, 1881, by RICE, P. J.-We deem it unnecessary, and therefore unwise, to discuss and pass upon the estate of the cestui que trustent under the deed from J. W. Hollenback to General Osborne, as trustee, and the agreement of compromise in pursuance whereof it was made. There are questions between the parties to those · instruments suggested by an examination and comparison of them which cannot be settled in this form of action and in this collateral proceeding. The only question raised by the reserved points is, whether the plaintiff can maintain this action as the owner of the locus in quo within the meaning of the act of 1824, against one who has cut and removed timber without authority or license. To support trespass there must be in the plaintiff, at the time of the act complained of, either actual possession or the right of immediate actual possession flowing from the right of property. Lewis v. Carson, 3 H. 34. This general definition does not, however, exactly apply to the statutory action given by the act of 1824, for the damages awarded under that act go to the owner, "that is, to the person to whom the thing belongs, the master or rightful owner thereof; a description which does not apply to the character of tenant." Tammany v. Whitaker, 4 W. 221. But, notwithstanding this action is given to the owner, and not to a mere possessor, the interest which the defendant has in the joinder of all the owners must be chiefly to prevent a second recovery for the same trespass, and the term owner cannot be given such a technical meaning as to authorize the defendant's pleading that there was an outstanding equity in some stranger to the action, under whom he did not pretend to claim, and thus defeat the action. The plaintiff has the undisputed legal title to an undivided three-fifths part of the premises, and by the express reservation or proviso of his deed to General Osborne, a trustee, he is to receipt for and receive the rents, issues, and profits arising from the whole estate or land, to develop, improve, and sell the same without joinder of the trustee, to expend such moneys thereon as he may deem necessary, and to account for and pay over to the trustee two-fifths of the rents, issues, and profits received. It seems quite clear that a recovery by him must be a recovery by the trustee for the same trespass, and that his possession and legal dominion over the land are such as to constitute him the owner as against a trespasser. Upon payment of the jury fee it is ordered that judgment be entered for the plaintiff on the verdict. W. P. Ryman, and G. Mortimer Lewis, Esqs., for plaintiff. E. S. Osborne and John Lynch, Esqs., for defendants. Court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne County. IN RE ADMISSION OF ADJACENT TERRITORY INTO THE Boroughs. Where adjacent territory is admitted into a borough by the borough authorities under section 30 of the act of 1851, and no appeal is taken under section 4 of the act of 1871, the annexation becomes complete upon the expiration of the time allowed for appeal, without confirmation by the court or approval by the grand jury. The opinion of the court was delivered May 25, 1885, by RICE, P. J.-An ordinance of the borough of Pittston, approved by the burgess March 11, 1884, declared and provided inter alia as follows: "Section 1. That upon petition of at least twenty freeholders of, and residents upon, property embraced in the section of Pittston township lying adjacent to said Pittston borough and hereinafter described, the said section is hereby admitted as part of the Fourth ward of said Pittston borough." (Here follows a description of the territory admitted.) A copy of the borough ordinance, together with a plan or plot of the adjacent territory, were filed in the office of the clerk of this court on March, 26, 1884, and after publication of notice thereof for three consecutive weeks the same were laid before the court, and on May 3, 1884, the court made an order confirming the same. On October 25, 1884, by consent of all parties concerned, the court made an order striking off the confirmation of the proceedings, and on the same day granted a rule to show cause why the order of confirmation should not be reinstated. This rule is now before us for disposition, and the question is, whether the attempted annexation of the adjacent territory was regular and complete without a submission of the proposition to the grand jury. Under the act of April 1, 1834, the jurisdiction to change the limits of a borough was vested exclusively in the court. The mode of procedure was the same as in the incorporation of a borough and, of course, included a reference to, and approval by, |