heir, the court, on December 4, 1882, decided that the estate should be divided into seven shares, and that the report in other respects not material to be mentioned here, should be changed as set forth in its order, and with such modifications it was decreed that the report of the auditor be confirmed, the court appending a re-statement of the amount awarded to the distributees inter alia as follows: "Distributed to J. B. Shiffer, $276.67; previously paid, $200.00." Confirmation of the report of the auditor as modified by the court was an adjudication of the court which must stand until satisfied, reversed upon appeal, set aside on review, or otherwise stricken from the record. It is thoroughly well settled that matters which have been once determined by judicial authority cannot be again drawn into controversy between the parties and privies to the decision. Notes to Duchess of Kingston Case, 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 787; Clark v. Douglass, 62 Penn. St. 408. If there is a judgment or decree in favor of a party, definite in its terms and ripe for execution, the debtor cannot deprive the creditor of his remedy by allegations that there was a mistake or error clerical on the part of the court. Whether the reasons given by an auditor or by a court for the decision rendered are sound, is of no importance in considering the question of the right of a party to realize the fruits of a judgment. If there existed error or mistake on the part of the court, produced either by its own inadvertence or the blunder of the parties, the remedy is not by resisting process to enforce the judgment or decree. The only remedy, if any exists, is by review, in some manner, of the proceedings which resulted in the adjudication complained of. Milne's Appeal, 3 Out. 483., et seq. In this case nothing appears in the notes of evidence returned by the auditor sufficient to defeat the right of the distributee in question to his share. No exception was taken to the auditor's report awarding a sum to J. B. Shiffer, assignee of H. W. Lee, and, therefore, the court committed no error in awarding the one-seventh of the fund to the assignee. It is a well settled rule in equity that when the court has possession of the case, it has full power to dispose of all questions which may arise, and in the decree to settle all controversies between the parties in reference to the subject in dispute. The Orphans' Court has power to determine questions both of fact and of law. It has power to inquire into and determine all questions on distribution-Dunda's Appeal, 73 Penn. St. 474-including setoff. Buckner's Estate, 9 W. N. C. 511. Where there is a dispute between assignees of a fund in court for distribution, it has jurisdiction to determine which party is entitled to the fund. McGettrick's Appeal, 98 Penn. St. 9. In determining what amount a distributee is entitled to receive out of the estate, it is competent for an auditor to determine, not only what the share of the claimant amounts to, but also what, if any, equities or legal claims existed by which there should be a deduction from the share, and upon such reduction to report as due a less sum than the amount of one share. Upon the record now before us there is a decree which entitles the complainant, J. B. Shiffer, to an execution for the sum found due him, with interest. Rule made absolute. W. E. and C. A. Little, for rule Harding & Frear, contra. Court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne County. COMMONWEALTH V. GRAHAM. Criminal law-False pretenses-Indictment-Arrest of judgment An indictment for obtaining goods by false pretenses must state the goods to be the property of some person named, and an omission of such allegation renders the indictment incurably defective, Motion in arrest of judgment. The opinion of the court was delivered May 4, 1885, by RICE, P. J.-I. All the text writers agree that an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretenses must state the goods to be the property of some person named, and where no owner is laid the indictment will be quashed. 2 Wh. C. L. 2157; 2 Bish. Cr. Pro. 1734; Wh. Pre. of Ind. 335; Arch. Cr. Pr. & Pl. *464. Our first impression was that this defect, though fatal on a mo tion to quash, was not available after verdict. The decisions, however, are the other way. So far as we have been able to consult them we find that they hold the defect to be one of substance and not of form, and hence is not cured by the verdict. The case of Sill v. Reg. 15 Eng. L. & E. 375, covers all the questions involved, and is especially applicable because it contains a construction of statutes regulating procedure in criminal cases almost precisely the same as ours. It was probably that decision which led to the passage of the English act of 24 & 25 Vict. C. 9, S. 88, which now renders an allegation of ownership unnecessary. We have no such act, and hence we feel constrained by the great weight of authority to hold that the omission of such allegation renders the indictment incurably defective. Reg. v. Martin, 8 A. & E. 481; Reg. v. Norton, 8 C. & P. 196; State v. Smith, 8 Blackf. 489; State v. Lathrop, 15 Vt. 279; Thompson v. People, 24 Ill. 61. The second reason is not well founded in fact, but even if it were it would be no cause for arresting the judgment. For the first reason filed it is ordered that judgment be arrested. Court of Quarter Sessions of Luzerne County. COMMONWEALTH V. BRYANT. Criminal law-Malicious mischief. The destruction of a boat may be the subject of indictment for malicious mischief at common law. Motion in arrest of judgment and rule for a new trial. The opinion of the court was delivered September 2, 1884, by RICE, P. J.-The defendant was indicted and convicted for having wilfully, maliciously, and mischievously cut and destroyed a certain boat, the property of the prosecutor. The reason assigned for arrest of judgment is that the indictment does not set forth an offense punishable by indictment, either at common law or under any statute of Pennsylvania. The offense charged is not within any of our statutes, but without elaborating upon the question discussed, we conclude from an examination of the authorities that the destruction of a boat may be the subject of indictment for malicious mischief at common law (see Loomis v. Edgerton, 19 Wend. 420; Com. v. Cramer, 2 Pears. 441; 2 Wh. Cr. L. 2002, etc.), and that under sec. II of the criminal procedure act of 1860, which provides, that "every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good at law which charges the * if at common law, so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury," the offense is sufficiently well described to sustain judgment on the verdict. As no opinion was given it is not possible to tell the precise ground upon which the court quashed the indictment in Com. v. Casperson, 14 W. N. C. 106, but it is quite probable that it was because that indictment did not aver that the act was done mischievously, or with malice, against the owner. (See 2 Wh. Cr. L. 2012, b.) We are far from satisfied, however, that there was sufficient evidence of malice. It was thought on the trial, and quite likely the jury got the same idea, that the declarations of the defendant furnished the evidence of his having sawed the boat in two out of revenge against the prosecutor. An examination of the defendant's testimony shows that he was entirely misunderstood. Except upon the theory that the defendant, enraged because his own boat had been sawed in two, retaliated by sawing that of the prosecutor, no argument could have been successfully made from the evidence that he acted maliciously. But this theory is not sustained by the evidence which shows that the prosecutor's boat was sawed first because, as the defendant supposed, it was worthless and had no owner. The following day he found his own boat sawed, and supposing that it had been done by the prosecutor as a retaliatory act, he upbraided him for it, and then the wordy altercation ensued which he narrates. The case is not of serious importance in its consequence to the defendant, but, nevertheless, it is our duty to set aside a verdict of conviction, even in such a case, if it is clearly against the weight of the evidence. The motion in arrest of judgment is overruled, and the rule for a new trial is made absolute. John McGahren, for commonwealth. P. H. Campbell and J. T. Lenahan, for defendant. Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County. HERMAN, ADMINISTRATOR, V. ABRAHAM RINKER AND Practice Judgments on notes more than ten years old without leave of courtlimitations applicable to notes containing a confession of judgment. Statute of 1. The court has power to establish a rule governing the entry of judgments on notes containing confessions; but if judgment is entered, in disregard of the rule, the court will make such orders as will preserve the rights of the parties 2. If judgment is entered on a note, not under seal, containing a confession of judgment, which is more than six years old, the court will open such judgment to permit the defendant to plead the statute of limitations. 3. The court will not re-consider a rule which has already been passed upon by a prior judge of the court. Rule to strike off a judgment on the ground of non-compliance with the fifteenth rule of court. The opinion of the court was delivered April 20, 1885, by ELWELL, P. J.—From the time of the organization of the courts under the constitution of 1790, the power of the courts to provide by rule that leave must be obtained of the court, or a judge thereof, to enter judgment on a warrant of attorney that is above ten years old, and that such leave must be based upon an affidavit of the execution of the instrument, that the parties are living and the money unpaid. The origin of the rule, and the general doctrine in respect to established rules of court and the discretion which may be exercised in administering them, are sufficiently shown by the cases of Vannetta v. Anderson, 3 Binney, 423; and Gannon et al. v. Fritz, 79 St. Rep. 303. There are numerous other authorities on the subject, but these being among the earliest and the latest decisions, it is unnecessary to refer to others. The judge who presided in this court at the time of the entry of the judgment in question, on the affidavit of one of the defendants, granted a rule to show cause why the judgment should not be stricken off, for the reason that no affidavit had been made nor leave granted, as required by the rule of court. |