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[Currie on Confirmation of Executors.-M'Laren on Wills, ii. § 1657.-Dove Wilson, Sheriff Court Practice, 4th ed., 546.]

J. W. B. I.

EX. NEW. This refers to the quotation of prices on the stock exchange for shares or other security, the holders of which are about to receive an allotment of new stock at what may be considered an advantageous price of issue. When these words form part of the contract, the seller retains the advantage, if any, and the buyer's right to the security is exclusive of any right to subscribe to the new issue (see Ex. ALL; Ex. DIV.).

A. E.

EXPECTATION OF LIFE, a term introduced by De Moivre, denotes the number of years which persons of a certain class, e.g. English males, live on an average after a certain age, e.g. 20; the average being obtained as follows. The number of years which each of a great many, say n, specimens of the class under observation, lives after the assigned age having been observed, the sum of these numbers is divided by n. The Expectation is thus the arithmetic mean of the n observed numbers (see AVERAGE). It is contrasted with another average of the same numbers, viz. the Median (see AVERAGE), technically termed the "equation of life." The term "expectation" is objected to by Dr. Farr as suggesting the latter rather than the former sort of average. He prefers to say mean afterlifetime. Comparing the two kinds of average, Neison seems to think that the expectation of life is not so well suited "for medical and other purposes in which it is required to determine the relative value of an improvement or other change which may have taken place within a given period of life."

(See DEATH-RATE; DE MOIVRE; INSURANCE; MEAN AFTERLIFETIME; STATISTICS.)

[Walford's Insurance Cyclopædia, article "Expectation."-Farr, Vital Statistics, pp. 279, 309.

EXPEDITATION. By the FOREST LAWS (q.v.) all mastiffs or other large dogs kept within a forest had to be expeditated, i.e. maimed sufficiently to prevent them chasing the deer. According to the laws of Canute the dog was to be hamstrung, but by a charter of Henry II. a somewhat milder operation was allowed, three toes of one forefoot being cut off with a chisel, leaving the ball of the foot intact. For keeping an unexpeditated dog within a forest a fine of 3s., called "footgeld," was imposed, but before the end of the 15th century in many of the English forests this fine had become a customary payment, sometimes called "houndsilver," collected triennially, which formed no small item in the revenues of the forest owner.

[See Ducange, Glossarium media et infimæ Latinitatis, Editio nova a L. Favre, Paris, 1884.Manwood, Forest Laws, London, 1615.-Cowell's Interpreter of Words and Phrases, London, 1701.-Forest Accounts, some of which are quoted by Manwood.]

A. H.

EXPENDITURE OR SPENDING has two distinct meanings which are often confused.

1. Expenditure may mean simply the payment out of money, that is, the exchange of money for other goods. In this sense it does not imply any consumption of wealth on the part of any one, and it cannot be opposed to "saving." A man who saves £100 a year ordinarily expends or spends those £100, .e. exchanges them for other goods, just as much as if he did not save anything. The things on which he expends them will be different, but the expenditure, unless of course the money is hoarded, will be the same.

2. Expenditure may mean payment of money for personal consumption on the part of an individual, and consumption, pure and simple, on the part of the community. In this sense it is rightly opposed to "saving." The £100 a year saved by an individual is not in this sense of the word expended or spent either by himself or any one else. It is simply the value in money of a part of the community's income, which, instead of being consumed, has been added to the capital of the country (see SAVING, PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE).

E. C.

EXPENSES OF PRODUCTION (see PRODUCTION).

EXPERIENCE. Upon the value of experience in the study of political economy the most contradictory opinions have found adherents.

Some economists have expressed themselves as though political economy were a science similar in type to astronomy-as though all economic truths could be derived by strict deduction from one or two first principles,

such as "All men desire wealth," or "All men are averse to labour." Other economists have denounced general reasoning, and have laid exclusive stress on the accumulation of facts. They would apparently reduce political economy to the task of observing and recording particulars without any admixture of inference. These opposite opinions have rarely been held in their most extreme forms. But by stating them as forcibly as possible we may be assisted to detect the fallacies which they involve.

It will appear upon examination that neither of these principles can be carried out in its integrity. The attempt to carry out either would result in intellectual paralysis.

There has never yet existed an economist so rigorously deductive in his method as not to draw to some extent upon experience of economic phenomena. Many economists have indeed drawn upon a field of experience too restricted to justify dogmatic conclusions. Many economists have been too much influenced by the economic experience of their own time, or of their own country. Even this narrow experience they may not have studied exhaustively. They may have picked up their knowledge of it insensibly, here and there, bit by bit. It is thus that the man of business, as contrasted with the student, acquires his knowledge of economic phenomena. Ricardo, the greatest of those economists who are alleged to have been rigorously deductive in method, may be said to have acquired most of his knowledge in this way. Such knowledge, being very partial, may sometimes prove misleading. But even such knowledge has great influence upon the development of theory. Ricardo's economic theories would certainly have been different had he lived in another age than the nineteenth century, or in another country than England.

An economist strictly deductive in method could never get beyond his first premisses. The contrary seems possible because the economist who apparently deduces everything from first principles in reality weaves into his argument statements of fact and wide generalisations which have become so familiar that he and his readers forget how they were first acquired.

Nor has there ever yet existed an economist who merely observed and recorded. Those economists who aimed at this ideal have nevertheless written history. The writing of history involves processes of selection, comparison, and inference, in which the historian's mind is active. No two persons perform these processes in quite the same way, and it is extremely easy to make mistakes in performing them. It is not merely that historians often infuse their work with their own political or religious sentiments, with the prejudices of their own age or their own class. It is rather that the historian cannot construct a narrative out of

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facts without interpreting those facts. But he cannot interpret the facts without using his mind, without adding to, or rather, without transforming, those facts.

The object of all science, including political economy, is not merely to amass facts but also to explain them. Facts are explained in so far as they are successfully brought under general laws. The general laws are always at first hypotheses, or in the vulgar tongue, guessesguesses at truth. Hypotheses are suggested by facts, and facts are interpreted by hypotheses. He who forms a hypothesis with hardly any knowledge of the facts is pretty sure to throw away his trouble. He who clings to a hypothesis once formed, neglecting or rejecting new facts, does worse, for he is trying to confirm himself in error. But to refrain from forming hypotheses is impossible to a reasoning creature, and, if it were possible, would be suicidal. The value of experience is not absolute but varies directly as the power of the mind which has the experience. One glance at the field of battle will suggest a decisive movement to the great general. The vicissitudes of a short and obscure life will give the great poet a key to human nature in its infinite variety. The scientific genius, although less brilliant, is not essentially different from theirs.

Whether in physical or in political science the master mind is that to which facts suggest their own explanation.

F. C. M.

[Cairnes, Character and Logical Method of Political Economy.-Bagehot, Economic Studies.] EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS. Experiment in the scientific sense has been well described as "putting in action causes and agents over which we have control, and purposely varying their combinations and noticing what effects take place" (Herschel, Study of Natural Philosophy, p. 76). In sciences such as physics and chemistry, in which the phenomena are amenable to arrangement, it is by far the most potent instrument of discovery. Where, however, there is not the same facility for easy manipulation, the inquirer is compelled to fall back on the less effective method of simple observation. Instead of creating instances for himself, he has to find them in nature, or wait till they are presented spontaneously to his view.

Economics, in common with the other social sciences, clearly belongs to the latter class. The phenomena of wealth are closely inter-connected, and are besides affected by the other forms of social activity. Hardly any economic event can be said to be the result of a single cause, it is rather the product of several contributory causes. Nor are the total effects of any one agency easily separable; they are combined with those of others in a whole which cannot be analysed. In technical language "plurality of causes" and "intermixture of effects," the

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two great hindrances to the use of experiment (Mill, Logic, bk. iii. ch. x.), are generally present in economic facts. To secure the requisite isolation of any phenomenon selected for study is rarely possible. The most rigorous form of inquiry, known as the "method of difference," the essence of which "is the comparison of two instances, which resemble one another in all material respects, except that in one a certain cause is present, while in the other it is absent" (Keynes, Scope, p. 170), is plainly excluded, since we cannot introduce a single cause that will have only a measurable effect, nor can we be sure that the surrounding conditions remain unaltered. The "method of agreement" in which the instances compared resemble each other in only one particular is not merely inferior as an experimental resource, but is inapplicable to social phenomena. Two countries or periods that had one common feature would have more than one. In two classes of cases, however, experiment may be sometimes used, viz. (1) in reference to the premises or data of economic science, thus the "law of diminishing returns' admits of experimental proof; (2) More important than the preceding exception, which is rather apparent than real, are those cases in which, by deductive reasoning, it can be shown that the action of an economic force is limited, and then its working within those limits can be experimentally ascertained.

These exceptions notwithstanding, it may be said that scientific experiments (experimenta lucifera) are a very slight resource in economics.

The case is somewhat different with regard to practical questions. Legislative measures and individual actions are, if so intended, so many experiments on the social system. Thus if several countries, widely differing in other respects, have established a system of peasant proprietary with good results, while several other countries, also widely differing inter se, are without that system and show inferiority, we may argue that peasant proprietary is experimentally justified. The same reasoning would be applicable to commercial policy, and has actually been used in reference to the case of Victoria and New South Wales, but illogically, as a number of cases are required to exclude other influences.

Again, by applying special legislation, e.g. a particular kind of land tenure, to one part of a country, we can ascribe to its influence the special effects noticed in that district. Practical experiments (experimenta fructifera) may also be employed by means of (1) permissive legislation, or (2) temporary legislation.

Private persons also carry out practical economic experiments, as in the cases of profitsharing (Leclaire), and the recent eight hours day experiment at Sunderland (Economic Journal, ii. pp. 755, 756). A large accumulation

of instances may even give a very near approach to rigorous scientific proof.

A vaguer use of the term "experimental method" is common in continental and especially in French writers. J. B. Say, for example, declares that the true method of political economy is La méthode expérimentale qui consiste essentiellement à n'admettre comme vrais que les faits dont l'observation et expérience ont démontré la réalité (Traité, Discours prélre, p. x. 5th ed. 1826). Here "experiment" is used as synonymous with "experience"; it therefore includes observation and experiment in the strict sense.

[J. N. Keynes, Scope and Method of Political Economy, pp. 169-178.-J. S. Mill, Logic, bk. iii. chs. viii., x.; bk. vi. ch. ix.-G. C. Lewis, Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics, ch. vi. Jevons, Methods of Social Reform, pp. 253 seq. -Léon Donnat, La Politique Experimentale, 2nd ed. Paris, 1891].

C. F. B.

EXPERT. An expert may be defined as a person possessing special knowledge of any science or art. Art is here taken in its most comprehensive signification, to include the useful as well as the fine arts, cooking or carpentry as well as music or painting. The opinion of an expert on matters connected with his own subject is more likely to be correct than the opinion of a man to whom that subject is almost or altogether unknown. But the degree in which an expert's opinion outweighs the opinion of the ordinary man will vary according to the nature of the subject.

For, first, the subject may be one with which the ordinary man has no acquaintance, or it may be one with which he is acquainted, although not so fully as the expert. Thus every man in his senses knows to some extent what food is wholesome, although he may not know so much on this point as a qualified doctor. Every man who can write has some power of comparing hands, although not so much power as belongs to an expert in handwriting. But only an expert in navigation can determine the exact position of a ship out of sight of land. Only an expert in astronomy can determine the probable distance of a fixed star from our planet. In such matters the judgment of the ordinary man is absolutely worthless.

Upon

Secondly, the subject may be so complex that no expert has more than a very imperfect knowledge of it. Political and economic science are characterised by this complexity. political or economic questions the opinion of a man who knows much is far more valuable than the opinion of a man who knows little or nothing; but even the opinion of the man who knows much affords a very imperfect security. Such complex questions often present different aspects to different classes of experts. Let us suppose that an opinion is required on the expediency of a law to regulate the hours of labour. At least five different classes of experts

are more or less entitled to be heard:-(a) The economist who has read and reflected upon the theory of economic phenomena; (b) the political philosopher who has read and reflected upon the theory of the state and of legislation; (c) the statesman who is familiar with the practice of government, and can judge what kind of laws it is usually expedient to make and possible to enforce; (d) the employer who has had the opportunity and the will if not the wisdom to discover how production can be carried on to the greatest profit; (e) the workman who has had the opportunity and the will, if not the wisdom, to discover what are the best conditions of life which he can obtain for himself; all these men can bring to the determination of the problem a knowledge which other men do not possess, and are entitled in a greater or less degree to speak with the authority of experts. One person might, of course, combine more than one of these characters, and might, therefore, claim a higher degree of authority.

Thirdly, the subjects of knowledge differ in the degree in which they excite passions such as prevent the expert from employing his intellectual superiority to its fullest advantage. On any subject, indeed, were it astronomy or textual criticism, the judgment of an expert may be disabled by vanity or love of contention.

But

on those subjects which immediately touch the interests of mankind, notably theological, political, and economical subjects, the judgment of the expert is more likely to be disturbed by his passions. These passions are at least as ungovernable in ignorant men. But wherever they prevail they lessen the interval between the ignorant man and the expert. For the finer the intellectual instrument the more it is disturbed by acute emotion.

F. C. M.

EXPERTISE (FRENCH) is the legal process by which judges, when called on to decide special or technical cases, may appoint, on their own authority, or on the demand of one or both of the litigants, persons possessing the necessary knowledge or experience, called experts, to examine, and report on, the points at issue. The conditions under which those operations are conducted are laid down in Arts. 303-323 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One of the most frequent applications of the law is in the settlement of disputes between foreign importers and the French customs authorities relative to the class, quality, origin, or value of merchandise subject to duty. The first supplementary convention to the Anglo-French treaty of commerce of 1860 conferred on British importers in France the right to demand an expertise. When the Customs propose to exercise the right of preemption, the importer and the customs each nominates one of the experts. In case of disagreement the two experts choose an umpire, and if they cannot agree on the choice, the umpire is appointed by the president of the

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nearest tribunal of commerce. Objections were frequently made that the persons named as experts did not possess the necessary qualifications, and on the renewal of the treaty of commerce, in 1873, a protocol was signed, stipulating that they should be chosen from a list of merchants or manufacturers drawn up by the chambers of commerce in each locality having a customs bureau. A British chamber of commerce had just been founded in Paris, and that body submitted to the Paris chamber (French) the names of the principal British merchants in Paris, for them to be comprised in the list of experts; but the French chamber of commerce refused to nominate them on the ground of their foreign nationality, although British traders had previously been accepted as experts. The British chamber appealed to the Foreign Office, and on the intervention of the British ambassador the French minister of foreign affairs considered the claim a just one, and some of the names proposed were added to the list of experts in Paris. Those names were, however, subsequently removed from the list on the expiration of the treaty of commerce in 1881, and British importers who now have disputes with the French customs can only be represented in an expertise by a French merchant or manufacturer, who is naturally disposed to impede, rather than to facilitate foreign competition in his own trade. There

is no appeal from the decision of the experts in commercial affairs, when they agree, but civil expertises are still governed by Art. 323 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which judges are not bound to adopt the opinion of experts if they are not convinced by it.

T. L.

[Lois du 27 Juillet 1822 et du 7 Mai 1881; arrêts de la Cour de Cassation, 30 Avril 1838, et 30 Janvier 1839.]

EXPLOIT. The French verb exploiter primarily means simply to use in such a way as to make a profit out of. It is applied to such actions as working a mine or a railway, cultivating a farm, or publishing a newspaper. There are some things which it is admittedly improper to use in such a way as to make a profit out of them; it is disgraceful, for instance, to exploiter any one's credulity, ignorance, or good nature. Hence the word comes to have sometimes a bad sense. The socialists who teach that the capitalist obtains an illegitimate gain by employing men for wages have applied the term to his action in this bad sense. To exploiter men or labourers thus means to use them in such a way as to make a profit out of them, it being at the same time implied by the use of the word that this, though not perhaps disgraceful to an individual who does it under present circumstances, is fundamentally improper, and would not be allowed in an improved state of society.

It is almost exclusively in this bad sense that