between the citizens of our country and the citizens or subjects of other countries, and between the citizens of the different States."

* *

The following definition is given by the Century Dictionary: "Commerce is an exchange of goods, merchandise, or property of any kind; trade; traffic; * trade on a large scale, carried on by transportation of merchandise between different countries, or between different parts of the same country, distinguished as foreign commerce and internal commerce; as the commerce between Great Britain and the United States, or between New York and Boston."

Webster defines it as "the exchange or buying and selling of commodities; especially the exchange of merchandise on a large scale between different places or communities; extended trade or traffic.'

In the case of Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, the Court said: "No distinction is more popular or more clearly expressed than that between manufacturers and commerce. * * * If it be held that the term includes the regulation of all such manufacturers as are intended to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that this also includes all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate not only manufacturers, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human industry. For is there one of them that does not contemplate more or less clearly, an interstate or foreign market?"

In the case of Mobile vs. Kimball, 102 U. S. 702, we find that commerce among the States within exclusive regulation of Congress consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities.

In Swift vs. Sulphine, 39 Fed. 637, it is said: "Commerce embraces all transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of all such commodities as are transported, bought and sold by the usages of the commercial world."

In Chicago vs. Fuller, 17 Wallace (U. S.) 568, the Court said: "Commerce is traffic, but it is much more. It embraces also transportation by land and water and all means and appliances necessarily employed in carrying it on."

In Groves vs. Slaughter, 15 Peter (U. S.) 511, commerce is defined as "trade, traffic and intercourse."

In the Crandall case, I Nev. 312, it is stated "that the word commerce, as used in the Constitution, includes all its ramifications in every feature or form which it may assume."

In the case of Southern Express Company vs. Goldberg, 62 L. R. A. 670 (Va.) the Court said:

"The contention on behalf of the Southern Express Company is that Section 1215 is in conflict with Section 8, sub-section 3 of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that Congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

"It has long been established by the Supreme Court of the United States, to whose decisions we must look in determining questions of this character, that, as to all subjects of commerce which are national in their character, admitting of only one uniform system or plan of regulation, the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States is not only supreme, but exclusive, and that its failure to act is not to be interpreted as licensing the States to act. The silence of Congress is held to be an emphatic assertion that the subject shall be left free from any restrictions, exactions or burdens. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; Mobile county v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L ed. 238; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, L. ed. 158, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 826; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 L. ed 244, I Inters. Com. Rep. 31, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. ed. 1200, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681.

66 * * It is also an established principle that commerce between the States can be legitimately affected by State Laws in that large class of cases involving the police power of the State, such as laws for the security of the lives, limbs, health and comfort of persons, and the protection of property, or when it does those things

which may otherwise incidentally affect commerce, such as the establishment and regulation of highways, canals, railroads, wharves, ferries, pilotage and other commercial facilities."

In State vs. Morgan, 2 S. Dak. 50, it is said: "Commerce as employed in Section 8, Art. 1, U. S. Constitution, consists of intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation, the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities."

It

In the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. 6, p. 217, we find this definition: "Commerce in its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care and various mediums of exchange become commodities and enter into commerce. is in this latter and broader sense that the term is used in the Constitution of the U. S. in that provision which confers the regulation of commerce upon Congress. By force of this provision, the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various operations, become the objects of commercial regulation. In the widest sense the term includes not only trade, the purchase and sale of commodities, but includes the transportation, navigation and commercial intercourse."

In Welton vs. Missouri, supra, the Court said: "It will not be denied that that portion of commerce with foreign countries and between the States which consists of the transportation and exchange of commodities is of national importance, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation. The full object of investing this power in the general government was to insure this uniformity and avoid discriminating State legislatures."

Then again in the case of Gloucester vs. Pa., 114 U. S. 203, the Court said: "It needs no argument to show that commerce between States which consists of transportation of persons and property between them, is a subject of national character and requires uniformity of regulation."

From the definitions as given above, it is quite apparent that commerce embraces a large variety of subjects, and includes, in its widest sense, every class of commodities or subjects which relate to the ordinary usages of commercial life.

Insurance is nothing, more or less, than a contract whereby for a stipulated consideration, one party agrees to pay to the other party

a specified sum upon the happening of a certain contingency. It is simply an undertaking to indemnify against losses arising upon a contingent event. This definition is in harmony with the English and American authorities.

Two centuries have passed since insurance was first introduced under a royal charter in London, since then it has grown to mighty proportions and has taken a fixed place among our commercial institutions. It required some time to determine that such a business was morally entitled to the support of the Courts, and that it was calculated to prove of large benefit to communities. The feasibility of the scheme has, however, long since been demonstrated, and insurance is now an established fact. It not only has the sanction and approval of the Courts and of the Legislatures of the respective States, but it has the endorsement, when conducted on proper lines, of all intelligent persons interested in the betterment of human conditions. Not only is this true, but insurance, when measured by its multiples of companies, represents one of the largest, if not the largest, financial interests to-day in the commercial world. It is a recognized force in commercial transactions. Policies of insurance are made the means of credit and security for those who have no interest in the life of the party insured other than that created by the insurer himself. This class of insurance differs from that which is represented by Fraternal Beneficiary Associations, but in defining “insurance" we must view it, not in a narrow sense, but in its broadest and most comprehensive scope. Looking at it thus we must recognize that insurance is closely interwoven with commercial interests. While it is a contract, pure and simple, it is a contract which vests, in many instances, by the terms thereof, large and valuable rights in the beneficiary, which, though dependent upon the happening of a certain event, are nevertheless of special commercial value. A beneficiary may, under many of our policies of insurance, contract obligations and secure the same through the assignment of the insurance, thus enabling him to deal in commodities or merchandise, traffic or trade through the contract of insurance. Does not this give to the "insurance contract" a distinct commercial character? Is it not made an avenue of commerce?

It should be borne in mind that insurance is not confined in its relationship to the citizens of the State, where the association or

corporation came into existence, but insurance corporations and associations having their existence under the laws of one State, reach out their ramifications into nearly, if not all, other States throughout the Union, so that their daily transactions are transactions between citizens of the different States, and in this respect they of necessity are interstate and intercommercial. If, therefore, insurance falls within any of the definitions of commerce as above stated, it would seem to follow that Congress has the right to regulate it.

If commerce embraces the agent, the vehicle by and through which commercial relations are operated and maintained, does it not seem clearly within the range of legitimate application to place insurance, as it is to-day recognized and accepted, as one of the branches of commerce? While a contract, is it not a contract which carries with it those objects, those benefits, those interests which enter into many avenues of commercial life?

We speak of insurance as being purchasable. It is certainly something which is on the market, and which can be acquired by anyone who is able to conform to the requirements of the sale. It is one of our largest branches of trade. There is no community to-day which has not its insurance dealer; insurance agent; insurance representative; some one who has insurance to sell; who is seeking a market for it and who is exercising all his power to make disposition of his commodity. The fact that it does not represent merchandise as commonly understood, that it does not represent wares or tangible goods, does not render it any the less a thing of value, something which can be realized upon, something which has its market price, something which has a recognized standing in the ordinary business transactions of life. In many instances it has its actual cash value which can pass from one person to another, so that the party to whom it may be assigned may become vested with a cash interest in a policy under certain conditions, as valuable, under all ordinary circumstances, as the actual cash itself. If this is true, why should insurance not be a subject for Congressional regulation?

President Roosevelt in his message to Congress in December last, referring to the subject of "insurance" said:

"The business of insurance vitally affects the great mass of the people of the United States and is national, not local, in its appli