tablished by law, all church registers are unauthentic and not regarded as public documents in our Courts; and that no presumption was to be indulged in that the statutory law of New York made church registers of births and baptisms admissible in evidence, and without proof on that point the Court would presume that they were not admissible in evidence in the State of New York, and hence not admissible in evidence in the State of Missouri; but

In Hunt vs. Order of Chosen Friends, 64 Mich., 671; 31 N. W., 576, a somewhat different rule was stated. A sworn and examined extract from the parish records certified to under oath, by the priest of the church, that the record was kept according to the rules of the church and more than 30 years old, was received in evidence. The Court said:

"There is no reason why a parish register should not be received and credited. The rule laid down in England, and followed until recent times, which recognized none but registers and similar records of churches of the established religion, has been abrogated there by statute, so as to open the door to many other records which all churches keep; and which are quite as likely to be accurate as those of an established church. Those registers serve a purpose equivalent to that served by family records. In this country they are fairly to be dealt with as equivalent to corporation records, which are generally evidence of such matters as are recorded in the usual course of affairs. There is not much authority on the subject here, but all the analogies and reasons which apply to other presumptively correct documents, apply to these.

"There is no more reason to suppose these entries will be incorrect or falsified than any other. Fraud is possible anywhere; but it cannot be presumed in records of churches any more than in any other documents preserved for similar purposes. The rejection of such proofs would be disastrous. They are relied on by the whole community."

And in Jacobi vs. Order of Germania, 26 N. Y., Supp., 318, certified copies of church record reciting the date of the assured's baptism and of his birth proved to have been kept not under express legal enactment, but regularly from time immemorial by the parish priest and now under direction of the supervisors of schools and churches of the German principality, wherein the church was

located, were held admissible as bearing on the age of the assured as a record of a public nature, under Section 962 of the Code preserving evidence admissible at common law, as such evidence was admissible at common law.

And in American Life Ins. Co. vs. Rosenagel, 77 Pa. State, 77, a copy of the baptismal record was introduced in evidence accompanied by the deposition of the parish priest to the effect that said record was kept according to the laws of the country and that he was the custodian of the records. The Court held that his testimony was sufficient on the subject of the laws of the country on that point saying: "The law of a foreign country on a given subject may be proved by any person, who, though not a lawyer, or not having filled any public office, is or has been in at position to render it probable he would make himself acquainted with it. His knowledge was just that which the responsible head of a public office would be assumed to have of the law which had controlled the past operations of his department. It was his duty to know, and he testified that he did know, the law relating to the records in his charge."

The weight of authority is decidedly to the effect that parish records are admissible in evidence, but care should be taken that copies thereof sought to be introduced in evidence are properly authenticated.

In Supreme Assembly Royal Society of Goodfellows vs. McDonald (N. J.) 35 Atlantic, 1061, a deposition of the parish priest at Stewartstown, Ireland, certifying to the copy of the parish record there kept, was held inadmissible because of failure to show by what law or authority the register was kept, or by whom kept. Neither did it show to what religious denomination the church at Stewartstown belonged.

And in Tessman vs. Supreme Commandry, United Friends of Michigan, 103 Mich. 185; 61 N. W., 261, certified copies of the baptismal record were held to be inadmissible in evidence because the certificate failed to show that the copies were true and accurate copies of the original entries but only asserted that certain facts stated in the certificate were shown by the parish register.

The identity of the person named in the parish record with the

person assured must also be shown before the parish record is admissible in evidence.

In Morrissey vs. Wiggins Ferry Co., 47 Mo., 521, on Page 525, it is said:

"In all these and similar cases the registry is no proof of the identity of the parties there named with the parties in controversy, but the fact of identity must be established by other evidence."

And in Royal Society of Goodfellows vs. McDonald, supra, it is also said:

"It is a well settled rule that a parish register showing only the date of the child's baptism is not evidence of the date of its birth or of its identity."

And in Durfee vs. Abbott, 61 Mich., 471 it is said:

"It is necessary, however, that the defendant should prove the identity of the person baptized with the party litigant, and it was necessary for the jury to be convinced of that fact."

The evidence required to establish a prima facie case of identity of the parties, however, need be but slight.

In Dolan vs. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 173 Mass., 197, it was held:

"That if the name in the naturalization papers was identical with that in the policy, that that fact alone, in connection with the description contained in the papers, would be prima facie evidence of the identity of the person.'

And in Hartshorn vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. Supp., 14, upon the trial the defendant introduced a baptismal record and then showed by the sister of the member that the member's maiden name was the same as that set forth in the baptismal record; and that their parents' names corresponded identically with those given in the baptismal record, and it was held that such record and testimony constituted prima facie evidence of the identity of the assured with the person thus baptised, and that she was living on the date mentioned in the baptismal record which would make her over age at the time she became a member of the society.

Frequently baptismal records state the date of birth as well as the date of baptism, but they are competent only to prove the date of baptism and not the date of birth.

In Houlton vs. Manteuffel (Minn.) 53 N. W., 541 it is said: "Assuming that the certificate of defendant's baptism issued by his church, would have been admissible as an official entry or register to prove the fact and date of his baptism, it was not competent to prove his age or the date of his birth. An official entry or register must speak only to that which it was the duty or business of the official to do and not of extraneous facts which did not occur in his presence. Consequently the mention of a child's age in the registry of christenings is alone no proof of the date of his birth."

And in Kabok vs. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 N. Y., Supp., 718, the Court said:

"The record of baptism contained a statement of birth of the person referred to in it but none of the day on which the baptism itself took place. The extent to which, under the rule applicable to this registry, it could be relied upon as evidence, was the time or date of the baptism. As to the date of the birth of the assured the witness had no knowledge, neither did the registry contain any information of the source or information from which the reference to this fact was made. It was probably derived in some unexplained way from information either obtained from the parents or god-parents of the person baptized "and it was accordingly held the registry could only be relied upon as evidence of the date of baptism and not of the date of birth."

And in McQuirk vs. Mutual Benefit Life Assn. of Hartford, 20 N. Y., Supp., 908, in defense of the action the baptismal record was introduced in evidence. It contained no reference to the date of birth of the person baptized. The Court held it could be received in evidence only to prove the fact of baptism and its date and not of the age of the person.

In Lavin vs. Mutual Aid Society (Wis.), 43 N. W., 143, a baptismal certificate which merely showed the date of the baptism of the person was held inadmissible to prove the date of his birth. The Court said:

"At most it is merely a certificate of the baptism of the deceased. It is true it incidentally mentions or recites the age of the infant baptized, but that was no proof of birth of such infant.” And in State of New Jersey vs. Snover, 63 N. J., Law, 382,

a criminal case, the age of the prosecuting witness was material, and upon this issue the trial Court admitted, over objection, a written certificate of baptism in which the clergyman had given the date of birth. This was illegal evidence.

In Whitcher vs. McLaughlin, 115 Mass., 167, the baptismal certificate was introduced in evidence and treated as an entry made by a third person in the discharge of his official duty. It was held that while the certificate was not evidence of the birth of the party named therein, if there was other evidence tending to fix the member's age at the time, it would become material and the entry as competent as one of the links in the chain of evidence proving the date of birth.

2. PUBLIC RECORDS.

Public records such as Naturalization Papers, Census Returns, Marriage Certificates, Voter's Registration Lists and School Registers, are generally held to be inadmissible in evidence unless the statutes of the State or the laws of the country under which the records are kept require the official having charge of such records to keep a record of the age of the person the record affects.

In Passmore vs. Passmore Estate, 60 Mich., 463, a marriage certificate was introduced in evidence which stated the age of the contracting parties at the time of the issuing of the certificate. The Court held that there was nothing in the law which made the statements of age in the marriage certificate evidence of the age of the parties and the certificate was therefore not admissible in evidence.

In Deutscher Frauen Kranken Verein vs. Gregor, 35 Ill. App. 113, upon a question of age there was introduced in evidence a certificate of the attending physician made by him to the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the City of Chicago. The Court stated that there was no general law requiring such certificate as had been referred to and that no ordinance of the City of Chicago had been put in evidence, and if an ordinance had been put in, one question would be whether it required the age of the person to be stated in the certificate.

In Murray vs. Supreme Lodge, New England Order of Protection, 52 Atlantic, 722 (Conn.), the Statutes of Connecticut pro