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decree of a Circuit Court of the United States, this court has jurisdic-
tion over its judgment to correct the error. Dowell v. Applegate, 327.
e. This court has no jurisdiction to revise the decision of the highest court
of a State, in an action at law, upon a pure question of fact, although
a Federal question might arise if the question of fact were decided in
a particular way. Israel v. Arthur, 355.

7. The decision by the highest court of a State that a woman divorced
from her husband in a proceeding instituted by him and by a decree
which does not bind her, who marries another husband, and lives with
him as his wife, is thereby estopped, after the death of the first hus-
band, from setting up a claim to a widow's share in the distribution
of his estate, presents no Federal question for revision by this court.
1b.
8. The decision of the highest court of a State, in a suit brought by the
State to establish its title to lands within the State, claimed and occu-
pied by a railroad company, that the State was estopped by its acts,
conduct, silence, and acquiescence from setting up such claim, presents
no Federal question for revision by this court. Michigan v. Flint &
Pere Marquette Railroad Co., 363.

9. To give this court jurisdiction over a judgment of the highest court of
a State, the title, right, privilege, or immunity relied on must be
specially set up or claimed at the proper time and in the proper way,
and the decision must be against it; whereas, in this case, the question
was not suggested until after judgment, and after an application for
rehearing had been overruled, and only then in the form of a motion
to transfer the cause. Duncan v. Missouri, 377.

10. Compliance with a mandate of this court, which leaves nothing to the
judgment or discretion of the court below, may be enforced by man-
damus. City Bank of Fort Worth v. Hunter, 512.

11. This court cannot entertain an appeal from a judgment executing its
mandate, if the value of the matter in dispute upon the appeal is less
than $5000.

lb.

12. No appeal lies from a decree for costs. Ib.

-

13. The verdict and judgment in the court below having been for $5000,
and that judgment having been a few days later amended on the
motion-apparently ex parte — of the defendant, by adding to it the
sum of $116.73, interest, this court, as the defendant made the motion
with the sole object of obtaining a writ of error not otherwise allow-
able, declines to permit what was done to be efficacious in the accom-
plishment of the purpose designed, and dismisses the writ of error.
Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Booth, 671.

14. When a defendant, after the close of the plaintiff's evidence, moves to
dismiss, and, the motion being denied, excepts thereto, and then pro-
ceeds with his case, and puts in evidence on his part, he thereby
waives the exception, and the overruling of the motion to dismiss can-
not be assigned for error. Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Daniels, 684.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. A Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction over a suit to
enforce a contract for the conveyance of land brought in the State
where the land is situated by the assignee of one party to the contract
against the other party, if both parties to the contract are citizens of
the same State, although the assignee is a citizen of a different State.
Plant Investment Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway, 71.
2. Under the act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, the Circuit Court of the
United States has no jurisdiction, either original, or by removal from
a state court, of a suit as one arising under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States, unless that appears by the plaintiff's
statement of his own claim. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 454.

C. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
The District Court of the United States in the District of Kansas had
jurisdiction over a prosecution for the crime of perjury, in violation
of the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 5392, committed in what is now the
Territory of Oklahoma before the passage of the act creating that
Territory, although the indictment was not found until after the pas-
sage of that act. Caha v. United States, 211.

LACHES.

1. The facts admitted or proved in this case show that the plaintiff was
guilty of laches in failing to file his bills for so long a time, and it is
held that they were properly dismissed by the court below. Halstead
v. Grinnan, 412.

2. Laches is an equitable defence, controlled by equitable considerations,
and the lapse of time must be so great, and the relations of the de-
fendant to the rights such, that it would be inequitable to permit the
plaintiff to assert them, where he has had for a considerable period
knowledge of their existence, or might have acquainted himself with
them, by the use of reasonable diligence. Ib.

3. The length of time during which a party neglects the assertion of his
rights which must pass in order to show laches, varies with the
peculiar circumstances of each case, and is not subject to an arbitrary
rule. Ib.

See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 4.

LAGER BEER.

See SPIRITUOUS LIQUOR.

LEASE.

See LOCAL LAW, 1.

LIMITED LIABILITY.

See SHIPS AND SHIPPING.

LOCAL LAW.

1. An owner of grazing land in Texas, who stocks his land with cattle
greatly in excess of the number which can be fed upon it, and per-
mits them to go on and occupy and feed from the grass growing upon
unoccupied land of a neighboring proprietor, with no separating fence,
becomes liable to the latter for the rental value of his land so occu-
pied. Lazarus v. Phelps, 81.

2. Evidence of the payment of the purchase money due to the State of
Pennsylvania on a land warrant, clothes the person paying it with the
ownership of the warrant, and with the right to maintain ejectment
for the land. Murphy v. Packer, 398.

3. A recital in a patent from Pennsylvania to B of a conveyance by A to
B before the warrant issued, is no evidence against persons claiming
under C to whom a previous patent had issued for the same land upon
the warrant to A. Ib.

4. When county commissioners in Pennsylvania buy in for the county
land sold for nonpayment of taxes, and the land, while owned by the
county, is illegally assessed for taxes, and sold for nonpayment of
them, and conveyance is duly made to the purchaser, who remains in
possession forty years, the county is estopped from asserting title in
itself.

lb.

5. When a valid title to real estate in Pennsylvania becomes vested in a
person by reason of the ownership of a land warrant and his pay-
ment of the purchase money to the State, a stranger to his title, claim-
ing under another and distinct title, cannot avail himself of the act of
April 22, 1856, Purdon's Digest, 1064, 11th ed., with regard to implied
or resulting trusts. Ib.

Arkansas.
Illinois.

Montana.
Mississippi.
Texas.
Utah.

See RAILROAD, 3.

See ASSIGNMENT FOR Benefit of

CREDITORS, 3, 4; EQUITY, 4.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.

See GUARDIAN AND Ward.
See LOCAL LAW, 1.

See CONTRACT, 2.

LONGEVITY PAY.

1. Under the act of March 3, 1883, c. 97, 22 Stat. 473, an officer in the
navy, who resigns one office the day before his appointment to a higher
one, though in a different branch of the service, is only entitled to
longevity pay as of the lowest grade, having graduated pay, held by
him since he originally entered the service. United States v. Alger,

384.

2. United States v. Alger, 151 U. S. 362, and United States v. Stahl, 151 U. S.
366, reaffirmed. Ib.

MANDATE.

See JURISDICTION, A, 10, 11.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. When the employé of a railroad company sues the company to recover
damages for injuries inflicted upon him while in its service by reason
of defective machinery, and it plainly appears that he was guilty of
contributory negligence, and there is no evidence of a wilful or inten-
tional negligence on the part of the railroad company for the purpose
of injuring the plaintiff, there is nothing in the case to submit to the
jury. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway v. Schumacker, 77.
2. A switchman in the employ of a railroad company was directed, in the
line of his regular duty, to connect together two cars, one of which was
loaded with bridge timbers. The timbers were unusually and danger-
ously loaded, extending so far over the end of the car as to make the
coupling dangerous. The switchman had no notice or knowledge of
this fact, and in making the coupling was very severely injured. To
an action brought to recover damages for the injury, the railroad com-
pany pleaded that the injuries were the result of the switchman's neg-
ligence, and not of the negligence of the company, and on the trial
asked to have the jury instructed to return a verdict for defendant.
The court declined, and instructed the jury on this point, in effect,
that they were to find whether the car was or was not properly loaded,
and whether the plaintiff, by the exercise of proper diligence, could or
could not have discovered the projecting timber before the cars came
together and in time to avoid the danger, and that if he could not, by
the exercise of such diligence, have so discovered it, then he was en-
titled to recover. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Held,
that, as there was no conclusive evidence of a want of due care on the
part of the switchman in not observing the projecting timber while in
discharge of his duty, and while his attention was directed to his work,
there was no error or unfairness in these instructions. Northern Pa-
cific Railroad v. Everett, 107.

3. A railroad company is bound to see to it, at the proper inspecting sta-
tion, that the wheels of the cars in a freight train about to be drawn
out upon the road are in a safe and proper condition; and if the ser-
vants to whom it delegates this duty perform it so negligently as to
permit a car to go into service on the train, one of the wheels of which
has an old crack in it some twelve inches long, filled with grease, rust
and dirt, but which could have been detected without difficulty, and
in consequence of that wheel's giving way while the train is in motion
an accident takes place by which another servant of the company is
injured, the company is liable therefor. Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Daniels, 684.

MINERAL LAND.

1. The side lines of the location of a lode claim, under Rev. Stat. § 2322,
are those which run on each side of the vein or lode, distant not more

than 300 feet from the middle of such vein. King v. Amy & Silver-
smith Mining Co., 222.

2. A line in such a location which does not run parallel with the course
of the vein, but crosses it, is an end line. Ib.

3. When, in making such a location, the claimant calls the longer lines.
which cross the vein, side lines, and the shorter lines, which do not
cross it, end lines, this court will disregard, in its decision, the mis-
take of the locator in the designation of the side and end lines, and
will hold the locator to the lines properly designated by him, as it
cannot relocate them for him. Ib.

4. A deed of a mining claim by a qualified locator to an alien operates as
a transfer of the claim to the grantee, subject to question in regard to
his citizenship by the government only. Manuel v. Wulff, 505.

5. If, in a contest concerning a mining claim, under Rev. Stat. § 2326, one
party, who is an alien at the outset, becomes a citizen during the pro-
ceedings and before judgment, his disability under Rev. Stat. § 2319
to take title is thereby removed. lb.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.

MORTGAGE.

See PARTIES, 2, 3.

MOTION TO DISMISS.

See JURISDICTION, A, 14.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

The Mayor and City Council of Boston had authority, in 1885, to authorize
the City Water Board, without previous advertisement, to contract for
the exchange of such pumping engines and machinery as were inade-
quate or of insufficient capacity for those of the capacity required by
plans and estimates for a high-service extension previously made, and
to direct that the expense of such exchange should be charged to the
appropriation for high-service extension; and the contract made by
the Water Board, in pursuance of such authority, and without pre-
vious advertising, is binding on the city. Worthington v. Boston, 695.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. After serving as a brakeman in the employ of a railroad company, S. be-
came a conductor on the same railroad, and as such had been engaged
at a depot yard at one of its stations at least once a week, and usually
oftener, for seven years. While making up his train at that yard, pre-
paratory to running out with it, after the chief brakeman had failed
in an attempt to make a coupling he tried to make it. There was an
unblocked frog at the switch where the car was. He put his foot into
this frog, and was told by the brakeman that he would be caught if
he left it there. He took it out, but put it in again, and, being unable

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