city officers no more than two officers shall be elected, i. e., the mayor and members of the council. When we add to this the provision that municipal elections shall not be held at the same time as State and national elections (Const. Amend., Art. First, 3; Mun. Corps., Art. VII, 2) we are justified in believing that the municipal voter will, if this principle is incorporated into law, at the same time not need to place the reliance he has to place at present on the national and State political parties, and will be able to vote not because of any influence which that vote will have on the future of his party, but because of the influence he thinks it will have upon the municipal issues in which he is interested.

With this same end in view, provision has been made (Ibid.) for nomination for municipal office by petition of a small number of citizens, for personal registration, an absolutely secret vote and a blanket ballot with the names of candidates alphabetically arranged under the title of the office and that each voter shall vote separately for each candidate for whom he votes. If such methods of nominations and elections are followed it is believed that voters may be able in their municipal elections either to break away altogether from the State and national parties and form separate municipal parties, or may, because of the greater powers of independent political action they will possess, be able to force the local organizations of the State and national parties to fight out city elections on the basis of city issues. Whichever may be the outcome is a matter of little importance, provided an unbiased and unprejudiced consideration of city issues by the city voters is secured.

Such, then, are the purposes of the draft, and such has been the way in which it has been attempted to effectuate them. It has been felt that city government must, to be efficient, be emanci

pated from the tyranny of the national and State political parties, and from that of the Legislature-the tool of the party. It must, however, be subject to the proper control of the State government as the representative of the interests of the State. To avoid tyranny and preserve control is not easy. The problem may be solved, however, by diminishing both the temptations and opportunities for tyranny and by throwing limitations about the exercise of the control without destroying it. These temptations and opportunities have, it is hoped, been diminished by making special legislation very difficult, by enlarging the powers of the cities, by making the control of the city government of little value to the parties through reduction of patronage and a publicity of accounts, and finally by making it easy for the city voter to separate city from State and national issues, and to insist that these city issues shall receive attention apart from any considerations of national and State politics. The State control has been preserved, but its exercise has been taken from the legislative and intrusted to administrative officers wherever it has been felt that its preservation is absolutely necessary.

PUBLIC OPINION AND CITY GOVERNMENT UNDER

THE PROPOSED MUNICIPAL PROGRAM

HORACE E. DEMING

Honest, efficient, and progressive city government is impossible in the United States without the support of a strong public opinion. Public opinion which can not be effectively expressed and carried out is, for practical purposes, non-existent. No proposition for the improvement of city government in the United States is worth consideration that does not provide for the full, free, and deliberate expression of the wishes of the voters and for the carrying of their wishes into effect. No scheme of city government will give promise of much improvement which will not develop an effective and general interest among the voters themselves in the actual conduct of the public affairs of the city.

One of the problems which the proposed Municipal Program undertakes to solve is to provide a form of city government which will compel the development of this interest, and upon which the public opinion of the voters, when deliberately expressed, will be effective.

To some it may seem a startling statement that, so far at least as city government is concerned, there is not only not now, but there never has been, a public opinion in the United States which has either prevented or corrected the principal evils of bad city government. But how else shall we account for the fact that the remedy for such evils has almost invariably been to deprive the city of power to perform the very functions which naturally belong to it? For example, the limitation of the city's power to levy

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taxes for city purposes is almost universal in this country; the public opinion of its citizens is not deemed sufficiently intelligent or effective to keep the city from bankruptcy. And how otherwise shall we account for the general resort by the city to outside agencies in order to conduct purely city affairs? Witness the constant appeals to the State Legislature to remedy this or that purely local trouble or to create permanent or temporary boards of officials to perform purely local functions. Even in the election of the public officers of the city, its citizens rely mainly upon the agency of national or State political parties. Where in the United States is there a city which possesses all the powers requisite to conduct its local affairs without aid or interference from the State Legislature? or whose elective officers are not usually the product of the activities of national or State political parties? or in which the framework of the city government favors the full, free, and deliberate expression of the popular will as to the conduct of city affairs?

Sufficient reasons for this lack of local public spirit may be found in our political history.

From the origin of our government to almost the year 1876 the one great political question that, almost to the exclusion of every other, absorbed the attention of our citizens, was whether the United States were to be a nation or a federal league. From the surrender of Cornwallis to the withdrawal of the Union troops from the Southern States after the Civil War, the public had neither time nor inclination to consider problems of administration. It was not till the decade from 1876 to 1886 that the importance of good administration to good government began to attract public attention at all effectively. The century of political travail which had given birth to our national life left behind it,

moreover, political habits of thought and political methods of action which have made improvement in public administration difficult and slow. City government, more than either national or State government, is an administrative problem. Until 1860 our cities were few and small; we may be almost said to have had no cities. What wonder, then, that, if there be not yet an enlightened public opinion sufficiently strong to compel the administrative service of the State or of the nation to be conducted upon an efficient and economical plan, there should also be lacking the enlightened public opinion to compel honest, efficient, and progressive city government?

Another historical reason for the lack of city public spirit has been the marked influence of the political theory of division of the fundamental powers of government among many different officials. The constitutional scheme of government devised by the fathers was one of checks and balances. A President, a Senate, a House of Representatives, and a Supreme Court, each the product of a different electorate or appointing body, and each vested with different functions, were set the one against the other to conduct the government. Only a portion of the population could take any direct part in selecting the rulers of the country. Even this limited class had no direct voice in the selection of President or Senators. The Supreme Court was appointed by the President. Representatives held office for two years, the President for four years, Senators for six years. A manifest tendency of such a plan was to produce inefficient administration and a government not responsive to the popular will. The division of power among so many different officers and the different sources from which these officers derived their authority, dissipated responsibility for offical conduct. And, since the nearest approach of the government