subject to these reasonable rules and regula- | who was merely guilty at most of an error of tions; and it is his duty when he purchases a judgment or neglect to make the inquiries he ticket, to inform himself as to the train he pro- ought legally to have made.] Twenty-second poses to enter, and to ascertain what his ticket assignment of error. entitles him to. [If he fails to do this, and without any fault or neglect or violation of their own rules on the part of the railroad company by which such error is brought about, he takes a train on which his ticket is not good, he may be obliged to leave such train, he not being subjected to unnecessary force or being put off at a dangerous or improper place.] [The forcible ejection of a passenger from a train, especially at a point away from a station, or even at a station, is such an exercise of authority as should only be undertaken in a clear case; much more when the place is not at a station, and they have no right to eject a passenger at a place of danger, or where injury is liable to result.] Sixteenth and seventeenth assignments of error. [Where a person knowingly violates the rules of a railroad by intruding upon a train without a ticket, or with a ticket that he knows does not entitle him to travel on such train, such person becomes a mere trespasser and is not entitled to the same care or consideration that should be given to one who unwittingly and ignorantly and innocently gets upon a train upon which his ticket does not entitle him to ride.] Eighteenth assignment of error. [You are instructed, as a matter of law in this case, that it was Mr. Rosenzweig's duty to ascertain whether his ticket entitled him to a passage on the train in question before going upon it; and if he failed to do so the Company would have a right to carry out its rule and to eject him from the car, using no more force than was necessary, and putting him off at a safe place, in accordance with its own rule, which prohibited conductors from ejecting a passenger except at a station or near a dwelling house.] Nineteenth assignment of error. [If the plaintiff, knowing that he was not entitled to ride on No. 20, and in willful violation of the rules of the Company, entered the train, then he would, I take it, be entitled to less consideration than he otherwise could claim: he would be a mere trespasser; the law would not hold the Company or its officers to so careful a line of conduct as in the case of a merely negligent but well meaning person who had ignorantly or carelessly entered the wrong train;] [but if he had been carried before on this train, on the same kind of ticket, and having no knowledge or notice that his round trip ticket was not good, he entered the car without any objection being made by the employees of the Company, whose duty it was to see that the door of the car was kept locked, and that persons not having the proper ticket were not allowed to enter, he could not afterwards be treated as a wrong doer and mere trespasser, and summarily ejected at such place as suited the caprice or temper of the conductor, and in violation of the rule of the Company which requires that passengers should not be put off except at a station, or near a dwelling house; and such ejection would be wrongful.] Twenand ticenty-first assignments of error. It was the duty of the conductor to use discrimination, and not to treat as a mere trespasser and tramp and wrong doer, a passenger The duty of the conductor was to comply with the rules of the Company and, if the plaintiff was without a proper ticket, to put him off at a station or dwelling house; and if he chose to treat the plaintiff as a mere, wanton, wrong doer and willful trespasser, by ejecting him in the Company's yard, at a distance from the station and away from dwelling houses, and at a dangerous place, he took the risk for his employer of such ejection at such improper place, afterwards turning out to be a mistake. [In this view of the case it becomes important for you to consider and determine as between the conflicting evidence of the plaintiff and Williams, and the plaintiff and Jacob Loesch; for, if their evidence is credited, the plaintiff must stand in a somewhat different position from that which he will occupy in case you find their evidence is unreliable, and that the plaintiff was merely ignorantly and innocently on the train, instead of being there surreptitiously and knowing him to be there without right.] Twenty-third assignment of error. The plaintiff requested the court to charge, inter alia, as follows: 1. If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff purchased a first class ticket entitling him to ride from Erie to Cleveland and return; that he had no notice from the defendant that his ticket so purchased did not entitle him to ride on train No. 20; that the servants of the defendant, in violation of the rule of defendant, omitted to lock the doors of the car when in Cleveland, or to notify the plaintiff that he had no right to take a seat in said car: that they permitted him to take a seat in said car; that the servants of defendant ejected plaintiff from said car after the train had left the depot, when it was passing through the yard of defendant's railway; that said yard was considered by defendant to be a dangerous place; that plaintiff, when endeavoring with care to walk through said yard back to the depot, was hurt by a car or by falling into or over some obstruction, then, and in that case, your verdict should be for the plaintiff. Answer. This cannot be affirmed as an entirety; the plaintiff was not entitled to notice that the ticket he held did not allow him to ride on the train in question; but if he had been previously carried on the train on the same kind of a ticket, and in good faith, without notice or knowledge on his part that he had no right to a passage on the particular train mentioned, and with permission and acquiescence of the employees of defendant, the plaintiff took a seat in a car of said train, and the employees of the defendant Corporation afterwards ejected him at a dangerous place, and the plaintiff, while using ordinary care and caution, in endeavoring to make his way through the yard back to the depot, received injuries such as should have been foreseen by the conductor of the train as the natural or probable consequence of leaving the plaintiff in such a place in the night time, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. First assignment of error. 2. That if the jury find from the evidence that the servants of the defendant ejected the plaintiff from its cars, not at a regular station | right to be there, or whether he was there innor at a dwelling house, as required by the rules of the Company, but at a place known to the defendant to be dangerous and unsafe, then, and in that case, if they find for the plaintiff their verdict should be for punitive damages. Answer. This is affirmed, with the single qualification that while the jury may, under such circumstances, find punitive or exemplary damages in favor of plaintiff, they are at liberty to find compensatory damages only, if they see proper. Second assignment of error. The defendant requested the court to charge, inter alia, as follows: 1. That plaintiff was bound to ascertain and know the rules and regulations prescribed by the defendant Company, under which passengers could ride upon that train, and that the law presumes he did know them. Answer. The first part of this point is affirmed; but the last is refused. It is true that the plaintiff was bound to ascertain the rules of the Company as to the train on which he took passage, but there is no legal presumption that he did so ascertain them. Third assignment of error. 3. The plaintiff in this action admits and testifies that he did not know and made no effort to ascertain whether, under the rules of the Company, his ticket entiled him to ride on the train from which he was ejected; if, therefore, the jury shall find from the evidence in this case that (under the established rules of defendant Company) the ticket that the plaintiff had purchased did not entitle him to ride on that particular train, then the court is requested to charge, as a matter of law, that, no special contract being averred or proved, the plaintiff became and was a trespasser on that particular train, and defendant had a perfect legal right to eject him therefrom, using no more force than was necessary for that purpose. Answer. This is for the jury. Instructions should be asked for on a hypothetical case, and not by requiring the court to affirm or negative alleged facts as having been proven. The legal proposition included in this point is covered by the answer to the next point. Fourth assignment of error. 66 4. If the jury shall find, from the evidence in this case and within the law as it shall be given them by the court, that under established rules of defendant Company the plaintiff had no legal right to be on the particular train of defendant Company from which he was ejected, and was a trespasser thereon, then the court is requested to charge you as a matter of law that defendant Company was not required to put him off at one place rather than another; while the law will not permit a person to be exposed wantonly to peril, there is no rule which requires any consideration to be shown for the mere convenience of a wrong doer" or trespasser; and if the jury shall find from the evidence in this case that plaintiff was a wrong doer and trespasser on said train, then plaintiff cannot recover in this action without averring and proving that the act was willful and wanton, which he has not done. Answer. This is refused. It is for the jury to find from the evidence whether the plaintiff was a mere trespasser, wantonly and knowingly intruding on the train, aware of his having no nocently and ignorantly, in good faith, and through the negligence of the servants of the Company (defendant) in omitting to obey the rule which required them to take precaution against persons without proper tickets getting upon said train. The mere fact that the ticket held by plaintiff did not entitle him to be carried on that particular train, under the rules and regulations of the Company (defendant), would not, as assumed in this point, entitle the defendant's servants to treat him as a wrong doer or relieve the Company from treating him with care and humanity. Fifth assignment of error. 5. Plaintiff's right to recover in this action must be measured by the averments contained in his declaration; plaintiff has, in legal effect, alleged a right to recover based upon a contract which entitled him to a ride from Cleveland to Erie on the particular train from which he was ejected. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show this. The court is requested to charge as a matter of law that plaintiff has wholly failed to prove such a contract, and therefore cannot recover in this action. Answer. This is refused. The right of the plaintiff to recover in this action does not depend entirely upon his showing a right to ride upon the train in question. Sixth assignment of error. 7. That if the jury find from the evidence in this case that under the rules of the defendant Company the conductor could not receive a round trip ticket nor money from the plaintiff for a ride from Cleveland to Erie upon said train, the conductor had a legal right to put him off the train when he saw fit; and unless in doing so he used more force than was necessary, and that plaintiff was injured by the use of such unnecessary force, he cannot recover. Answer. This is refused. The conductor had no right to put the plaintiff off the train except at a proper and safe place; and it is for the jury to say from the evidence whether the place where plaintiff was ejected was a proper and safe place or otherwise. Seventh assignment of error. 8. That under the evidence in this case the plaintiff was unlawfully upon the train, and therefore a trespasser, and the conductor had a perfect legal right to expel him from the train at any time he saw fit, and the defendant is not liable for any injuries that he received as the result of such legal expulsion; therefore the jury cannot consider the question of whether the plaintiff was in fact injured on his way back to the depot from the place where he was so put off said train, or the question in what manner such injury occurred, if it did occur. fused. Eighth assignment of error. Re 9. Persons about to walk upon a railroad track, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, are bound to recognize all the natural and usual hazards of the undertaking, and make use of their sense of hearing as well as sight; and if either cannot be rendered available, the obligation to use the other is stronger, to ascertain while they are on or about the tracks whether a train is in dangerous proximity, or injury from any cause is to be apprehended; and if they attempt to walk in such a place without this precaution, it will be at their own peril and responsibility, for the consequences cannot be | tributing to the injury, and he cannot recover shifted upon the defendant. Affirmed. in this action. 10. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff was left by the conductor in a reasonably safe place between the tracks of the defendant Company's road, he was bound as a prudent and careful man not to leave such place until he could find another equally safe, if such another could be found with reasonable diligence and care on his part; and if he failed to use such reasonable diligence and care, he was guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover. Affirmed. Answer. This is affirmed, with the quaiification that the jury should examine the evidence carefully, plaintiff being a stranger at the place, and his evidence being that the conductor pointed towards the depot as a place of safety towards which he should make his way by the tracks. Ninth assignment of error. 15. If the jury shall find, from the evidence in this case, that on the north side of defendant's tracks at Erie Street there was a platform and stairway ascending therefrom to a bridge from which there was a safe way to escape from the tracks and all dangers incident thereto, and that on the south side of defendant's right of way there was a well defined pathway leading to other steps ascending to Erie Street, over and by either of which plaintiff could travel in safety southward to the city, and by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence on his part he might have discovered these safe methods of travel, then he was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury, and he cannot recover in this action. Affirmed. 11. If the jury find, from the evidence, that the tracks in the defendant Company's yard were lighted, artificially or otherwise, at the time and place when and where plaintiff was put off the car, so that a man of ordinary observation could see all the surroundings with reasonable clearness, and with reasonable care and prudence in observing his surroundings could have found the safe means of escape from the tracks of the Company's road; which the evidence shows existed, and did not use such reasonable care and prudence in seeking such means of escape from any dangers that 16. The plaintiff has testified in this action may have then existed, he was guilty of con- that after being ejected from the train he tributory negligence, and cannot recover. Af- walked down the tracks and towards the depot, firmed. without looking for a safe way of travel by way of the platform and stairway leading to the bridge at Erie Street. His admitted neglect in this regard was a violation of the duty that the law imposed, and was contributory negligence, and the plaintiff cannot recover. 12. That if the jury find, from the evidence, that plaintiff was put off the cars without violence, and without any personal injury to him up to the time he was so put off, but that the injuries of which he complains were all received after he was so put off the cars, and in an attempt to reach the city or the depot, the plaintiff cannot recover, unless the jury find from the same evidence that the injury he did receive was the natural and probable consequence of the act of the conductor, such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the case might and ought to have been foreseen by the conductor as likely to flow from his act. Affirmed. 13. That even if the conductor had no right to put the plaintiff off the car as he did, if he put him off without violence or immediate injury, and under an honest belief that he had a right to do so, and the alleged personal injury was received after he was so put off the cars, plaintiff cannot recover for the injury so received unless such injuries were the natural and probable consequence of the act of the conductor; such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the case might and should have been foreseen by the conductor as likely to flow from his act. Affirmed. Answer. I decline to affirm the matter of fact claimed in this point. It was the duty of the plaintiff to make every effort to secure his own safety; and if by this neglect to do so he sustained injury, he cannot recover. It is not for the court to affirm alleged points of evidence; that is for the jury. The proper way is to put a hypothetical case. Tenth assignment of error. 17. If the jury shall find from the evidence in this case that after plaintiff was ejected from the car he walked down the tracks of the defendant Company and negligently or otherwise placed himself in front of a moving car or train, or heedlessly ran into or on to something, in consequence of which an injury resulted, then the court is requested to charge, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence contributing to the injury, and cannot recover in this action. Affirmed. 18. If the plaintiff himself cannot tell how he received his alleged injuries, whether by a blow from a moving car or engine, or by a fall over some obstacle in his path, the jury cannot guess, speculate or infer how his alleged inju al and probable consequence of the act of the conductor, such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the case might and ought to have been foreseen by the conductor as likely to occur; and the verdict should be for the defendant. 14. If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that at Erie Street bridge there were two safe ways by which plaintiff could have trav-ries were received, nor that they were the natureled south to the city, one by the platform and stairway, on the south side of defendant's tracks, and another by the well defined pathway on the north side of the defendant's tracks, then it will not do for plaintiff to say that he did not know of them, for the law made it his duty to look around and know for himself that there were such places of safe travel; and if he neglected this obvious duty and pursued his way down the tracks and yard of the defendant Company, in consequence of which an injury resulted, then he was guilty of negligence con Answer. While it is true that the jury cannot guess, speculate or infer as to how the plaintiff's injuries were received, yet if they believe from the evidence that such injuries were received by the plaintiff as the direct consequence of his expulsion from the train, and were such injuries as might have been foreseen by the conductor as the natural or probable consequence of leaving the plaintiff at such a place, and that the inability of the plaintiff to testify as to the manner in which he was hurt, results from his having been rendered insensible at the time from such injuries, the fact that he is unable to give an account of the manner of his being so hurt should not of itself have the effect of defeating his claim. The point is therefore refused. Eleventh assignment of error. 19. The plaintiff having testified in answer to the following question to wit: Q. Now, in your direct examination, as I un. derstand you, you didn't know how you were hurt? A. I have so stated, that I didn't know the exact cause. It was a blow from the rear, or I was struck from the rear; whether it was by a car or locomotive, or whether by the projection or whether from the shove I got, or whether a trip and a fall and falling and doing it; I don't know whether it was from the rear; I don't know what did it. Q. You don't know whether you was hit by an engine or car, or whether you were sandbagged? A. No sir. Q. Then it is altogether probable that the blow was the cause of the fall? A. It may have been. I haven't any means of knowing. Q. What is your best impression? Q. You haven't any impressions about it? And the foregoing being the uncontradicted evidence of the plaintiff himself, the court is requested to charge the jury that there is no evidence that the expulsion from the cars was the direct cause of the injury, and that therefore the plaintiff cannot recover for any injuries sustained after he was put off the cars. Answer. This is refused for the reason just stated in answer to the eighteenth point of defendant, and for the further reason that it is not proper to require the court to read to the jury particular portions of the evidence in a case, and thus to give it undue prominence, besides affirming its correctness. The proper method is to put a hypothetical case. Twelfth assignment of error. 20. It being an undisputed fact that the plaintiff did not receive the injuries complained of in the act of his ejection from the car, but afterwards, he must satisfy the jury by the evidence how he received his alleged injuries; and unless he has done so he cannot recover. Answer. This is affirmed, but not in the narrow sense of requiring the plaintiff to show the exact manner of his being hurt, if he is unable to do so. It is sufficient if the jury find from the evidence that the injuries were such as resulted and might have been foreseen as the natural or probable consequence of ejecting the plaintiff at night at the place where he was put off. Thirteenth assignment of error. 21. That under all the evidence in this case the plaintiff cannot recover and the verdict must be for the defendant. Answer. This is refused. jury under all the evidence. ment of error. The case is for the Fourteenth assign The court admitted the following evidence of Dr. Brandes, the plaintiff's physician: Q. What, if anything, during the time you were treating him, was said by him in relation to his feet? A. He complained of coldness in his feet. Objected to-that the statements of the plaintiff to his physician are not competent unless against his interest; and also objects to this testimony of what the plaintiff said to him; that the doctor is called as a medical expert, and that he is not to state the statements of the witness. The court: The exclamations of pain and the statements of the patient to his physician, as to his suffering and the locality from which the suffering came, is competent evidence, and the objection is overruled. Twenty-fourth assignment of error. The court excluded the following question and offer on the part of the defendant: Q. Do you know of your own knowledge where Collin's puller was when No. 20 pulled out of the Union Depot going east? Objected to as leading. The court: That is leading and excluded. Defendant's counsel offers this to find out whether the witness does know where the train was, to be followed by asking him, if he answers that he does know, where it was. The court: It is a leading question and overruled because it admits of a yes or no answer. Twenty-fifth assignment of error.. The court allowed the following question to be asked defendant's witness: Q. The fare from Cleveland to Erie was the same on all express trains for one through ticket from Cleveland to Erie, as on this Limited Express? Objected to by the defense, as incompetent testimony and not cross examination. The court: He has testified that this ticket was not good on that train; now that opens the door for you to cross examine him as to what trains it would be good on; and I don't know but what it would as to what the fare was on other trains, as testing his recollection and credibility as to that point; the question is allowed. Twenty-sixth assignment of error. The court also allowed the following question to be asked defendant's witness: Q. Didn't you say to Policemen Shaffer and Sandusky that Dr. Brandes was in "cohoots" with him? A. No sir. The court: It is strictly cross examination. Any question that will show the bias or prejudice of the witness is always admitted. Twentyseventh assignment of error. Messrs. Rasselas Brown, John P. Vincent, C. D. Roys and S. M. Brainerd, for plaintiff in error: A railroad company has a right to make and enforce all needful and reasonable rules and regulations for the management and operation of its road and trains. Johnson v. R. R. Corp. 46 N. H. 213 and cases there cited; State v. Overton, 14 Neb. 435: R. R. Co. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; Cheney v. R. R. Co, 11 Met. 121. It is the duty of persons doing business with the company to inform themselves of the rules and regulations and to conform to them. Dietrich v. R. R. Co. 71 Pa. 432; R. Co. v. Clark, 72 Pa. 231; R. R. Co. v. Green, 86 Pa. 421; Crawford v. R. R. Co. 26 Ohio St. 580; R. R. Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 421. In case of purchasing a ticket it is the duty of a person to know on what train it can be used; the ticket is but a part of the contract for passage, the rules and regulations being the other part. Dietrich v. R. R. Co., R. Co. v. Clark, Crawford v. R. R. Co, and R. R. Co. v. Whittemore, supra. The law imposing the duty of knowledge upon the passenger, there is a conclusive legal presumption that he had the knowledge. Horan v. Weiler, 41 Pa. 470. There can be no recovery unless there is negligence; and there can be no negligence without a breach of duty. R. R. Co. v. Schwindling, 101 Pa. 258; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125. A railroad company has the right to forcibly eject those who refuse to comply with reasonable regulations. Hibbard v. R. R. Co. 15 N. Y. 455; Townsend v. R. R. Co. 56 N. Y. 295; R. R. Co. v. Fleming, 18 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 347; R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Frederick v. R. R. Co. 37 Mich. 342. It is always a question of law for the court, whether the admitted or uncontroverted facts, as they stand upon the record, constitute a legal cause of action. Paddon v. People's Ins. Co. 107 Ill. 195; R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 128; Grows v. R. R. Co. 67 Me. 100; Hong v. R. Co. 85 Pa. 293; R. R. Co. v. Schwindling, 101 Pa. 258. To permit a jury to pass upon a fact admitted or unquestioned is to permit it to find a fact not admitted, and therefore to find a condition of things which is denied by both parties to the suit. Hoag v. R. R. Co. 85 Pa. 297; King v. Thompson, 87 Pa. 369; R. R. Co. v. Fries, 87 Pa. 234; Harrisburg v. Saylor, 87 Pa. 216; Goshorn v. Smith, 92 Pa. 435; Jennings v. R. R. Co. 93 Pa. 337; R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 128; Paddon v. People's Ins. Co. 107 Ill. 198; Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116 (89 U. S. bk. 22, L. ed. 780). The court assumed that the acts were willful and wanton. It should have been left to the jury. R. R. Co. v. Harwood, 80 Ill. 88; Payne v. Reese, 100 Pa. 306; Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Pa. 78; Baker v. Fehr, 97 Pa. 72; Goshorn v. Smith, 92 Pa. 435; R. R. Co. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 15; Harrisburg v. Saylor, 87 Pa, 216. It has never been judicially determined that the acts specified in the instruction constituted negligence. R. R. v. Co. Kirk, 90 Pa. 19. There was no cause of action made out under the declaration. Frederick v. R. R. Co. 37 Mich. 342; Hunter v. Mc Hose, 100 Pa. 38, 41; R. R. Co. v. Marcott, 41 Mich. 433; R. Co. v. Stark, 38 Mich. 714; R. Co. v. Robinson, 106 Ill. 142; East St. Louis Packing, etc. Co. v. Hightower, 92 Ill. 140. The plaintiff is bound by his pleading and cannot enlarge the issue. The rule is "That if the pleader, though needlessly, describe the tort and the means effecting it, with minuteness and particularity, and the proof substantially vary from the statement, there will be a fatal variance which will occasion a nonsuit." 1 Chitty, Pl. 15th Am.. ed. p. 362; Bloomington v. Goodrich, 88 Ill. 558. Plaintiff's right of recovery must be confined to the particular negligence charged in the declaration. R. R. Co. v. Mock, 72 Ill. 141; R. R. Co. v. Robinson, 106 Ill. 142; R. R. Co. v. McKee, 43 Ill. 119. An allegation in a petition that a railway company carelessly, negligently, wrongfully and unlawfully ran its car over and killed the plaintiff's intestate does not amount to an allegation that the carelessness and negligence were willful; and the recovery must be contined to compensatory damages only. Jacobs v. R. R. Co. 10 Bush (Ky.) 263; Robinson v. Stokely, 3 Watts, 270; Stanfield v. Phillips, 78 Pa. 73; Johnson v. C. P. R. Co. 51 Iowa, 25. "Unlawfully" states only a conclusion of law and is mere surplusage. R. R. Co. v. Dodge, 72 Ill. 253; Kilgore v. Furgeson, 77 Ill. 213; People v. Village of Crotty, 93 III. 180. In some of the States, as in New Hampshire, exemplary damages, ultra compensation, are denied, changing the rule previously existing in that State. Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342. Where there has been no oppression, fraud, wantonness or other circumstance to call for exemplary damages, these large verdicts are a violation of the rule of compensation. Nagle v. Mullison, 34 Pa. 48; P. R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. 372; R. R. Co. v. Schwindling, 101 Pa. 258; Cutler v. Smith, 57 Ill. 252; Pullman Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill, 125; R. Co. v. Beggs, 85 Ill. 80. Unless the injury has been wantonly inflicted, exemplary damages cannot be given and the jury must be confined to damages strictly compensatory. R. R. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339. The act complained of must be the prox imate and not the remote cause of the injury, to entitle the injured party to recover. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 353; Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. 171; R. R. Co. v. Keighron, 74 Pa. 316; Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 90; McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436; Hoag v. R. R. Co. 85 Pa. 293; Ryan v. R. R. Co. 35 N. Y. 210; R. Co. v. Valleley, 32 Ohio, 345; Henry v. R. Co. 76 Mo. 288. If this conductor or any other, on a prior occasion, in violation of the rules of the Company and in neglect of duty, allowed the plaintiff or anyone else to ride on this train without being provided with the proper ticket, it gives to the plaintiff no rights, and cannot be made available by the court or jury to justify the conduct of the plaintiff or establish his right to recover against the Company. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 40 Miss. 45; R. R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374. Messrs. S. A. Davenport, G. A. Allen and J. Ross Thompson, for defendant in error: |