defendant's wife, for the purpose of being communicated by her to her husband. The court held that there was evidence in this case to go to the jury of the defendant's knowledge of the character of his dog. In Baldwin v. Cassella, 41 Law J. Rep. N. S. Exch. 167, the guilty dog was kept at the stables of the defendant, under the care and control of the defendant's coachman; the defendant supposed the dog to be harmless, but the coachman knew that the dog was of a mischievous nature. The court held that knowledge on the part of such a servant was enough to fix his master's liability. Last week, in the case of Appleby v. Percy, in the Court of Common Pleas, the defendant was a licensed victualler, and kept the dog which bit the plaintiff on the premises where the defendant carried on business. On two former occasions the dog had flown at customers, who had complained of its conduct to the waiters at the bar of the public-house. The question for the court was whether these complaints were sufficient to prove the defendant's knowledge of the character of the dog. At nisi prius, Mr. Justice Honyman had directed a nonsuit, and this ruling was upheld by Mr. Justice Brett. On the other hand, Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Keating thought that there was evidence of the scienter to go to the jury. Thus we find that, after repeated discussions in courts of law, eminent judges are at variance upon what seems to be a very simple point, and so we are induced to suppose that this difference of judicial opinion is rather the result of external causes than of the intrinsic difficulty of the matter itself. The fact is, that the injustice of a law which refuses to a plaintiff a remedy for a wrong unless he can show that somebody else has previously been the victim of a similar wrong, insensibly inclines the minds of judges to relax the rule. Surely the time has arrived when the legislature should be asked to class human beings with cattle and sheep, and to protect "person" to the same extent as it does "property." By 28 and 59 Vict., chap. 60, the owner of every dog is liable in damages for injury done to any cattle (including horses, Wright v. Pearson, 38 L. J. Rep. N. S., Q. B. 312) or sheep by his dog, and it is not necessary for the party seeking such damages to prove a previous mischievous

propensity in such dog, or the owner's knowledge of such previous propensity. No one has ever attempted to show that this Act has been burdensome or unfair to owners of dogs; and, if we may judge from the rarity of actions under this statute, the effect of it has been to induce owners of dogs of doubtful character to put an end to the possibility of the dogs doing harm. If the Act were extended in the way we have suggested, all dogs of a spiteful, snapping or biting disposition would either be kept under the control of collar and chain, or be deemed to be no longer worth the animal tax. The indignant words of the Lord Chief Justice, uttered on Monday last in the case of Hockaday v. Wheeler

"What business had a man to keep a savage brute like this? he might as well keep a lion"-would then acquire real potency. As it is, people seem to be utterly indifferent as to the safety of their neighbours; and whenever a plaintiff seeks damages for the bite of a dog, the defendant strains every nerve to prove that, while the whole neighborhood knew the dog to be an awkward customer, the defendant supposed the dog to be as harmless as a lamb. Meanwhile, lawyers are frightened by mad dogs in Fleet Street, while in Westminster Hall almost as much confusion is created by eminent judges differing on the simplest and most threadbare question known to the law.-Law Journal.

In Leonard v. Stover the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has recently decided that the owner of a building with a roof so constructed that snow and ice collecting on it from natural causes will naturally and probably fall into the adjoining highway, is not liable to a person injured by such a fall upon him, while travelling upon the highway, provided the entire building is at the time let to a tenant who has covenanted to make "all needful and proper repairs, internal and external." The same court decided in Shepley v. Fifty Associates, 101 Mass. 251;

3 Am. Rep. 346 and 106 Mass. 194; 8 Am. Rep. 318, that if the owner of the building has control of the roof he is liable.-Albany Law Journal.

CCDIFICATION OF THE LAW OF

NATIONS.

Since our last issue we have received the Continental Herald, containing the first day's proceedings of the International Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations. Among the members present from the United States were: Mr. David Dudley Field, Hon. Charles P. Daly, Judge Peabody, Dr. J. B. Thompson and Dr. Miles; while from England and Continental Europe were present a number of well-known publicists; and even Japan had one representative. The members of the Association were welcomed by the President of the Conseil d'Etat in a very admirable little speech, which was responded to by Mr. Field, the President of the Association. Aside from the report of the secretary, there was little done beside a considerable, apparently, desultory talk. A goodly amount of solid work was however planned for the session, and we hope it was accomplished, for however sceptical we may be about the attainment of the ultimate object in view, there can be no doubt that the two associations, whose meetings have been held this year at Geneva, are doing a good work. As was said by M. Carteret, the Cantonal President: "Whatever difficulties there may be in drawing up a good code of International Law, and above all in securing its vitality and advancement, there is room to entertain legitimate hopes in this respect. From every quarter there is something of this sort expected, and-sign of approaching moral conquestsfrom different quarters and under divers forms, individual or collective efforts are being made at the present moment tending in the same direction: that is to say, that law should replace force in international relationships." Albany Law Journal.

[Elec. Case.

Sub-agents. When a large and general authority is given to an agent, the candidate will be held responsible for the acts of sub-agents of such person. Corrupt practices.· Rule when there appears to have been general corruption, or only isolated cases of bribery.--Money given to sub-agents to expend without accompanying directions.--Colourable purchases. Colourable charity and liberality.- Loans of money.-Hiring conveyances to take voters to poll.

Costs. Costs should follow event, although the personal charges against the respondent fail, unless put in wantonly, or unless expense of trial has been thereby increased.

[CORNWALL, Sept. 3-7, 1874.-SPRAGGE, C.]

The petition contained the usual charges, but the seat was not claimed by the petitioner, who was the unsuccessful candidate. The case was tried at Cornwall before the Chancellor.

James Bethune and McIntyre appeared for the petitioner.

Harrison, Q. C., D. B. Maclennan and H. S. Macdonald, for the respondent.

SPRAGGE, C.-The enquiry divided itself into two branches. 1st. That relating to the question of agency. 2nd. That relating to the commission of corrupt practices.

With reference to the question of agency, the contention of the Counsel for the respondent, that what was known as the

Common Law of Parliament does not apply to elections to the House of Commons, can not, in my opinion, be supported. It would be more accurate to refer to this law as the Common Law of England relating to Parliamentary elections, and in the absence of any expressed intention to the contrary, it must be held to come within the Provincial enactments introducing generally the Common Law of England. Reg. v. Gamble & Boulton, 9 U. C. Q. B. 546, is an authority in support of this view.

The law of agency as regards Parliamentary elections is not the ordinary law of agency, but a special law. The usual rule is, that where an agent acts contrary to his instructions, the principal is not bound; but in Parliamentary agency it is different, for there the principal is liable for all acts of the agent whatsoever, even though they be done contrary to his express instructions. (His Lordship referred to the remarks of Blackburn, J., in the Bewdley Case, 1 O'M. & H. 16.)

As to the evidence of agency, mere canvassing of itself does not prove agency, but it tends to prove it. An act, however trifling in itself, may be evidence of agency,-and a number of acts, no one of which might in itself be conclusive evidence, may together amount to proof. It is hardly necessary to observe that an agent need not be a paid agent.

In this case Mr. D. B. Maclennan was an agent for whose acts the respondent was responsible. Mr. Maclennan was instrumental in overcoming the reluctance of the respondent to become a candidate. He acted with the respondent in various matters connected with the election; went to the factories at Cornwall with him; canvassed part of the town; went to the meetings at St. Andrews with the respondent; held meetings for the promotion of the election at his office, at which the respondent personally attended. It was a clear case of agency. Even two or three of these circumstances alone, perhaps even one, without the others, would establish agency clearly. There was no authority from the respondent to Maclennan to corrupt the constituency, but there was no necessity for this authority in order to render the respondent liable for corrupt acts done by Maclennan.

The entrusting of large sums of money, as has been done in some cases in England, is only one of the modes of appointing a chief agent, and is not essential to such appointment.

Henry Sandfield Macdonald must also be considered as an agent of the respondent. He canvassed the township with the approbation of

[Elec. Case.

the respondent. through the township and introduced him to voters, and he did not on these occasions accom. pany the respondent as a mere driver, for the respondent on two or three occasions waited for his convenience, showing that his personal attendance was considered desirable. He took so active a part in the election that he considered himself justified in calling the meetings at St. Andrews. At the first meeting he suggested to those present what should be done to further the election; at the second he examined the results of the canvass. The evidence of agency was very cogent.

He drove the respondent

I think the general authority given to D. B: Maclennan and H. Sandfield Macdonald empowered them to employ sub-agents, for whose acts the respondent would be liable in like manner as for their own acts.

Besides Mr. D. B. Maclennan and Mr. Henry Sandfield Macdonald, the sub-agents appointed by them, and those who were appointed canvassers at the meetings in St. Andrews and in town must also be considered agents for whom the respondent is answerable.

With reference to the first meeting at St. Andrews, it has been said that it was not regularly convened. Certainly there was less regularity and formality about its calling than is usual in such cases. But this regularity or formality is by no means necessary. If the meeting assembles, and has the sanction of the candidate, this is sufficient to render the candidate liable for its acts, and those of agents appointed by it. The object of the meetings at St. Andrews was to secure a canvass of the township, not merely to discuss election matters.

Where the number of those present at meeting is very large, that is a reason why all present should not be considered as being appointed agents. It is clear in this case that the whole 150 or 200 present at the meeting were not appointed agents; certain of them only were requested to canvass their neighbourhoods, and, to use the words of a witness, "to interest themselves in the election." It is these persons alone who can be considered as agents. It is immaterial whether a committee be formally or informally appointed. It is sufficient if certain duties be assigned to its members and the candidate sanction this assignment of duties. Here the respondent drove out to the meetings with Mr. D. B. Maclennan, one of his chief agents. He was present during the meetings, and was there undoubtedly to further his own election. He cannot be considered as a mere spectator. Being present

at the meetings, he must be presumed to have been cognizant of all that was done, and therefore must be considered as having acquiesced in all that was done. Even if the respondent had not been present himself, the presence of his chief agents, Maclennan and Henry Sandfield Macdonald, would have rendered him liable for the action of the meeting. We must not look at the form but at the substance of what took place. And I think that the canvassers appointed at the St. Andrews meetings must be considered as agents for whom the respondent is responsible. The Westminster Case, 1 O'M. & H., 89, and the Wigan Case, ib., 188, do not apply. In those cases the associations were without doubt voluntary.

As to the meetings at Maclennan & Macdonald's office in Cornwall, the persons who attended those meetings must be deemed agents of the respondent. These persons examined the voters' lists, appointed canvassers, and received reports of his canvass. The usual formalities, as to calling together the meetings, and the transaction of business, appear to have been observed, but this was unnecessary. The respondent acquiesced in the acts done. (His Lordship here read the remarks of Blackburn, J., on the definitions of agency in the Taunton Case, i O'M. & H., 185-6; also the remarks of Willes J., as to the responsibility of a candidate for the acts of his agents in the Coventry Case, ib., 107.)

As to the second branch of the case, namely, that relating to the commission of corrupt practices, these consist principally of acts of bribery. Bribery is not confined to the actual giving of money. Being an unlawful act, it is to be expected that attempts will be made to conceal it from the light of day. The Courts, therefore, have always examined the various acts connected with the transac tion, to see whether there is a corrupt motive. Where a grossly inadequate price has been paid for work, or for an article, it is clearly bribery. And in the present case several instances of such bribery occur. In considering the question of corrupt practices as affecting any particular election, we should also examine the whole evidence carefully to ascertain the mode and spirit in which the election contest has been carried on; whether it has been on the whole pure and free from corruption, or whether there has been a general laxity of principle and evident disregard of the law. When the corrupt acts are isolated much greater strictness of proof will be required.

One thing that strikes me in this case is the large sum expended by the two chief agents of

[Elec. Case.

the respondent, a sum averaging about $3 a head for the votes polled for the respondent.

Large amounts were also paid without any express directions as to their application, amounts which would not be required for any legitimate use. In the case of Donald Miles McMillan, for example, the words used upon the money being handed to him were "Here, you may require it." If this money were applied improperly, it must be considered that it was intended so to be applied.

Again, when Henry Sandfield Macdonald, having "heard that the North West Corner was corrupt," gave $140 or $150 to George McDonald, of Molinette, to expend there without any directions as to the mode of expenditure, the only inference must be that it was to be expended in order to corrupt. This inference is supported by the statement of George McDonald, who, on being asked why he accepted the money, replied that he was appre hensive "that the other side were going to bribe," which implies that he considered his side should do so as well.

There were many similar cases in which considerable sums of money were paid without directions as to the application, but it is unnecessary to dwell upon these further than for the purpose of showing the general spirit in which the contest was carried on on behalf of the respondent. In the case of Gilbert Runnions bribery with the knowledge and consent of Henry Sandfield Macdonald, one of the chief agents of the respondent, is proved.

Henry Sandfield Macdonald, when he handed the money to George McDonald, named Runnions as a person to whom money should be given. And the money was paid to Runnions by G. McDonald, as Runnions admits. This is the same as if H. S. Macdonald gave it himself.

The evidence of George McDonald and that of Runnions differs as to the amount paid, but this is immaterial—money was paid.

In other cases Henry Sandfield Macdonald left the giving of the money to George McDonald "on discretion." This was a direct appointment of George McDonald as agent. And in exercise of this discretion, George McDonald bribed Cannon and the two Worleys.

The payments by Donald Miles McMillan to the Clines and to Murray are other instances of bribery. In the case of the Clines, McMillan paid money to them, or as he afterwards says to one of them, nominally for the purchase of oats, but at the time of the alleged purchase no quantity of oats was named, no time for deli

very was specified, no receipt for the money was taken, and no oats have as a matter of fact been delivered; the alleged purchase was undoubtedly a mere colourable proceeding. The fact that the Clines and Murray declared their intention to vote for the respondent does not affect the case.

Again, the payment of $10 to Alguire by Henry Sandfield Macdonald falls within the rule of inordinate and excessive payment. Where $4 or $5 would have been sufficient, the excess must be considered as given for some other purpose, which purpose was corrupt."

66

66

The payment of $50 to the Rev. Mr. Smith, I think, falls within the rule as to colourable charity," or "colourable liberality," referred to in the cases, and was therefore given with a corrupt motive.

With reference to the loans of small sums to various persons, we must of course take into consideration that the firm of Maclennan & Macdonald was in the habit of lending small sums. But the lending of various sums amounting to $210 at 6 per cent., is certainly suspicious, since it is admitted by Mr. Macdonald that the current rate was 8 per cent., and no reason is given why 6 per cent. only was asked. I think the reasonable inference must be that the loans were made with a view to the election. It is not necessary, however, to lay much stress upon these transactions.

The loan of $150 to Depuis is very clearly a case of bribery by Duncan G. McDonald, a subagent. The loan was for two years, without interest, a note being given to secure re-payment. The note was originally drawn payable with interest, but this was changed. Depuis says in his evidence that McDonald 66 got nothing but my vote for the money." Is not this a stipulation that Depuis should have the loan without interest if he would vote? Was it not a present of the two years' interest?

Again, Morrisette was an active agent. He attended the meetings at Maclennan & Macdonald's office in Cornwall. He examined the voters' lists. He had $140 entrusted to him. As to the disposition of this money he gives a very confused account, but the promise of $15 to Fitzpatrick's daughter was clearly an offer of a bribe. He said he would give the money if she got her father to vote, and the offer of a bribe is equivalent to a bribe, although it requires clearer and stronger evidence to support it.

The payment of money by Wood to Aaron Walsh was also illegal. Here the note endorsed by Walsh was paid by him 25 years ago.

[Elec. Case.

He considered the payment a hardship, but he does not deny his liability. The fact that the money paid by Wood was not furnished by the respondent or either of his chief agents, makes no difference. The endeavour by Wood to restore friendship was undoubtedly done to influence the vote.

In the case of Alexander McDonald, the exercise of forbearance in pressing the judgment in the hands of Maclennan & Macdonald was evidently with the view of influencing the vote.

These cases of bribery are sufficient to render the election of the respondent void, and I shall only make a few remarks on the other circumstances disclosed in evidence.

The treatment of Heath was a gross wrong, and one of those stratagems inexplicable to right thinking men. The case of Charles Mullins was also a very gross case. A stratagem was used in inducing him to get into the sleigh driven by Grant, and in spite of his remon strances he was driven into the country and thereby prevented from voting. I consider the conduct of Donald McMillan, a justice of the peace, who was present, and knew that an outrage was about to be committed, and yet did not interfere, as deserving of the strongest cenThe case is as gross a one as can well be conceived.

sure.

As to the hiring of the special train, I think there was no personal impropriety in the case. A mere hiring of a conveyance to carry voters is not an act wrong in itself, and would not be so at all but for the express provisions of the law. And I am inclined to think that the hiring in this instance does not fall within the meaning of the law, and that it is the same as the case of one sending his own carriage.

I am not required in this case to say whether the corruption was so general as that the election should on that account be set aside, but an election may undoubtedly be void on that ground: Bradford Case, 1 O'M. & H. 40.

I exonerate the respondent personally from any complicity in the corrupt acts committed, but I think that it is my duty to say that I can scarcely conceive that Mr. D. B. Maclennan and Mr. H. S. Macdonald would have acted in the manner in which they appear to have acted at this election if they had appreciated the gravity of the acts committed by them.

My judgment, therefore, is that the election is void. Costs to be paid by the respondent. I do not think that the fact that the personal charges against the respondent have failed should alter the usual rule that costs follow the event. The expense of the trial has not