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have absconded. The reputed father is liable to arrest and imprisonment, until he gives security to indemnify the town chargeable with the maintenance of the child. These provisions are intended for the public indemnity, and were borrowed from the several English statutes on the subject; and similar regulations to coerce the putative father to maintain the child, and indemnify the town or parish, have been adopted in the several states.

The father of a bastard child is liable upon his implied contract, for its necessary maintenance, without any compulsory order being made upon him, provided he has adopted the child as his own, and acquiesced in any particular disposition of it. The adoption must be voluntary, and with the consent of the mother, for the putative father has no legal right to the custody of a bastard child, in opposition to the claim of the mother; and, except the cases of the intervention of the town officers, under the statute provisions, or under the implied contract founded on the adoption of the child, the mother has no power to compel the putative father to support the child. She has a right to the custody and control of it as against the putative father, and is bound to maintain it as its natural guardian; though, perhaps, the putative father might assert a right to the custody of the child as against a stranger.d

There are cases in which the courts of equity have regarded bastards as having strong claims to equitable protection, and have decreed a specific performance of voluntary settlements made by the father in favour of the mother of her natural child. On the other hand, there are cases in

a Laws of N. Y. sess. 36. ch. 12.

b Hesketh v. Gowing, 5 Esp. N. P. Rep. 131.

c The King v. Soper, 5 Term Rep. 278. The People v. Landt, 2 Johns. Rep. 375. Carpenter v. Whitman, 15 Johns. Rep. 208. Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. Rep. 109.

d Rex v. Cornforth, Str. 1162.

e Marchioness of Annandale v. Harris, 2 P. Wms. 432. Horten v. Gibson, 4 S. Car. Equity Rep. 139. Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch Rep. 338,

which the courts of equity have withheld from the illegiti mate child every favourable intendment which the lawful heir would have been entitled to as of course. Thus, in Fursaker v. Robinson,a a natural daughter brought her bill against the heir at law to supply a defective conveyance from her father to her, but the Chancellor refused to assist her, on the ground that she was a mere stranger, being nullius filia, and not taken notice of by the law as a daughter, and that the father was not under any legal obligation to provide for her as a child, though he might be obliged by the law of nature, and so the conveyance was voluntary, and without any consideration. This hard decision was made by Lord Cowper in 1717; but the fanguage of Lord Ch. King, in a subsequent case, to which I have just alluded, is certainly much more conformable to justice and humanity. "If a man says he, "does fa mislead an innocent woman, it is both reason and justice that he should make her reparation. The case is stronger in respect to the innocent child, whom the father has occasioned to be brought into the world in this shameful mauner, and for whom, in justice, he ought to provide."

a Prec. in Ch. 475. 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 123. pl. 9. Gilb. Eq. Rep. 139. Gilb. F. R. 256.

2 P. Wms. 432:

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can be of a daughter, whose heirship is presumptive, and not apparent. But as all the children, male and female, equally inherit with us the guardianship by nature would seem to extend to all the children. The Court of Chancery, for just cause, may interpose and control that authority and discretion which the father has in general in the education and management of his child."

(2.) Guardian by nurture occurs only when the infant is without any other guardian, and it belongs exclusively to the parents, first to the father, and then to the mother. It extends only to the person, and determines when the infant arrives at the age of fourteen, m the case both of males and females. As it is concurrent with guardianship by nature, it is in effect merged in the higher and more durable title of guardian by nature. This guardianship is said to apply only to the younger children, who are not heirs apparent; and as all the children inherit equally under our laws, it would seem that this species of guardianship has become obsolete.

(3.) Guardian in socage, has the custody of the infant's lands, as well as his person The common law gave this guardianship to the next of blood to the child, to whom the inheritance could not possibly descend; and therefore, if the land descended to the heir on the part of the father, the mother, or other next relation on the part of the mother, had the wardship; and so if the land descended to the heir on the part of the mother, the father, or his next of blood, had the wardship.d These guardians in socage cease, when the child arrives at the age of fourteen years, for he is then entitled to elect his own guardian, and oust the guardian in socage, and they are then accountable to the heir for the rents and profits of the estate. If the infant, at that age, does not elect

a 2 Fonb. Tr. of Equity, 234. note.

b 3 Co. 38. b. Harg. note 67, to lib. 2 Co. Litt. Com. Dig. tit. Guardian, D.

e Com, Dig. tit. Guardian, B,

d Litt. sect. 123.

• Ibid.

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